S10 - International Mediation

Question 1

mediation

Answer 1

process in which one or more third parties assist the parties in conflict in reaching a solution that they are either unable or unwilling to find or their own.

Question 2

intractable conflicts and mediation

Answer 2

Intractable conflict use mediation. This is because there is a lot of hostility and resistance in intractable conflict, which gives the need for mediation.

Question 3

negotiation as an extension

Answer 3

Extension of the existing negotiation process. When parties do not feel comfortable with talking to each other directly, a mediator can offer to facilitate the communication, therefore it is an extension of the negotiation process.

mediator can offer to facilitate the communication in negotiation

Question 4

when do parties turn to a mediator

Answer 4

Hinting towards ripeness: better outcome than the one they can achieve by fighting.

Hinting toward bias: better outcome than one reachable through direct negotiations.

Question 5

contingency model

Answer 5

context

performance

outcomes

Question 6

contingency model - context

Answer 6

nature of the mediator

nature of the parties

nature of the dispute

Question 7

contingency model - performance

Answer 7

mediation behaviour

Question 8

contingency model - outcomes

Answer 8

success or failure mediation

Question 9

states as a mediator (nature mediator)

Answer 9

advantages superpower: more leverages / more resources to help implementation / required time and skills to negotiate

disadvantages superpower: likely to work in own interest / can seem imposed / bias

advantages small-sized: cannot gain anything / less biased / win more trust

disadvantages small-sized: less resources / less leverage

Question 10

four types of mediators / nature of the mediator

Answer 10

states

international / regional organizations

religious organizations / humanitarian ngo’s / advocacy groups

illustrous individuals

Question 11

international / regional organizations as mediator (nature mediator)

Answer 11

Realists tend to be sceptical of international organizations. They are seen as smoke screen for the interests of powerful states and therefore criticized when they try to mediate

mandated by their charters - can only mediate in certain types of conflict

promotion of peace as a value

only interested in particular outcome

organizational limitations. For some international organizations, they can only mediate conflicts that are between members.

Question 12

religious organizations, humanitarian NGO’s, advocacy groups as mediator (nature mediator)

Answer 12

autonomy, not linked to state

long-term presence in conflict: they can alert parties to early warning signs. Can establish close relationships with local officials, and gain attention for the conflict through documentation. Can also help with long-term economic development projects.

low-level of intrusiveness: not going to ask for very big concessions for governments, because they do not have leverage. That makes them trusted as a mediator.

narrow area of expertise. Conflicts overlapping several issues makes it unlikely for NGO’s to have the expertise to resolve those conflicts

issue focus: humanitarian concerns, resources

Question 13

illustrious individuals (nature mediator)

Answer 13

Known worldwide for integrity and moral stance

Question 14

nature of the mediator - partiality

Answer 14

Mediation requires significant investment (material and non-material).

Outside actors would not mediate unless they have an interest in the outcome. Therefore actors have an explicit and an implicit bias. This makes mediation a foreign policy tool.

bias, otherwise mediator would not invest

Question 15

offensive reasons mediator

Answer 15

limiting rivals’ zone of influence / obtaining the gratitude of conflicting sides

Question 16

defensive reasons mediator

Answer 16

preserving influence over conflicting sides / preventing rival actors to capitalize by getting involved in the conflict / preventing spillover effect

Question 17

bias of an actor

Answer 17

delivering a party to the negotiations = closeness to one party implies the possibility of delivering that party to an agreement. A biased mediator can also persuade their ‘friend’ to join the negotiation.

liability of closeness = mediators are not successful if perceived as preferring a solution favouring the party to which they are close. Sometimes there could have been reached a better agreement when there was no biased mediator. Relationship with mediator can also be damaged when the country with the bias is not happy with the outcome it got.

Question 18

nature of the mediator - leverage

Answer 18

strategic power (resources) = resources / attributes of the mediator

tactical power (at the table)

Question 19

leverage

Answer 19

= the ability to influence others and bring them closer to your preferred outcome

Question 20

strategic power (resources)

Answer 20

legitimate power: influence due to position. This is due to authority, that gives an actor the right to instruct other countries.

expert power: knowledge and expertise in a lot of areas. Having expertise that one or both parties in conflict don’t have can lead to leverage.

information: ability to control and manipulate information.

referent power: charisma, status, prestige.

reward power: award compliance, carrots.

coercive power: punish non-compliance, sticks.

Question 21

nature of the parties

Answer 21

party arithmic

internal cohesiveness

regime type

Question 22

party arithmic

Answer 22

who are the disputing sides / spoilers. Mediators need to investigate if everyone who needs to be here at the negotiations actually participating.

Question 23

internal cohesiveness

Answer 23

Gives the problem of two-level games. Low cohesiveness leads to confusion in identifying the appropriate party. Proliferation of constituencies makes it difficult to negotiate.

