Lecture 7: Defending Intentional Explanation Flashcards
intentional realism
intentionally characterized psychological states both exist and can be legitimately cited in explaining and/or predicting at least some of the behaviour of things with minds
Three kinds of causal relationships which FP posits for mental states:
- MS is caused by impinging environmental events
- MS contributes to the causation of behaviour
- MS causes/is caused by other mental states
Churchland on the 3 kinds of causal relationships
there are no states that satisfy these three conditions
Fodor on the 3 kinds of causal relationships
we should anticipate that a completed science will include states having these features, although we shouldn’t expect them to be type-identical
Fodor’s aim
vindicate folk psychology
what is the main obstacle for Fodor?
explaining how states type-individuated in terms of their intentional contents can play the relevant causal roles
how does Fodor think we can overcome this obstacle?
we can overcome this obstacle if we modify the view in light of contemporary work in AI. This gives us the computational theory of the mind
Fodor on mental processes
mental states and processes are computational
Fodor on computational processes
computational processes are both symbolic and formal
how are computational processes symbolic?
They are symbolic in that the states over which they are defined are representations. This is just the representational theory of the mind
how are computational processes formal?
They are formal in that they operate upon representations solely by virtue of their formal properties
mentalese
Fodor’s language of thought
what is required to vindicate folk psychology?
a constraint on the individuation of psychological state types, called the formality condition
the formality condition
If the types posited by the computational theory of mind are to be beliefs/desires, etc., then the mental representations can differ in content only when they differ in shape
how does Fodor identify the formality condition?
with a kind of methodological solipsism as a research strategy in contemporary cognitive science
methodological solipsism
Only the features of representations directly given to the mind can be considered when categorizing mental states for psychological explanation.
solipsism
the idea that we can only know about our existence and our states
methodological
a principle for taxonomizing in cognitive psychology
methodological individualism
- a more general principle for taxonomizing in science
- Casual powers come from the bottom-up
- Common in the philosophy of social science
Dennett and Putnam on computational psychology
Both Dennett and Putnam argue that it is very unlikely that mental states, intentionally individuated will correspond to the causally efficacious states posited by computational psychology
Searle’s response to Fodor’s project
Searle proposes the Chinese Room TE to challenge Fodor’s project of vindicating folk psychology
what position does Searle target?
strong AI
weak AI
we can use computers to formulate and test hypotheses about the functional organization of the mind
strong AI
the appropriately programmed computer is a mind in the sense that computers, given the right programs, can be said to understand and have other cognitive states
Searle’s Chinese room TE
- Imagine a person in a Chinese Room who performs analogous computational operations on symbols to those performed by the computer, where this is a matter of manipulating them in virtue of their formal properties
- What the person in the Chinese Room can do is answer questions in Chinese about what happens in stories also in Chinese
- The person in the Chinese Room can also do this by following instructions in English for performing operations on the Chinese symbols, as inputs and outputs, purely by their shapes or formal properties
- But, Searle claims the person in the Chinese Room doesn’t understand the relevant utterances in Chinese and doesn’t have the intentional states of a Chinese speaker
the systems objection
The person in the Chinese Room is part of a system involving rules, data banks, etc. It is the entire system that understands Chinese
Searle’s response to the systems objection
Suppose the individual internalizes all of the other elements of the system. We now get the same inputs and outputs as in the original TE, but we still have no understanding of Chinese
the robot objection
what is missing is an appropriate causal connection between the inputs and outputs to the divide and the outside world
Searle’s response to the robot objection
it won’t help to link the person in the CR to the world in certain ways. This still won’t justify ascribing to him an understanding of Chinese. We could put Searle himself inside the robot in place of the computer program
Fodor’s response to the robot objection
what we need is the right kind of causal linkages to the world, although we are not yet able to identify what these are
what two claims does Fodor see Searle as confusing?
