Week 14 Flashcards

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1
Q

Selective attention

A
  • our brain is only able to focus on one specific aspect of a situation clearly (allows us to not be too overwhelmed by there and therefore have consciousness!)
  • usually beneficial but can be dangerous (e.g. focusing on a phone screen when crossing the road)
  • we have some degree of divided attention (multi-tasking)
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2
Q

Broadbent’s filter model

A
  • attentional selection symbolised as Y-shaped tube with chunks of sensory information represented as balls
  • lower part of Y tube only accepts one ball at a time, with a hinged flap acting as a filter (early stage)
  • shows how unattended information is largely filtered
    and blocked out (responds to free will as you can choose what you want to focus on, but not both!)
  • e.g. dichotic listening task - showed that participants are almost entirely unaware of information presented to unattended ear (selective attention)
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3
Q

Cocktail party phenomenon

A
  • highly pertinent stimuli (e.g. your name) can suddenly capture your attention even in a noisy environment
  • even in unattended ear, in dichotic listening experiment, high priority words can catch your attention
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4
Q

Treisman’s attenuation model

A
  • suggestion that attention acts as a selective filter but unattended information is not blocked completely
  • first, physical properties of sensory information are analysed involuntarily (e.g. voice)
  • knowledge about words is accessed, through mental lexicon, and are stored in terms of frequency, relevance etc. relating to their recognition threshold
  • threshold can be temporarily lowered based on current priorities/environment to allow some words to be triggered more easily
  • if signal passes both filters, its meaning is analysed
  • due to cocktail party phenomenon + observation that fragments from the unattended ear are reported if they are of the same context as the attended message (i.e. unattended information must have been processed to some extent)
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5
Q

Late selection theories (Deutsch & Deutsch)

A
  • claim that all sensory information is processed non-selectively and in parallel
  • output of sensory processing is placed in STM (if not rehearsed or saved, loss from STM is what acts as attentional bottleneck)
  • selection of information regarding conscious awareness only occurs after analysis of meaning
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6
Q

Subliminal perception

A
  • suggests that words are semantically processed and might affecting processing speed of subsequent words (if they are semantically related they are “primed” to be detected)
  • e.g. brief flashing of prime word (doctor) lead to later related word (nurse) being detected more quickly
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7
Q

Negative priming

A
  • participants are instructed to actively attend to one display and ignore the other one
  • noted that naming times to target objects are slower if it was the unattended object on a previous trial (ignoring a stimulus slows down subsequent redirecting of attention to it)
  • suggests that unattended information is not simply discarded but actively suppressed (deeper processing of unattended info)
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8
Q

Capacity theory (Kahneman)

A
  • moves away from attentional bottleneck idea but rather that people have a limited capacity pool of attention to carry out mental activities
  • if an activity is easy, very little attentional capacity is used up (so you may be able to multitask), whereas if it is difficult, it uses up more resources
  • e.g. dual task experiment - illustrated that there is a pool of limited attention capacity as selective attention to multiple tasks make them individually take longer
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9
Q

What does attentional capacity depend on?

A
  • task demands (e.g. takes up more capacity if you are learning something new for the first time)
  • arousal (alertness, fatigue etc.)
  • individual differences (some people have a longer attention span than others in general)
  • momentary intentions (e.g. generally more focused in an exam environment)
  • individuals have substantial control over how they allocate their attention but performance will decline if attentional demand exceeds supply
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10
Q

Automaticity (not attention demanding)

A
  • complex activities are intially intensely attention-demanding but, with increasing skill and practice, we can move into more automatic processing mode
  • e.g. for professional musicians
  • automatic processing generally occurs without intention and conscious decision so consumes few resources of attention capacity; also occurs much more rapidly
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11
Q

Conscious processing (attention demanding)

A
  • only occurs with deliberate attention
  • open to awareness and introspection
  • uses conscious resources (i.e. drains pool of conscious attentional capacity)
  • much slower
  • e.g. Stroop conflict - demonstrates that reading is so automatic to us that it conflicts with more attention-demanding conscious task (e.g. naming the colour of the word rather than reading it) –> means tasks take longer and are more prone to error
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12
Q

Consciousness

A
  • a person’s subjective experience of the world and the mind
  • what makes us uniquely human
  • each person’s consciousness is subjective and individual
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13
Q

Four properties of consciousness

A
  • intentionality (the fact that consciousness is often about something, also limited by attention)
  • unity (resistance to division of attention)
  • selectivity (capacity to include some objects and not others, e.g. dichotic listening, idea of filtering of attention)
  • transience (its tendency to change, may be due to limited capacity of working memory so focus of your attention keeps changing)
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14
Q

Phenomenology

A

how things seem to the conscious person, in their understanding of mind and behaviour

