2018 Flashcards
Other than locally at the Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers (RTCB), where can ALL FOUR RTCB
positions be verified following a Reactor trip?
- PPS Status Panel
- B05 Phase Current Lights
- Supplemental Protection Logic Actuation Cabinets
A. 1 ONLY
B. 2 ONLY
C. 1 and 3 ONLY
D. 2 and 3 ONLY
A. Plausible since the PPS Status Panel is correct, however all 4 breaker positions can also be
verified open at the SPLA Cabinets
B. Plausible since both phase current lights at B05 must be extinguished in order for the reactor to
trip, however each light can be extinguished by one of two breakers opening, therefore all four
RTCBs cannot be confirmed as open based solely on the status of these lights.
C. Correct.
D. Plausible since the SPLA Cabinets are correct, however B05 phase current lights cannot be used
to confirm the status of all 4 RTCBs.
Following an uncomplicated Reactor trip from 100% power, with NO operator action, Pressurizer level will stabilize at ~ \_\_\_(1)\_\_\_ and SG pressures will stabilize at ~ \_\_\_(2)\_\_\_ . A. (1) 33% (2) 1050 psia B. (1) 33% (2) 1170 psia C. (1) 52.5% (2) 1050 psia D. (1) 52.5% (2) 1170 psia
A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since 1050 psia is approximate SG pressure at full
power. Additionally, SG levels are restored to their full power setpoint post-trip with no operator
action, so it would be reasonable to believe SG pressures were also restored to their full power
values.
B. Correct.
C. First part is plausible since 52.5% is the full power setpoint, and with no operator action it is
reasonable to believe level would continue to be controlled at the full power setpoint (as SG level
is), however pressurizer level setpoint is based on Tave and post-trip Tave will result in a setpoint
of 33%. Second part is plausible since 1050 psia is approximate SG pressure at full power.
Additionally, SG levels are restored to their full power setpoint post-trip with no operator action, so
it would be reasonable to believe SG pressures were also restored to their full power values.
D. First part is plausible since 52.5% is the full power setpoint, and with no operator action it is
reasonable to believe level would continue to be controlled at the full power setpoint (as SG level
is), however pressurizer level setpoint is based on Tave and post-trip Tave will result in a setpoint
of 33%. Second part is correct.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 1 has just tripped from 100% power
Pressurizer pressure is slowly lowering
Pressurizer Relief Valve Status Panel on B04 shows a 9% Red LED lit for PSV-200
Which of the following describes the Pressurizer level response and the operability of the
Pressurizer?
Pressurizer level will initially ___(1)___ and the Pressurizer will become INOPERABLE per
LCO 3.4.9, Pressurizer, AS SOON AS Pressurizer level ___(2)___ .
A. (1) rise, then lower
(2) lowers to less than 10%
B. (1) rise, then lower
(2) lowers to less than 27%
C. (1) lower, then rise
(2) rises to greater than 56%
D. (1) lower, then rise
(2) rises to greater than 65%
A. First part is plausible since Pressurizer level lowers in all cases of RCS leaks, with the exception
of a steam space LOCA. Second part is plausible since 10% is the bottom of the band for
Pressurizer level acceptance criteria in SPTAs.
B. First part is plausible since Pressurizer level lowers in all cases of RCS leaks, with the exception
of a steam space LOCA. Second part is plausible since 27% is the low end of the Pressurizer
level band per LCO 3.4.9, Pressurizer, however in this case, pressurizer pressure will rise.
C. Correct.
D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since 65% is the top of the band for Pressurizer
level acceptance criteria in SPTAs
Given the following conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 100% power NC is cross-tied to Train ‘A’ EW Which of the following events would cause a rising indication on Essential Cooling Water System Radiation Monitor, RU-2? 1. A leak in the 1B RCP HP Seal Cooler 2. A leak in the Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger 3. A leak in the Letdown Heat Exchanger A. 1 ONLY B. 2 ONLY C. 1 and 3 ONLY D. 2 and 3 ONLY
A. Correct. Although all 3 events would result in rising indications on the NC RM (RU-6), when
cross-connected with EW, only the RCP HP Seal Cooler leak would be seen on RU-2.
B. Plausible since this would cause rising indication on RU-6, however not on RU-2 because EW
system pressure is ~ 93 psig and Fuel Pool system pressure is ~ 45 psig to ensure any heat
exchanger leakage goes from EW to the Fuel Pool.
C. Plausible since 1 is correct, and 3 would cause rising indication on RU-6, however 3 will not result
in rising indication on RU-2.
D. Plausible since 2 and 3 would cause rising indication on RU-6, however they will not be seen by
RU-2.
Per 40EP-9EO08, Blackout, Charging Pumps are ___(1)___ in order to prevent a potential
RCS leak due to thermal shock of the ___(2)___ when power is restored.
A. (1) placed in Pull To Lock
(2) Reactor Coolant Pump Seals
B. (1) placed in Pull To Lock
(2) Regenerative Heat Exchanger
C. (1) aligned to the alternate discharge header
(2) Reactor Coolant Pump Seals
D. (1) aligned to the alternate discharge header
(2) Regenerative Heat Exchanger
A. Correct.
B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since power being restored to the Charging Pumps
without the pumps in pull to lock would result in cold charging flow being sent through a hot HX,
however the reason for this action is to prevent shocking the RCP seals via an uncontrolled
restoration of seal injection.
C. First part is plausible since the primary concern regarding charging pumps is to prevent an
uncontrolled re-initiation of seal injection, and aligning the charging pumps to the alternate
discharge header would divert flow from the RCP seals, however the correct action is to place the
charging pumps in pull to lock. Second part is correct.
D. First part is plausible since the primary concern regarding charging pumps is to prevent an
uncontrolled re-initiation of seal injection, and aligning the charging pumps to the alternate
discharge header would divert flow from the regenerative heat exchanger, however the correct
action is to place the charging pumps in pull to lock. Second part is plausible since power being
restored to the Charging Pumps would result in cold charging flow being sent through a hot HX,
and aligning the charging pumps to the alternate discharge header would bypass flow around the
regenerative heat exchanger, however the reason for this action is to prevent shocking the RCP
seals via an uncontrolled restoration of seal injection.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 2 is in MODE 5
Train ‘A’ SDC is in service using LPSI Pump ‘A’
Subsequently:
The ‘A’ LPSI Pump tripped due to an 86 lockout
The crew will be alerted of the loss of the ‘A’ LPSI Pump by a ___(1)___ on the SESS
Panel and annunciator 2B06A, SDC TRAIN A/B FLOW LO, ___(2)___ annunciate.
