Lecture 3: Logical Behaviourism

Question 1

category mistake

Answer 1

misconstrue the logical type of thing to which a particular linguistic expression refers → X refers to something in category A, but treat it as if it refers to something that is in category B: ask the wrong Q

Question 2

where is there a category mistake in Cartesian Dualism?

Answer 2

in a philosophical account of mental discourse

Question 3

what is Descartes’ category mistake?

Answer 3

thinking that our talk about minds is talking about unobservable internal stuff when it’s just talk about observable behaviour

Question 4

Ryle’s logical behaviourism

Answer 4

MD is talk about properties of observable behaviour, not inner causes of behaviour

Question 5

logical behaviourism on the ascription of intentional & qualitative states

Answer 5

Ascriptions of mental states (beliefs, desires, sensations) are ascriptions of multi-tracked dispositions to behave, expressed as a conjunction of conditionals

Question 6

logical behaviourism on intelligent behaviour

Answer 6

Talk of people acting intelligently, thoughtfully, or carefully, is not talk of some inner state or process guiding behaviour, but a more detailed description of the observable behaviour itself

Question 7

disposition

Answer 7

tendency to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances

Question 8

dispositional concept

Answer 8

if X were to happen, then Y would happen

Question 9

manifest dispositions

Answer 9

pattern in something’s behaviour, says nothing about the object’s inner states

Question 10

real dispositions

Answer 10

the makeup of something in virtue of which it would have specific manifest dispositions

Question 11

problems with logical behaviourism

Answer 11

1) Logical behaviourism cannot account for the explanatory functions of MD
2) Problems with formulating the proposed translations of MD
3) Putnam: general problems with LB

Question 12

Ryle’s response to the objection that LB cannot account for the explanatory function of MD

Answer 12

• it does explain MD by locating bits of behaviour in larger patterns of behaviour
• We must appeal to real dispositions to explain behaviour

Question 13

Problems with formulating the proposed translations of MD

Answer 13

Dispositions cannot give meaning to intentional state because they do not hold for every person

Question 14

Putnam’s general problem with LB

Answer 14

There is no conceptual link between being in an MS and being disposed to act in certain ways because we can ascribe an MS even with no disposition. We should focus on real dispositions, internal explanations

Question 15

Modified logical behaviourism

Answer 15

(1) analytic entailments between mind- and behaviour statements, (2) that may not translate but are considered to do so because behaviour-talk is more specific (pragmatic)

Question 16

why does modified logical behaviourism use analytic entailments?

Answer 16

We need criterion to learn what MS words mean because behaviour is the only accessible criterion

Question 17

why is even modified logical behaviourism unacceptable?

Answer 17

we would fail to ascribe pain to creatures that had it just because they had no behavioural disposition to show it

Question 18

x worlders thought experiment

Answer 18

• Super-stoics Mk1: inhibit non-verbal learned pain behaviour
• Super-stoics Mk2: inhibit non-verbal learned pain behaviour and unconditioned pain responses
• X-worlders: no learned/unlearned pain behaviour and inhibit verbal pain behaviour → we still ascribe pain to them (brain waves)

Question 19

what does the x-worlders thought experiment demonstrate?

Answer 19

why even modified logical behaviourism is unacceptable