Week 4 Case 8 G.R. No. 147437 Flashcards
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. The antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
(PNR v. Brunty, G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006)
Volkswagen Karmann Ghia: Arnold Litonjua –> No right of way
Mistubishi Super Saloon: Larry V. Caminos, Jr
Litonjua’s negligence was only contributory.
The proximate cause of the accident was negligence of Litonjua.
How is the right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to the other motorists described?
The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to other motorists is mutual, coordinate and reciprocal. He is bound to anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway are equal to his own. Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or property, it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others as well as for his own.
What is the definition of reckless imprudence?
Reckless imprudence generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the necessary precaution once the danger or
peril becomes foreseen. Thus, something more than mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle is necessary to constitute the offense of reckless driving, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person.
What are the elements of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property? Which element is more central to the finding of guilt?
Hence, in prosecutions for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether or not one of the drivers of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a question that lies in the manner and circumstances of the operation of the motor vehicle, and a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely:
(a) that the offender has done or failed to do an act;
(b) that the act is voluntary;
(c) that the same is without malice;
(d) that material damage results; and
(e) that there has been inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender.
Among the elements constitutive of the offense, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law. This, because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct is all that that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused, that is, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.
Why was petitioner’s contention negated?
Petitioner’s contention was negated based on two grounds:
(1) Entry in the traffic accident investigation report (TAIR) noted petitioner’s speed beyond what is lawful, which he did not question; and
(2) Physical evidence on record, as shown by the photographs, in which he was not able to discharge the burden of proving that these were against him.
What is the importance of rate of speed in reckless driving cases? Is it indicative of imprudent behavior?
Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in determining whether a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile, and evidence of the extent of the damage caused may show the force of the impact from which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be modestly inferred. While an adverse inference may be gathered with respect to reckless driving from proof of excessive speed under the circumstances —as in this case where the TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the intersection in excess of lawful speed—such proof raises the presumption of imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence, or, as otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as to require the accused to show that under the circumstances he was not driving in a careless or imprudent manner.
Speeding, moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to exercise such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered on the road. What is reasonable speed, of course, is necessarily subjective as it must conform to the peculiarities of a given case but in all cases, it is that which will enable the driver to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. This standard of reasonableness is actually contained in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136.
What are the responsibilities of motorists approaching an intersection?
Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. It is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance where the motorist is approaching an intersection. Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway. A driver approaching an intersection is generally under duty, among others, to be vigilant and to have the vehicle under control as to be able to stop at the shortest possible notice, that is, he must look for vehicles that might be approaching from within the radius that denotes the limit of danger. Since compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching motorist has exercised the level of precaution required under the circumstances, then with more reason that he exhibit a relatively higher level of care when the intersection is blind at the point where the roads meet. In other words, where the view at an intersection is obstructed and an approaching motorist cannot get a good view to the right or left until he is close to the intersection, prudence would dictate that he take particular care to observe the traffic before entering the intersection or otherwise use reasonable care to avoid a collision, which means that he is bound is to move with the utmost caution until it is determinable that he can proceed safely and at the slowest speed possible so that the vehicle could be stopped within the distance the driver can see ahead.
What was the conclusion as to Caminos’ diligence in driving in this case?
It can only be surmised at this point that petitioner had inexcusably fallen short of the standard of care in a situation which called for more precaution on the highway in failing to make an observation in the interest at least of his own safety whether or not it was safe to enter the crossing. Since he is chargeable with what he should have observed only had he exercised the commensurate care required under the circumstances of the case, the inescapable conclusion is that he had inexcusably breached the elementary duties of a responsible, prudent and reasonable motorist.
What is the ultimate test in the degree of care and attention required of a driver? Was this applied in this case?
In general, the degree of care and attention required of a driver in a particular case in exercising reasonable care will vary with and must be measured in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, such that it must be commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle. In other words, he must observe a sense of proportionality between precaution and the peculiar risks attendant or even inherent in the condition of the road which are open to ordinary observation. The ultimate test, in other words, is to be found in the reasonable foreseeability that harm might result if commensurate care is not exercised. It is not necessary, however, that a motorist actually foresee the probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable; it would suffice that he, in the position of an ordinary prudent man, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of a general nature as that suffered was to materialize. The evidence in this case is teeming with suggestion that petitioner had failed to foresee the certainty of the collision that was about to happen as he entered the junction in question especially considering that his lateral vision at the intersection was blocked by the structures on the road. In the same way, he failed to solidly establish that such failure to foresee the danger lurking on the road could be deemed excusable as indeed his contention that he was running at a safe speed is totally negated by the evidence derived from the physical facts of the case.
