Phil final

Question 1

Knowledge

Answer 1

a bunch of different components that when put together guarantee knowledge

2 sources of knowledge
- perceptional
- testimony

Question 2

Knowledge as an ability

Answer 2

when the word “know” is followed by “how”, we are expressing someone has an ability

ex. meghan knows how to ride a bike

Question 3

Knowledge as an acquaintance

Answer 3

When you follow “knows” with a name, we are expressing that we are acquainted with someone/something

ex. they know mark

Question 4

Factual knowledge

Answer 4

Sometimes we talk about the factual knowledge of an entire group

ex. philosophy students know not all facts are knowledge

Other times we talk about the factual knowledge of individuals

ex. Betty knows that not all facts are knowledge

Question 5

Academic skeptics

Answer 5

-Think that knowledge is impossible
-Like the stoics, they distinguishes impressions and judgments and argued that knowledge consists in accepting only those impressions that can’t be wrong
-But,
-They think that there are no such impressions
-So there is no knowledge

in simple terms

• the knowledge of things is impossible
  -ideas and notions are never true
  -whatever reasons are used to justify knowledge must be justified itself- leading to an infinite regress

Question 6

Pyrrhonian skeptics

Answer 6

-more radical
-think that we should withhold all judgment as this avoids the self defeat of the academic skeptic position
-they think that in order to come to genuine knowledge we need a criterion for determining which of our beliefs or impression are accurate
-but then we face the problem of justifying the criterion itself

Question 7

Descartes and examining perceptual beliefs

Answer 7

-17th century philosopher, scientist and mathematician
-First mediation contains an argument that still frame the debate
-ultimately, he rejects skepticism
- he says that rather than attempting to undermine perception as a reliable method for belief formation by finding a single failure, he begins with the best case of perception- the case that leads to knowledge if any does

-his best case concerns ordinary beliefs about familiar proximal objects
-he writes his first mediation by the fire but then considers his belief that he is sitting by a fire
- says - the problem is though, if everything we believe comes through senses, and we cannot know though senses if we are dreaming, then we cannot rule out our beliefs as inaccurate

-argument
-we cannot know we are not dreaming
-if we cannot know that we are not dreaming then none of our sensory beliefs are knowledge
-if none of our sensory beliefs are knowledge, then we have no knowledge
-therefore we have no knowledge

Question 8

Validity

Answer 8

-an argument is valid if the premises logically entail the conclusion
- an argument is true is the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true

ex- if dogs moo, cows bark
- dogs moo
-therefore cows bark

Question 9

Soundness

Answer 9

An argument is sound if it is
1. Valid
2. its premises are true

ex. if the lights are on, the electricity is working
- the lights are on
- therefore, the electricity is working

Berlin is in germany
Germany is in Europe
therefore Berlin is in Europe

Question 10

Deductive arguments

Answer 10

Valid arguments are deductive

Question 11

Inductive arguments

Answer 11

sometimes arguments may be convincing and give you good but not decisive reasoning to believe the conclusion
-these are inductive arguments

Question 12

Necessary conditions

Answer 12

A condition is necessary for something if it must be satisfied for that something

ex- in order to be a cat, it is necessary that something is (a) alive, (b) an animal, (c ) a mammal

However non of these conditions are sufficient - I am alive and a mammal but not a cat

Question 13

Sufficient conditions

Answer 13

A sufficient conditions guarantees (suffices for) that something

ex. it suffices to be a dog that something is a beagle
- this is not necessary for being a dog that something is a beagles after all there are other ways to be dogs

Question 14

Gettier examples and the traditional analysis of knowledge

Answer 14

x knows p iff= traditional analysis

for something to be knowledge it must be a) believed, b) justified, c) true

His example

-Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job
-Smith has strong evidence that Jones is the man that will get the job and Jones has 10 coins in his pocket
-Suppose that he comes to believe the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket
-Smith is actually going to get the job and he has 10 coins in his pocket
-In this case Smiths beliefs are justified and true
- but it is not knowledge because we can have a justified true belief that is independent of the justification

Another example
-Suppose you look at a hitherto-reliable clock that just happens to be stopped. The clock reads 11:52 and it is in fact 11:52 at the time you look at it
-you have a justified true belief but not knowledge

Question 15

Goldmans causal theory of analysis

Answer 15

Ones beliefs that things are thus-and-so must be caused by things actually being thus-and-so

x knows p iff :
a) x believes p
b) p is true
c) x is justified in believing p
d) s’s belief that p is not based on a false premise

ex. Smith believes (p) John owns a Ford and the source for this belief is perfectly reliable. When the source told Smith (p) , it was perfectly true. But John has since lost his Ford and (by accident) gained another. In that case it seems that Smith does not know.

ex. I enter fake barn country, a region of barns with with hundreds of fake barn facades and just 1 real barn and I look at one and believe it is the actual barn. It is the actual. Many intuit that I do not know it is a barn because my belief could have easily been false.

Question 16

Fake barn cases and their importance

Answer 16

Important because Goldman came up with it and it is a counter example to his own theory.

In a fake barn case, the agent believes that something is true because she directly perceives it. But it turns out she is in an environment where her perceptual evidence could very easily have been misleading and led her to form a false belief

Question 17

Internalism

Answer 17

Suggests that a persons belief cannot be justified if the reason and motivation for the belief have not been considered

ex. think of a long help belief- like Mount Everest is the tallest mountain in the world

you may strongly believe this but have no idea why you initially adopted the belief or evidence there is for it

internalists would say that this impacts whether you know something

Question 18

externalism

Answer 18

Believe that if knowledge always requires access to evidence or insight into how we know, then we risk a regress.

