V. Instruments économiques Flashcards
Nommer des types d’instruments économiques
- Coercitifs ou punitifs: quotas, tarifs, barrières non tarifaires, embargos, boycotts, gel des avoirs, expropriations, manipulation du cours des monnaies, suspension de l’aide…
- Incitatifs: aide, libéralisation, allégement de la dette…
Nommer les cinq plus grands bénificaires du Plan Marshall, du plus grand au plus petit
G-B (1), France (2), Italie (3), Allemagne de l’Ouest (4), Pays-Bas (5)
Caractériser l’interdépendance
• = caractéristique du système
Définition: Deux dimensions : sensibilité et vulnérabilité
Canaux de communication multiples
1- multiplication des acteurs
2- conséquence politique: perte d’autonomie
3- conséquence politique: coalitions transnationales
4- Absence de hiérarchie entre les questions, « issue politics »
5- conséquence politique: on ne peut plus séparer politique étrangère et politique interne
6- conséquence politique: stratégies de liaison
7- Perte d’utilité de la force
8- La puissance ne dérive pas de la puissance militaire mais d’asymétries
Donner des cas où s’applique l’interdépendance économique et les caractériser
Cas : commerce
- Asymétries => menaces d’interruptions (A. Hirschman)
- (Russie et gaz; Chine et terres rares; US et technologie, denrées agri
- pouvoir d’influence sur la politique et la définition des intérêts de l’Etat cible
Cas: sanctions économiques
- = option de remplacement de la diplomatie et de la force
- Souvent employées: 170 fois depuis WW1, dont 50 ds les années 1990
- Tx de succès estimé faible (35%)
- Paradoxe: les décideurs continuent d’utiliser cet instrument que les chercheurs estiment inefficace.
- 1990-2001 = décennie des sanctions»: 14 cas de sanctions
- 1992-2012: 22 cas: maintien de la paix (14) (un seul cas non interne) terrorisme (4) Prolifération d’armes de destruction massive (3) soutien à des gouvernements démocratiques (4) R2P (1)
MAIS
- Séparer les question de l’utilisation de celle de ses résultats
- Faible comparé à quoi?
- Notion de succès – Calculer par rapport aux coûts des autres options
- F(objectifs) – Chgt de comportement – Engagement – signal à des tiers
Cas: conditionnalité de l’aide
- Peuvent être jugées comme une intrusion dans les affaires intérieures de l’Etat;
- peuvent contredire d’autres objectifs que poursuivent les agences de développement;
- Les bénéficiaires peuvent avoir le choix
- La mise en œuvre de ces conditions est difficile
Probabilité plus grande de succès quand
- imposées à l’unité administrative qui sera appréciée sur la base de sa propre performance;
- la satisfaction de ces conditions ne requiert pas la participation de nombreux fonctionnaires;
- elle porte sur des questions politiquement peu sensibles;
- les mesures exigées sont facilement vérifiables; • les conditions peuvent être remplies rapidement et d’un seul coup;
- elles ne nécessitent pas de profonds chgts institutionnels; • et elles font l’objet d’un fort consensus technique.
Cas: Mesures commerciales pour l’environnement (MCE)
Restrictions commerciales = vieil outil; uni- ou multilatérales; utilisées pour:
- décourager l’exploitation non durable des ressources naturelles • ex. CITES (approche au cas par cas)
- décourager des procédés de production dommageables pour l’env. . ex. Dispute thon-dauphin
- inciter les producteurs à internaliser les coûts environnementaux de leurs produits et modes de production
empêcher les passagers clandestins • ex.: Protocole de Montréal
- empêcher la fuite des industries dans des refuges pour pollueurs • ex. ANACDE • Pb des CC
- empêcher l’exportation d’externalités environmentales négatives • ex. Bâle I (approche au cas par cas) : Accord préalable en connaissance de cause; jusqu’à interdiction par les pays de l’OCDE (1994)
Nommer des problèmes des AME
Procédures de sanctions commerciales invalidées par règles de l’OMC
– Thon-dauphin
– Tortues-crevettes
Les pbs des AME pour l’OMC
Trois problèmes potentiels :
- Imposition des mesures commerciales des AME à un membre de l’OMC qui n’est pas partie à l’accord ;
- Imposition de barrières non tarifaires au nom de la protection de l’environnement;
- Utilisation par un pays de critères liés au mode de production (production processes and methods (PPM))
Définir les approches économiques des USA pour favoriser la démocratie selon Collins
Incentive approaches attempt to promote democracy from the top-down, by leveraging aid and trade privileges to persuade authoritarian leaders to implement political reform. Assistance approaches aim to induce democratization from the inside, through funding and technical assistance to state institutions, and from the bottom-up, by providing support to civil society and elections.
