Attribution Theory III: Recent Research Developments Flashcards

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1
Q

THE GILBERT MODEL

A

identification -> attribution -> automatic dispositional inference -> effortful situational correction

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2
Q

TGM: REVISIONS

A

KRULL (1993); KRULL & ERICKSON (1995)
- applied to situation perception like person perception (ie. Quattrone (1982))
- model suggests characterisation as always relatively effortful dispositional inference; correction = effortful adjustment in inf

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3
Q

TGM: ADJUSTEMENTS

A
  • are we always looking for dispositional/personal explanations as default?
  • maybe studies set up so perceivers do BUT in alternative settings focus may shift to situational
    KRULL (1993)
  • perceivers inferential goals may make model applicable to situation perception
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4
Q

SITUATION > PERSON EXAMPLES

A
  • thinking of taking degree course BUT people on it say they did very badly -> is coursework difficult? = situation inf
  • thinking of joining army -> why does everyone get up at 5am?
  • first tutorial BUT no one answers tutors qs -> is it the norm to stay silent?
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5
Q

MIXED MODEL OF SOCIAL INFERENCE

A

FROM…
dispositional -> situational correction
…TO:
situational -? dispositional correction

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6
Q

MIXED SOCIAL INFERENCE EXAMPLE

A

BOB IS SUCCEEDING AT TASK
- GILBERT = effortlessly automatically categorise Bob as competent
- aka. disposition > situational correction (ie. maybe task is too easy)
- if judgement invited personal attribution, KRULL agrees BUT…
- KRULL = when judgement invites situational attribution -> effortlessly characterise situation as simple
- correction = dispositional (aka. Bob may just be competent)

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7
Q

EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION

A
  • replication of “sexual fantasies study” BUT comparing 2 dif inferential goals (dispositional/situational)
  • results replicated Gilbert’s findings for those in dispositional goal conditions
  • opposite pattern found for situational goal conditions
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8
Q

GILBERT MODEL REVISION: SUMMARY

A

MARKUS & KITAYAMA (1991)
- more flexible model can aid understanding of cultural difs (ie. collectivist cultures)
MOLDEN & DWECK (2006)
- help understanding of individual difs (ie. entity VS incremental theorists)
LIEBERMAN ET AL (2002)
- social cognition neuroscience suggests 3 stages may not be sequential
OVERALL: despite revisions, GILBERT = well-established in academic spheres

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9
Q

DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES

A
  • GILBERT developed to explain beh to adults
  • BUT how well does it translate onto developmental issues of person perception?
    HAGA ET AL (2014)
  • children should categorise/characterise actors/situations (more automatic processes) before using additional info to correct infs about dispositions/situations (more deliberate processes)
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10
Q

THE TRAIT STAGE

A
  • aka. how kids develop social inference strategies
    RHOLES ET AL (1990)
  • 4 year olds have good trait vocab
    LIU ET AL (2007)
  • kids know how to apply trait vocab when faced w/trait implying beh
  • BUT researchers don’t conclude kids are drawing dispositional infs w/o evidence of tendencies generalising over time
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11
Q

TTS: CORRECTION FOR SITUATION

A

BALDWIN & BALDWIN (1970)
- evidence of 5 year olds not discounting certain info even when alternatives = possible
FOLMER ET AL (2008)
- kids don’t differentiate between dif explanations
- see effort = ability in importance
- ability appears later

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12
Q

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN OLDER KIDS

A

HAGA ET AL (2014)
- hypothesis = older kids shown ability to correct for situational info
- younger kids lack full mastery of effortful correction processes -> more susceptible to CB

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13
Q

HAGA ET AL (2014): PROCEDURE

A
  • kindergarten kids watched silent video of sad kid
  • punishment condition (mad parents) VS gift condition (pleased parents)
  • dispositional ratings (aka. what do you think the kid is like everyday?) = scales across very sad/happy; always crying/never cries/always laughing/never laughs
  • understanding situational constraints (aka. how would you feel if you were talking about mad/pleased parents?) = smiley/sad face scale
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14
Q

HAGA ET AL (2014): RESULTS

A
  • pps of all ages characterised sad kid as dispositionally sadder when situation couldn’t account for sad beh
  • correction appears in older kids BUT not younger
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15
Q

! CRITICAL !

A
  • studies using dif paradigms/goals/situational constraints obtained similar results
    HAGA ET AL (2014)
  • children show more adherence to GILBERT model w/age
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16
Q

UNANWERED QUESTIONS REGARDING KIDS

A

BUT…
- maybe tasks = harder for younger kids (aka. cognitive business hampers correction)
- why do difs emerge? do older kids have more cognitive resources? do they extract rule discounting at certain point?
- does socialisation teach kids that beh is multiply determing?

17
Q

WHY DOES MINDFULNESS REDUCE CB?

A

FACTORS ^ CB
- cognitive capacity/mood/need for cognition
- all show relationship between cognitive processing abilities + CB
HOPTHROW ET AL (2016)
- mindfulness characterised by focused/non-evaluative attention to/awareness of present moment
- shown to enhance various cognitive processes ie. attention
- reduces tendency to overlook situational factors (ie. stereotype threat/mindless eating beh)

18
Q

HOPTHROW ET AL (2017): PROCEDURE

A
  • 2 (mindfulness/control) x 2 (for/against nuclear power position) conditions
  • positioned determined via coin flip
  • 2 questions (to what extent does writer support/oppose nuclear power VS do YOU favour/oppose nuclear power)
  • Toronto Mindfulness Scale used to assess if manipulation achieved desired effect (yes)
19
Q

HOPTHROW ET AL (2017): RESULTS

A
  • interaction between condition/essay position = mindfulness attenuated CB; rating dif in M condition between for/against < dif in C condition
  • 2nd/3rd study replicated w/tweak to avoid potential boredom effects
  • mindfulness OR sustained attention?
20
Q

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

A

SCOPELLITI ET AL (2018)
- some studies develop new individual dif measure ie. Neglect of External Demands Scale/NED
- others test extent to which propensity for CB predicted consequential conceptuality related BUT dif judgements/decisions

21
Q

! CRITICAL 2 !

A
  • NED revealed propensity to make correspondent inferences = discriminated from IQ/decision making/cognitive ability/cognitive reflection/individual difs in cognitive processing/LOC/attributional style
  • CB = not just for faulty decision making/poor IQ instance OR individual processing style/control pref/attributional style
  • CB propensity determines overconfidence on dispositional attributions reflected uniformly across consequential attribution kinds variety
22
Q

! SUMMARY !

A
  • correspondence bias continues to draw interest
  • GILBERT held up well
  • situational inferences possibly occasionally come first (more flexible model)
  • developmental approaches fit well w/GILBERT (effortful correction comes later after cognitive capacities develop better)
  • possible to reduce CB via methods increasing state mindfulness