Lecture 5: Functionalism Flashcards
Smart on mental processes
Smart believes types of mental phenomena are types of physical phenomena, that can be individuated (distinguished) in terms of their causal-functional role
Putnam’s response to Smart
- We share mental phenomena with animals, so we need to specify shared physical phenomena for all mental states/processes
- We use behaviour to ascribe mental states, so the functional role is important
- We assume inputs & outputs & IO relations, but no particular physical substance
identity theory
Mental state/process types are physical-state/process types which are functionally individuated.
functionalism
Mental-state/process types are functional-state/process types which may be differently realized in different creatures.
token physicalism
all realizations of mental state types are physical realizations
2 types of functionalism
Rylean functionalism & psychofunctionalism
Rylean functionalism
MD is about genuine internal states of systems insofar as these states play particular causal roles in generating its behaviour (‘real’ dispositions) + the ‘causal role’ of a given mental state can include causal relations in which it stands to other mental states
inputs (Rylean functionalism)
observable states of affairs & other mental phenomena
outputs (Rylean functionalism)
observable behaviours or other mental phenomena
psychofunctionalism
CF roles determined by cognitive psychology, based on observable discriminative and behavioral capacities of the system
inputs (psychofunctionalism)
from perceptual modules: carry symbolic environmental information
outputs (psychofunctionalism)
sent to motor modules that produce behaviour
what type of functionalism is more sophisticated?
psychofunctionalism
psychofunctionalism and cognitive psychology
In psychofunctionalism, CP is methodically autonomous because distinct although related tasks
methodically autonomous
distinctive domain of inquiry & laws discoverable independently of progress in other sciences
task of cognitive psychology
determine the functional organization of intelligent systems & formulate laws
what does cognitive psychology hypothesize?
particular FOs that would allow observed capacities must be realizable in the system, can choose between FO models using physicalism
task of cognitive neuroscience
- examine particular realizations
- identify neural realizations that play the required functional roles
Churchland’s objection
in our species, we can’t abstract from neuropsychology
Fodor & Putnam’s response to Churchland
intraspecies identities unclear (plasticity), even if identities for beliefs & desires are less likely for sensations & emotions (qualia), even if identities the generalizations may be cross-species
Turing machine
device whose operations can be completely described in terms of a set of functions defined upon inputs, outputs, and states of the system
how are the functions of a Turing machine represented?
by a machine table
why are Turing machines relevant?
because they bear on the mind-body problem and on on how purely physical systems can accomplish their cognitive capacities
computational theory of the mind
The capacities of various systems (twm & twom) can be explained in terms of functional decomposition, where complex abilities of the system as a whole are explained by decomposing the system into parts that have simpler capacities & modelling how the operations of the parts are organized and coordinated
Challenges of functionalism
- How to specify the functional roles (inputs, outputs, relationships between MS)?
- How to capture the class of things that (intuitively) have mental states?
- How to correctly ascribe mental states to twm?
absent qualia problem (liberalism)
ascribe mental states to entities that don’t have them
solution to the absent qualia problem
qualitative mental states are essentially composite
Chauvinism
failure to ascribe mental states to creatures that surely do or could have them
inverted spectrum problem
Given FO, can we claim that an intelligent system is really in one specific kind of mental state?
what type of functionalism is the Turing machine associated with?
psychofunctionalism
Block’s people of China example
- Suppose we can describe your functional organization at a given time using a giant machine table with a billion squares
- Supposed we assign 1 billion people one square each in this table and connect them via technology so that each can communicate when necessary to the other
- Then, by construction, the entire system would be functionally equivalent to you over the given interval, if it received the inputs you do and produced the same outputs via state transitions
- So, if your having a particular mental life at t is just your realizing a particular model of functional organization at t then the artificial system should share all aspects of your mental life at t
- But, suppose your mental state at t included feeling slightly feverish
Then, the functionalist must say that the artificial system also has these mental states
