4.4 Summarize common networking attacks. Flashcards

1
Q

Denial of service

A

Force a service to fail
Take advantage of a design failure or vulnerability
Cause a system to be unavailable
Create a smokescreen for some other exploit
Doesn’t have to be complicated - Turn off the power

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2
Q

A “friendly” DoS

A

Unintentional DoSing -
Network DoS - Layer 2 loop without STP
Bandwidth DoS - Downloading multi-gigabyte Linux distributions over a DSL line

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3
Q

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

A

Launch an army of computers to bring down a service
This is why the bad guys have botnets
Asymmetric threat

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4
Q

DDOS amplification

A

Turn your small attack into a big attack
An increasingly common DDoS technique
Uses protocols with little (if any) authentication or checks - NTP, DNS, ICMP

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5
Q

DNS Amplification

A

Botnet C&C sends a single message to the botnet
Bots send spoofed DNS requests
DNS revolvers send amplified DNS responses to the Web Server

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6
Q

Effective social engineering

A

Constantly changing - You never know what’s next
May involve multiple people
May be in person or electronic - email, phone

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7
Q

Social engineering principles

A
  • Authority
  • Intimidation
  • Consensus / Social proof
  • Scarcity
  • Urgency
  • Familiarity / Liking
  • Trust
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8
Q

Authority

A

The social engineer is in charge• I’m calling from the help desk/office of the CEO/police

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9
Q

Intimidation

A

There will be bad things if you don’t help

If you don’t help me, the payroll checks won’t be processed

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10
Q

Consensus / Social proof

A

Convince based on what’s normally expected• Your co-worker Jill did this for me last week

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11
Q

Scarcity

A

The situation will not be this way for long

Must make the change before time expires

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12
Q

Urgency

A

Works alongside scarcity - Act quickly, don’t think

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13
Q

Familiarity / Liking

A

Someone you know, we have common friends

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14
Q

Trust

A

Someone who is safe

I’m from IT, and I’m here to help

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15
Q

Insider threats

A
  • Significant security issues• Harms reputation
  • Critical system disruption
  • Loss of confidential or proprietary information
  • Innocent employees - Phishing scams, hacking scams
  • Disgruntled employees - Someone is out to get you
  • Careless employees - Using a laptop for personal use
  • Defense in depth - Cover all possible scenarios
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16
Q

Logic Bomb

A

• Waits for a predefined event
• Often left by someone with grudge
Time bomb• Time or date• User event• Logic bomb• Difficult to identify• Difficult to recover if it goes off

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17
Q

Preventing a logic bomb

A

Difficult to recognize - Each is unique
• No predefined signatures
• Process and procedures - Formal change contro
l• Electronic monitoring - Alert on changes - Host-based intrusion detection, Tripwire, etc.
• Constant auditing - An administrator can circumvent existing system

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18
Q

Rogue access points

A

A significant potential backdoor
Very easy to plug in a wireless AP
Schedule a periodic survey
Consider using 802.1X (Network Access Control)

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19
Q

Wireless evil twins

A
Buy a wireless access point
Configure it exactly the same way as an existing network
Overpower the existing access points
WiFi hotspots are easy to fool
You encrypt your communication, right?
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20
Q

Wardriving

A

Combine WiFi monitoring and a GPS
Huge amount of intel in a short period of time
All of this is free - Kismet, inSSIDer - Wireless Geographic Logging Engine - http://wigle.net
Always an alternative - Warflying, warbiking

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21
Q

Phishing

A

Often delivered by spam, IM, etc. - Very remarkable when well done

  • Check the URL
  • Usually there’s something not quite right • Spelling, fonts, graphics • Vishing is done over the phone • Fake security checks or bank updates
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22
Q

Spear phishing

A

Phishing with inside information

Makes the attack more believable

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23
Q

Whaling

A

Spear phishing the CEO is “whaling”

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24
Q

Ransomware

A

Locks your computer “by the police”
The ransom may be avoided
• A security professional may be able to remove these kinds of malware

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25
Q

Crypto-malware

A

New generation of ransomware
Malware encrypts your data files
You must pay the bad guys to obtain the decryption key

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26
Q

Protecting against ransomware

A

Always have a backup
Keep your operating & applications system up to date - patches
Keep your anti-virus/anti-malware signatures up to date

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27
Q

DNS Poisoning

A

-Modify the DNS server
1. User 1 performs a normal DNS query to the DNS server:
-Modify the client host file
2. Bad guy modifies the DNS records and changes the IP address
Send a fake response to a valid DNS request• Requires a redirection of the original request or the resulting response
3. User 2 performs the same DNS query as User 1, but now the poisoned DNS entry is returned:

