Lecture 1: Intro to the Mind-Body Problem Flashcards
TWM’s vs non-TWM’s
- Both can be described as physical systems
- But, we can’t fully describe TWMs with solely a physical description as we could for non-TWNs because of their distinctive features
5 distinctive features of TWMs
- Intentional states
- Intentional explanations
- Instrumental rationality
- Qualitative states
- Accountability and responsibility
intentionality
- Mental states are individuated in terms of what they are about
- This has nothing to do with being on purpose or deliberate
propositional attitudes
mental attitude toward a proposition
can intentional states be about an object?
yes
can intentional states be identified with physical relations between the system & an intentional object?
no
indication
physical relation between A & B that causes A to be the way it is: A carries info about B => B has to exist
do the intentional objects of mental states need to exist?
no
intentional explanation
Explain & predict the behaviour of TWMs by reference to the intentional states ascribed to them
goal of intentional states ascription
explanatory & predictive
instrumental rationality
Intentional explanations & predictions assume the rationality of individuals
instrumental rationality and intentional states
It only makes sense to ascribe intentional states if we are prepared to ascribe instrumental rationality (because the end goal is only achievable with instrumental rationality)
does instrumental rationality require that mental states be rational?
no
qualitative states
states that have some experienced quality
what is self-consciousness according to Kant?
requires being able to think about internal states (not just a stream of internal states but also the capacity to unify that stream)
stream/train of consciousness/thought
unified by connecting states with other states
what is self-consciousness according to Husserl?
retention & protection
what is the basis for intentional states?
the ability to conceptualize one’s experience
accountability and responsibility
- Hold humans accountable morally & legally for their actions
- Linked to the idea that humans can act freely based on their mental states, they choose to act one way rather than another
what does responsibility require?
- Relevant beliefs
- Awareness of what one is doing
- Acting freely
do accountability and responsibility apply to all TWM’s?
no, we don’t hold animals responsible because according to Descartes, they are biological machines that lack free will & perhaps lack mental states too
beliefs
are intentional, but not qualitative
sensations
are qualitative, but not intentional
emotions
are both intentional & qualitative
perceptions
are intentional & qualitative dimensions, but what is of interest is their qualitative dimension
knowledge of TWM’s
TWM have immediate & certain knowledge of their qualitative mental states
qualitative vs. intentional states
Qualitative states require intentional states. Because requires self-consciousness which requires registrations of the world & body taken as yours and as representations of external reality
other minds problem
Do entities with intelligence but no qualitative states have minds?
solutions to the other minds problem
monism & dualism
monism
The difference is a purely physical difference, which explains the distinctive properties and capacities of twm’s (MIND=BRAIN)
physical difference
a difference in either the psycho-chemical composition organization
physicochemical composition
the kind of physical stuff of which something is composed
organization
the way the physical stuff is put together
objections to monism
- Many lower animals have brains but it isn’t clear if they have minds
- We have no explanation, as yet, why having a brain, which is just one more physical feature of an entity should provide a physical system with the kinds of capacities we ascribe to TWMs
more sophisticated monist argument
TWMs differ from other physical systems in their biochemical and organizational complexity
Cartesian Dualism
- no amount of complexity in a physical system whose operations are completely describable in physicochemical terms can account for the sorts of capacities we ascribe to TWMs
- TWMs are composite entities, composed of a physical body, whose operations are described and explicable in terms of the same physical laws that govern other things in the universe. This body is responsible for those properties TWMs share with other things
