Han 3 Flashcards
Felicity conditions and discourse
An important notion in speech act theory is the concept of felicity conditions. For a speech act to ‘work’, Austin argued that there are a number of conditions that must be met. The first of these is that there must be a generally accepted procedure for successfully carrying out the speech act, such as inviting someone to a wedding through the use of a formal written wedding invitation, rather than an informal email message. Also, the circumstances must be appropriate for the use of the speech act. That is, someone must be getting married. The person who uses the speech act must be the appropriate person to use it in the particular context- such as the bride or a groom’s family, or in some cases the bride or groom, inviting the person to the wedding. A friend of the couple getting married cannot, for example, without the appropriate authority invite someone to the wedding.
Austin argued that this procedure must be carried out correctly and completely. The person performing the speech act must (in most circumstances) have the required thoughts, feelings and intentions for the speech act to be ‘felicitous’. That is, the communication must be carried out by the right person, in the right place, at the right time and, normally, with a certain intention or it will not ‘work’.
If the first two of these conditions are not satisfied, the act will not be achieved and will ‘misfire’. If the third of these conditions does not hold, then the procedure will be ‘abused’.
Illocutions in discourse
How does speech act theory contribute to the study of discourse?
• Speech act theory can provide insights into the requirements that a form (the locution) must meet to ensure that the illocution and the intended uptake take place. The illocution serves as a prerequisite for the achievement of the perlocution the speaker/writer has in mind.
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• Speech act theory can serve as a framework for indicating what is required in order to determine the relationship between form and function, between locution and illocution, and between illocution and perlocution.
Sometimes, the locution (the utterance itself) provides an indication of the intended illocutions. Searle (1969) refers to these indications as illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDS). IFIDS includes:
IFIDS includes:
performative verbs
• word order
• intonation
• accent
• certain adverbs
• mode of the verb
And stress(Pragmatics)
If an IFID is present, the utterance is said to have an explicit illocution; in all other cases the utterance is said to have an implicit or indirect illocution.
Examples of explicit illocutions:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
In (1)
I request that you put out your cigarette.
He is putting out his cigarette.
Is he putting out his cigarette?
Are you going to put that cigarette out or not? Would you please put out your cigarette?
the performative verb “to request” makes the illocutionary intent explicit.
The difference in word order between (2) and (3) is indicative of the illocutionary intent, ‘statement’ and ‘question,’ respectively. Ascending intonation and an accent on the word ‘cigarette’ can also convey an expression of surprise.
In (4) the tag ‘or not’ is indicative of the imperative character of the illocution.
In (5) the mode of the verb indicates that this is a request; the adverb ‘please’, depending on the intonation, can make the request either cautious or insistent. It is also possible to convert (5) into an order by placing a special accent on ‘please’ and ‘cigarette’.
IFIDS do not always provide a definitive answer regarding illocutionary intent.
Example (IFID if… then):
1. If you take the garbage out, I will give you a beer.
2. If you keep this up, you will have a nervous breakdown.
Only (1) contains a conditional promise.
In (2) the IFID is not the only relevant factor; more background information is needed, specifically that a nervous breakdown is dangerous. Otherwise, it is impossible to deduce why (2) is seen as a warning.
Much knowledge is needed to link the right illocution to a locution. Example:
Can you stop by in a minute?
A:The form is an interrogative
Why is the interrogative interpreted as a request?
A request can be identified by the following felicity conditions:
Felicity conditions for requests
a. The propositional content
The content must refer to a future act, X, which is to be carried out by the address.
b. The preparatory condition
1. The addressee is capable of executing X and the speaker believes that the addressee is capable of doing it.
2. It is obvious to both conversational participants that the addressee will not perform the act without being asked.
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c. The sincerity condition
The speaker actually wants the addressee to do what has been requested.
d. The essential condition
The utterance serves as an attempt to persuade the addressee to execute X.
The interrogative given in the example above possesses the illocutionary intent of a request. The interrogative must be interpreted as an order when it is uttered by a supervisor to a subordinate. In this case the illocution is far from self-explanatory. For correct interpretation, knowledge of the discourse situation and knowledge of the relation between the participants are required. Knowledge of the world is necessary as well.
Therefore, an illocution, a simple form, can in many cases only be interpreted (have a function) when different kinds of knowledge are used (linguistic cues, knowledge of the discourse situation, knowledge of the world).
A request can be identified by the following felicity conditions:
Felicity conditions for requests
a. The propositional content
The content must refer to a future act, X, which is to be carried out by the address.
b. The preparatory condition
1. The addressee is capable of executing X and the speaker believes that the addressee is capable of doing it.
2. It is obvious to both conversational participants that the addressee will not perform the act without being asked.
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c. The sincerity condition
The speaker actually wants the addressee to do what has been requested.
d. The essential condition
The utterance serves as an attempt to persuade the addressee to execute X.
The interrogative given in the example above possesses the illocutionary intent of a request. The interrogative must be interpreted as an order when it is uttered by a supervisor to a subordinate. In this case the illocution is far from self-explanatory. For correct interpretation, knowledge of the discourse situation and knowledge of the relation between the participants are required. Knowledge of the world is necessary as well.