What is the definition of right of way?
In traffic law parlance, the term “right of way” is understood as the right of one vehicle to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another approaching vehicle under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give rise to a danger of collision unless one of the vehicles grants precedence to the other. Although there is authority to the effect that the right of way is merely of statutory creation and exists only according to express statutory provision, it is generally recognized, where no statute or ordinance governs the matter, that the vehicle first entering an intersection is entitled to the right of way, and it becomes the duty of the other vehicle likewise approaching the intersection to proceed with sufficient care to permit the exercise of such right without danger of collisions.
In our setting, the right of way rule is governed by Section 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136, which materially provides:
Section 42. Right of Way.
(a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right which he might otherwise have hereunder.
(b) The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection shall yield the right of a way to a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such first-mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as required in this Act.
How is the right of way defined for vehicles approaching in an intersection?
What is the jurisprudential ruling in Adzuara v. CA?
Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not absolute in terms. It is actually subject to and is affected by the relative distances of the vehicles from the point of intersection. Thus, whether one of the drivers has the right of way or, as sometimes stated, has the status of a favored driver on the highway, is a question that permeates a situation where the vehicles approach the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such distances and speed that if either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is likely to occur. Otherwise stated, the statutory right of way rule under Section 42 of our traffic law applies only where the vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time and not where one of the vehicles enter the junction substantially in advance of the other. Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the same time does not necessarily depend on which of the vehicles enters the intersection first. Rather, it is determined by the imminence of collision when the relative distances and speeds of the two vehicles are considered. It is said that two vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time where it would appear to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the position of the driver approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued on their courses at their speed, a collision would likely occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle approaching from the left must give the right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right.
Nevertheless, the rule requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the driver on the right on approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left to come to a dead stop, but he is merely required to approach the intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may yield the right of way to a vehicle within the danger zone on his right. He is not bound to wait until there is no other vehicle on his right in sight before proceeding to the intersection but only until it is reasonably safe to proceed.
Thus, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals, it was established that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a turn; but if the person making the turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru-street, he is bound to give way to the former.
How is the negligence of the injured person or the driver of the motor vehicle with which the accused’s vehicle collided treated?
In other words, how is proof of the negligence of the offended party treated?
Moreover, in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the person who was injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the accused’s vehicle collided does not constitute a defense. In fact, even where such driver is said to be guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never work favors to the case of the accused. In other words, proof that the offended party was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of his automobile bears little weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing the accused’s culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, even if we are to hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent in neglecting to keep a proper lookout as he took a left turn at the intersection, such negligence, contrary to petitioner’s contention, will nevertheless not support an acquittal. At best, it will only determine the applicability of several other rules governing situations where concurring negligence exists and only for the purpose of arriving at a proper assessment of the award of damages in favor of the private offended party.
Was Arnold Litonjua negligent?
No.
It is as much unsafe as it is unjust to assume that Arnold, just because the TAIR so indicated that he at the time had no right of way, that Arnold had performed a risky maneuver at the intersection in failing to keep a proper lookout for oncoming vehicles. In fact, aside from petitioner’s bare and self-serving assertion that Arnold’s fault was the principal determining cause of the mishap as well as his allegation that it was actually Arnold’s car that came colliding with his car, there is no slightest suggestion in the records that could tend to negate what the physical evidence in this case has established. Clearly, it was petitioner’s negligence, as pointed out by the OSG, that proximately caused the accident.
What is the measure of a motorist’s duty?
All told, it must be needlessly emphasized that the measure of a motorist’s duty is such care as is, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle, and in proportion to or commensurate with the peculiar risk attendant on the circumstances and conditions in the particular case, the driver being under the duty to know and to take into consideration those circumstances and factors affecting the safe operation of the vehicle which would be open to ordinary observation.
