Common Pool Resources Flashcards
Problem
Stock: resource diff exclude
- needs coordinated production / maintenance
Flow: private consumption
- needs sharing out and assigning among users to prevent over consumption
Tragedy of the commons - who
Garrett Hardin 1968
Tragedy of the commons
Illustrates degradation environment as open pasture available to all
Each herder: benefits grazing, suffers others grazing
Motivated add more = direct benefit w costs shared out
Rational herders herd w/out limit=land ruined
Equilibrium not Pareto-optimal–> individually rational strategies = collectively irrational outcomes
Intervention 1
The state
-gov control : decide 1) who 2) when 3) how many animals
Fine to increase cost defecting - move equilibrium to Pareto optimal
Intervention 1 problems
Assumes gov can control by 1) determining capacity of CPR 2) assign 3)monitor 4) sanction
–> requires lots of ability and info = costly
E.g. 3rd world countries’ forests nationalised
Felling Borneo for palm oil
Unable to supply sufficient numbers foresters to enforce regulations
Those employed= paid poorly –> corruption and bribes
Intervention 2
Privatisation
-sometimes feasible w land but not water resources
Ostrom : mixture private and public institutions
Intervention 3
Self enforced institutions
- self interested participants design, monitor and enforce arrangements
- deal with FRiding and commitment problems
Intervention 3 problems
Depends characteristics of community
- internal: trust, social capital, same interests
- external: having autonomy (self-governance) to change institutional structure
No guarantee of success - time consuming, effort, conflict-invoking
More likely to work if small scale and in 1 country/community
What are they?
Benefit group but diminished benefits to everyone if each individual pursues own self-interest
Non excludable
Subject to crowding - rival consumption