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15
Q

Materialism

A

the philosophical idea that mental states are the product of physical systems alone, dispensing any need to explain consciousness in terms of some additional property that resides in our brain (e.g. mini-us)

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16
Q

Anthropomorphism

A

the tendency to attribute human qualities to nonhuman things

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17
Q

Choice blindness

A

when people are unaware of their decision-making processes and justify a choice as if it were already decided (explained by the after-the-fact interpretative role of consciousness)

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18
Q

Change blindness

A

unawareness of significant events changing in full view reveals that, without attention, we miss much of what is happening in the world (we may fill in missing portions of experience by making assumptions)

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19
Q

Inattention blindness

A

reveals that the scope of our consciousness is limited, affecting what we notice around us, especially when we divide our attention

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20
Q

Unilateral visual neglect

A
  • patient fails to notice stimuli appearing on the side of space contralateral to the side of a hemispheric lesion
  • not due to blindness but due to attention deficits!
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21
Q

Balint’s syndrome

A
  • attentional disorder where patient loses the ability to voluntarily shift visual attention to new locations, associated with damage to both sides of the brain
  • issues perceiving multiple objects in visual field simultaneously
  • more generalised form of visual neglect disorder (e.g. difficulty distinguishing between overlapping figures)
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22
Q

Blindsight

A
  • residual vision in the absence of cortical processing (visual blindness but still able to detect a target present in affected region)
  • patients say they are guessing as they do not believe they can perceive visual images but they get answers correct
  • proves that there are multiple visual processing areas in addition to area V1 that could support unconscious vision
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23
Q

Short-term memory (STM)

A
  • holds information only very briefly and has severely limited capacity
  • useful for any complex cognitive task that requires short term storage (or buffering) of information, e.g. arithmetic, language and vision
  • used lots in day to day life
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24
Q

Long-term memory (LTM)

A
  • holds information for long periods and has potentially unlimited capacity
  • stored permanently in your memory and can be very easily accessed
25
Q

Capacity of STM

A
  • determined to have the capacity for 7 (+/- 2) items simultaneously, independent of the nature of the items
  • capacity is less than 7 for items that do not mean anything (e.g. nonsense words) –> suggesting contact to long-term representations in our mind
  • tested out by digit span tasks
26
Q

Digit span tasks

A
  • superspan lists (i.e. more than 7 items) lead to a less than perfect performance
  • primacy effect towards the start of the list (reflects contribution of LTM, earlier items have undergone more rehearsal and more likely to be committed to long-term memory store)
  • recency effect nearer the end of the list (contribution of STM as items are still active in there so are recalled better)
27
Q

Modal model of memory

A
  • proposed that memory consists of a flow of information that passes through multiple stages
  • for something to enter LTM, it has to first pass through STM
  • STM has limited capacity of 7 items
  • the longer an item is held in STM the more likely it is to be transferred to LTM
  • info can be refreshed in STM by means of rehearsal
28
Q

Sensory memory

A
  • a place where sensory information is kept for a few seconds or less
  • first stage of memory formation
29
Q

Iconic memory

A

fast-decaying store of visual information (one form of sensory memory

30
Q

Echoic memory

A

fast-decaying store of auditory information (another form of sensory memory)

31
Q

Evidence against the modal model

A
  • results from multi-part reasoning experiment showed that reasoning time does increase (due to taking up capacity of STM) but overall performance is still surprisingly good (with few errors)
  • implies that STM is not as central to complex tasks as assumed and that, even in people with STM impairments, they can function normally
  • also double dissociation of brain damage cases show that you can have a normal functioning STM and impaired LTM and vice versa which does not seem to make sense with this model –> in fact STM and LTM are separate memory systems
32
Q

Working memory

A
  • active maintenance and manipulation of information in short-term storage
  • perhaps a better way of describing STM as it is not just a place to hold information but is also made up of operations and processes
33
Q

Working memory model

A
  • suggests that the STM consists of more than one component
  • central executive integrates information
  • supplemented by two modality-specific peripheral systems –> visuo-spatial sketchpad (STM store for manipulation of visual and spatial information) and phonological loop (STM store for speech-based codes)
  • as well as the episodic buffer for daily tasks
  • explains why patients with one impaired aspect of STM can still function in other aspects
  • BUT, if two tasks use the same subsystem of working memory, then the task will be impaired due to inteference
34
Q

Central executive

A
  • retrieves information from LTM and integrates information flow between the other components of working memory
  • amodal (not tied to a specific modality)
  • constrained to available capacity (link to attention capacity; the more demands placed on the system the less efficiently it will work)
  • where complex decision making occurs
35
Q

Visuo-spatial sketchpad

A
  • specialises in temporary holding of visual and spatial codes
  • tested with Corsi blocks test
  • typical sequence span is around 5
36
Q

