Cade Part 2 Flashcards
Sherif and Asch
Sherif: autokinetic effect illusion where point of light in dark looks to be moving, ps estimate how much light moves. When alone say distinct estimates but when in groups, converged on group estimate- norms help resolve uncertainty
Asch: say which of three lines is the same length as target, alone correct 99% of time but in group of confeds, conform 33% only 25% correct but when responded privately conformity dropped and when confed in minority, they were ridiculed - called normative influence
Types of influence
Informational: accepting info from another as evidence about reality e.g. know something i dont
Normative: one conforms to gain social approval or avoid disapproval
Referent informational: conform to norm of group when ones membership in the group is important e.g. that what people like me do
Deutsch and gerarg 95
False consensus effect-illusory norms-Ross
Overestimate the degree attitudes are shared by others
Ross 97: ps asked to wear sandwich board around campus. Measure 1 is if they worse it and measure 2 is asking what % of peers are estimated to wear the board. People who agreed estimated that many of their peers would also wear it but if said no said others would be more likely to say no
Pluralistic ignorance
Conforming to what one believes is majority view but not endoring it- katz31
Shelton and richeson 2005: b and W say want more interracial friends. b and w ps scenario enter dining and see group of ppl but both don’t move to sit W eachother, w ps W wps reason was lack of interest more than fear of rejection , others lack of interest more than self. In bps, less diff between fear of rejection and lack of interest but desired more rejection from self and more lack of interest in others. When other ps b, wps more fear of rejection from self and more lack of interest from others but in bps, less fear of rejection more lack of interest from self- show perception not accurate
Cost of nonconformity
Guilt, shame, embarrassment, ostracism. Black sheep effect: cramner 2013: cost harsher for deviants in in group . Gelfand 2011: tight cultures have strong norms and less tolerance for defiance but opposite for loose
Moral norms definition
Feldman 2018: subset of social norms. Norms that govern behaviour that have good or bad outcomes for self and others
E.g. fairness, trust
Effect of gossip
Beersma and vankleef 2011: dictator game where could donate lottery to group or keep, ps got file w showed others tendency to gossip and talk about others. When tendency to gossip low, now diff between traceable or not on contribution to group but when tendency high, more contribution when traceable (gossip can be pro social)
Moral outrage
When moral norms broken, spread quick by social media. Hofman 2014: found ps more likely to learn about immoral than moral acts and more likely to learn about it online - most anger and disgust/outrage when learn of violation online over in person or tv /print. Brady 2017: more emotions words like hate,blame the more they were retweeted valence and group membership moderated effect as more retweets amount ingroup?. Follow up- MO driven by reinforcement learning as feedback like likes predicted tweeting next day and more among new users-users less sensitive to rein. In extreme places where mo the norm
Benefits of non conformity
Van kleef- powerful ppl more likely to invade space, interrupt, eat mouth open and privileged more likely to lie, cheat. Belezza: imagine Woman in luxury shop in winter. Either gym clothes (nonconform) or dress and furs (conform) ps either pedestrian or shop assistant and measured if they thought woman was high status. In conform, pedestrian rated higher and in non, shop rated more. Guy either teaches at good or bad uni (prestige) with smart looks or not (conformity). In conform: low prestige rated higher. in non conform , high prestige rated higher
Leadership
Van Kleef 2013: robin hoof effect: nonconform signals good leadership. Ps watches clips of open window and target closes it -pro social of ppl look cold or selfish if ppl look hot, violation as window says don’t touch. Measured power affordable- pro social rated higher. In actual, ps waged in office, when experimenter left, confed either offered p a cup or only poured self. In pro rated more power affordable
Resistance - types
Descriptive deviance is when you diverge from avg group attitude in direction consistent w desirable group attitude. Prescriptive when diverge in inconsistent direction.
Resistance-Morrison and Miller 2008
Imagine give speech in controversial topic either descrip, prescrip or non defiant. Or give speech on affirmative action in same conditions. Found descriptive then non deviant then perspriptive in order for proud, liked, different but good, similarity and comfort but for different but bad other way round. 3: bumper sticker (demo or repub) and blue or red states. In blue states, ratio of demo to repub was higher than demo to reoub registered voters and same for red
Outrage to action
Protests over death of Freddie gray by police-mooijman 2018: no. Moral tweets increase on days W violent protests and predicted no. Arrests. Unite the right rally in Virginia 2017 over removal of confed statues. High or low moral converge as either majority or few shared views and same of diff and told others think about the protests in same or diff way. Ps said moral issue and violence more acceptable when moral same as others
Change
Moscovici: ps did colour label task, block was blue but light changed, ps asked colour and light - vocal minority said it was green, changed amount of ps and found ppl swayed when more? Minority pushed ps threshold in direction of green when it differed
Diff theories of change nemeth or moscovici
Nemeth: convergent divergent thoery: diverging from conformity is threatening so inhibit thoughts or diverging not threatening so entertain minority views good for innovation. Moscovici argued conversion effect- accept view passively but validify minority view e.g. heuristic vs systematic processing - supported by Martin and hewstone- strong or weak arguments about animal research either repd minority or majority POV, heuristic acceptance of majority - but minority - check!