A. (1) white light ONLY
(2) WILL
B. (1) white light ONLY
(2) will NOT
C. (1) white light AND a blue light
(2) WILL
D. (1) white light AND a blue light
(2) will NOT
A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the trip of the LPSI pump will result in a loss of
SDC flow, however in order for that alarm to annunciate, the SDC pump breaker must be closed,
therefore on a loss of flow due to a pump trip, the SDC Train A/B Low Flow alarm does not come
in.
B. Correct.
C. First part is plausible since the blue SESS alarm indicates that a piece of equipment which should
be running is not running, however this is only for ESF equipment which is running due to an ESF
actuation. Second part is plausible since the trip of the LPSI pump will result in a loss of SDC
flow, however in order for that alarm to annunciate, the SDC pump breaker must be closed,
therefore on a loss of flow due to a pump trip, the SDC Train A/B Low Flow alarm does not come
in.
D. First part is plausible since the blue SESS alarm indicates that a piece of equipment which should
be running is not running, however this is only for ESF equipment which is running due to an ESF
actuation. Second part is correct.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 3 is operating at 100% power
Level Control Channel Selector Switch RCN-HS-110 is selected to Channel ‘X’
Pressurizer Heater Control Level Trip Selector Switch RCN-HS-100-3 is selected to
‘BOTH’
The Pressurizer is in boron equalization using only the non-class backup heaters
In this condition, how would the Pressurizer Pressure Control System respond to the
following failures?
(1) If Pressurizer Level Transmitter, RCB-LT-110Y, fails off-scale HIGH, the CLASS backup
heaters…
(2) If Pressurizer Level Transmitter, RCB-LT-110Y, fails off-scale LOW, the NON-CLASS
backup heaters…
A. (1) will energize
(2) will trip
B. (1) will energize
(2) will remain energized
C. (1) will remain off
(2) will trip
D. (1) will remain off
(2) will remain energized
A. First part is plausible since all backup heaters energize when pressurizer level is 3% above
setpoint, however this only occurs if the level selector switch is selected to the channel which
indicates > 3% above setpoint. Second part is correct.
B. First part is plausible since all backup heaters energize when pressurizer level is 3% above
setpoint, however this only occurs if the level selector switch is selected to the channel which
indicates > 3% above setpoint. Second part is plausible since the low level cutout is selected to
BOTH which implies that both level transmitters must fall below 25% to cutout the heaters on low
level, however in this position a low level on EITHER level transmitter will result in all heaters
tripping.
C. Correct.
D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the low level cutout is selected to BOTH which
implies that both level transmitters must fall below 25% to cutout the heaters on low level,
however in this position a low level on EITHER level transmitter will result in all heaters tripping
Given the following conditions:
The Reactor failed to automatically trip following a valid RPS trip signal
Manual Reactor Trip Pushbuttons failed to trip the Reactor
NGN-L03B2 breaker was manually opened
NGN-L10B2 breaker failed to open
The next action the crew should take is to ___(1)___ in order to de-energize the ___(2)___ .
A. (1) open NGN-S02F, Feeder Breaker for NGN-L10
(2) CEDMCS bus DIRECTLY
B. (1) open NGN-S02F, Feeder Breaker for NGN-L10
(2) running CEDM MG set, which will de-energize the CEDMCS bus
C. (1) dispatch an operator to locally open Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers
(2) CEDMCS bus DIRECTLY
D. (1) dispatch an operator to locally open Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers
(2) running CEDM MG set, which will de-energize the CEDMCS bus
A. First part is plausible since de-energizing NGN-L10 would be the correct action, however we do
not “go upstream” if the B2 breaker does not open. Second part is correct.
B. First part is plausible since de-energizing NGN-L10 would be the correct action, however we do
not “go upstream” if the B2 breaker does not open. Second part is plausible since de-energizing
L10 does stop the running MG set which will in turn de-energize the CEDMCS Bus, however
going upstream of L10 is not the correct action to take.
C. Correct.
D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the first response to an ATWS is to open L03
and L10 B2 breakers which will stop the running CEDM MG sets, however opening the RTCBs
locally will de-energize the CEDMCS Bus directly and the MG sets will remain running
Given the following conditions:
Unit 3 tripped from 100% due to a complete loss of Main Feedwater
Offsite power was lost on the trip
The ‘B’ EDG tripped on overspeed
In this condition, the preferred Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to feed SGs with is ___(1)___ and
the primary source of cooling to the AFW Pump bearing oil will be supplied by ___(2)___ .
A. (1) AFA-P01
(2) Train ‘A’ Essential Cooling Water
B. (1) AFA-P01
(2) the discharge of the running AFW pump
C. (1) AFN-P01
(2) Train ‘A’ Essential Cooling Water
D. (1) AFN-P01
(2) the discharge of the running AFW pump
A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since EW provides cooling water to several safety
related pumps, however AF pumps have their bearings cooled by the discharge of the pumps.
B. Correct.
C. First part is plausible since AFN is preferred over AFA for all conditions EXCEPT a loss of offsite
power. Second part is plausible since EW provides cooling water to several safety related
pumps, however AF pumps have their bearings cooled by the discharge of the pumps.
D. First part is plausible since AFN is preferred over AFA for all conditions EXCEPT a loss of offsite
power. Second part is correct.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 3 tripped from 100% power
On the trip, the following malfunctions occurred:
o SBCS Master Controller Output failed to 0%
o RRS Tave failed to 550°F
SG pressures are fluctuating between ~ 1230 and 1250 psia
Neither SG is being fed
The SGs are not being fed because ___(1)___ and the preferred method to restore
Feedwater to the SGs is to ___(2)___ .