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28
Q

Spoofing

A

Pretend to be something you aren’t
Email address spoofing
• The sending address of an email isn’t really the sender• Caller ID spoofing
• The incoming call information is completely fake• Man-in-the-middle attacks
• The person in the middle of the conversation pretends to be both endpoints

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29
Q

MAC spoofing

A
Your Ethernet device has a MAC address
Most drivers allow you to change this
Changing the MAC address can be legitimate
It might not be legitimate
Very difficult to detect
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30
Q

IP address spoofing

A

Take someone else’s IP address
Can be legitimate
May not be legitimate
Easier to identify than MAC address spoofing

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31
Q

Spoofing cont

A

A legitimate response to an ARP request is received from the default gateway.The ARP response is cached on the local device

An attacker sends an ARP response that spoofs the IP address of the router and includes the attacker’s MAC address.The malicious ARP information replaces the cached record, completing the ARP poisoning

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32
Q

Wireless Deauthentication

A

Wireless deauthentication• A significant wireless denial of service (DoS) attack

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33
Q

802.11 management frames

A

802.11 wireless includes a number of management features
Important for the operation of 802.11 wireless
Original wireless standards did not add protection for management frames

34
Q

Protecting against disassociation

A

IEEE has already addressed the problem

802.11w is required for 802.11ac compliance

35
Q

Brute force

A

The password is the key
Brute force attacks - Online
• Keep trying the login process
• Very slow
• Most accounts will lockout after a number of failed attempts• Brute force the hash - Offline
• Obtain the list of users and hashes
• Calculate a password hash, compare it to a stored hash
• Large computational resource requirement

36
Q

Dictionary attacks

A

People use common words as passwords
If you’re using brute force, you should start with the easy ones
• password, ninja, football
• Many common wordlists available on the ‘net
• Some are customized by language or line of work
• This will catch the low-hanging fruit
• You’ll need some smarter attacks for the smarter people

37
Q

VLAN hopping

A

“Hop” to another VLAN - this shouldn’t happen• Two primary methods• Switch spoofing and double tagging

38
Q

Switch spoofing

A

Some switches support automatic configuration
There’s no authentication required
can Send and receive from any configured VLAN
Switch administrators should disable trunk negotiation• Administratively configure trunk interfaces and device/access interfaces

39
Q

Man -in- the-middle

A
Redirects your traffic
• Then passes it on to the destination
• You never know your traffic was redirected
• ARP poisoning
•because ARP has no security
40
Q

Vulnerabilities and exploits

A

A weakness in a system

41
Q

Exploit

A

Take advantage of a vulnerability
Gain control of a system
Gain control of a systemModify data
Disable a service

42
Q

Zero-day attacks

A

Zero-day• The vulnerability has not been detected or published• Zero-day exploits are increasingly common• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)• http://cve.mitre.org/

43
Q

Device Hardening

A
Changing default credentials
Avoid common passwords
Upgrading firmware
File hashing
Disabling unnecessary services
Watching the network
Secure protocols - SSH, SFTP ,SNMPv3 ,TLS/SS,  IPse
Generating new keys
Disabling unused TCP and UDP ports
Disabling unused interfaces
44
Q

Mitigation Techniques

A

IPS signature management -
Device hardening
The native VLAN -Change the native VLAN number (e.g., VLAN 999)
Privileged accounts - Elevated access to one or more systems
FIM (File Integrity Monitoring)
Restricting access via ACLs - device ACLs to limit access
Honeypots - Attract the bad guys - and trap them there
Penetration testing - Simulate an attack

45
Q

Switch Port Protection

A
Loop protection
BPDU guard
Root guard
Flood guard
DHCP snooping
46
Q

Loop protection

A

IEEE standard 802.1D to prevent loops in bridged (switched) networks (1990)• Created by Radia Perlman• Used practically everywhere

47
Q

BPDU guard

A

PortFast -Bypass the listening and learning states
If a BPDU frame is seen on a PortFast configured interface (i.e., a workstation), shut down the interface• This shouldn’t happen - Workstations don’t send BPDU (Bridge Protocol Data Unit)

48
Q

Root guard

A

Root guard allows you to pick the root
• Cisco feature
• Prevents a rogue root bridge
• If your root bridge receives a superior STP BPDUon a root guard port, root guard changes the interface status to “root-inconsistent” (listening)
• This effectively disables the interface to the rogue root

49
Q

Flood guard

A

Configure a maximum number of source MAC addresses on an interface
• You decide how many is too many
• You can also configure specific MAC addresses
• The switch monitors the number of unique MAC addresses
• Maintains a list of every source MAC address
• Once you exceed the maximum, port security activates
• Interface is usually disabled by default

50
Q

DHCP snooping

A

IP tracking on a layer 2 device (switch)
Switch watches for DHCP conversations
Filters invalid IP and DHCP information