Therefore, an illocution, a simple form, can in many cases only be interpreted (have a function) when different kinds of knowledge are used (linguistic cues, knowledge of the discourse situation, knowledge of the world).
A request can be identified by the following felicity conditions:
Felicity conditions for requests
a. The propositional content
The content must refer to a future act, X, which is to be carried out by the address.
b. The preparatory condition
1. The addressee is capable of executing X and the speaker believes that the addressee is capable of doing it.
2. It is obvious to both conversational participants that the addressee will not perform the act without being asked.
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c. The sincerity condition
The speaker actually wants the addressee to do what has been requested.
d. The essential condition
The utterance serves as an attempt to persuade the addressee to execute X.
The interrogative given in the example above possesses the illocutionary intent of a request. The interrogative must be interpreted as an order when it is uttered by a supervisor to a subordinate. In this case the illocution is far from self-explanatory. For correct interpretation, knowledge of the discourse situation and knowledge of the relation between the participants are required. Knowledge of the world is necessary as well.
Therefore, an illocution, a simple form, can in many cases only be interpreted (have a function) when different kinds of knowledge are used (linguistic cues, knowledge of the discourse situation, knowledge of the world).
Rules versus principles
Searle took Austin’s work further by arguing that the felicity conditions of an utterance are ‘constitutive rules’. That is, they are not just something that can ‘go right’ (or wrong) or be ‘abused’- which is Austin’s view- but something which makes up and defines the act itself.
Thomas (1995) critiques this notion of constitutive rules and suggests that the notion of principle is perhaps more helpful to this discussion. She points out that it is extremely difficult to devise rules which will satisfactorily account for the complexity of speech act behaviour. She presents five basic differences between rules and principles to support her argument:
1. Rules are ‘all or nothing’, whereas principles are ‘more or less’. That is, rules are ‘yes/no’ in their application whereas principles can be applied partially. Thus, you can speak extremely clearly, fairly clearly, or not at all clearly, rather than simply ‘clearly’.
2. Rules are exclusive whereas principles can co-occur. Thus, using one rule precludes another whereas a number of principles (rather than rules) might apply at the same time.
3. Rules aim to define a speech act whereas principles describe what people do.
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- Whereas rules are definite, principles are ‘probabilistic’. That is, they describe what is more or less likely to be the case, rather than something which either does or does not apply.
- Rules are arbitrary, whereas principles are ‘motivated’. That is, people follow them for a reason, or purpose, to achieve a particular goal.
Conversational implicature and the Cooperative principle
An utterance often conveys more than the literal meaning of the words uttered. An example from Herbert Grice:
• Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, “Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues and he hasn’t been to prison yet.”
The form of this utterance does not say everything about the meaning and, thus, the function. A can derive from B’s remark that B does not hold a high opinion of C. In fact, B has basically said that C is a potential criminal. Yet, this cannot be derived from the literal meaning of B’s words. Why then can A draw these conclusions? Because A can assume that there is some relevance to B’s, at first glance, superfluous addition concerning prison. The only reason B would add that remark is if B meant to imply that C is a potential criminal.
Grice refers to this derivation as ‘conversational implicature’. It is the meaning that an addressee has to deduct from the locution, considering the context of the utterance. Therefore, conversational implicature refers to the inference a hearer makes about a speaker’s intended meaning that arises from their use of the literal meaning of what the speaker said. Implicature is not the same as inference. As Thomas (1995:58) explains, an implicature ‘is generated intentionally by the speaker and may (or may not) be understood by the hearer’. An inference, on the other hand, is produced by a hearer on the basis of certain evidence and may not be the same as what a speaker intends.
Example
If I say ‘There’s nothing on at the movies’ I do not mean ‘nothing at all’, but rather ‘nothing that I’m interested in seeing’. The person I am speaking to will assume this and ‘implicate’ my meaning.
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The cooperative principle:
Grice (1975) argues that in order for a person to interpret what someone else says, some kind of cooperative principle must be assumed to be in operation. People assume that there is a set of principles which direct us to a particular interpretation of what someone says, unless we receive some indication to the contrary.
Thus, when someone is speaking to us, we base our understanding of what they are saying on the assumption that they are saying what needs to be said rather than more than needs to be said, they are saying it at an appropriate point in the interaction and they have a reason for saying what they say.
The cooperative principle says you should make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the speech exchange in which you are engaged.
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Grice distinguished four categories within this general principle. He formulated these in basic maxims:
Grice’s maxims
Grice’s maxims
Maxims of quantity
- Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of exchange).
- Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Maxims of quality
Supermaxim: try to make your contribution one that is true (be truthful). Maxims:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say what you lack adequate evidence for.
Maxim of relevance
Be relevant.
Maxims of manner
Supermaxim: be perspicuous (i.e. express an idea clearly)
- Avoid obscurity of expression (unclear or difficult to understand).
- Avoid ambiguity (having more than one interpretation).
- Be brief.
- Be orderly.