A. (1) indicated Tave is too low
(2) transition to an Auxiliary Feedwater source
B. (1) indicated Tave is too low
(2) restore Main Feedwater by taking manual control of Downcomer Regulating Valves
C. (1) SG pressures are too high
(2) transition to an Auxiliary Feedwater source
D. (1) SG pressures are too high
(2) restore Main Feedwater by taking manual control of Downcomer Regulating Valves
A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible as this is a viable option and would restore feed to
the SGs, however per EOP Operations Expectations, the preferred option is to take manual
control of the downcomer valves to restore feed using Main Feed Pumps.
B. Correct.
C. First part is plausible since normal post-trip SG pressure is 1170 psia and a higher pressure in
the SGs could result in the MFPs not being able to send water to them, however the reason for
no feed is the low Tave. Second part is plausible as this is a viable option and would restore feed
to the SGs, however per EOP Operations Expectations, the preferred option is to take manual
control of the downcomer valves to restore feed using Main Feed Pumps.
D. First part is plausible since normal post-trip SG pressure is 1170 psia and a higher pressure in
the SGs could result in the MFPs not being able to send water to them, however the reason for
no feed is the low Tave. Second part is correct.
Question 13 Given the following conditions: Unit 1 is in a blackout condition Both Unit 1 EDGs are unavailable Off-site power is not expected to be available for 3 hours Per 40EP-9EO08, Blackout, an SBOG must be aligned to a vital 4.16 kV bus within a MAXIMUM of \_\_\_(1)\_\_\_ in order to ensure sufficient power is available to coping loads to support the blackout coping time of \_\_\_(2)\_\_\_ . A. (1) 1 hour (2) 4 hours B. (1) 1 hour (2) 16 hours C. (1) 2 hours (2) 4 hours D. (1) 2 hours (2) 16 hours
A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since 4 hours was the PV coping time prior to the 3-
unit trip due to a loss of offsite power in 2004, however it is now 16 hours. Additionally, if a
blackout is expected to last > 4 hours, a General Emergency is declared so correlating the GE
criteria with site coping time is plausible.
B. Correct.
C. First part is plausible since 2 hours is the rated time for the class batteries, however the
procedural guidance is to align an SBOG within 1 hour. Second part is plausible since 4 hours
was the PV coping time prior to the 3-unit trip due to a loss of offsite power in 2004, however it is
now 16 hours. Additionally, if a blackout is expected to last > 4 hours, a General Emergency is
declared so correlating the GE criteria with site coping time is plausible.
D. First part is plausible since 2 hours is the rated time for the class batteries, however the
procedural guidance is to align an SBOG within 1 hour. Second part is correct.
Given the following condition: Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a loss of off-site power Two minutes after the loss of off-site power, with NO operator action, letdown flow will be \_\_\_(1)\_\_\_ and charging flow will be \_\_\_(2)\_\_\_ . A. (1) 0 gpm (2) 44 gpm B. (1) 0 gpm (2) 132 gpm C. (1) 30 gpm (2) 44 gpm D. (1) 30 gpm (2) 132 gpm
A. Correct. Letdown will isolate on the loss of off-site power. The “always running” charging pump will be anti-pumped but the normally running charging pump will restart ~ 10 seconds after the trip when the EDGs re-energize the class buses. B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the Charging Pumps are class powered, and a loss of offsite power will temporarily result in an indicated Pressurizer level of 0% on (which would result in all 3 charging pumps running), however on the re-energization of the class bus, only one Charging Pump automatically restarts. C. First part is plausible 30 gpm is the low end for letdown flow in automatic, and the Pressurizer will shrink on the trip from 100% power, however the loss of charging flow while the EDG is starting up and loading on the bus will result in letdown flow isolating on high temperature. Second part is correct. D. First part is plausible 30 gpm is the low end for letdown flow in automatic, and the Pressurizer will shrink on the trip from 100% power, however the loss of charging flow while the EDG is starting up and loading on the bus will result in letdown flow isolating on high temperature. Second part is plausible since the Charging Pumps are class powered, and a loss of offsite power will temporarily result in an indicated Pressurizer level of 0% (which would result in all 3 charging pumps running), however on the re-energization of the class bus, only one Charging Pump automatically restarts.
Given the following conditions: Unit 1 is operating at 50% power RCN-LIC-110, Level Setpoint Control, is in REMOTE/AUTO RCN-HS-110, Level Control Selector Switch, is selected to Channel X Subsequently: 120 VAC Class Instrument Bus PNA-D25 de-energized due to an electrical fault With NO operator action, Pressurizer level SETPOINT will \_\_\_(1)\_\_\_ and actual Pressurizer level will \_\_\_(2)\_\_\_ . A. (1) lower to 33% (2) rise B. (1) lower to 33% (2) lower C. (1) remain at ~ 42% (2) rise D. (1) remain at ~ 42% (2) lower
A. First part is plausible since the setpoint is controlled by Tave and the Tave instruments are
powered from 120 VAC instrument bus power, however those are non-class instruments so they
are unaffected. Second part is correct.
B. First part is plausible since the setpoint is controlled by Tave and the Tave instruments are
powered from 120 VAC instrument bus power, however those are non-class instruments so they
are unaffected. Second part is plausible since the pressurizer level master controller is powered
by 120 VAC instrument bus power, and on a loss of power to the controller, two charging pumps
would stop causing pressurizer level to lower, however it is powered by non-class instrument
power so a loss of PNA-D25 has no impact to the master controller.
C. Correct. Setpoint is unaffected due to the inputs for the setpoint being non-class power.
Pressurizer level will rise since the level controller is selected to channel X (which fails to 0% on
the loss of PNA-D25), causing the system to start all charging pumps and reduce letdown flow in
order to raise pressurizer level back to the setpoint of ~ 42%.
D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the pressurizer level master controller is
powered by 120 VAC instrument bus power, and on a loss of power to the controller, two
charging pumps would stop causing pressurizer level to lower, however it is powered by nonclass instrument power so a loss of PNA-D25 has no impact to the master controller
Given the following conditions:
Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
A leak in the Nuclear Cooling Water System has resulted in a complete loss of NC
Train ‘A’ Essential Cooling Water has been cross-connected to NC per 40AO-9ZZ03,
Loss of Cooling Water
(1) Which of the following ESFAS signals will automatically close EWA-UV-65 and EWA-UV145, Cross-Tie Valves to/from Nuclear Cooling Water?
(2) What is the purpose of the auto close feature of these valves?
