Week 7 Case 20 G.R. No. 224863 Flashcards
Facts: Suicide or self-destruction, not accidental killing by cleaning of gun
Was Fortune now barred by laches from questioning the timeliness of the filing of the petition?
YES.
Since Fortune did not interpose any objection on
the timeliness of the filing of Susan’s motion for reconsideration in its Comment/Opposition, Fortune can no longer raise the belated filing of the motion for reconsideration in its Comment to Susan’s petition filed in this Court.
The burden of proving an excepted risk or condition that negates liability lies on the insurer and not on the beneficiary.
In the context of life insurance policies, who bears the burden of proving suicide as the cause of death?
In the context of life insurance policies, the burden of proving suicide as the cause of death of the insured to avoid liability rests on the insurer. Therefore, Fortune must prove suicide to defeat Susan’s claim.
In a jurisprudential ruling in In United Merchants Corp. v. Country Bankers Insurance Corp., the Court discussed:
An insurer who seeks to defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of establishing that the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation. If loss is proved apparently within a contract of insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to
establish that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability.
In the present case, the Court finds that Fortune failed to discharge its burden of proving, by preponderance of evidence, that Reuben’s death was caused by suicide, an excluded risk in his policy. The CA primarily relied on the testimony of Dr. Pagayatan which the CA considered res gestae, and the testimony of Dr. Fortun in concluding that Reuben committed suicide.
However, these pieces of evidence cannot be given credence by the Court.
Was Dr. Pagayatan’s testimony on the statement Randolph allegedly gave moments after Reuben was brought to the hospital admissible?
No. Dr. Pagayatan’s testimony on the statement Randolph allegedly gave moments after Reuben was brought to the hospital is inadmissible. It is not res gestae as contemplated in Sections 36 and 42 of Rule 130.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules provides that “a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.” Res gestae , one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, is found in Section 42 of Rule 130 which states:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be received as part of the res gestae.
Here, Dr. Pagayatan was neither a participant, victim, or spectator to the death of Reuben. He merely repeated in court what was relayed to him by Randolph who was also not a participant, victim or spectator to the act in controversy. He is not the declarant envisioned by the Rules as he had no personal knowledge of the fact that Reuben took his own life. Nobody witnessed Reuben take his own life. The information Randolph relayed to Dr. Pagayatan, which the latter testified on during trial, cannot be admitted as proof of the veracity of said information. This is not the res gestae statement
contemplated by the Rules. Thus, the CA committed error in admitting and giving credence to Dr. Pagayatan’s testimony on the matter.
Did the testimony of Dr. Fortun sufficiently
prove that Reuben’s death was caused
by suicide?
NO.
The testimony of Dr. Fortun failed to prove that Reuben’s death was caused by suicide.
Though Dr. Fortun is a renowned expert in the field of forensic pathology, her analysis and opinion were confined to documentary evidence, including the medico-legal report, investigation report, and photographs that the Court considers insufficient to conclude with certainty that Reuben took his own life. Her conclusions and suppositions were not reached through a comprehensive examination of Reuben, the weapon involved, nor the scene of the incident.
Between the testimony of Dr. Fortun, who admitted that she did not conduct a post-mortem examination on Reuben, and Dr. Nulud, who actually conducted an autopsy on Reuben and prepared the medico-legal report, the
latter should be given more weight.
Likewise, the RTC correctly ruled that Dr. Fortun’s testimony regarding the presence of gun powder or residue on Reuben’s hand carries no weight
because her qualifications and expertise restrict her from testifying on it. In her cross-examination, Dr. Fortun admitted that forensic chemistry is not her expertise.
Is Susan is entitled to the value of
Reuben’s outstanding obligation?
YES.
Susan is entitled to the value of Reuben’s outstanding obligation.
It is clear from the Endorsement Letter that Susan, as the creditor of Reuben and the designated beneficiary of his policy, is entitled to her claim,
up to the extent of his indebtedness.
What is statutory basis of the policy of the State against wagering contracts? What is its purpose?
The policy of the State against wagering contracts is apparent in Section 3 of the Insurance Code, as amended, requiring the presence of insurable interest for a contract of insurance to be valid.
This is meant to eliminate the temptation of taking out a policy for speculative or evil
purposes. Insurance policies should be obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose of speculating upon the hazard of a life in which one has no interest in.
What does Section 10 of the Insurance Code posit? What is applicable in this instant case?
Section 10. Every person has an insurable interest in the life and health:
“(a) Of himself, of his spouse and of his children;
“(b) Of any person on whom he depends wholly or in part for education or support, or in whom he has a pecuniary interest;
“(c) Of any person under a legal obligation to him for the payment of money, or respecting property or services, of which death or illness might delay or prevent the performance; and
“(d) Of any person upon whose life any estate or interest vested in him depends.
Paragraph (c), Section 10 of the same Code enumerates the kinds of insurable interest contemplated in Section 3, which is applicable in this case.
Why was Susan a creditable beneficiary of Ruben? In other words, why does Susan have an insurable interest on Ruben’s life?
Therefore, a debtor may name his creditor as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy taken out in good faith and maintained by the debtor.
Likewise, a creditor may take out an insurance policy on the life of his debtor. However, there are marked differences in the implication of these two scenarios.
What are the differences between:
(1) a policy taken by a creditor on the life of his debtor; and
(2) a policy taken by the debtor on his own life and made payable to his creditor?
The differences between a policy taken by a creditor on the life of his debtor and a policy taken by the debtor on his own life and made payable to his creditor are reconciled as follows:
[A] distinction should be made between a policy
taken by a debtor on his life and made payable to his creditor, and one taken by a creditor on the life of his debtor. Where a debtor in good faith insures his life for the benefit of his creditor, full payment of the debt does not invalidate the policy; in such case, the proceeds should go to the estate of the debtor.
Meanwhile, in a situation where an insurance is taken by a creditor on the life of his debtor:
[T]he insuring creditor could only recover such
amount as remains unpaid at the time of the death of the debtor, — such that, if the whole debt has already been paid, then recovery on the policy is no longer permissible.
What was the Court’s decision as to the value of the policy?
For the Court, in taking out a policy on his own life and paying its premium, Reuben intended to use it as a collateral for his debt at least to the amount of the policy’s face value. The insurable interest of Susan is not limited to just what Reuben owed her at the time the policy took
effect. Instead, she becomes entitled to the value of Reuben’s outstanding obligation at the time of his death the maximum recoverable amount of
which is the face value of the policy.
Nevertheless, taking into consideration the state’s policy against wagering contracts and the principle of equity, the P2,000,000.00 which
Susan received from Rossana should be deducted from P16,000,000.00, the total outstanding obligation of Reuben at the time of his death. The face value of the policy, P15,000,000.00 should be the maximum amount that Susan may receive.
Having already received P2,000,000.00 (from Rosanna) of the P16,000,000.00 Susan
invested in Reuben’s business, she can now only recover up to the balance of his outstanding obligation, P14,000,000.00.
