PACES Flashcards
In a question on wether the Ontological argument is successful or successfully proves the existence of god what would your PACE be?
P - Anselm’s ontological argument
A - Gaunilo’s perfect island objection
C - Alsem objection - god’s existence is necessary not contingent - logical contradiction to deny it.
E - Anselm’s ontological somewhat stands but is weak -
A - Kant’s existence is not a predicate - disproves alsems ontological.
C - Malcolm’s ontological argument
A - Kant - Objects as malcolm has not poven the concept of god is definitely not contradictory or impossible just stated it in a premise
E - Agree with Kant, Malcolm’s ontological; is weak
A - Can object + utilise Leibniz principle of sufficient reason to back malcolm’s ontological
E - Empiricists objection - ‘Causal principle’ eg Gluons
O - Overall neither Anselm nor Malcolm’s ontological argument are successful.
In a question on wether the Cosmological argument is successful or successfully proves the existence of god what would your PACE be?
P - The Kalam Cosmological argument
A - Hume + empiricist objections to the possibility of a necessary being + impossibility of verifying this empirically. Kalam’s premices 2 + 3 are too contentious.
C - Kalam utilise Leibniz Principle of Sufficient Reason
A - Russel: the argument commits ‘The Fallacy of Composition’
E - Kalam cosmological argument cannot successfully prove the existence of God.
A - Descartes Cosmological argument - there must be necessary being
C - Hume + empiricist objections to The Causal Principle + ‘impossibility’ of infinite regression so arguably there’s no need for a ‘first cause’
E - Descartes Cosmological does not prove the existence of God.
A - Aquinas 3rd way/ cosmological argument
C - Objection to ‘something cannot come out of nothing’ + gluon example + aquinas ‘proof’ of first cause would only show it exists, not that it has attributes of a theistic god, such as omniscience, omnipotence etc.
E - Aquinas cosmological does not prove the existence of God.
O - Overall cosmological arguments are not sufficient
In a question now wether the Design/Teleological arguments are successful or successfully prove the existence of god what would your PACE be?
P - William Paley’s Teleological from analogy
A - Hume argument that the design argument is built upon a faulty analogy + inference offers the best explanation
C - Paley’s defence of the design argument by analogy
A - The reproduction of living things does not explain their design - Darwin’s Theory of Evolution
E - If some other explanation is as good as or better than or Paley invoking the existence of a designer, then paley’s argument will fail. As it does here so it’s arguably that Paley’s design argument doesn’t prove existence of god/is not successful in proving the existence of a designer.
P - Swinburne Design Argument:
A - Hume: Arguing from a unique case
C - Swinburne response
E - Swinburne’s argument stands
A - Can object to Swinburne’s design argument via Occam’s razor;
C - Swinburne’s explanation respects Occam’s razor.
A - The problem of spatial disorder - Damaging to design argument in its entirety
E - Therefore Swinburne’s argument doesn’t prove god/ a designer + neither does any Design argument.
In a question on wether Religious Language is cognitive or non-cognitive or meaningful what would your PACE be?
P - A.J Ayer (Non-Cognitivism) Verification Principle
A - Hicks - objection to Ayer’s via Eschatological verification + VP fails itself
C - Ayers counter to Hick - Verification principle not always relevant its a guide intended to show it is the right definition of ‘meaningful’
E - Reject Ayer’s Non-Cognitivism
A - Flews Cognitivism - The University Debate: ‘Flews Challenge’ to demonstrate how meaningful religious statements are + need to be willing to falsify it ie ‘Undetectable Gardner’
C - Michal accepts Flew’s cognitivism but rejects the need to withdraw our beliefs + claims
- Eg the trusting partisan example. We must count evidence against them but because of this evidence we aren’t required to withdraw our belief.
A - Flew’s response: Flew accepts michals qualification, but appeals to the problem of evil. Belief in god should be withdrawn at some point or becomes irrational.
C - Michal/Objection - but this is no longer about the meaning of religious language, but the rationality of religious belief
E - Just because something seems irrational doesn’t mean it’s false, a rational basis doesn’t imply something cant be the case so we don’t need to falsify - agree with Michal i.e. the book of jobe from the bible, religion teaches people that god may seem irrational but isn’t.
A - Hares Bliks argument as solution
C - What about mental illness is schizophrenia - they may think their ‘bliks’ are reality + meaningful but are not. Meaningful almost implies that there’s truth or that it can be verified so what does it really mean to say something meaningful? If something can be meaningful without being verifiable then Hare stands but if you don’t then it doesn’t.
O - Therefore overall religious language is meaningful - agree with Hare + his blocks argument.
In a question on wether Functionalism is a plausible theory what would your PACE be?
P - Functionalism
A - Qualia criticism (intrinsic non-intentional properties of consciousness) + possibility of a functional duplicate (inverted qualia).
C - Functionalist objection to inverted qualia ‘Fine Grade Differences’ 2 individuals did not have the same inputs + outputs as one was colorblind.
E - Functionalism stands
A - Blocks Chinese Mind
C - Blocks analogy doesn’t work as could be disrupted ie radio connections breaking etc.
A - Could be compared to bodily disruptions in function ie brian tumour
E - Arguably too excessive + extreme so functionalism stands.