A. (1) SIAS
(2) To isolate Containment during accident conditions
B. (1) SIAS
(2) To ensure adequate cooling flow to the SDCHX during accident conditions
C. (1) CSAS
(2) To isolate Containment during accident conditions
D. (1) CSAS
(2) To ensure adequate cooling flow to the SDCHX during accident conditions
A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the NC system is divorced from the EW
system on a SIAS, however containment isolation is maintained by either the CIAS or CSAS
signals.
B. Correct.
C. First part is plausible since CSAS does isolate NC valves to containment, however SIAS closes
the EW-NC cross-tie valves. Second part is plausible since the NC system is divorced from the
EW system on a SIAS, however containment isolation is maintained by either the CIAS or CSAS
signals.
D. First part is plausible since CSAS does isolate NC val
Given the following conditions:
Unit 2 tripped from 100% power due to a seismic event
ADVs are being used to maintain SG pressures in the normal post-trip bands
Subsequently:
A break in the Instrument Air system has resulted in a complete loss of Instrument Air to
the MSSS Building
(1) Due to the loss of Instrument Air, ADVs will…
(2) When backup nitrogen is aligned, the ADVs can be operated for a MINIMUM of…
A. (1) drift closed until backup nitrogen is manually aligned to the ADVs
(2) 2 hours
B. (1) drift closed until backup nitrogen is manually aligned to the ADVs
(2) 13.3 hours
C. (1) remain open due to backup nitrogen automatically aligning to the ADVs
(2) 2 hours
D. (1) remain open due to backup nitrogen automatically aligning to the ADVs
(2) 13.3 hours
A. First part is plausible since the ADVs do fail closed on a loss of IA, and this would be the correct
failure method if nitrogen had to be manually aligned, however nitrogen is automatically aligned
keeping the ADVs in their current position on a loss of IA. Second part is plausible since 2 hours
is the amount of time the ADVs would remain operational following a loss of DC power, however
on a loss of IA they remain operational for 13.3 hours.
B. First part is plausible since the ADVs do fail closed on a loss of IA, and this would be the correct
failure method if nitrogen had to be manually aligned, however nitrogen is automatically aligned
keeping the ADVs in their current position on a loss of IA. Second part is correct.
C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since 2 hours is the amount of time the ADVs would
remain operational following a loss of DC power, however on a loss of IA they remain operational
for 13.3 hours.
D. Correct.
Given the following conditions: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Subsequently: Grid instabilities have resulted in lowering grid frequency If grid frequency continues to lower, the crew should anticipate an automatic Reactor trip due to… A. Low DNBR B. Low SG Level C. Low SG Pressure D. Low Pressurizer Pressure
A. Correct. The lowering grid frequency will result in RCPs slowing down, which will lower the
margin to DNBR, resulting in a Reactor Trip.
B. Plausible since grid frequency lowering will result in the Main Turbine taking on more load, which
will draw more steam, and could cause the MFPs to be unable to keep up with demand.
C. Plausible since the Main Turbine will take on more load, and increasing turbine load will lower SG
pressure, however the Reactor will trip on low DNBR first.
D. Plausible since the Main Turbine will take on more load, and increasing turbine load will lower
PZR pressure, however the Reactor will trip on low DNBR first
Given the following conditions:
Unit 3 is operating at 80% power
Part Strength CEAs have been inserted to 132” withdrawn for ASI control
Subsequently:
Part Strength CEA 32 began withdrawing with no operator action
The RO placed the Mode Select Switch in STANDBY
CEA 32 stopped at 139.5” withdrawn
All other Part Strength CEAs remained at 132” withdrawn
In order to comply with Technical Specifications, the crew must ___(1)___ and this action
must be completed within a MAXIMUM of ___(2)___ .
A. (1) commence a boration to restore SDM
(2) 15 minutes
B. (1) commence a boration to restore SDM
(2) one hour
C. (1) reduce power to within the limits of the COLR
(2) 15 minutes
D. (1) reduce power to within the limits of the COLR
(2) one hour
A. First part is plausible since the CEA deviated in the outward direction it could be assumed that
the positive reactivity inserted would result in a loss of SDM, and therefore need to be mitigated
via a boration per LCO 3.1.2, Shutdown Margin – Reactor Trip Breakers Closed, however the
mode of applicability for LCO 3.1.2 is not met at 100% power. Second part is plausible since 15
minutes is the completion time for a boration during a loss of SDM, however in this case, the
completion time is one hour.
B. First part is plausible since the CEA deviated in the outward direction it could be assumed that
the positive reactivity inserted would result in a loss of SDM, and therefore need to be mitigated
via a boration per LCO 3.1.2, Shutdown Margin – Reactor Trip Breakers Closed, however the
mode of applicability for LCO 3.1.2 is not met at 100% power. Second part is correct.
C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the completion time for a boration due to a
loss of SDM is 15 minutes, and 15 minutes is also the completion time for a load reduction when
directed by the ECC, however a power reduction due to a misaligned CEA must be completed
within a maximum of one hour.
D. Correct.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when four-finger full-strength CEA 66 dropped to
the bottom of the core
Power stabilized at 96% following the CEA drop
Per 40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions, the crew must lower power to a final MAXIMUM power
level of ___(1)___ in the first hour, and will maintain Tave approximately ___(2)___ Tref
during the turbine load reduction.
A. (1) 76%
(2) equal to
B. (1) 76%
(2) 3°F above
C. (1) 80%
(2) equal to
D. (1) 80%
(2) 3°F above
A. First part is plausible since a 20% power reduction is required in the first hour, and 76% is 20%
below the power level prior to commencing the power reduction, however the required power
reduction is 20% below the pre-drop power level. Second part is plausible since this would keep
Tcold on the program band, however during a power reduction Tave is rasied to 3°F above Tref.
B. First part is plausible since a 20% power reduction is required in the first hour, and 76% is 20%
below the power level prior to commencing the power reduction, however the required power
reduction is 20% below the pre-drop power level. Second part is correct.
C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since this would keep Tcold on the program band,
however during a power reduction Tave is rasied to 3°F above Tref.
D. Correct.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 3 is operating at 12% power.
RCN-LIC-110, Level Setpoint Control, is in REMOTE/AUTO.
