Attribution Theory III: Recent Research Developments Flashcards
THE GILBERT MODEL
identification -> attribution -> automatic dispositional inference -> effortful situational correction
TGM: REVISIONS
KRULL (1993); KRULL & ERICKSON (1995)
- applied to situation perception like person perception (ie. Quattrone (1982))
- model suggests characterisation as always relatively effortful dispositional inference; correction = effortful adjustment in inf
TGM: ADJUSTEMENTS
- are we always looking for dispositional/personal explanations as default?
- maybe studies set up so perceivers do BUT in alternative settings focus may shift to situational
KRULL (1993) - perceivers inferential goals may make model applicable to situation perception
SITUATION > PERSON EXAMPLES
- thinking of taking degree course BUT people on it say they did very badly -> is coursework difficult? = situation inf
- thinking of joining army -> why does everyone get up at 5am?
- first tutorial BUT no one answers tutors qs -> is it the norm to stay silent?
MIXED MODEL OF SOCIAL INFERENCE
FROM…
dispositional -> situational correction
…TO:
situational -? dispositional correction
MIXED SOCIAL INFERENCE EXAMPLE
BOB IS SUCCEEDING AT TASK
- GILBERT = effortlessly automatically categorise Bob as competent
- aka. disposition > situational correction (ie. maybe task is too easy)
- if judgement invited personal attribution, KRULL agrees BUT…
- KRULL = when judgement invites situational attribution -> effortlessly characterise situation as simple
- correction = dispositional (aka. Bob may just be competent)
EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION
- replication of “sexual fantasies study” BUT comparing 2 dif inferential goals (dispositional/situational)
- results replicated Gilbert’s findings for those in dispositional goal conditions
- opposite pattern found for situational goal conditions
GILBERT MODEL REVISION: SUMMARY
MARKUS & KITAYAMA (1991)
- more flexible model can aid understanding of cultural difs (ie. collectivist cultures)
MOLDEN & DWECK (2006)
- help understanding of individual difs (ie. entity VS incremental theorists)
LIEBERMAN ET AL (2002)
- social cognition neuroscience suggests 3 stages may not be sequential
OVERALL: despite revisions, GILBERT = well-established in academic spheres
DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES
- GILBERT developed to explain beh to adults
- BUT how well does it translate onto developmental issues of person perception?
HAGA ET AL (2014) - children should categorise/characterise actors/situations (more automatic processes) before using additional info to correct infs about dispositions/situations (more deliberate processes)
THE TRAIT STAGE
- aka. how kids develop social inference strategies
RHOLES ET AL (1990) - 4 year olds have good trait vocab
LIU ET AL (2007) - kids know how to apply trait vocab when faced w/trait implying beh
- BUT researchers don’t conclude kids are drawing dispositional infs w/o evidence of tendencies generalising over time
TTS: CORRECTION FOR SITUATION
BALDWIN & BALDWIN (1970)
- evidence of 5 year olds not discounting certain info even when alternatives = possible
FOLMER ET AL (2008)
- kids don’t differentiate between dif explanations
- see effort = ability in importance
- ability appears later
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN OLDER KIDS
HAGA ET AL (2014)
- hypothesis = older kids shown ability to correct for situational info
- younger kids lack full mastery of effortful correction processes -> more susceptible to CB
HAGA ET AL (2014): PROCEDURE
- kindergarten kids watched silent video of sad kid
- punishment condition (mad parents) VS gift condition (pleased parents)
- dispositional ratings (aka. what do you think the kid is like everyday?) = scales across very sad/happy; always crying/never cries/always laughing/never laughs
- understanding situational constraints (aka. how would you feel if you were talking about mad/pleased parents?) = smiley/sad face scale
HAGA ET AL (2014): RESULTS
- pps of all ages characterised sad kid as dispositionally sadder when situation couldn’t account for sad beh
- correction appears in older kids BUT not younger
! CRITICAL !
- studies using dif paradigms/goals/situational constraints obtained similar results
HAGA ET AL (2014) - children show more adherence to GILBERT model w/age
UNANWERED QUESTIONS REGARDING KIDS
BUT…
- maybe tasks = harder for younger kids (aka. cognitive business hampers correction)
- why do difs emerge? do older kids have more cognitive resources? do they extract rule discounting at certain point?
- does socialisation teach kids that beh is multiply determing?
WHY DOES MINDFULNESS REDUCE CB?
FACTORS ^ CB
- cognitive capacity/mood/need for cognition
- all show relationship between cognitive processing abilities + CB
HOPTHROW ET AL (2016)
- mindfulness characterised by focused/non-evaluative attention to/awareness of present moment
- shown to enhance various cognitive processes ie. attention
- reduces tendency to overlook situational factors (ie. stereotype threat/mindless eating beh)
HOPTHROW ET AL (2017): PROCEDURE
- 2 (mindfulness/control) x 2 (for/against nuclear power position) conditions
- positioned determined via coin flip
- 2 questions (to what extent does writer support/oppose nuclear power VS do YOU favour/oppose nuclear power)
- Toronto Mindfulness Scale used to assess if manipulation achieved desired effect (yes)
HOPTHROW ET AL (2017): RESULTS
- interaction between condition/essay position = mindfulness attenuated CB; rating dif in M condition between for/against < dif in C condition
- 2nd/3rd study replicated w/tweak to avoid potential boredom effects
- mindfulness OR sustained attention?
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
SCOPELLITI ET AL (2018)
- some studies develop new individual dif measure ie. Neglect of External Demands Scale/NED
- others test extent to which propensity for CB predicted consequential conceptuality related BUT dif judgements/decisions
! CRITICAL 2 !
- NED revealed propensity to make correspondent inferences = discriminated from IQ/decision making/cognitive ability/cognitive reflection/individual difs in cognitive processing/LOC/attributional style
- CB = not just for faulty decision making/poor IQ instance OR individual processing style/control pref/attributional style
- CB propensity determines overconfidence on dispositional attributions reflected uniformly across consequential attribution kinds variety
! SUMMARY !
- correspondence bias continues to draw interest
- GILBERT held up well
- situational inferences possibly occasionally come first (more flexible model)
- developmental approaches fit well w/GILBERT (effortful correction comes later after cognitive capacities develop better)
- possible to reduce CB via methods increasing state mindfulness
