Week 6 Readings: Individuals

Question 1

Reference dependence

Answer 1

Evaluating outcomes not in terms of absolute gains/losses but in relation to a reference point, often status quo. This often lead to status quo bias where states are more willing to take risks to defend what they have than to acquire something new.

Question 2

Loss aversion

Answer 2

pain of a loss is felt more acutely than pleasure of an equivalent gain.

Question 3

Concession aversion

Answer 3

where states are reluctant to make concession in negotiations even if they might lead to a better outcome than no agreement at all.

Question 4

Framing effects

Answer 4

how a problem or decision is framed can influence choices.

Question 5

Risk orientation

Answer 5

individuals tend to be risk averse when dealing with potential gains but risk acceptant when facing losses.

Question 6

Escalation in crises

Answer 6

states in conflict both framing the situation as potential losses and become more willing to gamble on risky strategies in hope to avoid those losses.

Question 7

Byman and Pollack examples of individual leadership influence

Answer 7

Hitler: Grandiose vissions and distorted perceptions of germany’s ower, framed any compromise with existing euro order as an unacceptable loss

Saddam: history of risky gambles and tendency to personalize threats that lead him to underestimate the cost of actions and overestimate his ability to pervail in conflicts like the Iran-Iraq war and gulf war.

Question 8

Deturence Theory

Answer 8

a strategy aimed at dissuading an adversary from taking an unwanted action by convincing them that the costs of such action would outweigh any potential benefits. It typically involves the threat of retaliation, often through military means, to prevent hostile actions.

Question 9

Prospect Theory

Answer 9

”- Deviates from expected utility theory by positing that how people frame a problem around a reference point has a critical influence on their choices and that people tend to overeigh losses with respect to comparable gains, to be risk adverse with respect to gains and risk- acceptant with respect to losses, and to respond to probabilities in a non- linear manner. [Levy]

Characterized by several key concepts

• Loss Aversion: Individuals tend to strongly prefer avoiding losses over acquiring comparable gains.
• Framing Effects: How choices are presented, or framed, significantly influences an individual’s decision, even if the underlying options are identical.
• Reference Point: Decisions are made based on gains and losses relative to a reference point, usually the status quo, rather than on absolute outcomes.
  “

Question 10

To what degree, and in what ways, do the qualities of individual leaders affect matters of war and peace?

Answer 10

”* Leaders establish a **state’s intentions and shape its power **(Can turn status quo power into a revisionist one or amplify existing revisionist tendencies)
* Leader personality traits directly impact war and peace
– risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to engage in war (Hitler and Napoleon)
–Assad was more cautious in nature, led him to choose diplomacy over conflict
– leaders with grandiose visions can destablize entire systems, exceeding their state’s capabilities and the ability of the system to contain them. (Hitler, napoleon, saddam, khomeini)
* Jervis argues decision makers tend to interpret info based on existing theories and images, leading to potential mispreceptions
* individuals impact domestic and systemic factors
“

Question 11

How do explanations based on specific leaders compare in their explanatory power with explanations based on the state or international system?

Answer 11

”- traditional IR theories often treat states as unitary rational actors driven primarily by desire for security. readings argue state intentions are not predetermined or fixed.
- their leader’s personalities and preferences significantly impact a state’s goals
- leaders prclivity for risk, grandiosity, and trustworthyness are key for explaining/predicting int. outcomes “

Question 12

Answer 12

Question 13

Jervis Hypthesises

Answer 13

“●
Hypothesis 1: Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images.
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Hypothesis 2: Scholars and decision-makers are apt to err by being too wedded to the established view and too closed to new information, as opposed to being too willing to alter their theories.
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Hypothesis 3: Actors can more easily assimilate into their established image of another actor information contradicting that image if the information is transmitted and considered bit by bit than if it comes all at once.
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Hypothesis 4: Misperception is most difficult to correct in the case of a missing concept and least difficult to correct in the case of a recognized but presumably unfilled concept.
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Hypothesis 5: When messages are sent from a different background of concerns and information than is possessed by the receiver, misunderstanding is likely.
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Hypothesis 6: When people spend a great deal of time drawing up a plan or making a decision, they tend to think that the message about it they wish to convey will be clear to the receiver.
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Hypothesis 7: Actors tend to perceive the behavior of others as more hostile than it is.
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Hypothesis 8: Actors tend to see other states as more hostile than they are.
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Hypothesis 9: Actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it is.
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Hypothesis 10: Because a state gets most of its information about another state’s policies from that other state’s foreign office, the state may fail to recognize the foreign office’s attempts to deceive them or to see that the foreign office is giving misleading information because it is poorly informed.
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Hypothesis 11: Actors tend to overestimate the degree to which others are acting in response to what they themselves do when the others behave in accordance with the actor’s desires; but when the behavior of the other is undesired, it is usually seen as derived from internal forces.
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Hypothesis 12: When actors have intentions that they do not try to conceal from others, they tend to assume that others accurately perceive these intentions.
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Hypothesis 13: Actors tend to overestimate their own importance as an influence on others.
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Hypothesis 14: Actors tend to overlook the fact that evidence consistent with their theories may also be consistent with other views.

”

Question 14

Jervis No Concept Model

Answer 14

Incorrectly fit concept (idea, issue, event) into previously known concept

Question 15

Jervis rejected concept model

Answer 15

• understand concept, but reject it. thus refuse to acknowledge them when they are happening.

