Unit 7 - Inferences (unit 17 BSB) Flashcards
Inferences
The following are the specific statutory provisions with which students should be familiar (and able to refer to by section number): sections 34, 35, 36 and 37 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. The following is the specific leading case authority with which students should be familiar (and should be able to refer to by name): Lucas
Sections 34 - SILENCE AT INTERVIEW
Section 35 - SILENCE AT TRIAL
Section 36 - silence when arrests whilst in possession of incriminating objects/substances/marks
and
Section 37 - silence on arrest at the scene of the crime
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
Can someone be convicted based on a lie?
NO!
- Lies told by the accused, on their own, do not make a positive case of any crime
Then what does a lie show?
they may indicate a consciousness of guilt and in appropriate circumstances may therefore be relied upon by the prosecution as evidence supportive of guilt, as in Goodway [1993] 4 All ER 894
Cases where a Lucas direction is required
Judge is required to give a Lucas direction WHEN (the FOUR Burge situations):
- Where the defence relies on an alibi.
- Where the judge considers it desirable or necessary to suggest that the jury should look for support or corroboration of one piece of evidence from other evidence in the case, and amongst that other evidence draws attention to lies told, or allegedly told, by the defendant.
- Where the prosecution seek to show that something said, either in or out of the court, in relation to a separate and distinct issue was a lie, and to rely on that lie as evidence of guilt in relation to the charge which is sought to be proved.
- Where although the prosecution have not adopted the approach to which we have just referred, the judge reasonably envisages that there is a real danger that the jury may do so.
The above are all situations where the prosecution say that, or the jury may erroneously
conclude that, the telling of a lie must mean that a D is guilty (i.e. that the lie is evidence
against the accused, in effect using it as an implied admission of guilt
What points should the court make when making a Lucas Directions:
- as much as possible, be tailored to the circumstances of the case
It will normally suffice to make two points:
(1) first that the lie must be admitted or proved beyond reasonable doubt, and
(2) that the mere fact that the accused lied is not in itself evidence of guilt since defendants may lie for innocent reasons, so only if the jury are sure that the accused did not lie for an innocent reason can a lie support the prosecution case.
When a Lucas direction is UNNECESSARY
Only need a direction WHERE: the prosecution say, or the judge envisages that the jury may say,
that the lie is evidence against the accused, in effect using it as an implied admission of guilt.
(1) The direction is not required in run-out-of-the-mill cases where the defence case is contradicted by the evidence of prosecution witnesses in such a way as to make it necessary for the prosecution to say that the accused’s account is untrue insofar as the two sides are in conflict.
(2) Direction not required simply because the jury may reject the evidence of an accused about a central issue in the case, because that situation is covered by the general direction on the burden & standard of proof.
(3) Don’t need a Lucas direction where, It is otiose, i.e. where the rejection of the explanation given by the accused almost necessarily leaves the jury with no choice but to convict as a matter of logic.
- Usually, lies relate directly to the matter they are on trial for.
-If the only explanation behind a Defendant’s lie is that they are guilty of the offence, there is no difficulty in simply allowing the jury to assess the prosecution’s evidence and the D’s credibility in order to reach their conclusion. - Eg, if D denies committing the burglary; if the jury are sure that D lied about participating in a burglary, the only sensible conclusion is that they are guilty of the offence.
(4) Don’t need where: the accused has offered an explanation for his lies and the judge has dealt
with that explanation fairly in his summing-up
Does an accused have the Right to silence?
An accused person in a criminal trial has traditionally been accorded a ‘right to silence’, sometimes termed a privilege against self-incrimination.
These concepts are not specifically mentioned in the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, Article 6, but it has been held that they constitute ‘generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6’
Aspects of the right to silence recognised in domestic law:
- Accused is not a compellable witness at trial;
- Accused under no general duty to assist the police with their inquiries.
YJCEA 1999, s59 and Sch 3: responding to Saunders v UK by restricting the use which can be made of evidence obtained under compulsion under a variety of statutory provisions including the Companies Act s343
Previously at common law, were inferences generally permitted to be drawn from the exercise of the right to silence?
No.
no inferences were generally permitted to be drawn from the exercise of right to silence, either by a suspect under investigation or by an abused at his trial
- Prior to 1994: no evidential significance could be attached to accused’s decision to exercise right
to silence; Ds had absolute right to say nothing; right to sentence in ECHR an essential part of our
justice system
Where the statutory scheme does not apply = the common-law rule still applies.
That right (no inferences from silence) has been eroded by ss34-38 CJPO 1994: specifies circumstances in which adverse inferences may be drawn from the exercise of the primary right to remain silent
Where the statutory schemes applies = court is under obligation to ensure the jury are properly directed re the limited inferences which can be drawn (Condron v UK). ‘particular caution’ required by court before invoking the accused’s silence again him.
Whether the statutory scheme fulfils this requirement is a matter that is likely to continue to figure in criminal appeals
What is an adverse inference?
a common sense conclusion that is adverse to the interests of a party in proceedings.
