Lecture 5: Functionalism Flashcards

1
Q

Smart on mental processes

A

Smart believes types of mental phenomena are types of physical phenomena, that can be individuated (distinguished) in terms of their causal-functional role

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Putnam’s response to Smart

A
  • We share mental phenomena with animals, so we need to specify shared physical phenomena for all mental states/processes
  • We use behaviour to ascribe mental states, so the functional role is important
  • We assume inputs & outputs & IO relations, but no particular physical substance
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

identity theory

A

Mental state/process types are physical-state/process types which are functionally individuated.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

functionalism

A

Mental-state/process types are functional-state/process types which may be differently realized in different creatures.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

token physicalism

A

all realizations of mental state types are physical realizations

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

2 types of functionalism

A

Rylean functionalism & psychofunctionalism

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Rylean functionalism

A

MD is about genuine internal states of systems insofar as these states play particular causal roles in generating its behaviour (‘real’ dispositions) + the ‘causal role’ of a given mental state can include causal relations in which it stands to other mental states

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

inputs (Rylean functionalism)

A

observable states of affairs & other mental phenomena

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

outputs (Rylean functionalism)

A

observable behaviours or other mental phenomena

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

psychofunctionalism

A

CF roles determined by cognitive psychology, based on observable discriminative and behavioral capacities of the system

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

inputs (psychofunctionalism)

A

from perceptual modules: carry symbolic environmental information

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

outputs (psychofunctionalism)

A

sent to motor modules that produce behaviour

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

what type of functionalism is more sophisticated?

A

psychofunctionalism

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

psychofunctionalism and cognitive psychology

A

In psychofunctionalism, CP is methodically autonomous because distinct although related tasks

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

methodically autonomous

A

distinctive domain of inquiry & laws discoverable independently of progress in other sciences

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

task of cognitive psychology

A

determine the functional organization of intelligent systems & formulate laws

17
Q

what does cognitive psychology hypothesize?

A

particular FOs that would allow observed capacities must be realizable in the system, can choose between FO models using physicalism

18
Q

task of cognitive neuroscience

A
  • examine particular realizations
  • identify neural realizations that play the required functional roles
19
Q

Churchland’s objection

A

in our species, we can’t abstract from neuropsychology

20
Q

Fodor & Putnam’s response to Churchland

A

intraspecies identities unclear (plasticity), even if identities for beliefs & desires are less likely for sensations & emotions (qualia), even if identities the generalizations may be cross-species

21
Q

Turing machine

A

device whose operations can be completely described in terms of a set of functions defined upon inputs, outputs, and states of the system

22
Q

how are the functions of a Turing machine represented?

A

by a machine table

23
Q

why are Turing machines relevant?

A

because they bear on the mind-body problem and on on how purely physical systems can accomplish their cognitive capacities

24
Q

computational theory of the mind

A

The capacities of various systems (twm & twom) can be explained in terms of functional decomposition, where complex abilities of the system as a whole are explained by decomposing the system into parts that have simpler capacities & modelling how the operations of the parts are organized and coordinated

25
Q

Challenges of functionalism

A
  • How to specify the functional roles (inputs, outputs, relationships between MS)?
  • How to capture the class of things that (intuitively) have mental states?
  • How to correctly ascribe mental states to twm?
26
Q

absent qualia problem (liberalism)

A

ascribe mental states to entities that don’t have them

27
Q

solution to the absent qualia problem

A

qualitative mental states are essentially composite

28
Q

Chauvinism

A

failure to ascribe mental states to creatures that surely do or could have them

29
Q

inverted spectrum problem

A

Given FO, can we claim that an intelligent system is really in one specific kind of mental state?

30
Q

what type of functionalism is the Turing machine associated with?

A

psychofunctionalism

31
Q

Block’s people of China example

A
  • Suppose we can describe your functional organization at a given time using a giant machine table with a billion squares
  • Supposed we assign 1 billion people one square each in this table and connect them via technology so that each can communicate when necessary to the other
  • Then, by construction, the entire system would be functionally equivalent to you over the given interval, if it received the inputs you do and produced the same outputs via state transitions
  • So, if your having a particular mental life at t is just your realizing a particular model of functional organization at t then the artificial system should share all aspects of your mental life at t
  • But, suppose your mental state at t included feeling slightly feverish
    Then, the functionalist must say that the artificial system also has these mental states