The Charging Pump Selector Switch is in the 1-2-3 position.
Subsequently:
A fault in the Pressurizer Level Controller fails the SETPOINT to 50%.
Which of the following describes the immediate response to the controller failure?
The ‘E’ Charging Pump, CHE-P01, ___(1)___ receive a start signal and the Pressurizer
Backup Heaters ___(2)___ turn on.
A. (1) SHOULD
(2) SHOULD
B. (1) SHOULD
(2) should NOT
C. (1) should NOT
(2) SHOULD
D. (1) should NOT
(2) should NOT
A. First part is plausible since the pressurizer is now 17% below setpoint (setpoint at 12% power is
33%), and the “standby” charging pump gets a stop signal at 14% below setpoint, but the start
setpoint for the standby charging pump is 23% below setpoint. Second part is plausible since the
heaters energize on a level deviation of > 3%, however that deviation must be level > setpoint,
not the other way around.
B. First part is plausible since the pressurizer is now 17% below setpoint (setpoint at 12% power is
33%), and the “standby” charging pump gets a stop signal at 14% below setpoint, but the start
setpoint for the standby charging pump is 23% below setpoint. Second part is correct.
C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the heaters energize on a level deviation of >
3%, however that deviation must be level > setpoint, not the other way around.
D. Correct.
Given the following conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 6 Core off-load is in progress Subsequently: The Refueling SRO informs the Control Room that a Fuel Assembly has been dropped in the Refueling Pool The RO reports that Power Access Purge Radiation Monitors, RU-37 and RU-38, are slowly trending up Per 40AO-9ZZ22, Fuel Damage, the crew should ensure \_\_\_(1)\_\_\_ and \_\_\_(2)\_\_\_ are initiated. A. (1) CPIAS (2) CREFAS B. (1) CPIAS (2) CRVIAS C. (1) FBEVAS (2) CREFAS D. (1) FBEVAS (2) CRVIAS
Explanation:
A. Correct.
B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since ventilation to the control room is changed in
response to this event, however CR ventilation is shifted to essential mode using a CREFAS, not
isolated using a CRVIAS.
C. First part is plausible since the fuel building is connected to the refueling pool during core off-load,
and FBEVAS would be correct if the assembly was dropped in the SFP, however since the
assembly was dropped in Refueling Pool, CPIAS is actuated instead of FBEVAS. Second part is
correct.
D. First part is plausible since the fuel building is connected to the refueling pool during core off-load,
and FBEVAS would be correct if the assembly was dropped in the SFP, however since the
assembly was dropped in Refueling Pool, CPIAS is actuated instead of FBEVAS. Second part is
plausible since ventilation to the control room is changed in response to this event, however CR
ventilation is shifted to essential mode using a CREFAS, not isolated using a CRVIAS
Per 40DP-9AP09, SG Tube Rupture Technical Guidelines, after the most affected SG has
been isolated during a SGTR…
(1) Why is the isolated SG pressure maintained less than 1135 psig?
(2) Why is D/P between the RCS and the isolated SG maintained at +/- 50 psid?
A. (1) To minimize the likelihood of lifting a MSSV on the isolated SG
(2) To minimize the leak rate to and from the affected SG
B. (1) To minimize the likelihood of lifting a MSSV on the isolated SG
(2) To minimize the pressure stress across the degraded SG U-tube(s) to prevent
further degradation
C. (1) To ensure SBCS remains available by minimizing D/P across the MSIV Bypass
Valve
(2) To minimize the leak rate to and from the affected SG
D. (1) To ensure SBCS remains available by minimizing D/P across the MSIV Bypass
Valve
(2) To minimize the pressure stress across the degraded SG U-tube(s) to prevent
further degradation
A. Correct.
B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since lower D/P across the degraded U-tubes will
lower the likelihood for further degradation, however the reason for maintaining +/- 50 psid is to
minimize leak rate.
C. First part is plausible since reopening the MSIV bypass to reduce pressure in the isolated SG is
preferred over using ADVs, however the reason for maintaining pressure < 1135 psig is to
prevent opening a Main Steam Safety on the affected SG. Second part is correct.
D. First part is plausible since reopening the MSIV bypass to reduce pressure in the isolated SG is
preferred over using ADVs, however the reason for maintaining pressure < 1135 psig is to
prevent opening a Main Steam Safety on the affected SG. Second part is plausible since lower
D/P across the degraded U-tubes will lower the likelihood for further degradation, however the
reason for maintaining +/- 50 psid is to minimize leak rate
Which of the following failures would prevent a Containment Isolation Valve from
automatically closing on a subsequent auto close signal?
A. A Train ‘A’ sequencer failure
B. A complete loss of Instrument Air
C. A loss of Class 120 VAC bus PNA-D25
D. A loss of Class 480 VAC MCC PHA-M35
A. Plausible since a Train ‘A’ sequencer failure will prevent several ESFAS actuated components
from going to their actuated state, however the sequencer does not control CIVs.
B. Plausible since IA is the motive force for several CIVs, however IA is not the closure mechanism
for CIVs.
C. Plausible as several CIVs are closed by AC powered MOVs, however the power supply for these
MOVs is not PNA.
D. Correct.
During a Control Room evacuation due to a fire, the Pressurizer and Steam Generator level
and pressure indications which are considered reliable are located on the ___(1)___ Remote
Shutdown Panel and are protected from the potential effects of the fire by ___(2)___ .
A. (1) Train ‘A’
(2) the isolators in their circuitry
B. (1) Train ‘A’
(2) placing their LOCAL/REMOTE handswitches to LOCAL
C. (1) Train ‘B’
(2) the isolators in their circuitry
D. (1) Train ‘B’
(2) placing their LOCAL/REMOTE handswitches to LOCAL
A. First part is plausible since Train ‘A’ is where the station blackout generators tie in and the turbine
driven AFW pump is a Train ‘A’ pump, however the indications with fire isolators in them are on
Train ‘B’. Second part is correct.
B. First part is plausible since Train ‘A’ is where the station blackout generators tie in and the turbine
driven AFW pump is a Train ‘A’ pump, however the indications with fire isolators in them are on
Train ‘B’. Second part is plausible since there are LOCAL/REMOTE switches which isolate
equipment from the control room to prevent spurious actuations due to hot shorts or grounds,
however the indications do not have LOCAL/REMOTE disconnects, they have isolators in their
circuitry.
