Property Dualism Flashcards
Explain what the theory ‘Property Dualism’ argues
Property Dualism claims;
- There’s just 1 sort of substance - the physical substance but 2 types of property.
- However, there are 2 ontologically distinct types of property; mental and physical properties ( so within us we have both physical and non-physical - consciousness and mental properties)
Mental properties are dependent on physical properties but not reducible to them (so qualia or consciousness etc is not reducible to the physical)
- Though there is just one type of substance, the physical substance, at least some mental properties are neither reducible nor supervenient upon physical properties.
- the properties identified by physicalists do not form the complete fundamental nature of the universe - because, in addition, there are properties of consciousness.
Explain what ‘Contiousness’ is
Consciousness - Mental states (thinking)/ qualia (so it’s the question of mental states still but just referred to as consciousness
Explain ‘Jacksons knowledge argument (Mary in the room)’
The basis of the argument:
- A neuroscientist, Mary, is locked in a room and has never seen any colour. She cant in this room + she’s only ever seen black and white.
- However Mary knows absolutely every physical fact there is to know about the concept of color vision; she is then allowed to see red for the first time.
The claim = that Mary learns something new about color vision when she first sees red.
Therefore not all facts are physical facts, (ie it doesn’t show qualia or what it is to have qualia of colors so physicalism is false because physical facts is simply not satisfactory you need consciousness of red)
- What it is like for us to see red is not a neurophysiological or functional fact about the brain.
Mary knows all ‘All the physical facts + everything neuroscience would discover + all the facts about how thins function that is entailed by those facts. - If the fundamental nature of the world is entirely physical, then complete physical knowledge would be complete knowledge. Mary knew everything physical about color vision AND YET she learnt something new upon seeing red for the first time.
- SO our minds are not purely physical
State the 3 Counters/ criticisms of Jacksons knowledge argument (Mary)
1 - Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge:
2 - Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge:
3- Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way (The ‘New knowledge’/ Old fact’ response)
Explain criticism No.1 - ‘Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge’ against Jacksons knowledge argument
- Mary doesn’t learn propositional knowledge of some new fact she gains a new ability eg to recognize red + utilise the knowledge she already has to recognise it + put it into practice
This is like riding a bike - you can learn all the facts about riding bikes. When they ride a bike they have a new skill but this does not prove that Mary has acquired a new non-physical fact.
Explain criticism No.2 ‘Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge’ and the objection
Mary doesn’t learn about a ‘New fact’ but becomes directly aware of the colour red
- Suppose what it’s like to see red is some property of the brain. Mary knows about this property, but her brain has never had the property so she isn’t acquainted with it.
When marys brain actually undergoes the process she knows all about then she will be acquainted with the color and gain abilities of recognition.
Responses to the objection;
Acquaintance knowledge involves propositional knowledge
- Becoming acquainted with red involved learning some new facts especially as there non-physical thus what it is like to experience red can imply to be a physical property of the brain.
Explain Criticism No.3 ‘Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way’
+ the objection
- The concept of water is different from the concept of H20 however they are the same property there’s just two ways of thinking about the same ‘stuff’
There is more than one way of knowing about the same fact. To know that there is water in the glass is to know that there is H20. These are different ways in which we think about the world. Mary has a theoretical concept of red (wavelengths of light, neurons firing etc). On seeing red, Mary gains a new pheonmenal concept of red (A concept based on expeirncing something)
Objection - the property dualist would disagree because experiencing the color red is not a different way of knowing about a physical fact. In fact, it is acquiring a non-physical experinemce or qualia which cannot be explained purely in terms of the physcial.
Explain David Chalmes ‘Philosophical Zombies’ argument for Property Dualism
- A zombie, in the philosophical sense, is a physical replica of a person but with no phenomenal consciousness
- Zombies are not possible in the actual world, the laws of nature correlate physical properties with consciousness
Are they possible in a different possible world?
