Lecture 6 - Neoliberalism Flashcards
neoliberal vs. neorealist - commonalities
anarchic international system
states are central actors: unitary, rational, egoistic, utility-maximizing
neoliberal vs. neorealist - differences
progress is possible, although not automatic. there is an increase in collective benefits. also anarchy not unchanging, gradually filed with human created processes and institutions.
transnational politics = state and non-state actors (e.g.,
international organizations (IOs), multi-national corporations (MNCs).
high and low politics as interdependent
domestic politics shape international politics
barriers for cooperation under anarchy
Collective action problems
Barriers are not insurmountable
barriers for cooperation under anarchy: collective action problems
Lack of information: uncertainty of other actors’ preferences; unknown payoffs (the value of cooperation and defection)
Incentive to cheat
barriers for cooperation under anarchy: barriers not insurmountable
Trust of the future intensions of other actors
Payoff structures can be altered to improve the prospects for cooperation
Mutually beneficial arrangements exist, not necessarily zero-sum
game theory
combination of mathematics and logics to analyse
strategic interaction among decision-makers
non-cooperative games = zero-sum, constant-sum
cooperative games = positive-sum, increasing-sum, or variable-sum
nash equilibrium
describes a situation where every player in a game chooses the best strategy for themselves based on the strategies chosen by the other players, and no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategy
pareto-optimal
outcomes in which one could not gain additional benefits without making someone else worse off
cooperative games - outcomes
mixed - motives
pareto - optimal
nash equilibrium
low pay-off for cooperation
because of distrust / lack of information / cheating / egoistic behaviour a low pay-off for cooperation
especially if cooperation has different pay-off levels for involved actors -˃ relative gains
increasing-sum games
Iteration leads for tit-for-tat/reciprocity and issue linkage reward cooperation and punish defection
Constant regular interaction and information exchange
Small group (monitoring each other’s actions)
shadow of the future
leads to prospective gains
International Institutions’ Role in Cooperation
provide transparency (information about others)
reduce uncertainty = dependable expectation of rule consistent behaviour
help monitor others
alter payoffs = reduce costs of legitimate bargains / enhance costs of illegitimate bargains
= enhance likelihood of compliance
Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation
Interdependence
Hegemon
Relative Gains and Absolute Gains
International Institutions
Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation: interdependence
Mutual dependence
=˃ Problems cannot be solved with traditional power politics and unilaterally but require cooperation.
In contrast, in games of harmony and games of deadlock, cooperation is unnecessary to the realization of mutual interests
Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation: hegemon
hegemon = powerful state which provides self-interested global or regional stability
An important but not necessary condition – transaction costs; international institutions’ values to states
Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation: relative / absolute gains
absolute gains = States are interested in increasing their power and thus cooperate with others to increase their capabilities
–> win-win game
relative gains = States are interested in how much they achieve relative to others and only cooperate if they
can gain more than others
–> zero-sum game
Facilitating Conditions for International Cooperation: international institutions
formal = Multilateral organizations with physical locations, buildings, staff, budgets, and other resources at their disposal
informal = Sets of implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations (international regimes)
Qualities of Regimes
regimes are social institutions
regimes do not act; they contain injunctions = prescribe certain actions and prohibit others
regimes are intervening variables between fundamental characteristics of world politics (e.g., distribution of power) and behavior of actors
Institutional Design
membership rules = in- or exclusive / only states or also non-states
level of centralization = single enforcement?
scope of issues covered = scientific / economic / political
control mechanisms = voting arrangement
flexibility of arrangements in dealing with new unanticipated circumstances
Institutional Design: Facilitating Bargaining
Normalizing rules of procedures for collective decision-making – more certainty on state behavior
and the achievement of collective goals
Providing the forums for bargaining
Relevant institutional features = scope of issues / issue linkage / legalization / decision-making rules
Institutional Design: Counter
state compliance
transparancy = collection information / monitoring mechanism
ability and resources to publish defectors
reducing implementation cost
inclusion of flexibility: escape clauses
