Week 4 Case 7 G.R. No. 170631 Flashcards
What is the doctrine or rule applicable in this case?
The applicable doctrine or rule in this case is the registered-owner rule.
The plaintiff may first prove the employer’s ownership of the vehicle involved in a mishap by presenting the vehicle’s registration in evidence. Thereafter, a disputable presumption that the requirements for an employer’s liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code have been satisfied will arise. The burden of evidence then shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has ensued. This case, thus, harmonizes the requirements of Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and the so-called registered-owner rule as established in this court’s rulings in Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, Del Carmen, Jr. v. Bacoy, Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, and Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez.
Why were the petitioner’s contentions negated?
(1) Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real party in the interest in the case.
(2) Respondent’s non-adducement of proof that Bautista acted within the scope of his authority is not fatal.
(3) It failed to prove that it exercised the requisite diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
(4) Award of moral damages, actual damages, death indemnity, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees is reasonable.
(5) Caravan is still solidarily liable since Bautista is only a necessary party, not an indispensable party, to the case. Liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary.
Why was the first contention of the petitioner (that Abejar is not a real party in interest) negated?
Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real party in interest in this case. In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her action for damages: that she exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes; that Reyes’ death was caused by the negligence of petitioner and its driver; and that Reyes’ death caused her damage. Respondent properly filed an action based on quasi-delict. She is a real party in interest.
What statutory rules or provisions support Abejar’s case as a real party in interest?
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a real party in interest:
RULE 3. Parties to Civil Actions
. . . . SECTION 2. Parties in Interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
“To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he [or she] must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.”
Respondent’s capacity to file a complaint against petitioner stems from her having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes. Article 216 of the Family Code identifies the persons who exercise substitute parental authority:
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child
becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising substitute parental authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents:
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Both of Reyes’ parents are already deceased. Reyes’ paternal grandparents are also both deceased. The whereabouts of Reyes’ maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no record that Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances that respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed the role of Reyes’ parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes’ custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with Article 220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes’ education and provided for her personal needs. To echo respondent’s words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own daughter.
What are the bases of respondent’s right to proceed against petitioners?
Respondent’s right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on two grounds.
First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason that when Reyes died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent would have felt upon the loss of one’s child. It is for this injury “as authentic and personal as that of a natural parent” that respondent seeks to be indemnified.
Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes’ actual parents would have been capacitated to do.
How was the issue on the termination of Abejar’s parental authority resolved?
Inasmuch as persons exercising substitute parental authority have the full range of competencies of a child’s actual parents, nothing prevents persons exercising substitute parental authority from similarly possessing the right to be indemnified for their ward’s death.
We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having reached the age of majority, she was already emancipated upon her death. While parental authority is terminated upon emancipation, respondent continued to support and care for Reyes even after she turned 18. Except for the legal technicality of Reyes’ emancipation, her relationship with respondent remained the same. The anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes’ death was no different because of Reyes’ emancipation.
In any case, the termination of respondent’s parental authority is not an insurmountable legal bar that precludes the filing of her Complaint. This court declared that Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is broad enough to accommodate even plaintiffs who are not relatives of the deceased.
What does Article 2176 of the New Civil Code emphasize as to the obligation to pay damages caused by doer’s fault or negligence?
It is particularly noticeable that Article 2176 of the New Civil Code stresses the passive subject of the obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or negligence. The article does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the relation that must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and the person who may recover damages, thus warranting the inference that, in principle, anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the person responsible therefor.
Why was the second contention of the petitioner (that Abejar offered no documentary or testimonial evidence to prove that Bautista acted “within the scope of his assigned tasks” when the accident occurred) negated?
Respondent’s Complaint is anchored on an employer’s liability for quasi-delict provided in Article 2180(e), in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Article 2180(e): Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Was respondent’s no showing of proof/evidence that the driver “was within the scope of his assigned task” fatal?
No.
Contrary to petitioner’s position, it was not fatal to respondent’s cause that she herself did not adduce proof that Bautista acted within the scope of his authority. It was sufficient that Abejar proved that petitioner was the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
What two (2) rules were in consideration and in clash in this portion of the case?
First, Article 2180’s specification that “[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks[.]”
Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles.
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the vehicle.
Which is given preference in conflict between Article 2180 and the registered-owner rule?
The so-called registered-owner rule is given preference and this preference is established in court’s rulings in Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, Del Carmen, Jr. v. Bacoy, Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, and Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez.
Despite Article 2180, the Court still held the bank liable for damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.
However, Aguilar, Sr., Del Carmen, Filcar, and Mendoza should not be taken to mean that Article 2180 of the Civil Code should be completely discarded in cases where the registered-owner rule finds application.
What is the appropriate approach in cases where both the registered owner rule and Article 2180 apply?
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen. This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the owner may have done in relation to that employment. The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public.
To prove that it incurred no liability, what could have Caravan done?
It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following:
(1) that it had no employment relationship with Bautista;
(2) that Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or
(3) that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
Why was Caravan not able to disprove its liability or prove any of the three (3) things in the previous slide?
(1) Petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time of the accident.
(2) Petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident. When asked by the court why Bautista was at the place of the accident when it occurred, Sally Bellido, petitioner’s accountant and supervisor, testified that she did not “have the personal capacity to answer [the question]” and that she had no knowledge to answer it.
(3) Petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the requisite diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
Why was the third contention of the petitioner (that it exercised due diligence in hiring Bautista) negated?
What are proof that Caravan failed to exercise the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista?
(1) No actual compliance, despite issuance of company policies.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome presumption.
(2) It also committed an actual violation of the law when it allowed Bautista, a non-professional license holder, to drive professionally and be in service of Carnival.
Employing a person holding a non-professional driver’s license to operate another’s motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
