Philosophical Behaviourism Flashcards
What is physicalism
Physicalism states that (mind + body = same thing)
However mental processes are dependent on physical ones so everything ‘supervenes’ on the physical. Physicalism implies that everything is made up of matter and therefore takes up space.
Physicalism states there is just one sort of thing - the physical and (matter)
There is one thing which is matter and mental properties are properties of material substance
Who is the main philosopher for Hard Behaviourism?
Hempel
What is Philosophical Behaviourism
- Everything can be explained purely in terms of behaviour
Mental states aren’t a thing as we cant see or observe them only the physical
- Can examine mental properties because talk of mental states can be translated into talk of behavioural states without loss of meaning.
- Behaviorism is a non-reductive dependency mental properties ontologically depend on physical properties but AREN’T identical to them
State the 2 types of Philosophical Behaviourism
- Hard Behaviourism (Hempel)
- Soft Behaviourism (Ryle’s)
‘logical ‘analytical’ and ‘hard’ behaviourism.
Explain Hempels Hard Behaviourism argument
1 - Hempel Hard behaviourism = a physicalist theory
‘All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions which exclusively use the language of physical to talk about bodily movements’
- what we are talking ab when we talk about the mind and mental states is behaviour.
- ‘The mind’ is not a thing there is only the physical which we can observe + there’s a finite set of behavioural states
- To know the meaning of a statement is to know the conditions under which we would call it true and those under which we would call it true and under those things we would call it false
- So ‘the meaning of a statement is established by the conditions of its verification’ = the observations that we can make to check its truth. ‘The conditions of its verification’ are simply the observations that we can make to check its truth.
Explain the ‘Paul toothache example’ which can be used to defend Hard Behaviourism
The Paul toothache example:
The meaning of ‘Paul has a toothache (or any other psychological claim) is its conditions of verification, unless we can verify it empirically, it will be meaningless
Conditions of verification:
At the question “what’s the matter” Paul utters the words “i have toothache” (psychological behaviour)
Closer examination reveals a decayed tooth with an exposed pulp’
‘Paul weeps and makes gestures of such and such kinds’ (bodily behaviour)
‘Pauls blood pressure, digestive processes, the speed of his reactions, show such and such changes’
(physical bodily states)
What are the implications of Hempels Hard Behaviourism?
If we have a statement we should be able to explain it in order to empirically verify it or else it is meaningless - ie Paul and the Toothache example (it starts as Paul saying he has a toothache (only mental states) but by the end there’s physical proof so we able to verify it ie through gestures that are observable.
- There’s no essence to mental states and events + as a result there is no genuine question about how mind and body relate to one another or interact with one another.
1st Implication - If we cannot say that the conditions of verification for a statement are , we cannot empirically check or test the truth of the statement, then it is meaningless.
2nd Implication - Two statements have the same meaning if they are both true or both false in the same conditions
3rd Implication - We can translate a statement into a series of statements that describe the conditions of verification but expressed in different words or concepts.
Explain the criticism of Circularity against Behaviourism
Circularity;
So different mental states may be dispositions to the same behaviour, depending on other mental states
WE can never fully reduce a mental state purely to behaviour. There can never be full reduction - we cannot get rid of the mind.
Eg - fear of snakes -
1) i believe snakes are dangerous 2) i believe snakes can kill people 3) i believe snakes are poisonous 4) therefore it will kill me - these are all mental states being contemplated they aren’t necessarily reflected in behaviour. If we have a mental state of a fear of snakes each of them are all mental states being contemplated + mental states explaining other mental states. Yet behaviourism claims there is NO mental states whatsoever and thus behaviourism contradictory because its mental states causing our behaviour ie running from a snake.
Explain the ‘Distinctness of mental states from behaviour’ against Behaviourism ie Super Spartans
‘The Distinctness of Mental states from behaviour’ (ie Super Spartans)
It seems many mental states/processes have an ‘inner’ aspect that cant be captured by behaviour or behavioural dispositions,
To be in pain involves certain things such as wincing from the pain but this does not capture the ‘essence’ of what pain is. Thus not everything can be understood just as a behavioural disposition because Behaviourism misses the phenomenology of the mind.
Demonstrated by Putnams ‘super-spartans’
Via culture spartans had no disposition to express pain at all and yet they feel pain.
Or someone can fake pain and so we think we are observing someone’s behaviour physically but in fact its not real.
(therefore we cant get rid of the mind and yet behaviourism claims everything pure behavourism)
Explain the criticism of Multiple Realizability against Hemples Behaviourism
Multiple Realizability:
There is no finite set of statements about behaviour as their indefinitely heterogenous + thus behaviour doesn’t provide an adequate amount of what mental concepts mean.
The criticism attacks behaviourists claim that everything can be understood in terms of the physical and mental states can be reduced to behavioural without loss of meaning because this sent the case.
Mental states can be realised by different people in different varieties of ways demonstrating analysis of mental states via behaviour isn’t possible. Ie someone sees a lion approaching and out of fear runs whilst another person states frozen out of fear.
Explain Ryles Soft Behaviourism
Like Hempel, Ryle argues that ‘propositions about mental states/propositions are propositions about behavioural dispositions so mental concepts like ‘pain’ can be understood in terms of behaviour.
However Ryles doesn’t claim that phycological statements can be translated or ‘reduced’ without loss of meaning to statements that refer to behaviour + instead places an explicit emphasis on the idea of dispositions to behave.
- Dispositions are indefinitely heterogeneous + can manifest themselves in every possible way hence why people can respond to the same event in a variety of behavioural ways
Explain Ryles ‘Category Mistake’ criticism of Substance Dualism
The Category Mistake:
Ryles argues the mistake substance dualism makes is a ‘category mistake’ ( to treat a concept as belonging to a different logical category from one it actually belongs to).
He argues it makes the mistake of thinking the mind is like the body, to think mental + physical concepts operate in the same way in the same logical framework of ‘things’ + ‘causes’ The mind is not another ‘thing’.
Ie if you visit Oxford and see the vacuity’s, colleges, people and ask where the university is you’ve misunderstood what university is thinking that its another thing alongside the people, vacuities etc so you’ve made a category mistake.
There’s no mind (so saying there’s a separate mental state and behaviour = a category mistake) because everything is behaviour there’s no mind. There’s only 1 eternity and its behaviour.
Explain the criticism against Ryles Soft Behaviourism ‘Asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states’
Ryle observes that its part of the ‘official doctrine’ of substance dualism that the ways we gain knowledge of our own + others mental states are very different as we are directly aware of our own mental states whereas we can only infer other peoples as self knowledge comes from consciousness and our introspection.
Dualism thinks of mental states as ‘inner’ and defends an asymmetry of knowledge
Our mental states are inaccessible to other people
But known to us through conscious introspection
P1- The analysis of mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions (or conditions of verification) rules out an asymmetry between self-knowledge + knowledge of other people’s mental states.
P2- Yet it seems obvious from experience that there is such asymmetry
C1- Therefore, philosophical behaviourism is false.
(basically when thinking to yourself its not publicly available through behaviour its only within us, i can guess what other peoples introspection is but there’s a difference between how we know ourselves vs other people).
State the 3 key criticisms against Hempels Hard Behaviourism
No. 1 - Circularity
No.2 - ‘Distinctness of mental states from behaviour’
No.3 - Multiple realizability
State the main criticisms against Ryles Soft Behaviourism
1 - Asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states’
2 - Circularity