A - Jackson’s knowledge argument (Mary in the room)
C - Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but instead gains acquaintance knowledge
A - Acquaintance knowledge is a form of propisitional knowledge thus physical properties don’t offer complete account of mental properties + aren’t reducible to inputs and outputs
C - The criticism misunderstands the argument. When she leaves the room the realises how impoverished her conception of other people’s colour experiences have been but she does not necessarily gain any ‘new’ personal knowledge.
E - Functionalism stands
O - Overall our analysis of mental states can purely be known in terms of ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ as a complete description of the mental states outputs, for each possible set of inputs and therefore Functionalism does provide a coherent and plausible account of the mind-body relationship.
In a question on wether Eliminitive Materialism is a plausible theory what would your PACE be?
P - Eliminative Materialism - reasons to reject folk psychology
A - Folk-Psychology has a good predicate and explanatory power and so is the best hypothesis.
C - Eliminativists response that its weaker than other neuroscience + should be abandoned
E - Agree Eliminative Materialism stands + its plausible we should abandon Folk Psychology.
A - However the abandonment of folk psychology is a the expense of denying the fact that we possess mental states + ‘Our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority of other considerations’
C - Things that seem obvious can be wrong.
E - The counter is accurate so Eliminativism is plausible
A - Eliminative Materialism as a theory is ‘Self-Refuting’
C - Eliminativists would argue this objection assumes folk psychology is the accurate account of mental states however It is inconceivable that folk psychology is false, since the very idea of ‘being false’ depends on folk psychology being true
E - Eliminative Materialism is not a convincing theory as the criticism of ‘self Refuting’ is too daming.
O - Overall Elimintive materialism doesn’t stand as the entirety of the theory contradicts itself.
In a question on wether philosophical behaviourism is plausible what would your PACE be?
P - Hemepls Hard Behaviourism
A - Criticism - Multiple Realizability
C - Ryles Soft behaviourism avoids multiple realizability issue + talk about how ryles argues psychological terms are publicly available (so there no hidden mental states)
E - Ryles soft behaviourism stands
A - ‘asymmetry between self-knowledge + knowledge of other people’s mental states’ undermines Ryles Soft Behaviourism + goes against his claim that psychological terms are publicly available
C - Ryles responds by arguing that introspection is us chatting with ourselves + communication with oneself + so introspection doesn’t undermine his claim that theres hidden mental states
E - Ryles soft behaviourism stands
A - Circularity criticism
C - Category mistake the criticism + concept of there being mental states is a fallacy
A - Criticism The distinctness of mental states from behaviour (reinforces the fact we can never fully reduce mental states to physical or behavioural ones i.e. Super Spartans + thus behaviourism is false)
E - Ryles soft behaviourism arguably does not withstand criticism as there’s something missing which cant be explained in terms of behaviour + the physical. There can never be a full reduction + we cannot eliminate the mind/mental states.
In a question on wether Property Dualism provides a plausible argument what would your PACE be?
P - Property Dualism + Jackson’s Knowledge argument (Mary)
C - physicalist objection; Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge
A - Counter from property dualists aquaintance involves new non-physical knowledge (qualia) so physicalism is false
E - Property Dualism stands
A - Mary does gain new propositional knowledge but this is knowledge of facts she already knew of (in a different way)
C - Property dualists would disagree
E - Property dualism stands
A - Philosophical zombies argument - David Chalmes
C - Criticism - A ‘Philosophical zombie world/ ‘zombie world’ is not conceivable’
A - Chalmers - we cant assume theres complete physical + functional analysis of consciousness
C - ‘What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible’ (H20/Ocean)
A - Chalmer - Disanalogy between water + phenomenal properties. Qualia and consciousness is not the essence of human beings - so zombies are metaphysically possible.
E - Property Dualisms stands
In a question on wether the existence of evil is compatible with the existence of god/ weather we can save the problem of evil what would your PACE be?
P - Logical problem of evil + Introduce 2 distinction between natural + moral evil
A - Free will theodicy + Plantinga’s free will defence
C - Theodicies only solve the moral evil (not natural)
A - Satan exists (explains natural evils existence)
E - Weak response so plantinga’s free will defence alone does not solve the problem of natural evil
P - The Evidential problem of evil (distribution of evil is evidence alone against god)
A - Hick’s soul-making
C - Soul making does not explain Animal suffering.
A - Necessary for development. Being alive = subject to pain.
E - Hicks analogy stands
A - Is it plausible or accurate that terrible evils are really necessary for our moral and spiritual growth?
C - Terrible evils are terrible in contrast to more ‘ordinary’ evils. If we remove the terrible ones, the next-terrible ones will seem exceptional and we’ll wonder why those are permitted. Hick basically draws on gradients + perspective - If we remove evils, the world with little evil is also a world with little human freedom, responsibility + development.
A - A great deal of evil doesn’t (appear to) contribute to spiritual growth at all.
C - Evil that appears not to contribute to soul making cannot be rationalised. However the existence of such irrational evils is part of the process of soul
E - Seems we can accept hicks soul making theodicy as explanation for moral evil + why its compatible with gods existence however neither Hicks nor Plantinga are capable of solving the problem of natural evil nor evidential problem of evil.