Question 16

Jervis Ill fitting concept model

Answer 16

Accept that the concept exists and can happen but don’t recognize as happening in the current instance.

Question 17

Jervis: Safeguards to prevent perception distortion

Answer 17

“–be aware of your bias
–constantly evaluate attitudes for beliefs that are not logically linked
–surround yourself with people who disagree with you”

Question 18

Bismarck vrs Wilhelm II Example

Answer 18

“Byman contrasts the leadership of Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II to demonstrate how individual personalities can lead to drastically different foreign policies. Bismarck, skilled in diplomacy and a proponent of Realpolitik, aimed to maintain the balance of power in Europe and secure Germany’s place within it. He skillfully constructed alliances that served to restrain Germany’s allies and prevent large-scale conflicts.

In contrast, Wilhelm II, characterized by his assertive and, some might argue, impulsive personality, pursued a more aggressive foreign policy focused on expanding German power and prestige. This ultimately alienated potential allies, fostering suspicion and pushing Europe closer to war.
“

Question 19

Hitler Example

Answer 19

readings repeatedly use Hitler as a stark example of how a leader’s personality can have catastrophic consequences for a state and the international system. While many in Germany desired a return to national prominence and even territorial expansion after the losses of World War I, Hitler’s ambitions went far beyond these aims. His ideology, fueled by racial hatred and a desire for dominance, propelled Germany towards a war of conquest, aiming to subjugate Europe and achieve global hegemony. His risk tolerance and delusional thinking led to devastating strategic blunders that ultimately resulted in Germany’s defeat. This case exemplifies how individual pathology and extremist ideologies can shape a state’s intentions, exceeding the desires of its people and leading to destructive conflict.

Question 20

Napoleon example

Answer 20

“Byman/pollack presents Napoleon as a leader whose military genius and insatiable ambition fundamentally shaped France’s capabilities and actions. Napoleon’s exceptional military skills elevated France’s military power, allowing it to dominate much of Europe. However, Napoleon’s ambition, exceeding the desire of the French people for expansion, spurred him to repeatedly engage in high-risk military campaigns that eventually led to France’s downfall. This example shows how individual talent can enhance a state’s power, while an individual’s unchecked ambition can lead to overextension and ultimately weaken the state.
“

Question 21

”
Saddam Hussein (Iraq) vs. Hafez al-Assad (Syria) example”

Answer 21

The authors use the comparison of Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad to demonstrate how, despite facing similar domestic and geopolitical circumstances, different personality traits can lead to different foreign policy decisions. Both leaders were authoritarian rulers of relatively weak states facing more powerful neighbors and internal dissent. However, Saddam, characterized by his willingness to take significant risks, repeatedly engaged in aggressive military actions against neighboring states and pursued ambitious goals of regional hegemony. On the other hand, Assad, generally exhibiting greater risk aversion, pursued a more cautious foreign policy, carefully calculating his moves and avoiding direct confrontations that could threaten his regime.

Question 22

Ayatollah Khomeini (Iran) Example

Answer 22

Byman/Pollack discusses how Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, exemplifies how charisma and ideology can empower a leader to shape not only their own state’s foreign policy but also influence actors beyond their borders. Khomeini’s charisma and revolutionary zeal resonated with Shia populations throughout the Middle East, challenging existing political orders. His determination to spread the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran’s borders influenced the behavior of other states, prompting them to adjust their policies in response to the perceived threat.

Question 23

What is the role of leaders

Answer 23

The Role of Leaders: Individuals shape a state’s intentions, influence its military and diplomatic power, determine its strategies, and provoke reactions from other states.

Question 24

Personality traits role

Answer 24

Personality Traits: Leaders who are risk-tolerant, delusional, or driven by grandiose visions are more likely to initiate wars and destabilize the international system.

Question 25

Predictability and Alliances:

Answer 25

Predictable leaders foster stronger alliances because their behavior inspires trust and allows for more effective cooperation.

Question 26

Enabling Factors:

Answer 26

The influence of individual leaders is amplified when power is concentrated in their hands, when systemic or domestic forces are ambiguous, and during periods of rapid change or crisis.

Question 27

Reference Dependence:

Answer 27

People tend to evaluate outcomes not in terms of absolute gains or losses but rather in relation to a reference point, often the status quo. This reference dependence can lead to a status quo bias, where states are more willing to take risks to defend what they have than to acquire something new.

Question 28

Loss Aversion:

Answer 28

The pain of a loss is felt more acutely than the pleasure of an equivalent gain. In international relations, this can translate into a concession aversion, where states are reluctant to make concessions in negotiations, even if those concessions would ultimately lead to a better outcome than no agreement at all.

Question 29

Framing Effects:

Answer 29

How a problem or decision is framed—for example, in terms of potential gains or losses—can significantly influence choices, even if the underlying options are objectively the same. For instance, a state facing a declining international position might frame the status quo as a loss and be willing to take extreme risks to prevent further decline. Conversely, a state that has recently made gains might be more willing to compromise if it can be induced to view those gains as the new reference point, rather than viewing concessions as losses.

Question 30

Risk Orientation:

Answer 30

Individuals tend to be risk-averse when dealing with potential gains but risk-acceptant when facing losses. This dynamic can lead to escalation in crises, as states in a conflict, both framing the situation as one of potential losses, become more willing to gamble on risky strategies in the hope of avoiding those losses.