C. Correct.
D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since there are LOCAL/REMOTE switches which
isolate equipment from the control room to prevent spurious actuations due to hot shorts or
grounds, however the indications do not have LOCAL/REMOTE disconnects, they have isolators
in their circuitry.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 1 was tripped due to a 20 gpm RCS leak into Containment.
SPTAs have been completed and 40EP-9EO03, LOCA, has been entered.
One RCP has been stopped in each loop.
Containment conditions are NOT harsh.
The crew commenced a cooldown and depressurization at 0200.
Plant conditions at 0200:
o RCS Tcold = 506°F
o RCS Thot = 507°F
o REP CET = 521°F
o RCS Pressure = 2200 psia
Plant conditions at 0300:
o RCS Tcold = 408°F
o RCS Thot = 410°F
o REP CET = 419°F
o RCS Pressure = 1700 psia
Based on current plant conditions, the _____(1)_____ has been exceeded, and the CRS
should direct stopping the cooldown _____(2)_____ per 40EP-9EO03, LOCA.
Standard Appendix 2, RCS Press Temp Limits Normal CTMT Conditions, is provided.
A. 1. P/T limit
2. and stabilizing RCS pressure
B. 1. P/T limit
2. but continuing the RCS depressurization
2018 PVNGS NRC Initial License RO Written Exam Rev 6
C. 1. cooldown rate
2. and maintaining pressure stable
D. 1. cooldown rate
2. but continuing the RCS depressurization
A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since stopping the cooldown and stabilizing pressure
would allow the thermal stresses to be slowly absorbed in the vessel and by stopping the cooldown the
RCS could slowly heat up resulting in parameters returning to the “good” side of the P/T curve,
however per 40EP-9EO03, LOCA, the CRS should stop the cooldown and continuing to reduce
pressure.
B. Correct. Per step 37 of 40EP-9EO03, LOCA, since the 200°F subcooling curve has been violated, the
cooldown must be stopped and the RCS depressurized to get within RCS P/T limits.
C. Plausible since if REP CET is used the cooldown rate has been exceeded (521°F – 419°F)/1 hour =
102°F/hr, however Tcold is the value used to track cooldown rate. Second part is the correct action for
exceeding 100°F/hr cooldown rate, however since the P/T limit was violated, stopping the cooldown
and depressurizing is the correct action.
D. Plausible since if REP CET is used the cooldown rate has been exceeded (521°F – 419°F)/1 hour =
102°F/hr, however Tcold is the value used to track cooldown rate. Second part is the correct action for
a P/T limit being exceeded.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 2 is operating at 30% power
Nuclear Cooling Water Containment Isolation Valve, NCA-UV-402, has spuriously closed
The crew must trip the Reactor and all RCPs if they cannot reopen NCA-UV-402 within a
MAXIMUM of ___(1)___ minutes, and the AOP which will direct reopening NCA-UV-402 is
___(2)___ .
A. (1) 3
(2) 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water
B. (1) 3
(2) 40AO-9ZZ04, Reactor Coolant Pump Emergencies
C. (1) 10
(2) 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water
D. (1) 10
(2) 40AO-9ZZ04, Reactor Coolant Pump Emergencies
A. First part is plausible as 3 minutes is the limit on a loss of NC flow to the RCPs when seal
injection is not in service, however since seal injection would not be affected by the loss of NC,
there is a 10 minute limit to restore NC. Second part is correct.
B. First part is plausible as 3 minutes is the limit on a loss of NC flow to the RCPs when seal
injection is not in service, however since seal injection would not be affected by the loss of NC,
there is a 10 minute limit to restore NC. Second part is plausible as RCP Emergencies is entered
on a loss of NC, however the actions to restore NC flow is in the Loss of Cooling Water AOP.
C. Correct.
D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible as RCP Emergencies is entered on a loss of NC,
however the actions to restore NC flow is in the Loss of Cooling Water AOP.
Letdown Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve, CHE-UV-520, will automatically bypass the Ion Exchangers if temperature at the outlet of the Letdown Heat Exchanger reaches a MINIMUM of \_\_\_(1)\_\_\_ and when temperature returns to normal, CHE-UV-520 \_\_\_(2)\_\_\_ to the Ion Exchangers. A. (1) 125°F (2) will automatically realign B. (1) 125°F (2) must be manually realigned C. (1) 135°F (2) will automatically realign D. (1) 135°F (2) must be manually realigned
A. First part is plausible since 125°F at the outlet of the LDHX will cause a high temperature alarm,
however UV-520 doesn’t bypass the IXs until 135°F. Second part is plausible since UV-520 does
realign automatically in response to temperature, however only to bypass the IXs.
B. First part is plausible since 125°F at the outlet of the LDHX will cause a high temperature alarm,
however UV-520 doesn’t bypass the IXs until 135°F. Second part is correct.
C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since UV-520 does realign automatically in
response to temperature, however only to bypass the IXs.
D. Correct.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 3 has tripped from 100% power
An emergency boration is required
RWT Level Transmitter LT-200 has failed to 0%
RWT Level Transmitters LT-203A/B/C/D on B02 all indicate 95%
Per Standard Appendix 103, RCS Makeup / Emergency Boration, which of the following
boration flowpaths are available SOLELY by taking actions from the Control Room?
1. CHN-UV-527, Makeup to Charging Pump Suction Valve
2. CHE-UV-536, RWT Gravity Feed to Charging Pumps Valve
3. CHN-UV-514, Boric Acid Makeup to Charging Pumps Valve
A. 1 and 2
B. 1 and 3
C. 2 ONLY
D. 3 ONLY
A. Plausible that CHN-UV-527 would be available since this is the normal method of emergency
boration, requires no field actions, and actual level in the RWT is 95%, however if LT-200
indicates < 73% the BAMPs will not start which prevents the use of UV-527 for boration. CHEUV-536 is correct.
B. Plausible that CHN-UV-527 would be available since this is the normal method of emergency
boration, requires no field actions, and actual level in the RWT is 95%, however if LT-200
indicates < 73% the BAMPs will not start which prevents the use of UV-527 for boration.
