Lecture 4: Identity Theory Flashcards
the main argument for identity theory
- Sensations are about inner causes of behaviour (agrees with CD, disagrees with LB)
- These inner causes are physical (disagrees with CD)
- These inner causes are identical to brain processes
Smart’s understanding of the Cartesian Dualist argument
P1: When I make such a report, I must be reporting on something
P2: But there is nothing physical which I could be reporting since the after-image doesn’t enjoy determinant spatiotemporal existence
C1: So, I must be reporting on something non-physical
C2: so, sensations/qualitative states are non-physical and must be states of a CM
Smart’s reason for rejecting Cartesian Dualism
- There is a flaw in P2 of the Dualist account
- Physical explanations follow Ockham’s razor (the simplest explanation is the most likely to be correct)
redescription strategy
redescribing the correlated events in terms of their constituent or component elements or terms of the microscopic nature of a macroscopic entity. Then we appeal to further lawlike correlations of a more general nature
why isn’t the redescription strategy available to the Dualist?
because it assumes we’re dealing with physical phenomena that can be described in more basic terms
identification strategy
involves treating phenomena as two different ways of describing the same event
why isn’t the Identification strategy available to the Dualist?
because they are committed to regarding mental states as non-physical
what strategy does Smart propose we should use?
we should use the identification strategy to account for the apparent lawlike correlations between mental states and physical brain states
what does the identification strategy involve for Smart?
viewing sensations as a sort of brain process
Leibniz’s Law (The Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals)
if a and b are identical, then for all properties P, a has a property P if and only if b has a property P
Objection 7 to identity theory (commits the same error as Swimburne)
P1: I can conceive of sensations occurring without brain activity.
P2: I cannot conceive of brain processes occurring without brain activity.
C: Sensations cannot be identical to brain processes.
Objection 7 to identity theory as a violation of Leibniz’s Law
P1: Sensation(s) has the property of being conceivable by me as occurring in the absence of brain activity.
P2: Brain process (b) does not have the property of being conceivable by me as occurring in the absence of brain activity.
C: By LL, it is not the case that [sensation(s) = brain-process(b)].
why is objection 7 a violation of Leibniz’s law?
the problem is that the truth of P2 depends on whether a is identical to b. If a is, then P2 is false
objection 4 to identity theory
sensations and brain processes cannot be identical because they cannot possess all the same properties
Smart’s response to objection 4
the objection misrepresents what the identity theorist is claiming. The objection assumes that the proposed identity is between the after-image and the brain process. It is the experience of an after-image that is to be identified with the BP. Once we correctly represent the IT, there is no categorical incompatibility between sensations and brain processes
objection 5&6 to identity theory
attempts to reformulate the discernibility argument to apply the IT as clarified in response to objection 4
Smart’s response to objection 5&6
Our current use of language simply reflects our dualist philosophical and scientific heritage. If we have scientific reasons to accept IT, then we can simply revise our opinion as to what it makes sense to say
2 types of dualism
property & substance dualism
substance dualism
there is mental and physical stuff
example of substance dualism
Cartesian dualism
property dualism
some physical things have properties that are not solely explicable in physical terms
objection 3 to identity theory is ____
an argument for property dualism because some physical entities can have certain non-physical emergence properties
objection 3 to identity theory
P1: X reports the occurrence of a yellowish-orange after-image experience.
P2: X must have noticed the occurrence of something to report this experience - i.e. to individuate the experience she is reporting.
P3: X must have noticed certain features of this something to individuate it.
P4: Often, what X notices is not a physical feature of this something - i.e. any particular neurophysiological feature.
C: What X notices must be a non-physical feature.
emergence properties
properties that are not predictable based on the laws governing the physical properties from which they are emergent
would Smart like the explanation of emergent properties?
no because we get the problem of nomological danglers
nomological danglers
law-like correlations that can’t be easily accounted for by normal rules and laws
Smart’s response to objection 3
the meaning of sensation-talk is neutral concerning issues dividing identity theories and their opponents
objections to Smart’s response to objection 3
since in the case of the after-image, the likeness conditions are not satisfied, I must recognize what my current experience is like by appealing to its phenomenal properties
Smart’s counter
we can report a likeness without any conscious awareness of what the likeness consists in
Shaffer on the topic-neural sentence
- Critics of Smart, such as Shaffer, object that the topic-neutral sentence fails as a translation of first-person sensation reports because it doesn’t specify how one experience is like another
- Sensations are learned via inner ostention and individuated by reference to the particular phenomenal properties of the experience had under certain conditions, which topic-neutral sentences don’t account for
inner ostention
referring to the experiences had under such stimulus conditions
Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of a private language
Understanding the meaning of a linguistic expression requires grasping the criterion behind it, which is defined by the distinctive features of an experience. Without understanding this criterion, there cannot be a meaningful linguistic expression.
logical behaviourist response to Wittgenstein
the criteria for sensation talk are given by certain observable patterns in behaviour
Smart’s response to the logical behaviourist response to Wittgenstein
Smart rejects this option because it poses problems for the idea that first-person sensation statements are genuine reports
Smart’s Topic Neutral Sentence Response
- First- and third-person sensation reports are claims about inner states
- The inner states, which turn out to be kinds of brain processes, are individuated by reference to their distinct causal roles in mediating between stimuli and behaviour
- Pain is ascribed based on certain observable patterns in behaviour and refers to whatever kind of inner state stands in the appropriate causal relation to the relevant s-r patterns
the causal functional role of an inner state
the causal role which an inner state has in helping to realize a given input-output function
Smart’s response to objection 3
that sensations are inner events (in fact, brain processes) individuated in terms of their causal-functional roles
issues for Smart
- We don’t have any good evidence for the IT
- How do we differentiate the pain humans experience from the pain other animals experience?