Question 24

regime type

Answer 24

Liberal peace theory = democracies do not go to war to other democracies.

Democracies are more amenable to settling conflicts peacefully.

democratic peace theory

Question 25

nature of the dispute - ripeness

Answer 25

Perception of three crucial statements Mutually Hurting Stalemate. Both sides realize that they have more to gain by agreeing to negotiation than to continue fighting with each other. Encourages parties to look for a way out. Way Out. Parties must have a perception that a solution is possible and the orhter party has the same perception and is looking for a negotiation as well. Don’t have to identify a solution to the conflict, just have to believe that a negotiation is possible and that the other party shares the sense that negotiation is possible. Mutually Enticing Oppotunity. Both parties feel like they have something to gain from negotiation. ## Footnote mutually hurting stalemate / way out / mutually enticing opportunity

Question 26

nature of the dispute - tractability

Answer 26

Intensity - Quantitative studies: the more fatalities, the more changes that the parties will accept and commit to mediation - Qualitative studies: the more fatalities the less chances for success (intractable conflicts might be less amenable to mediation) Issues - Different types: sovereignty, ideology, security, self-determination, etc… - Generally, conflicts encompass several issues at the same time - Reframe zero-sum perception

Question 27

How do mediators get involved?

Answer 27

Ad hoc. This means that if a mediator is present for this negotiation, that will not automatically mean that they are present in another round of negotiation. Voluntary Non-coercive Legally non-binding. Mediator and parties can always step away from the negotiation process when they no longer want to be involved

Question 28

Role / action of mediator - performance

Answer 28

Expanding ZOPA (zone of possible agreement) Information exchange Implementation Political cover

Question 29

is the mediator credible - performance

Answer 29

Do the disputants think that the mediator’s offer is believable (mediator is not bluffing / not being deceived by opponent). Do the disputants think that the mediator can deliver the offer (mediator can make the offer stick) Third parties that are concerned with their reputations will be more inclined to deliver on their guarantees because of their past and future - track record - potential deceit decreases the chances that they could assume a similar role again ## Footnote believable / deliver the offer / concerned with own reputation?

Question 30

outcomes: implementation

Answer 30

Peacemaking --> implementation --> peacebuilding Peacebuilding is a longer peace process, where you establish trust again. Implementation is something you use to kickstart peacebuilding. ## Footnote implementation is the start for peacebuilding

Question 31

peace agreements are like laws

Answer 31

* They contain principles, not rules and specifics * Implementation is the tricky part More specific clauses is important because it provides with some cover if you want to hold something to the bargain. With more specific clauses you can state better that the other party did not hold their end of the bargain. Without specifics, it makes it easy to escape implementation and you can always blame the other side. ## Footnote lack specific clauses: makes it easy to escape implementation

Question 32

post-agreement dynamics - implementation

Answer 32

Agreement has been signed, but not much has changed. Parties are confident that it will be fine, but the people under them are not confident that it will work out. Some threats and power dynamics from during the war are also going to stay after signing. Implementations is where the changes actually happen. * Inequalities of power * Uncertainties and lack of trust * Potential spoilers and violence * Constituent needs and dissatisfaction * Institutionalized hatred and polarized identities These continuations lead to a pressure to default.

Question 33

signs of commitment - implementation

Answer 33

1. Entering negotiations is a signal 2. Each concession is a signal 3. Signing an agreement is a signal But action is what is now needed: * Costs and benefits become real. Benefits need to be offered as soon as possible (demilitarization) * Local needs for assurance must be met: local people must experience the peace dividend. They need to feel that something has shifted after the conflict

Question 34

actions of implementation

Answer 34

Power sharing Demilitarization Reforms Keeping to the schedule is key. Missing deadlines can be a trigger for a conflict to start. You don’t want to lose momentum. You also want to identify and neutralize spoilers as soon at possible, so put fires out in time.

Question 35

reasons for failure of implementation

Answer 35

By choice, no intention of keeping to the agreement. Lack of resources, ability, expertise Focusing on long-term issues: immediate concerns are often forgotten. Failure to manage small catastrophe

Question 36

third party roles - implementation

Answer 36

Hold parties to their word – decrease costs and increase benefits Marshalling resources Nurturing the moderate middle Putting out fires everywhere = spoilers / constituents / splinter groups / disagreements

Question 37

Outcomes: measuring success

Answer 37

Definitional shortcomings - Arbitrary definitions, so disagreement on what is a successful disagreement. - Dichotomous understanding (either – or) - Oversimplified (only agreement) - Time frame

Question 38

Successful mediation involves

Answer 38

* Bringing parties to the table * Signing an agreement * Making it stick

Question 39

bias of actor - delivering a party to negotiatoins

Answer 39

closeness to one party implies the possibility of “delivering” that party to an agreement

Question 40

bias of actor - liability of closeness

Answer 40

mediators are not successful if perceived as preferring a solution favoring the party to which they are close