Tipping points
when size of minority flips the attitude to become the norm
Centola 2018: groups did name matching game, each p got paired w a partner and both win points If give same name
Did few rounds to get norm then introduced minority - groups reached tippping point when minority 25%- implicit and consistent
Tutorial
Externalise: learning depends on other knowledge, transactive memory is info between ppl. Illusion of explanatory depth is know more until asked to explain it. Community knowledge hyp: think know more because others do. Paper by sloman and rabb: told description of rock and scientist DT either understood or didn’t. Found ppl said understood more. May be task demand (conformity) so made it secret knowledge then found people didn’t understand (but not sig.) or understability (ppl thought the description was enough/artefact manipulation) so took it out and said ppl gave a description) and still found effect. W: other cultures may be different . May be floor effect as low scores so changed scale from 1-7 to 1-100
Social dilemmas
Social traps: benefit self but cost to group. Social fences: cost to self but helps the collective. Rational self interest model/homo economicus of human behaviour . humans act with rational self interest
But model does not account for prosocial behaviour
Humans an ultra social
We have evolved as collab or die w foraging. Humans cooperate more than primates tomasello 2014. humans punish free riders, children apply distributive justice, humans intervene in response to norm violations, intrinsically motivated to help. Kep parts of cooperation: reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, fairness and punishment
Direct reciprocity
nowak and sigmund 2005: if you help me i help you. Khulman and mashello 75: did rounds of the prinsoners dilemma W a confed who either always cooperated, always defected or used tit for tat (help me I help you). If confed cooperates, p used cooperation or tit for tat. If competitor, no strategy worked as they don’t cooperate at all, for individualist, tit for tat works best. But tit for tat not always possible, more than 2 ppl and decision not simultaneous in world
Indirect reciprocity
Wedekind and braithwaite 2002: each player gets £3, play in groups. players paired off, one as a donor, other as a receiver. Donors could give 50p and told never see the other again to rule reciprocity. Ps have image score (increases when give and decrease when didn’t and public to others). Donors more likely to donate when receivers image score high (given in past), donors W low score more likely o donate to improve. Image score correlated W earning at the end, those W better score also earned more in subs prison dilemma
Fairness - the ultimatum game, schmittberger and Schwarze 82
player a gets initial £10 then divides as they see fit to player B, player b can accept or reject the offer.If b rejects, both a and b get nothing. Rational is b should accept any offer as still more than 0 but found the less a offers, more likely b was to reject. Oosterbeek 2004: first players after this then often make fairer offers
Emotional response fehr and fischbacher 2004
See unfair as unlikeable, disagreeable, less attractive and feel anger, disgust. Public goods game: 2+ ppl in group, all start W money and can put into shared pot which gets multiplied then shared out. If defect, get the most money as still keep yours and benefit from shared. Intro op to punish ppl in round 11 but had to spend money, if rational self interest you wouldn’t do that
Fehr and fischbacher 2004 results
Contribution declines until punishment added, even when cost and this increases contributions to pot. Then ps watch others play prisoner’s dilemma game, once learn the outcome they can pay to punish- found ppl willing to punish when just observing
Propagation of cooperation
Weber and murnighan 2008
Used public good game and ps either prosocial or proself. Either No confed, presence of high status contributor or low status ppl who always or didnt contribute
If no punishment, eventually all groups gave less money - same in prosocial and pro self w no contributor. If consistent contributor, contributions of all stayed high, and all made more money. Additive effect where high status consistent contrib has more effect and personalities made no diff
Cooperative cascade
Fowler and christakis 2010
6 public goods fames w diff groups and with or without punishment. Contribution of one person influences the others behaviour in next rounds (alter increases ego). Effect sustained several rounds later and influences ppl they didn’t directly interact W e.g. others at further degrees of separation
Helping behaviour
Empathy and perspective taking (TOM) involved in helping behaviour and diff regions in the brain. Empathetic distress is when seeing another in distress causes you much stress that causes burnout so don’t help. PT can help you figure out why another is distressed, esp if other doesn’t clearly show emotions
Affective pathways to helping: gleicchgert and decety 2013
used many doctors and measured empathetic concern, per taking, altruistic intention, emp distress, alexithymia as well as compassion satisfaction, burnout and secondary trauma .Found more emp concern, pt and altruism the more compassion satis. Emp distress and alexithymia linked to burnout and secondary traumatic stress
Role of experience-Lim and desteno 2017
Expect trauma ps to be less empathetic but ps did qs. on adverse life experience, emp concern. Pt, dispositional compassion and measured donation to the red cross
Found more adversity, the more pt and empathetic concern. And correlation between pt and emp concern as understand others. Only emp concern predict disposition compassion which predicted charitable donation
Replicated and found the same but dispo compassion predicted state compassion and spent more time helping others
