Week 5 Readings: Domestic politics and org Flashcards
Allison & Snyder
Allison Model 1
“The rational actor model (RAM): Governments are treated as the primary actors who calculate responses to strategic problems in order to maximize its strategic objectives – the most important being preserving peace and national security.
Govs
- identify their goals
- consider available policy options
- assess potential consequences of each option
- choose option best for their goals
Ex: US response to soviet MRBMS in cuba was a calculated response.
- (from class) In the cuban missile crisis there was a lot more going on than just JFK
- ”” Governmental behavior can be usefully summarized as action chosen by a unitary, rational decision maker, centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing. But government is not an individual… it is a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own”” (P. 143)
- actions are chosen based on their probable consequences
- Utility for policy advocacy: assess relative strength and weakness of options”
Allison Model 2
“Organizational Behavior Model:
Government behavior is understood as outputs of organizational processes where gov orgs perform pre-existing routines. The assumed division of labor of these processes/routines influence final decision rather than a unified national actor. Orgs are assumed to have limited flexibility/slow to change, with their culture influencing how they define goals, prioritize problems, and implement programs.
larg orgs rely on SOPs for efficientcy, and coordination, but can become ingrained and hinder adaption/innovation.
Ex: the US routinely preparing for soviet attack on europe but not for missiles in cuba.
- Gov’s perceive problems through org intersts ““Governmental behavior can therefore be understood, according to the second conceptual mode, less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.””
- Routine opperating procedure is greater dictator than rationality ““the behavior of these orgs and consequently the gov, relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by routines established prior to that instance””
- Outcomes are a result of groups in orgs, not only individuals ““the subjects in model II explinations are orgs and their behavior is explained in terms of org purposes and practices common to the members of the org, not those peculiar to one or another individual””
- actions are chosen by recognizing a situation as being of a familar, frequently encountered, type and matching the recognized situation to a set of rules
- Utility for policy advocacy: identifies centers of gravity in org processes”
Allison Model III
“The Governmental Politics Model: Gov actions are made as the outcomes of bargaining games among players (individuals, groups, and coalitions of players) in the government pushing their conceptions of national interests.
Ex: Kennedy’s decision to blockade Cuba rather than air strikes was a product of bargaining by goverment players.
- dissects khrushchev’s decision making under a new light revealing his appreciation of the situation to have been cloudy at best. Judgements bereft of any attribute of high quality deliberations. relies on haphazard and often incorrect info and w/o sustained analysis of the sort found in US. Manages a sullen, sporadic group of advisors and rivals.
- utility for policy advocacy: identify key decision makers and their specific intersts “
Steps in Rational Actor Model
1) identify their GOALS
2) consider all possible OPTIONS
3) assess the CONSEQUENCES of each option
4) select the option that BEST achieves their goals
What limitations are there to the rational actor model
1) The RAM simplifies reality by assuming that nations act as single, rational entities with a unified set of goals.
2) The model assumes that decision-makers possess complete information and can accurately assess the costs and benefits of different options.
3) The RAM struggles to account for the influence of organizational routines and standard operating procedures on government action.
4) The model does not adequately consider the role of bargaining and compromise among individuals and groups within the government.
How does the RAM apply to the Cuban missile crisis?
The soviet union’s decision to place missiles in cuba can be understood as a rational response to the perceived threat from the US.
What challenges are there to the RAM
factors such as misperceptions and mis calculations can challenge the mode.
Why does RAM fall short in the cuban missile crisis
- Fog of war (both US and USSR made decisions based on guesses, assumpptions, and incomplete info that lead to miscalculations)
- Organization Routines and SOPS (influenced USSR deployment of missiles & US intel failures)
- Bureaucratic politics and competing agendas (internal disagreements in JFK admin)
Standard Operating Procedures
Organizations rely on to establish procedures to function effectively. Can help org coordination and predictability, but also can lead to rigidity and make it difficult to adapt to novel situations.
Myth of Offensive Advantage / Cult of the Offensive
Military leaders in 1914 believed offensive stratgies were inherently more effective & that decisive victory could only be achieved by seizing the initiative and attacking first.
This occurred despite developments at the time that favored defensive warfare.
Structure/incentives in euro armies exacerbated this bias. (offensive plans being more professionally prestigious)
Shows a failures in ignoring objective mil realities, allowing organization biases to distort decision making, and failing to recognize the interplay of domestic/int politics
Allison
”- Examines the decision making process of US and USSR durring cuban missile crisis
- articulates 3 models he uses to analyze the crisis
– Model 1: rational actor model
– Model 2: Organizational behavior model
– Model 3: Governmental politics model
Allison supports a complex view of decision making where org routines and bureaucratic politics play a significant role. “
JACK SNYDER
“[cult of the offensive]
- Snyder argues that the widespread belief in the efficacy of offensive military strategies, prevalent among European military leaders prior to World War I, was a major cause of the war’s outbreak and its subsequent scale and devastation.
- military organizations, by their very nature, tend to favor offensive doctrines because they enhance their size, budgets, and prestige.
- argues that military leaders often fell prey to cognitive biases, overestimating their own capabilities and underestimating the potential costs and risks of offensive operations
- he maintains that technology alone cannot fully explain the widespread embrace of offensive doctrines. He argues that the perceived advantage of the offense was exaggerated and that a more balanced assessment of the strategic situation would have revealed the significant risks and potential costs of offensive strategies
- the cult of the offensive was a dangerous illusion that blinded European leaders to the true costs and risks of war”
“Why does RAM fall short in the cuban missile crisis
“Fog of war (both US and USSR made decisions based on guesses, assumpptions, and incomplete info that lead to miscalculations)
Organization Routines and SOPS (influenced USSR deployment of missiles & US intel failures)
Bureaucratic politics and competing agendas (internal disagreements in JFK admin)”
Standard Operating Procedures
Organizations rely on to establish procedures to function effectively. Can help org coordination and predictability, but also can lead to rigidity and make it difficult to adapt to novel situations.
Myth of Offensive Advantage / Cult of the Offensive
“Military leaders in 1914 believed offensive stratgies were inherently more effective & that decisive victory could only be achieved by seizing the initiative and attacking first.
This occurred despite developments at the time that favored defensive warfare.
Structure/incentives in euro armies exacerbated this bias. (offensive plans being more professionally prestigious)
Shows a failures in ignoring objective mil realities, allowing organization biases to distort decision making, and failing to recognize the interplay of domestic/int politics”