Silence at interview, s34
Drawing adverse inference from silence occurs where the accused withholds when questioned matters that are subsequently introduced in support of adefence at trial.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 34
[ THE LAW]
(1) Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is given that the accused—
* (a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being questioned under caution by a constable trying to discover whether or by whom the offence had been committed, failed to mention any fact relied on in his defence in those proceedings; or
- (b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact; or
- (c) at any time after being charged with the offence, on being questioned under section 22 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (post-charge questioning), failed to mention any such fact,
- being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have been expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed, as the case may be, subsection (2) below applies.
(2) Where this subsection applies—
- (a) [repealed];
- (b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an application made by the accused under paragraph 2 of schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998;
- (c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer; and
- (d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper.
(2A) Where the accused was at an authorised place of detention at the time of the failure, subsections (1) and (2) above do not apply if he had not been allowed an opportunity to consult a solicitor prior to being questioned, charged or informed as mentioned in subsection (1) above.
(3) Subject to any directions by the court, evidence tending to establish the failure may be given before or after evidence tending to establish the fact which the accused is alleged to have failed to mention.
(4) This section applies in relation to questioning by persons (other than constables) charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders as it applies in relation to questioning by constables; and in subsection
(1) above ‘officially informed’ means informed by a constable or any such person.
(5) This section does not—
- (a) prejudice the admissibility in evidence of the silence or other reaction of the accused in the face of anything said in his presence relating to the conduct in respect of which he is charged, in so far as evidence thereof would be admissible apart from this section; or
- (b) preclude the drawing of any inference from any such silence or other reaction of the accused which could properly be drawn apart from this section.
(6) This section does not apply in relation to a failure to mention a fact if the failure occurred before the commencement of this section.
s34
Failure to Reveal Facts
permits the tribunal of fact to draw ‘such inferences as appear proper’ from the:
Accused’s failure to reveal specific facts, provided that the various conditions set forth in s. 34(1) are made out and any questions of fact arising thereunder are resolved against the accused
S34 Only applies where…
a particular fact is advanced by the defence which is suspicious by reason of not being put forward at an early opportunity (s34 does not apply simply because the accused has declined to answer questions)
s34 also applies where the accused discloses the nature of the defence but fails to mention a particular fact that is relied upon at trial.
- in such a case there is a discretion whether to give a warning.
S34 is primarily directed at the mischief of the positive defence following a ‘no comment’ interview and/or the ‘ambush’ defence.
Counsel should not complicate trials and summings-up by invoking the section unless the merits of the individual case require it
s34
Common sense; where the accused has said enough in interview to set up the line of reasoning on which his defence was based, even if some points of detail are missing
= probably better to avoid a direction under s34 (that adverse inferences may be drawn).
s34:
To give the direction (that adverse inferences may be drawn) in a case where the accused has put forward no more than a bare denial, would be tantamount to directing that guilt may be inferred simply from the exercise of the right to silence, which is NOT the purpose of s34.
Adverse inferences consistent with Art 6 right to fair trial:
- ECtHR decisions confirm that: the mere fact that a trial judge leaves a jury with the option of drawing an adverse inference from silence in interview is not incompatible with the requirements of a fair trial.
- Whether the drawing of adverse inferences infringes Art 6 is a matter to be determined in light of all circumstances of the case, having regard to the situations where inferences may be drawn; the weight attached to them by the national court; and the degree of compulsion inherent in the situation.
Of particular importance: the terms of the judge’s direction to the jury on the drawing of adverse inferences.
o S34 has given rise to much more difficulty in directing the jury than s35 (failure to testify are trial)
Is Failure to give a proper direction a breach of Art 6?
-Failure to give a proper direction
= not necessarily a breach of Art 6, nor necessarily renders a conviction unsafe:
eg in Chenia, C had received a fair trial, due to strength of the evidence; the fact that his failure to mention relevant facts was not
consequence upon legal advice; the clear & accurate direction given on the failure of C to give evidence in the case.
Is Failure to give a proper direction a breach of Art 6?
-Failure to give a proper direction
= not necessarily a breach of Art 6, nor necessarily renders a conviction unsafe:
eg in Chenia, C had received a fair trial, due to strength of the evidence; the fact that his failure to mention relevant facts was not
consequence upon legal advice; the clear & accurate direction given on the failure of C to give evidence in the case.
Access to legal advice
can there be adverse inferences due to silence when D was not allowed to seek legal advice?
S34 (2A) Where the accused was at an authorised place of detention at the time of the failure
or refusal, subsections (1) and (2) do not apply if he had not been allowed an opportunity to
consult a solicitor prior to being questioned, charged or informed as mentioned in subsection (1) above.