- A world that is physically identical to ours but without consciousness - so where things are impossible in our world they are physically possible in another (where the laws of nature are different)
- If these are genuine possible worlds - ways the world could be then there are worlds which are physically impossible but metaphysically possible.
Are zombies ‘metaphysically’ impossible?
The argument;
The idea of a zombies isn’t a logical contradiction so there conceivable + if there conceivable then they are possible. If consciousness were ontologically dependent on physical properties then zombies would be impossible (as anything physical would have to possess consciousness but they don’t because consciousness is not ontologically dependent). Because zombies are possible, consciousness is not ontologically dependent on physical properties so physicalism is false. (So this shows physicalism is false because consciousness doesn’t depend on the physical body and physical properties do not determine mental properties like physicalism claims so because we can separate the two in another world ‘possible world’ - physicalism is false.
Explain what David Chalmers means by ‘Possible worlds’
Possible World:
A ‘possible world’ is a way of talking about how things could have been (like a contingent truth - could have been otherwise)
- Propositions describe ‘states of affairs’ - can be true or false
- A proposition that is contingently false describes a possible state of affairs, a way things could be but aren’t.
- Possible worlds are distinct from one another depending on what we are supposing to be true in that world
- Things have different properties in different possible worlds.
In other possible worlds;
Propositions can be true or false or just contingently false;
- You CANNOT have logical impossibilities so nothing is absolutely impossible ie bachelors are unmarried men:
State the 3 Criticisms of the Philosophical Zombies argument:
1 - A ‘Philosophical zombies/ zombie world’ is not conceivable’
2 - ‘What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible’
3 - What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality;
Explain criticism No.1 against the Zombies argument ‘Philosophical zombie world is not conceivable’
Phenomenal properties are ultimately physical properties realising particular functional roles;
A zombie is a physical + functional duplicate of a human being but without phenomenal consciousness however if physicalisms true then these phenomenal properties (contiousness) are physical properties + thus you cant have a physical duplicate of a human being( the zombie) without consciousness or qualia (can’t separate these properties) and You cant both have and lack phenomenal consciousness.
Therefore philosophical zombies are inconceivable.
(Contioussness are physical properties realising functional roles so if we have a functional and physical duplicate of a human being then this entails that this duplicate has contiosuness )
Explain Chalmers response tot he criticism ‘Philosophical zombie world is not conceivable’
Reply;
We cannot assume that there’s a complete physical + functional analysis of consciousness
Phenomenal properties of consciousness are ‘qualia’ - intrinsic, non-representational properties of experience
We can know all about something’s physical structure + function without being able to explain consciousness.
Explain criticism No.2 against the Zombies argument ‘What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible’
This criticism targets the second premise of the philosophical zombies argument . Although zombies are conceivable they aren’t in fact metaphysically possible + thus regardless of whether we can conceive of them what we can conceive isn’t always a reliable guide of the real world or what’s actually out there.
It is possible that water in oceans is fresh + it never falls as rain etc but this is metaphysically impossible (for water as we know it not to be water).
Water falling form the sky and into our oceans is an essential property if what makes water what it is and what makes the ocean what its composed of exactly how consciousness is an essential and property of what makes human beings people. Thus we cant infer metaphysical possibility from conceivability + cant argue that zombies (replica of human people) can not have consciousness or phenomenal properties because although conceivable, it isn’t metaphysically possible, in the real world.
Explain Chalmers response to the criticism ‘What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible’
The counter reply against metaphysically impossible;
There is a disanalogy between water + phenomenal properties
The concept of ‘water’ is a concept of something with a particular structure + casual role; likewise H20
Identical structure + casual role entails identical property
H20 is the essence of water
Qualia and consciousness is not the essence of human beings - so zombies are metaphysically possible.
Explain criticism No.3 against the Zombies argument ‘What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality’
This citicsm targets the inference from the claim that zombies are possible through the conclusion that property dualism is true.
Suppose zombies are possible. How does that show that property dualism is true in the actual world, rather than some other possible world?
So this is saying just because in a possible world its possible this doesn’t tel us anything about our world.
