Functionalism Flashcards
What is Functionalism?
Functionalism is an ontologically neutral theory (neither physicalist or dualist) but most functionalists are physicalists.
Functionalism argues; mental properties are reducible to functional properties + each mental state consists of a disposition to behave in a particular ways and to have certain other mental states, given certain inputs from the senses and certain other mental states,
So - our analysis of mental states can be known in terms of
‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’
What are functions or ‘functional properties’?
Functionalists, argue mental properties are reducible to functional properties but functional properties do not reduce to physical properties
- Functional properties multiply realizable. Mental properties can be realized by different physical properties/systems - ie brain states that realized pain can be different in different species but pain is the same mental state
- Most functionalists understand the relations between inputs, outputs + mental states casually (any functional state can be described in terms of what typically causes it) - its ‘causal role’
There’s many kinds of functional states (states that fulfil a functional role) e.g an eye can be understood in a variety of functional roles but there’s a lot of different eyes. What makes all eyes the same is what they do (there function) - converting light waves into neural signals to enable an organism to navigate its environment.
Functionalists argue the same is true for mental properties as different mental properties differ in their typical inputs + outputs.
Why is Functionalism neither a physicalist or dualist theory?
Functionalism + Physicalism:
- Functionalism analyses mental states in terms of what they do + Mental states could be realized in a distinct substances (dualism)
Functionalism + Behaviourism
- Functionalism can be understood as a descendant of philosophical behaviourism replacing ‘behaviour’ by ‘function’ which has several advantages;
Functionalism avoids the objection of circularity, as instead of talking about dispositions to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances, functionalism talks of dispositions to behave + have other mental states, given certain sensory inputs + other mental states.
It explicitly recognises what behaviour a mental state will cause depends on other
mental states
State the 3 key criticisms to Functionalism
- Qualia + Inverted qualia
- Blocks Chinese mind
- Jacksons Knowledge argument (Mary)
Explain the Qualia objection to Functionalism
Some philosophers argue that phenomenal properties are qualia. If they are, then functionalism cannot give a complete theory of the mind, as qualia are not functional properties;
- Qualia by definition are intrinsic, non-intentional properties of consciousness.
Mental states and indistinct non-intentional properties cannot by definition be completely analysed in terms of their causal roles - If Qualia exist, some mental properties cannot be analysed in terms of their causal roles
- Functionalism claims that all mental properties are functional properties which can be completely analysed in terms of their causal roles
- If Qualia exists, functionalism is false.
- If phenomenal properties are qualia , then they cannot be complete understood in terms of functions because functions are relational properties, not intrinsic properties.
- So if qualia exist , then functionalism cannot be true.
Explain blocks Chinese mind objection to Functionalism
Suppose that the whole nation of China was reordered to simulate the workings of a single brain (that is, to act as a mind according to functionalism).
- Each Chinese person acts as (say) a neuron, and communicates by special two-way radio in the corresponding way to the other people.
- The current mental state of the China brain is displayed on satellites that may be seen from anywhere in China.
- The China brain would then be connected via radio to a body, one that provides the sensory inputs and behavioural outputs of the China brain.
Thus, the China brain possesses all the elements of a functional description of mind: sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and internal mental states causally connected to other mental states
. If the nation of China can be made to act in this way, then, according to functionalism, this system would have a mind. Block’s goal is to show how unintuitive it is to think that such an arrangement could create a mind capable of thoughts and feelings.
Explain the counter from Functionalism to the criticism of the Chinese Mind
Objection; The analogy of a Chinese nation and a Chinese Mind does not work because there would be different disruptions- i.e. a radio would break.
Counter from Chinese Block;
- The radio breaking could be compared to a brain tumor- a major disruption to the brains functioning- so the analogy does hold
This isn’t a very strong counter response + arguably absurd + drastic
Explain the Physicalist objection to Functionalism
Physicalists argue - Functionalism can’t account for phenomenal properties on its own. These are the result of functional properties + the physical properties of the system
E.g. pain depends on our physiology
So a physical, functional duplicate will have the same mental states
Functionalism claims mental properties are functional properties defined in terms of there typical inputs + outputs (which may include other mental states)
- A mental state is just a state with a particular functional role (in effect functionalism replaces ‘behaviour’ with ‘functions’)
- Causal role functionalism interprets’ function ‘function’ as the role played in a network of causes and effects.