Phonological loop

A
  • specialises in the storage of speech-based codes
  • corresponds to what had been traditionally studied in STM research
  • capacity of around 7 items
37
Q

Episodic buffer

A

temporary storage space where information from long-term memory can be integrated into current working memory

38
Q

Time-based STM capacity view (Baddeley)

A
  • suggests there is no built-in limitation to phonological loop capacity but rather that STM capacity is constrained by the time it takes to report items
  • measured capacity is determined by the number of items that can be reported before they are lost/forgotten from the phonological loop
  • this explains the word length effect and reading speed (short words are easier than long words) which cannot be explained by the traditional “7” capacity view
39
Q

Concept

A
  • refers to a mental representation of groups/categorised features
  • abstract representation that cannot necessarily be visualised
40
Q

Semantics

A

Our general view of things in the world (e.g. general knowledge), rather than out own specific memories of our life events

41
Q

Semantic component of the STM

A
  • suggestion of an additional semantic aspect to the STM model
  • evidence that some people have a poor phonological loop but a good semantic STM (e.g. they cannot repeat an exact sentence but can repeat the gist of a sentence)
42
Q

Classical view of semantics (Plato and Locke)

A
  • intuitive view that most things can be definable by their necessary properties/semantic features (e.g. a cat has whiskers, catch mice, are feline etc.)
  • we put these properties together to determine the category something falls into
  • difficult to come up with an indisputible list of features for everything
43
Q

Prototypes principle

A
  • the idea that we organise our mental representations of a conceptual category around the average
  • the prototype possesses all characteristic features of its category but probably does not exist in the real world
  • e.g. family resemblance principles
  • instances have graded membership (i.e. some members are more obviously a member of a certain category than others - shown by typicality effects that influence answer time in verification tasks)
  • when we see something new, we compare it to a large collection of mental prototypes to tell us whether it should be part of that category or not (using abstraction)
44
Q

Exemplar theory

A
  • this theory says we compare a new instance to stored instances of all other members/examples of that category we have previously encountered (rather than an averaged out prototype)
  • uses typicality events and means things we encounter more often are retrieved faster
45
Q

Semantic recognition evidence

A
  • evidence suggests the brain uses both prototypes and exemplar strategies
  • visual cortex (involves prototypical mental representations) but prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia (involves learned examples)
  • studies shown that left hemisphere is more involved in prototypes and right hemisphere is more linked to exemplars
46
Q

Category-specific deficits

A
  • animate objects, inanimate biological objects and manmade artefacts
  • some patients appear to have semantic deficits in one of these given categories but be able to identify anything within the other two
  • depends on where the brain is damaged
47
Q

Damage to front part of left temporal lobe

A

results in difficulty identifying humans

48
Q

Damage to lower left temporal lobe

A

results in difficulty identifying animals

49
Q

Damage to region where temporal lobe meets occipital and parietal lobe

A

impairs ability to retrieve names of tools

50
Q

Behavioural economics

A
  • we have proven we do not always act rationally and do not always maximise utility over value
  • studies the effects of many factors on the decisions of individuals and institutions
  • in many cases we apply heuristics (mental shortcuts) to make faster decisions, but this often leads to biases or lack of reasoning
51
Q

Availability bias

A
  • the probability estimate of an occurrence is judged by its availability in memory
  • rather than any sort of rational/statistical computation, we often just base the probability of something happening based on our recent memory of something happening
  • humans are generally poor at estimating very low-probability events so we tend to use mental shortcuts
52
Q

Conjunction fallacy

A
  • tells us the combined probability of two events is always less than the independent probability of one event
  • yet people often believe that two events are more likely to occur together based on background information (shows how we do not apply our objective rationality)
53
Q

Loss aversion and nonlinearity

A
  • we hate losing more than we value winning the same amount
  • emotional impact of loss is felt stronger and longer
54
Q

Prospect theory

A
  • object prospect of gaining and losing vs the utility (how we feel about it)
  • if we were perfectly linear, relationship would be linear, but instead line is asymmetrical to take into account decision making under uncertainty
  • related to our difficulty judging probability of events
55
Q

Frequency format hypothesis

A
  • suggests that our minds evolved to notice how frequently thing occur, not necessarily how objectively likely they are too occur
  • we work in frequencies not probabilities
56
Q

Framing effects

A
  • occurs when people give different answers to the same problem depending on how it is phrased
57
Q

Divisions of reasoning (system 1)

A
  • operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control
  • often innate skills or acquired learnt skills
58
Q

Divisions of reasoning (system 2)

A
  • allocates attention to more taxing mental activities
  • often associated with a subjective experience of decision making
  • more likely to be subject to interference and disruption than system 1