S4 - Negotiation Strategies Flashcards

1
Q

security point

A

minimum a party is willing to accept

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2
Q

optimal outcome

A

maximum a party is able to obtain

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3
Q

bargaining space (zone of possible agreement / ZOPA)

A

the space between both the security points and the optimal outcome

No overlap in interests is no agreement, because there is no bargaining space

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4
Q

lying and zone of agreement

A

Lying is risky, because with a lie you possibly lock yourself out of a zone of agreement (lie about your security point). With lying your bargaining space is not clear.

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5
Q

two-level game and the zone of possible agreement

A

At a two-level game (Putnam), the figure looks the same, but then vertically (international / domestic level has a bargaining zone).

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6
Q

common tactics: tit-for-tat

A

responding in kind to whatever the other party does. Concession of the same kind for another.

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7
Q

common tactics: inviting unreriprocated offers

A

double down on a concession without making one yourself

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8
Q

common tactics: extreme claims and small concessions

A

starting really high, opening bid is important.

Too high can make you seem unserious and give negative sphere to the concessions.

Starting very low brings you in a vulnerable position, you end up closer to your own security point

high opening bid

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9
Q

anchoring

A

people stay stuck to an offer that was made in the very beginning

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10
Q

common tactics: commitment tactics

A

one cannot make more concessions because one does not have the authority to do that.

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11
Q

common tactics: take it or leave it offers

A

threatens to walk away, has the effect of cutting off alternatives. Gives a ‘this deal or no deal’ situation. Comes with deadlines or ultimatums.

Can also happen with peacemaking, when the end of the summit comes up

threat with walking away, cutting off alternatives

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12
Q

common tactics: trying to make you flinch

A

increasing the pressure (price) instead of making a concession.

Occurs in hostage situations.

Eventually you accept because the price keeps going up instead of concessions being made (situation worsening).

increasing price

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13
Q

common tactics: personal insults/ feather ruffling

A

pressuring, negative contact

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14
Q

common tactics: bluffing and lying

A

deception. If you do it, there might be a risk, because when you’re caught it might bring trouble, trust is gone.

Can also lock yourself out of the zone of agreement by creating options that you do not have (risky).

Can damage relationship, but what matters is outcome of negotiations.

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15
Q

common tactics: incentives - threats and rewards

A

promising mediators will promise things in peacemaking (recognition, access to international organisations).

Have to be believable and credible, because if not there is a problem. Party should believe you are able to ‘reward’. Threat should also be avoidable.

making promises / need to be believable and able to reward

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16
Q

common tactics: belittling your alternatives

A

talking bad about the alternative option that gives you a point of security

17
Q

common tactics: good cop and bad cop

A

friendly or aggressive behaviour.

The party will have a tendency to accept the conditions of the good cop because they are nice to you.

Can end up taking a bad deal that the good cop offers, while the bad cop could have offered a better one.

18
Q

integrative bargaining

A

Reframing the issues to find common ground (collaborative problem solving)

Exchanging information for reframing to be successful

Enlightened self interest: helping others to help oneself

19
Q

principled negotiation (Fisher and Ury)

A

People: Separate the people from the problem

Interests: Focus on interests, not positions

Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do

Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard

people / interests / options / criteria

20
Q

creating value

A

previously hidden joint gains

not focusing on dividing a fixed pie

finding ways to fulfill all parties’ needs and interests

avoiding zero-sum

21
Q

principled negotiation - what if they won’t play

A

negotiation jujitsu – go back to these principles, look behind their position, understand their concerns.

Ask questions to get information so you can try to go beyond the position.

Pausing is also a trick to use, because this can gain concessions (people get uncomfortable from silence).

Other option is the one-text procedure, which basically is inviting a mediator / bringing in a third party.

22
Q

principled negotiation - what if they use dirty tricks

A

taming the hard bargainer.

Dirty tricks means the negotiation is no longer about the problem, but about the process.

Usually when the other party is not happy with the way the negotiation is going.

Then you should go back to the four principles, identify the tactic being used and confront the other party with it.

If none of this works, you can always walk away

process is the problem. other party not happy with way negotiation is going.

23
Q

key implications - hard (distributive) bargaining

A

Risk of deteriorating relationships (and reputation)

Risk of creating deadlocks

Ineffective to address deep-stated interests: impedes value creation

Effective to defend vital interests and essential principles

24
Q

key ideas - integrative bargaining

A

Risk of creating unrealistic expectations

Time intensive

Opens new perspectives: creates a new bargaining space

Improves deteriorates relationships: looking through counterparts eyes

Effective for conflicts that deal with hard to quantify interests

25
Q

hard bargaining

A

Security point = minimum a party is willing to accept

Optimal outcome = maximum a party is able to obtain

Bargaining space is the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) = voluntary exchange zone, which is the space between two security points