Plausible that CHN-UV-514 would be available since this valve can be used without the use of
field actions, and it can still be used without BAMPs being available, however if UV-514 is used
without BAMPs available, manual field actions are required to bypass the discharge filter for
gravity feed flow.
C. Correct.
D. Plausible that CHN-UV-514 would be available since this valve can be used without the use of
field actions, and it can still be used without BAMPs being available, however if UV-514 is used
without BAMPs available, manual field actions are required to bypass the discharge filter for
gravity feed flow.
In order to meet the operability requirements of LCO 3.4.6, RCS Loops – MODE 4, a
MINIMUM of ___(1)___ RCS loops and SDC trains (any combination) must be OPERABLE
and a MINIMUM of ___(2)___ RCS loop(s) and/or SDC train(s) must be in operation.
A. (1) 2
(2) 1
B. (1) 2
(2) 2
C. (1) 3
(2) 1
D. (1) 3
(2) 2
A. Correct.
B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since in MODE 5 one train must be in operation and
MODE 4 has a higher heat removal demand, however there is only one train/loop required to be
in operation in MODE 4.
C. First part is plausible if thought that a minimum of one train of SDC and one RCS loop must be
operable with an additional train or loop available, however only two total trains/loops must be
operable in MODE 4. Second part is correct.
D. First part is plausible if thought that a minimum of one train of SDC and one RCS loop must be
operable with an additional train or loop available, however only two total trains/loops must be
operable in MODE 4. Second part is plausible since in MODE 5 one train must be in operation
and MODE 4 has a higher heat removal demand, however there is only one train/loop required to
be in operation in MODE 4.
Given the following conditions:
An ESD has occurred on Unit 1
SIAS was manually actuated on trend
Pressurizer pressure is 1950 psia and lowering
(1) HPSI flow will START to INDICATE when flow to each loop reaches a MINIMUM of …
(2) When RCS pressure has subsequently risen to greater than HPSI Pump shutoff head,
the pump should be secured within a MAXIMUM of…
A. (1) ~ 30 gpm
(2) 15 minutes
B. (1) ~ 30 gpm
(2) 1 hour
C. (1) ~ 75 gpm
(2) 15 minutes
D. (1) ~ 75 gpm
(2) 1 hour
A. First part is plausible since the first indicating line on the transmitter is 30 gpm, however the flow
indication doesn’t come on scale until 8-10% of full flow (750 gpm). Second part is plausible
since the EDGs can only run for 15 minutes without cooling water, however the HPSI Pumps can
be run for up to one hour on recirc.
B. First part is plausible since the first indicating line on the transmitter is 30 gpm, however the flow
indication doesn’t come on scale until 8-10% of full flow (750 gpm). Second part is correct.
C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the EDGs can only run for 15 minutes without
cooling water, however the HPSI Pumps can be run for up to one hour on recirc.
D. Correct.
Per 40AO-9ZZ18, Shutdown Outside the Control Room, after the Reactor is tripped, the
crew should stop ___(1)___ and if the RCPs do not trip from B04, the crew should
___(2)___ .
A. (1) all four RCPs
(2) direct an operator to trip all four RCPs at the switchgear
B. (1) all four RCPs
(2) de-energize NAN-S01 and NAN-S02 to stop all four RCPs
C. (1) one RCP in each loop
(2) direct an operator to trip one RCP in each loop at the switchgear
D. (1) one RCP in each loop
(2) de-energize either NAN-S01 or NAN-S02 to stop one RCP in each loop
A. First part is plausible since the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) has no controls or indications for
RCPs or RCP cooling water and cannot be verified to be operating within limitations (an RCP
running without cooling water is subject to seal failure within 30 minutes). Mitigating this risk by
transitioning to natural circulation is a plausible action to take. Second part is correct.
B. First part is plausible since the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP) has no controls or indications for
RCPs or RCP cooling water and cannot be verified to be operating within limitations (an RCP
running without cooling water is subject to seal failure within 30 minutes). Mitigating this risk by
transitioning to natural circulation is a plausible action to take. Second part is plausible since deenergizing NAN-S01 and/or NAN-S02 is directed in 40AO-9ZZ04, RCP Emergencies, if RCPs
need to be secured but the handswitches on B04 do not stop the pumps.
C. Correct.
D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since de-energizing NAN-S01 and/or NAN-S02 is
directed in 40AO-9ZZ04, RCP Emergencies, if RCPs need to be secured but the handswitches
on B04 do not stop the pumps.
While operating at 100% power, which of the following conditions, individually, will cause
Reactor Drain Tank level and pressure to rise?
1. RCS Pressure of 2425 psia
2. The in-service Backpressure Control Valve failing closed
3. Spurious closure of CHB-UV-505, Controlled Bleedoff Containment Isolation Valve
A. 1 and 2 ONLY
B. 1 and 3 ONLY
C. 2 ONLY
D. 3 ONLY
A. Plausible since the Pressurizer Safety valves do relieve to the RDT, however the pressurizer
safety valves don’t lift until a minimum of 2450.25 psia. A backpressure control valve failing
closed will result in the letdown relief valve lifting, however those reliefs send water to the
Equipment Drain Tank.
B. Plausible since the Pressurizer Safety valves do relieve to the RDT, however the pressurizer
safety valves don’t lift until a minimum of 2450.25 psia. Closure of CHB-UV-505 is correct.
C. Plausible since other relief valves which relieve reactor coolant relieve to the RDT, however the
letdown reliefs relieve to the EDT.
D. Correct.
Given the following conditions: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Train ‘B’ Essential Cooling Water is cross-tied with Nuclear Cooling Water supplying the essential NC loads Both NCW pumps are in Pull-to-Lock Based on these conditions, which of the following conditions, individually, would isolate cooling water to the RCPs? 1. Train ‘B’ SIAS 2. Train ‘B’ CSAS 3. Low Level in the ‘B’ EW Surge Tank A. 1 ONLY B. 2 ONLY C. 1 and 3 ONLY D. 2 and 3 ONLY
A. Plausible since a Train ‘A’ SIAS will isolate cooling to the RCPs when cross-tied with Train ‘A’
EW, however when NC is cross-tied with Train ‘B’ EW, cooling will not automatically be isolated
to the RCPs.
