Week 5 Case 14 G.R. No. 171092 Flashcards
Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi.
Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of dispensing justice.
Damages for impartial treatment of a passenger
What does Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention state?
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention states jurisdiction over the complaint for damages involving commercial airlines.
“An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court of the place of destination.”
Is the Warsaw Convention applicable to the Philippines?
Yes.
The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention.
Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
- This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking.
- For the purposes of this Convention the expression “international carriage” means any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this Convention. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an “international carriage”. The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it.
In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of destination was Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an “international carriage” within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.
What is the jurisprudential ruling on the Warsaw Convention, as discussed in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines?
The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto, “to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.”
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
How is the jurisdiction over the subject matter obtained in this case?
Discuss the applicable provisions in Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention.
Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before –
- the court where the carrier is domiciled;
- the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
- the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
- the court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.
What is the jurisprudential ruling regarding obtaining jurisdiction as to personality involving the Warsaw Convention, as discussed in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines?
In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Augusto Santos III, a resident of the Philippines, purchased a ticket from Northwest Orient Airlines in San Francisco, for transport between San Francisco and Manila via Tokyo and back to San Francisco. He was wait-listed in the Tokyo to Manila segment of his ticket, despite his prior reservation. Contending that Northwest Orient Airlines acted in bad faith and discriminated against him when it canceled his confirmed reservation and gave his seat to someone who had no better right to it, Augusto Santos III sued the carrier for damages before the RTC. Northwest Orient Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. The trial court granted the motion which ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the case was brought before us, we denied the petition holding that under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, Augusto Santos III must prosecute his claim in the United States, that place being the:
(1) domicile of the Northwest Orient Airlines;
(2) principal office of the carrier;
(3) place where contract had been made (San Francisco); and
(4) place of destination (San Francisco).
We further held that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is jurisdictional in character. Thus:
A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue provision. First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for damages “must” be brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this characterization is consistent with one of the objectives of the Convention, which is to “regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by air.” Third, the Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase “rules as to jurisdiction” used in Article 32 must refer only to Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1) as “jurisdictions,” which, as such, cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the time when the damage occurred.
How is the issue on jurisdiction involving the Warsaw Convention harmonized in this case?
In other words, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
Why was petitioner’s contention that Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines is not applicable denied?
Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines is analogous to the instant case because
(1) the domicile of respondent is London, United Kingdom;
(2) the principal office of respondent airline is likewise in London, United Kingdom;
(3) the ticket was purchased in Rome, Italy; and
(4) the place of destination is Rome, Italy. In addition, petitioner based her complaint on Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict and Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on Human Relations. In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Augusto Santos III similarly posited that Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention did not apply if the action is based on tort. Hence, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the factual setting of Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines and the instant case are parallel on the material points.
Tortious conduct as ground for the petitioner’s complaint is within the purview of the Warsaw Convention.
What does “obiter dictum” mean?
Black defines obiter dictum as “an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case” and thus “are not binding as precedent.”
It is thus settled that allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the course of the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
Did the respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court?
No.
Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, is not deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial court. We hence disagree with the contention of the petitioner and rule that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction over its person.
What is the jurisprudential ruling regarding obtaining jurisdiction of commercial airlines under voluntary appearance, as discussed in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan?
Special Appearance to Question a Court’s Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance – the first sentence of the above-quoted rule – means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.1avvphi1
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
