Lecture 7: Defending Intentional Explanation

Question 1

intentional realism

Answer 1

intentionally characterized psychological states both exist and can be legitimately cited in explaining and/or predicting at least some of the behaviour of things with minds

Question 2

Three kinds of causal relationships which FP posits for mental states:

Answer 2

1. MS is caused by impinging environmental events
2. MS contributes to the causation of behaviour
3. MS causes/is caused by other mental states

Question 3

Churchland on the 3 kinds of causal relationships

Answer 3

there are no states that satisfy these three conditions

Question 4

Fodor on the 3 kinds of causal relationships

Answer 4

we should anticipate that a completed science will include states having these features, although we shouldn’t expect them to be type-identical

Question 5

Fodor’s aim

Answer 5

vindicate folk psychology

Question 6

what is the main obstacle for Fodor?

Answer 6

explaining how states type-individuated in terms of their intentional contents can play the relevant causal roles

Question 7

how does Fodor think we can overcome this obstacle?

Answer 7

we can overcome this obstacle if we modify the view in light of contemporary work in AI. This gives us the computational theory of the mind

Question 8

Fodor on mental processes

Answer 8

mental states and processes are computational

Question 9

Fodor on computational processes

Answer 9

computational processes are both symbolic and formal

Question 10

how are computational processes symbolic?

Answer 10

They are symbolic in that the states over which they are defined are representations. This is just the representational theory of the mind

Question 11

how are computational processes formal?

Answer 11

They are formal in that they operate upon representations solely by virtue of their formal properties

Question 12

mentalese

Answer 12

Fodor’s language of thought

Question 13

what is required to vindicate folk psychology?

Answer 13

a constraint on the individuation of psychological state types, called the formality condition

Question 14

the formality condition

Answer 14

If the types posited by the computational theory of mind are to be beliefs/desires, etc., then the mental representations can differ in content only when they differ in shape

Question 15

how does Fodor identify the formality condition?

Answer 15

with a kind of methodological solipsism as a research strategy in contemporary cognitive science

Question 16

methodological solipsism

Answer 16

Only the features of representations directly given to the mind can be considered when categorizing mental states for psychological explanation.

Question 17

solipsism

Answer 17

the idea that we can only know about our existence and our states

Question 18

methodological

Answer 18

a principle for taxonomizing in cognitive psychology

Question 19

methodological individualism

Answer 19

• a more general principle for taxonomizing in science
• Casual powers come from the bottom-up
• Common in the philosophy of social science

Question 20

Dennett and Putnam on computational psychology

Answer 20

Both Dennett and Putnam argue that it is very unlikely that mental states, intentionally individuated will correspond to the causally efficacious states posited by computational psychology

Question 21

Searle’s response to Fodor’s project

Answer 21

Searle proposes the Chinese Room TE to challenge Fodor’s project of vindicating folk psychology

Question 22

what position does Searle target?

Answer 22

strong AI

Question 23

weak AI

Answer 23

we can use computers to formulate and test hypotheses about the functional organization of the mind

Question 24

strong AI

Answer 24

the appropriately programmed computer is a mind in the sense that computers, given the right programs, can be said to understand and have other cognitive states

Question 25

Searle’s Chinese room TE

Answer 25

• Imagine a person in a Chinese Room who performs analogous computational operations on symbols to those performed by the computer, where this is a matter of manipulating them in virtue of their formal properties
• What the person in the Chinese Room can do is answer questions in Chinese about what happens in stories also in Chinese
• The person in the Chinese Room can also do this by following instructions in English for performing operations on the Chinese symbols, as inputs and outputs, purely by their shapes or formal properties
• But, Searle claims the person in the Chinese Room doesn’t understand the relevant utterances in Chinese and doesn’t have the intentional states of a Chinese speaker

Question 26

the systems objection

Answer 26

The person in the Chinese Room is part of a system involving rules, data banks, etc. It is the entire system that understands Chinese

Question 27

Searle’s response to the systems objection

Answer 27

Suppose the individual internalizes all of the other elements of the system. We now get the same inputs and outputs as in the original TE, but we still have no understanding of Chinese

Question 28

the robot objection

Answer 28

what is missing is an appropriate causal connection between the inputs and outputs to the divide and the outside world

Question 29

Searle’s response to the robot objection

Answer 29

it won’t help to link the person in the CR to the world in certain ways. This still won’t justify ascribing to him an understanding of Chinese. We could put Searle himself inside the robot in place of the computer program

Question 30

Fodor’s response to the robot objection

Answer 30

what we need is the right kind of causal linkages to the world, although we are not yet able to identify what these are

Question 31

what two claims does Fodor see Searle as confusing?

Answer 31

1. The brain performs formal operations on symbols
2. The brain performs operations on formal (uninterpreted) symbols

Question 32

Searle’s response to Fodor

Answer 32

the only kinds of causal links that will do the tricks are those that generate intentionality and this is a matter of the particular physical processes involved, not of the sort of computational capacities a system processes

Question 33

similarities between Dennett, Fodor, and Searle

Answer 33

• We can’t do without mentalistic talk
• We have to explain the place of intentionality in our general scientific picture of the world and account for the explanatory successes of FP

Question 34

what two positions does Dennett distinguish?