Impact of the delay/lac of access to legal advice + adverse inferences
The lawful exercise of a power to delay access to legal advice could, where accused was at risk of adverse inferences being drawn, be sufficient to deprive accused of a fair procedure under Art 6
The dilemma is resolved by postponing the prospect that inferences will be drawn until the
accused has had the opportunity of consulting with a legal adviser
- The postponement occurs in exactly the same way whether access to legal advice is delayed lawfully or unlawfully
Fact later RELIED UPON as part of his defence = Meaning of ‘Reliance’
No inference is available unless D later relies on the facts he failed to mention in interview.
When does s34 not apply?
(1) To a fact that is undisputed; an admission by D of a fact relied on by the prosecution does not, without anything more, constitute reliance.
(2) S34 does NOT apply where accused makes no attempt to put forward at trial some previously undisclosed fact.
The fact may be relied on even where it is not asserted by D in oral testimony = so s34 can
apply where the accused himself does not give evidence. Can ‘RELY’ on a fact by:
o The fact may be advanced by a witness;
o Or the fact may be elicited from a prosecution witness (in XX);
o The fact may be given by a co-defendant
(Webber) An accused does ‘rely’ on a fact where counsel, acting on his instructions, puts a specific and positive case, in XX to prosecution witnesses (as opposed to asking questions intended to probe or test the prosecution case)
- The effect of specific & positive suggestions from counsel, whether or not accepted, is to plant in the jury’s mind the accused’s version of events. This may be so even if the witness rejects the suggestion, since the jury may mistrust the witness’s evidence.
- If a judge is in doubt whether counsel is merely testing the prosecution case or putting a
positive case = counsel should be asked, in absence of jury, to make the position clear. - But the positive case ought to be clear from the defence statement made in advance of trial.
Can have ‘reliance’ where counsel adopts evidence given by a co-defendant
Broad construction of a ‘fact’ which is relied on:
o Held that, the accused putting forward a possible explanation for his fingerprints being on a car number plate = a ‘fact’ as broadly construed in Webber.
o K’s belief in the guilt of 1+ named individuals of the crime with which he was charged was a ‘fact’ relied on.
Where D has varied his account between interview and his testimony at trial = the Crown are
likely to argue that his evidence was not credible - correct approach might be a Lucas
direction rather than s34 direction.
If prosecution fail to establish that the accused has failed to mention a fact =
jury should be
directed to drawn no inference.
Where judge directs jury on basis that s34 applies, the direction should identify the facts relied on:
and should not be mixed with other, innocuous, facts from which no inference can be drawn.
Where judge directs jury on basis that s34 applies: do they have to mention all facts?
Judge may be allowed some latitude in a complex case in not having to list all of the facts
which were not mentioned;
o But the identification of the specific fact/facts is generally required.
Judge should discuss any proposed direction with counsel before closing speeches:
discussion with counsel will reduce the risk of mistakes.
A fact can be “mentioned” through a PREPARED STATEMENT:
Where the accused at the relevant time gives a prepared statement in which certain facts are set forth, it cannot subsequently be said that there has been a failure to mention those facts.
(in some cases, A D will choose to put their explanation in a pre-prepared statement which is read out by their solicitor at the start of the hearing & will then subsequently answer ‘no comment’ to further questions)
How can a prepared statement may be a dangerous for an innocent accused ?
If something significant has been omitted
Since inconsistencies between the prepared statement and the defence at trial do not necessarily amount to reliance on unmentioned facts, the judge must be particularly careful
to pinpoint any fact that might properly be the subject of a s. 34 direction.
Prepared statement: another way jury may be warned
The jury might be directed to regard differences between the prepared statement and the accused’s evidence at trial as constituting a previous ‘lie’, rather
than as basis for a s34 direction
- Whilst under CAUTION:
o The accused must have been questioned under caution (s34(1)(a).
o The Caution: ‘you do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence’.
o The caution serves to inform the accused of the effect of s34.
o If no caution administered when questioned = no adverse inference may be drawn from accused’s failure to mention the relevant fact.
That he could REASONABLY have been expected to mention in the circumstances (facts which
should have been mentioned)
Adverse inferences only from a fact where the fact is one which, in the circumstances arising
at the time, the accused could reasonably have been expected to mention.
If the accused gives evidence, his reason for failing to disclose should be explored
(1) And any explanation advanced by the accused for non-disclosure must be considered in deciding what inferences (if any) should be drawn.
(2) S34 direction should not be given if accused has not been given an opportunity to deal with the question of why he failed to answer question:
That he could REASONABLY have been expected to mention in the circumstances (facts which
should have been mentioned)
In considering ‘reasonableness’, court is to consider:
The accused’s
(a) qualities,
(b) knowledge and
(c) any legal advice given
o Age, experience, mental capacity, health, sobriety, tiredness and personality.
That he could REASONABLY have been expected to mention in the circumstances (facts which
should have been mentioned):
Another factor = failure of interviewer to disclose relevant information when asked to do so
by the accused or his legal adviser:
if little information is forthcoming, a legal adviser may well counsel silence until a better assessment of the case to answer can be made; but everything depends on the facts