Inside approaches include providing funding and technical assistance to the traditionally more democratic institutions of the state (e.g., legislatures, courts), while bottom-up methods attempt to empower the mass population by funding elections and providing support to civil society (e.g., pro-democracy NGOs and independent media).
This study finds that while top-down incentive approaches can stimulate democratic change, this strategy tends to work only when aid and trade benefits are conditional; that is, when benefits are withheld until recipient states meet rigorous democratic benchmarks
Quel président américain est le plus grand promoteur de la démocratie?
Although Bill Clinton was responsible for elevating democracy promotion to doctrinal status, to most observers George W. Bush is the individual most firmly associated with the policy of exporting democracy. Bush acquired this reputation by positioning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as centerpieces of his strategy to foster the global expansion of democracy. Consequently, the American public and the international community have come to regard democracy promotion as a bellicist enterprise; that is, regime-change at gunpoint . The occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq constitute, for many, the touchstone case studies against which to assess the efficacy of the practice. As a result, democracy promotion has acquired a dubious reputation among the public due to the high human and financial costs of these operations, and their failure to foster the emergence of stable democratic governments
What is the modernization thoery and why did it fell out of grace?
Modernization theory posited that traditional economic practices represented the cause of underdevelopment in the world’s poorest states, and, therefore, if these states adopted “modern” development models—including market institutions, functional specialization, and property rights—rapid economic growth would follow. Walt Rostow, the most prominent architect of modernization theory, suggested that foreign aid would help foster the shift to modernization, and thus induce the wealth gains in recipient states that, the model asserts, are a necessary precondition for democracy. Modernization theory soon fell out of favor, however, as an economic and political model, as critics, including Henry Kissinger and Samuel Huntington, asserted that, contrary to the theory’s sanguine predictions, many of the states that underwent modernization also soon suffered from economic stagnation and political instability . Additionally, support for macroeconomic approaches to democracy promotion eroded as a result of the failure of empirical studies to demonstrate that aid can reliably stimulate economic growth. Foreign aid had, therefore, demonstrated poor efficacy with respect to raising income levels in recipient state to a degree (ostensibly) necessary to support democratic consolidationé
Quels sont les pours et les contres sur la question des motivateurs économiques?
According to Knorr (1973:150,179), financial inducement strategies possess dubious strategic value, with foreign aid demonstrating “very low… probable effectiveness” as an instrument of statecraft. Knorr identified two variables which acted to inhibit the efficacy of economic statecraft: first, nationalism which enhances a state’s will to resist economic pressure; and second, superpower rivalry, which provides target states with alternate sources of economic assistance.
Recent scholarship on economic incentive strategies conveys a more positive assessment of the efficacy of the practice. Haass and O’Sullivan (2000) maintain that economic incentives are often ignored by scholars and overlooked by policymakers. Incentives, according to Haass and O’Sullivan, are likely to be more effective instruments of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, as American primacy enhances Washington’s ability to leverage economic assistance. The authors provide the examples of Vietnam and North Korea, where, they asserts, recent U.S. incentive measures have demonstrated to be effective in catalyzing desired policy changes. Miroslav Nincic explains incentives’ effectiveness, asserting that incentives can act as “trading carrots” and “catalytic carrots.” Trading carrots can act to persuade regimes to reverse behavior by offsetting the costs of policy changes (relinquished policy objectives, credibility costs, and lost support from constituencies). Catalytic carrots can produce behavioral change in target states by altering the motivations of regimes, as inducements strengthen pro-internationalist elements, and reduce the power of groups advocating aggressive, hostile foreign policies.
Quelle influence a eu la chute du bloc communiste (associée à la fin de la dynamique de bipolarité) sur l’usage d’instruments économiques?