- Machine table functionalism interprets ‘function’ in terms of a machine that lists a series of conditional statements linking inputs, states and outputs.
- According to functionalism, mental state can be multiplied. A functional property (so mental properties) can be realised by various physical or even non-physical states, as long as they fulfil the relevant causal role.
Thus functionalism is compatible with both physicalism + substance dualism.
State the second Quail objection against Functionalism ‘Inverted Quail’
Inverted Qualia objection:
If two individuals can be looking at a blue wall but only one person sees blue an the other perceives black then arguably functionalism offers an inadequate account of the mind body relationship because despite the two individuals having the same ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs ‘ only one person can see blue and the other black.
Therefore, though, these two people have the same inputs + outputs as functionalism claims one of us is not seeing blue at all + thus we cannot argue that its plausible to completely define mental states as inputs and outputs. We can have the same inputs and outputs but have different experience/ qualia.
Explain Functionalists counter to the Inverted Quail objection ‘Fine Grade differences’
Fine Grade differences:
Functionalists claim that mental states are fully reducible to functional properties is plausible. In the inverted qualia objection the two people are seeing different colours on the wall, this is purely because these two people do not have the same inputs and outputs.
In this instance, one person is colourblind and consequently has a completely different output of the colour on the wall, whereas the other individual who is not colour bilnd experienced arethe accurate colour of the wall and thus has the typical inputs and outputs that the average person would experience.
Therefore the argument of qualia and inverted qualia does not undermine functionalists theory or argument and mental states can be understood as inputs and outputs.
Explain Jacksons knowledge argument (Mary) against Functionalism
Jackson argues knowledge cannot be equivalent to inputs and outputs as functionalism claims.
Jackson’s argument depicts a neuroscientist, Mary, who is locked in a room + has never seen any colour, only black + white, however she knows absolutely every physical fact there is to know about the concept of colour vision however then Mary is allowed to see red for the first time and suddenly learns something new about colour through qualia.
However this claim that Mary learns something new about colour vision when she first sees red in itself undermines functionalism argument because it shows that not all facts are physical facts and therefore physicalism is false and we cannot understand everything in terms of physical inputs and outputs because we need qualia and consciousness - in this case of colour - and therefore physical facts are not satisfactory for knowledge because what it is like for us to see red is not a neurophysiological or functional fact about the brain but requires qualia.
State Functionalists 2 possible counter responses against Jacksons knowledge argument
1) Functionalists can argue Mary had not had the input of colour + did not have the full set of inputs and outputs other people do and thus if she did then all mental properties would be reducible to inputs and outputs and therefore Jackson’s argument does not undermine their argument.
Thus can respond by arguing that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but instead gains acquaintance knowledge and becomes directly aware of red. Suppose what it is like to see red is some property of the brain. Though Mary already knew about this property, her brain has never had the property so she was not acquainted with it. However when Mary’s brain actually undergoes the process she knows all about then she will be acquainted with the colour and gain abilities of recognition. Thus mental properties are fully reducible to inputs and outputs, however in Mary’s case she hadn’t actually had this necessary input
2) The argument posed by Jackson asserts Mary did not know anything about other people’s experiences before she left the room, even though she knew everything physical about their experiences. Thus she gains qualia.
When she leaves the room the realises how impoverished her conception of other people’s colour experiences have been and so their facts about other people’s experiences of seeing red that mary gains and learns but she does not necessarily gain any ‘new’ personal knowledge. Thus our analysis of mental states can purely be known in terms of ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ as a complete description of the mental states outputs, for each possible set of inputs and therefore Functionalism does provide a coherent and plausible account of the mind-body relationship.
