Lecture 1: Intro to the Mind-Body Problem Flashcards

1
Q

TWM’s vs non-TWM’s

A
  • Both can be described as physical systems
  • But, we can’t fully describe TWMs with solely a physical description as we could for non-TWNs because of their distinctive features
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2
Q

5 distinctive features of TWMs

A
  1. Intentional states
  2. Intentional explanations
  3. Instrumental rationality
  4. Qualitative states
  5. Accountability and responsibility
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3
Q

intentionality

A
  • Mental states are individuated in terms of what they are about
  • This has nothing to do with being on purpose or deliberate
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4
Q

propositional attitudes

A

mental attitude toward a proposition

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5
Q

can intentional states be about an object?

A

yes

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6
Q

can intentional states be identified with physical relations between the system & an intentional object?

A

no

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7
Q

indication

A

physical relation between A & B that causes A to be the way it is: A carries info about B => B has to exist

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8
Q

do the intentional objects of mental states need to exist?

A

no

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9
Q

intentional explanation

A

Explain & predict the behaviour of TWMs by reference to the intentional states ascribed to them

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10
Q

goal of intentional states ascription

A

explanatory & predictive

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11
Q

instrumental rationality

A

Intentional explanations & predictions assume the rationality of individuals

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12
Q

instrumental rationality and intentional states

A

It only makes sense to ascribe intentional states if we are prepared to ascribe instrumental rationality (because the end goal is only achievable with instrumental rationality)

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13
Q

does instrumental rationality require that mental states be rational?

A

no

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14
Q

qualitative states

A

states that have some experienced quality

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15
Q

what is self-consciousness according to Kant?

A

requires being able to think about internal states (not just a stream of internal states but also the capacity to unify that stream)

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16
Q

stream/train of consciousness/thought

A

unified by connecting states with other states

17
Q

what is self-consciousness according to Husserl?

A

retention & protection

18
Q

what is the basis for intentional states?

A

the ability to conceptualize one’s experience

19
Q

accountability and responsibility

A
  • Hold humans accountable morally & legally for their actions
  • Linked to the idea that humans can act freely based on their mental states, they choose to act one way rather than another
20
Q

what does responsibility require?

A
  • Relevant beliefs
  • Awareness of what one is doing
  • Acting freely
21
Q

do accountability and responsibility apply to all TWM’s?

A

no, we don’t hold animals responsible because according to Descartes, they are biological machines that lack free will & perhaps lack mental states too

22
Q

beliefs

A

are intentional, but not qualitative

23
Q

sensations

A

are qualitative, but not intentional

24
Q

emotions

A

are both intentional & qualitative

25
Q

perceptions

A

are intentional & qualitative dimensions, but what is of interest is their qualitative dimension

26
Q

knowledge of TWM’s

A

TWM have immediate & certain knowledge of their qualitative mental states

27
Q

qualitative vs. intentional states

A

Qualitative states require intentional states. Because requires self-consciousness which requires registrations of the world & body taken as yours and as representations of external reality

28
Q

other minds problem

A

Do entities with intelligence but no qualitative states have minds?

29
Q

solutions to the other minds problem

A

monism & dualism

30
Q

monism

A

The difference is a purely physical difference, which explains the distinctive properties and capacities of twm’s (MIND=BRAIN)

31
Q

physical difference

A

a difference in either the psycho-chemical composition organization

32
Q

physicochemical composition

A

the kind of physical stuff of which something is composed

33
Q

organization

A

the way the physical stuff is put together

34
Q

objections to monism

A
  • Many lower animals have brains but it isn’t clear if they have minds
  • We have no explanation, as yet, why having a brain, which is just one more physical feature of an entity should provide a physical system with the kinds of capacities we ascribe to TWMs
35
Q

more sophisticated monist argument

A

TWMs differ from other physical systems in their biochemical and organizational complexity

36
Q

Cartesian Dualism

A
  • no amount of complexity in a physical system whose operations are completely describable in physicochemical terms can account for the sorts of capacities we ascribe to TWMs
  • TWMs are composite entities, composed of a physical body, whose operations are described and explicable in terms of the same physical laws that govern other things in the universe. This body is responsible for those properties TWMs share with other things