B. Correct. The Train ‘B’ CSAS will close containment isolation valves in the NC system which will
stop EW flow to the RCPs.
C. Same plausibility as distractor A for the Train ‘B’ SIAS. Plausible since a low level in the ‘A’ EW
surge tank will isolate the cross tie between Train ‘A’ EW and the NC system, however this does
not happen when Train ‘B’ is supplying NC loads.
D. Train ‘B’ CSAS is correct. Same plausibility for the low level in the ‘B’ surge tank.
The Main Spray Valves are connected to the RCS at the discharge of the \_\_\_(1)\_\_\_ RCPs and the Auxiliary Spray Valves are \_\_\_(2)\_\_\_ when the Charging Pumps are aligned to the alternate discharge header. A. (1) Loop 1 (2) available B. (1) Loop 1 (2) unavailable C. (1) Loop 2 (2) available D. (1) Loop 2 (2) unavailable
A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since charging flow is the motive force for aux spray
and charging remains in service when aligned to alternate discharge header, however aux spray
valves are bypassed when the alternate discharge header is in use.
B. Correct.
C. First part is plausible since main spray valves are in the same loop, however that loop is loop 1.
Second part is plausible since charging flow is the motive force for aux spray and charging
remains in service when aligned to alternate discharge header, however aux spray valves are
bypassed when the alternate discharge header is in use.
D. First part is plausible since main spray valves are in the same loop, however that loop is loop 1.
Second part is correct.
Given the following conditions: Unit 3 is operating at 100% power SPS Pressurizer Pressure transmitter, PT-199C, failed to 2500 psia With NO operator action, the ‘C’ RTCB will \_\_\_(1)\_\_\_ and the CEDMCS MG Set Output Contactor(s) will \_\_\_(2)\_\_\_ . A. (1) open (2) remain closed on BOTH MG sets B. (1) open (2) open on ONE of the two MG sets C. (1) remain closed (2) remain closed on BOTH MG sets D. (1) remain closed (2) open on ONE of the two MG sets
A. Correct.
B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the failed transmitter will cause actuations to
occur (like opening one RTCB), however the MG set output contactors will not open unless two
SPS transmitters exceed the trip setpoint of 2409 psia.
C. First part is plausible since RTCBs don’t open on a failure of one transmitter in most cases,
however the SPS transmitters will each open one RTCB when 2409 psia is exceeded. Second
part is correct.
D. First part is plausible since RTCBs don’t open on a failure of one transmitter in most cases,
however the SPS transmitters will each open one RTCB when 2409 psia is exceeded. Second
part is plausible since the failed transmitter will cause actuations to occur (like opening one
RTCB), however the MG set output contactors will not open unless two SPS transmitters exceed
the trip setpoint of 2409 psia.
(1) Following an inadvertent Train ‘A’ MSIS actuation, RCS Heat Removal is available using… (2) Following an inadvertent Train ‘A’ CIAS actuation, RCS Pressure Control is available using… A. (1) ADVs ONLY (2) Aux Spray ONLY B. (1) ADVs ONLY (2) Main AND Aux Spray C. (1) ADVs AND SBCS (2) Aux Spray ONLY D. (1) ADVs AND SBCS (2) Main AND Aux Spray
A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since a CSAS (Phase B Isolation) would isolate
instrument air to containment by closing IAA-UV-2 (instrument air to containment isolation valve),
rendering main spray unavailable, but a CIAS (Phase A Isolation) would not.
B. Correct.
C. First part – it is plausible that a Train ‘A’ MSIS would only isolate the MSIVs on SG#1, allowing
SBCS to remain in operation, however, either Train MSIS will close both MSIVs. Also, its
plausible to assume a ‘A’ MSIS would only isolate SG#1 just as an AFAS-1 only feeds SG#1.
Second part is plausible since a CSAS (Phase B Isolation) would isolate instrument air to
containment by closing IAA-UV-2 (instrument air to containment isolation valve), rendering main
spray unavailable, but a CIAS (Phase A Isolation) would not.
D. First part – it is plausible that a Train ‘A’ MSIS would only isolate the MSIVs on SG#1, allowing
SBCS to remain in operation, however, either Train MSIS will close both MSIVs. Also, its
plausible to assume a ‘A’ MSIS would only isolate SG#1 just as an AFAS-1 only feeds SG#1.
Second part is correct.
Given the following conditions:
Unit 1 is in MODE 3, cooling down to MODE 5 for emergent maintenance
The BOP depressed the LO SG PRESS SETPOINT RESET pushbutton on all four
channels when both SG pressures were 1000 psia
If the crew fails to reset the low SG pressure setpoints again during the cooldown, MSIS will
actuate AS SOON AS SG pressures lower to…
A. 560 psig
B. 600 psig
C. 760 psig
D. 800 psig
A. Plausible if thought that the setpoint reset lowers the setpoint from the current setpoint (960 psig)
and if thought that the setpoint is lowered by 400 psig (which is true for the RCS pressure
setpoint reset).
B. Plausible if thought that the setpoint reset lowers the setpoint 400 psig (which is true for the RCS
pressure setpoint reset).
C. Plausible if thought that the setpoint reset lowers the setpoint from the current setpoint, however it
lowers the setpoint 200 psig from the current SG pressure.
D. Correct.
When Containment pressure reaches a MINIMUM of ___(1)___ psig, Containment Cooling
is being provided by Containment Spray, and Containment Spray flow will commence when
the ___(2)___ .
A. (1) 3.0
(2) Containment Spray Pumps start
B. (1) 3.0
(2) Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves open
C. (1) 8.5
(2) Containment Spray Pumps start
D. (1) 8.5
(2) Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves open
A. First part is plausible since this is the pressure at which normal containment cooling stops and the
CS pumps start, however safeguards containment cooling will not begin until 8.5 psia when the
isolation valves open. Second part is plausible since the CS pumps start at a different pressure
than the valves open, however the pumps start first, then the valves open.
B. First part is plausible since this is the pressure at which normal containment cooling stops and the
CS pumps start, however safeguards containment cooling will not begin until 8.5 psia when the
isolation valves open. Second part is correct.
C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the CS pumps start at a different pressure
than the valves open, however the pumps start first, then the valves open.
D. Correct.
