Lecture 4: Identity Theory

Question 1

the main argument for identity theory

Answer 1

• Sensations are about inner causes of behaviour (agrees with CD, disagrees with LB)
• These inner causes are physical (disagrees with CD)
• These inner causes are identical to brain processes

Question 2

Smart’s understanding of the Cartesian Dualist argument

Answer 2

P1: When I make such a report, I must be reporting on something
P2: But there is nothing physical which I could be reporting since the after-image doesn’t enjoy determinant spatiotemporal existence
C1: So, I must be reporting on something non-physical
C2: so, sensations/qualitative states are non-physical and must be states of a CM

Question 3

Smart’s reason for rejecting Cartesian Dualism

Answer 3

• There is a flaw in P2 of the Dualist account
• Physical explanations follow Ockham’s razor (the simplest explanation is the most likely to be correct)

Question 4

redescription strategy

Answer 4

redescribing the correlated events in terms of their constituent or component elements or terms of the microscopic nature of a macroscopic entity. Then we appeal to further lawlike correlations of a more general nature

Question 5

why isn’t the redescription strategy available to the Dualist?

Answer 5

because it assumes we’re dealing with physical phenomena that can be described in more basic terms

Question 6

identification strategy

Answer 6

involves treating phenomena as two different ways of describing the same event

Question 7

why isn’t the Identification strategy available to the Dualist?

Answer 7

because they are committed to regarding mental states as non-physical

Question 8

what strategy does Smart propose we should use?

Answer 8

we should use the identification strategy to account for the apparent lawlike correlations between mental states and physical brain states

Question 9

what does the identification strategy involve for Smart?

Answer 9

viewing sensations as a sort of brain process

Question 10

Leibniz’s Law (The Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals)

Answer 10

if a and b are identical, then for all properties P, a has a property P if and only if b has a property P

Question 11

Objection 7 to identity theory (commits the same error as Swimburne)

Answer 11

P1: I can conceive of sensations occurring without brain activity.
P2: I cannot conceive of brain processes occurring without brain activity.
C: Sensations cannot be identical to brain processes.

Question 12

Objection 7 to identity theory as a violation of Leibniz’s Law

Answer 12

P1: Sensation(s) has the property of being conceivable by me as occurring in the absence of brain activity.
P2: Brain process (b) does not have the property of being conceivable by me as occurring in the absence of brain activity.
C: By LL, it is not the case that [sensation(s) = brain-process(b)].

Question 13

why is objection 7 a violation of Leibniz’s law?

Answer 13

the problem is that the truth of P2 depends on whether a is identical to b. If a is, then P2 is false

Question 14

objection 4 to identity theory

Answer 14

sensations and brain processes cannot be identical because they cannot possess all the same properties

Question 15

Smart’s response to objection 4

Answer 15

the objection misrepresents what the identity theorist is claiming. The objection assumes that the proposed identity is between the after-image and the brain process. It is the experience of an after-image that is to be identified with the BP. Once we correctly represent the IT, there is no categorical incompatibility between sensations and brain processes

Question 16

objection 5&6 to identity theory

Answer 16

attempts to reformulate the discernibility argument to apply the IT as clarified in response to objection 4

Question 17

Smart’s response to objection 5&6

Answer 17

Our current use of language simply reflects our dualist philosophical and scientific heritage. If we have scientific reasons to accept IT, then we can simply revise our opinion as to what it makes sense to say

Question 18

2 types of dualism

Answer 18

property & substance dualism

Question 19

substance dualism

Answer 19

there is mental and physical stuff

Question 20

example of substance dualism

Answer 20

Cartesian dualism

Question 21

property dualism

Answer 21

some physical things have properties that are not solely explicable in physical terms

Question 22

objection 3 to identity theory is ____

Answer 22

an argument for property dualism because some physical entities can have certain non-physical emergence properties

Question 23

objection 3 to identity theory

Answer 23

P1: X reports the occurrence of a yellowish-orange after-image experience.
P2: X must have noticed the occurrence of something to report this experience - i.e. to individuate the experience she is reporting.
P3: X must have noticed certain features of this something to individuate it.
P4: Often, what X notices is not a physical feature of this something - i.e. any particular neurophysiological feature.
C: What X notices must be a non-physical feature.

Question 24

emergence properties

Answer 24

properties that are not predictable based on the laws governing the physical properties from which they are emergent

Question 25

would Smart like the explanation of emergent properties?

Answer 25

no because we get the problem of nomological danglers

Question 26

nomological danglers

Answer 26

law-like correlations that can’t be easily accounted for by normal rules and laws

Question 27

Smart’s response to objection 3

Answer 27

the meaning of sensation-talk is neutral concerning issues dividing identity theories and their opponents

Question 28

objections to Smart’s response to objection 3

Answer 28

since in the case of the after-image, the likeness conditions are not satisfied, I must recognize what my current experience is like by appealing to its phenomenal properties

Question 29

Smart’s counter

Answer 29

we can report a likeness without any conscious awareness of what the likeness consists in

Question 30

Shaffer on the topic-neural sentence

Answer 30

• Critics of Smart, such as Shaffer, object that the topic-neutral sentence fails as a translation of first-person sensation reports because it doesn’t specify how one experience is like another
• Sensations are learned via inner ostention and individuated by reference to the particular phenomenal properties of the experience had under certain conditions, which topic-neutral sentences don’t account for

Question 31

inner ostention

Answer 31

referring to the experiences had under such stimulus conditions

Question 32

Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of a private language

Answer 32

Understanding the meaning of a linguistic expression requires grasping the criterion behind it, which is defined by the distinctive features of an experience. Without understanding this criterion, there cannot be a meaningful linguistic expression.

Question 33

logical behaviourist response to Wittgenstein

Answer 33

the criteria for sensation talk are given by certain observable patterns in behaviour

Question 34

Smart’s response to the logical behaviourist response to Wittgenstein

Answer 34

Smart rejects this option because it poses problems for the idea that first-person sensation statements are genuine reports

Question 35

Smart’s Topic Neutral Sentence Response

Answer 35

• First- and third-person sensation reports are claims about inner states
• The inner states, which turn out to be kinds of brain processes, are individuated by reference to their distinct causal roles in mediating between stimuli and behaviour
• Pain is ascribed based on certain observable patterns in behaviour and refers to whatever kind of inner state stands in the appropriate causal relation to the relevant s-r patterns

Question 36

the causal functional role of an inner state

Answer 36

the causal role which an inner state has in helping to realize a given input-output function

Question 37

Smart’s response to objection 3

Answer 37

that sensations are inner events (in fact, brain processes) individuated in terms of their causal-functional roles

Question 38

issues for Smart

Answer 38

• We don’t have any good evidence for the IT
• How do we differentiate the pain humans experience from the pain other animals experience?