The demise of the bipolar system, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, inverted the position of sender and target, as targets lost their ability to leverage counterbalancing offers in order to maximize aid and to deter donor demands. Foreign aid and trade preferences were thus likely to become more effective instruments of American economic statecraft.
Faire la différence entre Politically Conditional Foreign Aid et Politically Conditioned Trade Preferences
Politically Conditional Foreign Aid
For conditionality to operate in earnest, aid agencies would produce annual assessments of political conditions in potential aid recipients, and then allocate aid on the basis on these democracy measures, with more aid flowing to reformers and less aid released to states in which retrograde democratic progress was exhibited. If conditionality operated in this manner, if would represent an actual democratic incentive. Instead of this variable quotient, U.S. aid under the present system operates as a dichotomous variable; that is, aid is usually reserved annually at fixed levels unless considerable retrograde progress is noted, and then all non humanitarian aid is withdrawn. Several episodes of the punitive model have occurred, including the cases of Malawi (1992), Peru (1992), and Guatemala (1993), and indeed, these measures did contribute to the emergence or reinstitution of democracy. Still, this form of aid conditionality can be coded more properly as an economic sanctions program; a subject which resides outside the limits of this study. Before 2003, few, if any, episodes existed where the United States adjusted aid based on democracy scores, or offered new sources of aid with the proviso that recipients prove their democratic bona fides prior to the release of funds.
Millenium Change Account: Programme initié par Bush Jr. qui récompensait les pays pauvres de leurs actions pro-démocratie. Cinq milliards de bourses sur 3 ans.
The “selection indicators” include: civil liberties, political rights, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, immunization rates, public expenditure on health, girls primary education completion rate, business start up, inflation, trade policy, regulatory quality, fiscal policy, natural resource management, and land rights and access. The “effect” is seen most commonly is reference to economic policy reform, as 24 countries cited the prospect of receiving funds from the MCA as the primary reason for implementing reformsé
The program does exhibit serious deficiencies, though, including sluggish aid distribution, inadequate staffing levels at MCC, and lower-levels of funding than initially expected. The first two are easier to remedy, and MCC will likely rectify the start-up inefficiencies that plague nearly all nascent institutions, and begin to disburse aid with greater alacrity.
Politically Conditioned Trade Preferences
Europe also applies political conditionality in its PTAs with non-European countries, and the EU appears to have achieved better results, as its conditionality references human rights more broadly (Hafner-Burton 2005). The results are not nearly as impressive as those exhibited by the EU accession process, where proof of robust democratic governance is required before benefits are bestowed. Nevertheless, the EU has leveraged trade to promote democracy more successfully than the United States, due to its more genuine use of democratic conditionality in its extra-regional PTAs, including its greater willingness to enforce rights codicils. Positive results have been achieved in Togo, Fiji, Comoros, Niger, and Pakistan; cases where the EU’s decision to suspend PTA privileges appears to have played a role in the progressive reforms that followed
The case study evidence (from the U.S. and E.U. experiences) suggests, that if the United States wishes to use trade most effectively as a democracy promotion instrument, democratic conditionality ought to be established as an ex ante process, requiring partner states to prove their democratic credentials before bilateral free trade agreements are signed.
Qu’est-ce qui caractérise une démocratie consolidée?
These elements include: free and fair elections; independent legislative and judicial institutions; power in the control of elected civilian officials; freedom of speech, assembly, media, religion, and personal lifestyle; due process of law; low levels of corruption; and protection of minority communities. The presence of a robust civil society represents an additional element emphasized in the democracy literature as essential for democratic success and survival. Therefore, authentic democracy is likely to emerge and to consolidate in states that conduct free, fair, and regular elections, where power is divided and balanced, where civil liberties are guaranteed de jure and de facto, and where civil society has been permitted to develop.
These elements include: free and fair elections; independent legislative and judicial institutions; power in the control of elected civilian officials; freedom of speech, assembly, media, religion, and personal lifestyle; due process of law; low levels of corruption; and protection of minority communities. The presence of a robust civil society represents an additional element emphasized in the democracy literature as essential for democratic success and survival. Therefore, authentic democracy is likely to emerge and to consolidate in states that conduct free, fair, and regular elections, where power is divided and balanced, where civil liberties are guaranteed de jure and de facto, and where civil society has been permitted to develop.
