Lecture 8 Nuclear Weapons Flashcards
Bernard Brodie
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki:
“Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.“ – The Absolute Weapon
Waltz background
Because of lowering barriers to access of nuclear technology and a number of other factors, it is likely that a number of small and medium sized states will gain nuclear weapons in the near future.
The question: What impact will this have on international relations?
His argument: “More may be better.”
Why is more better?
“Nuclear weapons improve the prospects for peace.” “Decreases the probability of war.”
How is more better?
Decreases benefits of war
Increases costs of war
Takes away incentive to fight for territory
Favors defender thereby inhibiting war
Takes away uncertainty about relative capabilities
How do nuclear weapons decrease benefits of war?
- Large victories become unlikely because they invite nuclear retaliation.
- States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains.
How do nuclear weapons increase costs of war?
-”presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious…. Why fight when you could lose everything?”
How do nuclear weapons take away incentive to fight for territory?
-states have often fought over territory (Golan Heights, Alsace-Lorraine) that is important for their security.
Presence of nuclear weapons makes that territory less strategically important.
How do nuclear weapons favor defender thereby inhibiting war?
-States defending their own territory are more willing to use nuclear weapons than states attacking. This makes it less likely that an attack will occur.
How do nuclear weapons take away uncertainty about relative capabilities?
-Wars can happen due to incomplete information or uncertainty about relative capabilities. However, in a nuclear war “suffering may be unlimited,”(resolve becomes irrelevant) and the uncertainty is about “surviving or being annihilated.”
Waltz argument and the bargaining framework
What does the introduction of nuclear weapons do to the costs of war for each side?
To estimates about resolve?
To the incentive to misrepresent?
To the ideal points and the good that is being bargained over?
Counterarguments to Waltz
1) There are crazies out there
2) A state could feel the urge to take out the other state’s nuclear weapons when there are still few enough for this to be feasible
3) Will a smaller state carry out a nuclear attack in response to a military strike on say, the US, even when it is total suicide?
WCA1
There are crazies out there
- However, the building of nuclear weapons presupposes a certain level of stability.
- Moreover, due to the nature of the international system (anarchy), possession of nuclear weapons makes rulers modest, cautious, and prudent with regards to decisions that could have devastating effects on them, their regime, and their country.
- A state could hope to fire a nuke and remain unidentified but he “could not be certain” that would be the case.
WCA 2
A state could feel the urge to take out the other’s states nuclear weapons when there are still few enough for this to be feasible (preemptive or preventive attack).
- However, modern nuclear weapons fairly small, light, easy to move and easy to hide.
- This means that a state attempting to take out another state’s nuclear arsenal, even though it may be modest in size (say 10 or so), cannot be sure that it can get each one in an attack.
- Remember, with nuclear weapons, all you need is the uncertainty that you may not be able to get all of them. You could get all of them, but you might not.
WCA 3
Will a smaller state carry out a nuclear attack in response to a military strike on say, the US, even when it is total suicide?
- Perhaps not, but are you sure? Can you be certain about this?
Waltz on Iran
Why Iran should get the bomb