51
Q

Network Segmentation

A

Segmenting the network
Physical segmentation
DMZ

52
Q

Physical segmentation

A

Separate Device• Multiple units, separate infrastructure

53
Q

Logical segmentation with VLANs

A

Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs)• Separated logically instead of physically - Cannot communicate between VLANs without a Layer 3 device / router

54
Q

Network Troubleshooting Methodology

A
  • Identify the problem
  • Establish a theory of probable cause
  • Test the theory to determine cause
  • Establish a plan of action to resolve the problem and identify potential effects
  • Implement the solution or escalate as necessary
  • Verify full system functionality and, if applicable,implement preventative measures
  • Document findings, actions and outcomes
55
Q

Hardware Tools

A
  • Cable crimper
  • Cable tester
  • Punch-down Tool
  • TDR / OTDR
  • Light meter
  • Toner Probe
  • Loopback plug
  • Multimeter
  • Spectrum analyzer
56
Q

Cable crimper

A
  • ”Pinch” the connector onto the wire
  • The final step of a cable installation
  • Metal prongs push through insulation
57
Q

Cable tester

A

Continuity testing
Identify missing pins, crossed wires
Not used for advanced testing

58
Q

Punch-down Tool

A

Forces wire into a wiring block

Trims the wires and breaks the insulation

59
Q

TDR / OTDR

A

(Optical) Time Domain Reflectometer• Estimate fiber lengths, measure signal loss, determine light reflection, create wire maps• May require additional training

60
Q

Light meter

A

Send a light from one side• Measure the light power on the othe

61
Q

Toner Probe

A

Puts an analog sound on the wire• Inductive probe doesn’t need to touch the copper

62
Q

Loopback plug

A

• Useful for testing physical ports• Serial, Ethernet, T1, fiber• These are not crossover cables

63
Q

Multimeter

A

AC/DC voltages• Continuity, wire mapping

64
Q

Spectrum analyzer

A

View the frequency spectrum• Identify frequency conflicts

65
Q

Software Tools

A

Protocol analyzer
Network / port scanner
Wireless packet analysis
Speed test sites

66
Q

Protocol analyzer

A

Capture and display network traffic• Use a physical tap or redirect on the switch

67
Q

Network / port scanner

A

• Scan for open ports and IP addresses• Visually map the network• Rogue system detection

68
Q

Wireless packet analysis

A

View wireless information• Signal-to-noise ratio, channel information, etc.

69
Q

Speed test sites

A

Bandwidth testing• Pre- and post-change analysis• Not all sites are the same

70
Q

Command Line Tools

A
  • ping - Test reachability
  • traceroute - Determine the route a packet takes to a destination
  • nslookup and dig - Lookup information from DNS servers
  • ipconfig and ifconfig - View and manage IP configuration
  • iptables - Packet filtering
  • netstat - Display network statistics
  • tcpdump
  • Nmap
  • route - View the device’s routing table
  • arp - Address resolution protocol information
71
Q

ping - Test reachability

A

• ping - Test reachability to a TCP/IP address• ping -t - Ping until stopped with Ctrl-c• ping -a - Resolve address to a hostname• ping -n - Send # of echo requests• ping -f - Send with Don’t Fragment flag set

72
Q

traceroute

A

Takes advantage of ICMP Time to Live Exceeded error message• Not all devices will reply with ICMP Time Exceeded messages• traceroute

73
Q

nslookup

A

nslookup • dig

74
Q

ipconfig and ifconfig

A

ipconfig - Windows TCP/IP config
• ipconfig /all - Display all IP configuration details
• ipconfig /release - Release the DHCP lease
• ipconfig /renew - Renew the DHCP lease
• ipconfig /flushdns - Flush the DNS resolver cache• ifconfig - Linux interface configuration

75
Q

iptables - Packet filtering

A

Linux iptables - filter packets in the kernel
• Simple data blocks - ignores state
• Usually placed on a device or server

76
Q

netstat - Display network statistics

A

netstat -a - Show all active connections• netstat -b - Show binaries• netstat -n - Do not resolve names

77
Q

tcpdump

A

tcpdumpCapture packets from the command line• Available in most Unix/Linux operating systems• Included with Mac OS X, available for Windows (WinDump)• Apply filters, view in real-time• Written in standard pcap format

78
Q

pathping - Combination of ping and traceroute

A

pathping

79
Q

Nmap

A

Network mapper - find network devices• Port scan - Find devices and identify open ports• Operating system scan• Discover the OS without logging in to a device• Service scan• What service is available on a device? Name, version, details• Additional scripts• Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE

80
Q

route - View the device’s routing table

A

route print - View the Windows routing table

81
Q

arp

A

• arp -a - View the local ARP table