Answer 34

realism & interpretationism

Question 35

realism

Answer 35

A believes that p is just in case A is in a particular internal state

Question 36

interpretationism

Answer 36

ascriptions of beliefs are, in some sense, simply a function of the interpretive activities of interpreters, and will vary according to the interests of those interpreters

Question 37

what position does Dennett advocate for?

Answer 37

mild realism

Question 38

how does Dennett side with the realist?

Answer 38

He sides with the realist in claiming that belief ascriptions represent certain objective states concerning the cognitive agents to whom beliefs are ascribed

Question 39

how does Dennett side with the interpretationist?

Answer 39

He sides with the intepretationist in holding that beliefs can be discerned and individuated only relative to the interpretative endeavours of one who adopts a particular kind of predictive strategy

Question 40

4 types of predictive strategies you could adopt:

Answer 40

the astrological, physical, design, and intentional stances

Question 41

the astrological stance

Answer 41

• Determine the date and hour of my birth
• Apply an astrological algorithm

Question 42

the physical stance

Answer 42

• Determine the physical constitution of the system (me) and the physical impingements on it between now and the time at which you ask for the “K”
• Predict my behaviour by appealing to the laws of physics

Question 43

the design stance

Answer 43

• Ignore the details of the physical constitution of the system (me)
• Assume that I have been designed to behave in certain ways
• Predict that I will behave in the way that I have been designed to behave under the circumstances in question

Question 44

the intentional stance

Answer 44

• Assume that the system (me) is a rational agent and does what it ought to do in given circumstances
• Predict that I will do what it would be rational for me to do

Question 45

what is needed to adopt the intentional stance?

Answer 45

Dennett argues that to adopt the intentional stance for x, we must assume that x is a rational agent and attribute intentional states to x based on certain general properties

Question 46

the assumption of instrumental rationality

Answer 46

the rule that a rational agent has the beliefs and desires that it ought to have, given its interests, history, and place in the world

Question 47

instrumental rationality and desires and rationality

Answer 47

Start with the highest, or most basic desires of people: survival, absence of pain, food, comfort, procreation, entertainment, etc.

Question 48

how to know if a system is an intentional system/ true believer?

Answer 48

• Any system whose behaviour is well-predicted by this strategy (where it improves our predictive abilities) is an intentional system
• To be a true believer that genuinely has beliefs is just to be an intentional system

Question 49

appropriate functional states

Answer 49

beliefs, desires, etc. that are causally responsible for the behaviour

Question 50

strong realism

Answer 50

there is a fact of the matter as to what S believes, even here

Question 51

milder realism

Answer 51

there is no fact of the matter in such cases

Question 52

two answers to “Why does the IS work as well as it does?”

Answer 52

Because the intentional system in question is well-designed
Because the intentional system in question has this particular actual design

Question 53

what does Dennett think about those who think that it is obvious that the language of thought is correct

Answer 53

that they are confusing two empirical claims:

1. The intentional stance description yields objective real patterns in the world. This is established beyond skepticism
2. This real pattern is produced by another real pattern roughly isomorphic to it within the brains of intelligent creatures

Question 54

combinatorial explosion

Answer 54

as the behavioural capabilities of a system increase, the increase in the required internal complexity of the system increases by orders of magnitude

Question 55

illata

Answer 55

posited theoretical entities

Question 56

abstracta

Answer 56

calculation bound entities or logical constructs

Question 57

what does Dennett conclude from the problem of combinatorial explosion?

Answer 57

Dennett takes this to show that the concept of belief as it figures in FP is unappealing as a scientific concept

Question 58

Dennett’s proposal

Answer 58

split up the two roles and make them the subject of two new scientific theories

Question 59

what are Dennett’s two scientific theories?

Answer 59

intentional system theory & sub-personal cognitive psychology

Question 60

intentional system theory

Answer 60

• This is analogous to decision theory and game theory, which are also abstract, normative, and couched in intentional language
• As in decision theory, we update the beliefs and desires of the system via procedural rules and information about inputs and outputs from the environment

Question 61

which theory does belief-desire psychology fall under?

Answer 61

intentional system theory

Question 62

Sub-personal cognitive psychology

Answer 62

Internal states will be genuine illata but will be characterized in terms of their content. This requires taking account of how the system interacts with its environment

Question 63

what theory do causal states and processes fall under?

Answer 63

sub-personal cognitive psychology

Question 64

people of China vs. Chinese room TE

Answer 64

• The people of China example was meant to show that having the same functional organization as a twm doesn’t constitute having the same qualitative mental states as that of a twm
• The Chinese Room TE is supposed to show that having the same computational capacity as a twm isn’t constitutive of having the intentional mental states and general cognitive capacities (ex. Understanding intentionality) of a twm