- The brain performs formal operations on symbols
- The brain performs operations on formal (uninterpreted) symbols
Searle’s response to Fodor
the only kinds of causal links that will do the tricks are those that generate intentionality and this is a matter of the particular physical processes involved, not of the sort of computational capacities a system processes
similarities between Dennett, Fodor, and Searle
- We can’t do without mentalistic talk
- We have to explain the place of intentionality in our general scientific picture of the world and account for the explanatory successes of FP
what two positions does Dennett distinguish?
realism & interpretationism
realism
A believes that p is just in case A is in a particular internal state
interpretationism
ascriptions of beliefs are, in some sense, simply a function of the interpretive activities of interpreters, and will vary according to the interests of those interpreters
what position does Dennett advocate for?
mild realism
how does Dennett side with the realist?
He sides with the realist in claiming that belief ascriptions represent certain objective states concerning the cognitive agents to whom beliefs are ascribed
how does Dennett side with the interpretationist?
He sides with the intepretationist in holding that beliefs can be discerned and individuated only relative to the interpretative endeavours of one who adopts a particular kind of predictive strategy
4 types of predictive strategies you could adopt:
the astrological, physical, design, and intentional stances
the astrological stance
- Determine the date and hour of my birth
- Apply an astrological algorithm
the physical stance
- Determine the physical constitution of the system (me) and the physical impingements on it between now and the time at which you ask for the “K”
- Predict my behaviour by appealing to the laws of physics
the design stance
- Ignore the details of the physical constitution of the system (me)
- Assume that I have been designed to behave in certain ways
- Predict that I will behave in the way that I have been designed to behave under the circumstances in question
the intentional stance
- Assume that the system (me) is a rational agent and does what it ought to do in given circumstances
- Predict that I will do what it would be rational for me to do
what is needed to adopt the intentional stance?
Dennett argues that to adopt the intentional stance for x, we must assume that x is a rational agent and attribute intentional states to x based on certain general properties
the assumption of instrumental rationality
the rule that a rational agent has the beliefs and desires that it ought to have, given its interests, history, and place in the world
instrumental rationality and desires and rationality
Start with the highest, or most basic desires of people: survival, absence of pain, food, comfort, procreation, entertainment, etc.
how to know if a system is an intentional system/ true believer?
- Any system whose behaviour is well-predicted by this strategy (where it improves our predictive abilities) is an intentional system
- To be a true believer that genuinely has beliefs is just to be an intentional system
appropriate functional states
beliefs, desires, etc. that are causally responsible for the behaviour
strong realism
there is a fact of the matter as to what S believes, even here
milder realism
there is no fact of the matter in such cases
two answers to “Why does the IS work as well as it does?”
Because the intentional system in question is well-designed
Because the intentional system in question has this particular actual design
what does Dennett think about those who think that it is obvious that the language of thought is correct
that they are confusing two empirical claims:
- The intentional stance description yields objective real patterns in the world. This is established beyond skepticism
- This real pattern is produced by another real pattern roughly isomorphic to it within the brains of intelligent creatures
combinatorial explosion
as the behavioural capabilities of a system increase, the increase in the required internal complexity of the system increases by orders of magnitude
illata
posited theoretical entities
abstracta
calculation bound entities or logical constructs
what does Dennett conclude from the problem of combinatorial explosion?
Dennett takes this to show that the concept of belief as it figures in FP is unappealing as a scientific concept
Dennett’s proposal
split up the two roles and make them the subject of two new scientific theories
what are Dennett’s two scientific theories?
intentional system theory & sub-personal cognitive psychology
intentional system theory
- This is analogous to decision theory and game theory, which are also abstract, normative, and couched in intentional language
- As in decision theory, we update the beliefs and desires of the system via procedural rules and information about inputs and outputs from the environment
which theory does belief-desire psychology fall under?
intentional system theory
Sub-personal cognitive psychology
Internal states will be genuine illata but will be characterized in terms of their content. This requires taking account of how the system interacts with its environment
what theory do causal states and processes fall under?
sub-personal cognitive psychology
people of China vs. Chinese room TE
- The people of China example was meant to show that having the same functional organization as a twm doesn’t constitute having the same qualitative mental states as that of a twm
- The Chinese Room TE is supposed to show that having the same computational capacity as a twm isn’t constitutive of having the intentional mental states and general cognitive capacities (ex. Understanding intentionality) of a twm
