Lecture 6 - Neoliberalism

Question 1

neoliberal vs. neorealist - commonalities

Answer 1

anarchic international system

states are central actors: unitary, rational, egoistic, utility-maximizing

Question 2

neoliberal vs. neorealist - differences

Answer 2

progress is possible, although not automatic. there is an increase in collective benefits. also anarchy not unchanging, gradually filed with human created processes and institutions.

transnational politics = state and non-state actors (e.g.,
international organizations (IOs), multi-national corporations (MNCs).

high and low politics as interdependent

domestic politics shape international politics

Question 3

barriers for cooperation under anarchy

Answer 3

Collective action problems

Barriers are not insurmountable

Question 4

barriers for cooperation under anarchy: collective action problems

Answer 4

Lack of information: uncertainty of other actors’ preferences; unknown payoffs (the value of cooperation and defection)

Incentive to cheat

Question 5

barriers for cooperation under anarchy: barriers not insurmountable

Answer 5

Trust of the future intensions of other actors

Payoff structures can be altered to improve the prospects for cooperation

Mutually beneficial arrangements exist, not necessarily zero-sum

Question 6

game theory

Answer 6

combination of mathematics and logics to analyse
strategic interaction among decision-makers

non-cooperative games = zero-sum, constant-sum

cooperative games = positive-sum, increasing-sum, or variable-sum

Question 7

nash equilibrium

Answer 7

describes a situation where every player in a game chooses the best strategy for themselves based on the strategies chosen by the other players, and no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy

Question 8

pareto-optimal

Answer 8

outcomes in which one could not gain additional benefits without making someone else worse off

Question 9

cooperative games - outcomes

Answer 9

mixed - motives

pareto - optimal

nash equilibrium

Question 10

low pay-off for cooperation

Answer 10

because of distrust / lack of information / cheating / egoistic behaviour a low pay-off for cooperation

especially if cooperation has different pay-off levels for involved actors -˃ relative gains

Question 11

increasing-sum games

Answer 11

Iteration leads for tit-for-tat/reciprocity and issue linkage reward cooperation and punish defection

Constant regular interaction and information exchange

Small group (monitoring each other’s actions)

Question 12

shadow of the future

Answer 12

leads to prospective gains

Question 13

International Institutions’ Role in Cooperation

Answer 13

provide transparency (information about others)

reduce uncertainty = dependable expectation of rule consistent behaviour

help monitor others

alter payoffs = reduce costs of legitimate bargains / enhance costs of illegitimate bargains

= enhance likelihood of compliance

Question 14

Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation

Answer 14

Interdependence

Hegemon

Relative Gains and Absolute Gains

International Institutions

Question 15

Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation: interdependence

Answer 15

Mutual dependence
=˃ Problems cannot be solved with traditional power politics and unilaterally but require cooperation.

In contrast, in games of harmony and games of deadlock, cooperation is unnecessary to the realization of mutual interests

Question 16

Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation: hegemon

Answer 16

hegemon = powerful state which provides self-interested global or regional stability

An important but not necessary condition – transaction costs; international institutions’ values to states

Question 17

Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation: relative / absolute gains

Answer 17

absolute gains = States are interested in increasing their power and thus cooperate with others to increase their capabilities
–> win-win game

relative gains = States are interested in how much they achieve relative to others and only cooperate if they
can gain more than others
–> zero-sum game

Question 18

Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation: international institutions

Answer 18

formal = Multilateral organizations with physical locations, buildings, staff, budgets, and other resources at their disposal

informal = Sets of implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations (international regimes)

Question 19

Qualities of Regimes

Answer 19

regimes are social institutions

regimes do not act; they contain injunctions = prescribe certain actions and prohibit others

regimes are intervening variables between fundamental characteristics of world politics (e.g., distribution of power) and behavior of actors

Question 20

Institutional Design

Answer 20

membership rules = in- or exclusive / only states or also non-states

level of centralization = single enforcement?

scope of issues covered = scientific / economic / political

control mechanisms = voting arrangement

flexibility of arrangements in dealing with new unanticipated circumstances

Question 21

Institutional Design: Facilitating Bargaining

Answer 21

Normalizing rules of procedures for collective decision-making – more certainty on state behavior
and the achievement of collective goals

Providing the forums for bargaining

Relevant institutional features = scope of issues / issue linkage / legalization / decision-making rules

Question 22

Institutional Design: Counter

Answer 22

state compliance

transparancy = collection information / monitoring mechanism

ability and resources to publish defectors

reducing implementation cost

inclusion of flexibility: escape clauses