For anybody to know anything we would need an infinite amount of knowledge/ evidence which in not possible

Question 19

Nozicks tracking theory

Answer 19

Famous externalist theory

Idea is that knowledge requires not just getting something right but also tracking truth in the sense that the thinker would’ve still made the correct judgment in different circumstances

x knows that p iff
-p is true
-x believes that p
-if p were not true, x would not believe that p
-if p were true, x would believe that p

For instance I may always believe it is warm outside come may what. While I am right sometimes, I am in no way guaranteed to be right in different circumstances

Question 20

3 views of testimony

Answer 20

Reductionism, non-reductionism, scepticism

Question 21

Testimony

Answer 21

The process of acquiring beliefs from communication

Question 22

reductionism

Answer 22

-Unlike sceptics, reductionists think that testimony produces knowledge, but the way in which testimony produces knowledge is explainable in other terms
-we can understand testimony in terms of memory, perception, and inference
-global vs. local reductionism- generic vs. specific

Question 23

example of reductionism

Answer 23

you may have noticed that a speaker has provided you with truth in the past

you may then infer that a claim of theirs is true and come to believe it

testimony is not playing special role, you belief is primarily based on inference and perception

Question 24

non-reductionism

Answer 24

-non-reductivists think that you can rationally accept testimony as long as the testifier is in a good enough position
-lack defeaters
-testimony yields knowledge and it does so in a distinctive manner
-hold that testimony is a basic source of knowledge

Question 25

scepticism

Answer 25

-testimony never yields knowledge
-certainty is a necessary condition of knowledge and it never produces certainty

Question 26

defeaters

Answer 26

• a claim that renders a belief false or unreliable
  -ex. if you believe something because you read it in a book but then later learn that the author is a liar, then your original belief is false or unreliable
  -3 types- doxastic, normative, factual

Question 27

doxastic defeater

Answer 27

-defeaters as actual beliefs
-a claim we believe that defeats one of our other beliefs

Question 28

normative defeaters

Answer 28

-claims we are justified in believing (whether we believe them or not)

Question 29

factual defeaters

Answer 29

-true propositions that would defeat were we to believe them

Question 30

lackeys argument about testimonial knowledge

Answer 30

-she defends the view that testimony is a distinctive source of knowledge
-being a reliable testifier is different that being a reliable believer
-when you come to know something via testimony, you simply believe it is true based directly on their testimony
-hearers acquire knowledge via testimony, speakers must themselves have that knowledge

Question 31

lackeys proposal about testimony

Answer 31

• proposes that both of these thesis are false

-2: if H comes to know that p via S’s testifying that p, then S must know that p.

-2*: For every testimonial chain of knowledge C, in order for a hearer H in C to come to know that p via the testimony of a speaker S in C, at least the first
speaker S1 in C must know that P (in some non-testimonial way).

Question 32

3 views of memory knowledge

Answer 32

inferential theory, foundational theory, preservation theory

Question 33

inferential theory

Answer 33

-our memory is justified by inference
-idea is that in general my memory has proven reliable
-ex. when I remember my name, I succeed in having knowledge of my name because my memory has proven itself
-3 problems- circularity, inference takes times and the inference would have to be repeated every time

Question 34

Inferential theory -problem 1- circularity

Answer 34

-even if my memory has been reliable and I seem to remember it, my own belief that my memory has been reliable has to then be justified itself and its doesn’t seem as if propositions can be self justified

-ex. my memory is generally reliable, I remember that Calgary is south of Edmonton, therefor Calgary is south of Edmonton

Question 35

inferential theory- problem 2- inference takes time

Answer 35

• make an inference
  -notice it took you time to make it
  -you had to remember the premises during the time it took for the inference to take place
  -wont work in the case at hand

ex. it usually snows in January, I have no reason to think this January will be any different, therefor it will snow in January

Question 36

inferential theory- problem 3- inference would have to be repeated every time

Answer 36

-cant just make a general inference that memory is reliable and trust it because I would also have to remember to do that
- I would have to make the inference each time recall something

Question 37

foundational theory

Answer 37

-just having an experience of seeming to perceive that P, makes one justified on the first impression in believing that P, and similarly, having an experience of seeming to remember that P- makes one justified in believing that P
- 1 problem- the mere passage of time can increase justification

Question 38

Foundational theory problem

Answer 38

-the mere passage of time can increase justification
-case 1: I prove a mathematical problem at 2, keep proof of it in my mind at 2:01 and also remember the fact- now I have 2 sources of justification- memory and proof
-case 2: I adopt a belief that happens to be true, the next day I remember that belief and my memory justifies it, so the mere passage of time turns my irrational belief into a rational one

Question 39

preservation theory

Answer 39

• when I remember that P, my justification for believing P is whatever it was to begin with
  -memory just preserves the justification
  -note that forgetting what justifies a belief doesn’t eliminate that beliefs justification
  -1 problem- russels 5 minute hypothesis

Question 40

preservation theory problem

Answer 40

• russels 5 minute hypothesis says:

-5 minutes ago god created someone in exactly the same state I was in 5 minutes ago
-so this person has false memories identical to my genuine memories
-the duplicate lacks justification

Question 41

huemers dualistics theory

Answer 41

• one is justified overall if one had adequate justification for adopting a belief at some point and after that was justified in retaining it
  -avoids foundationalists problem because memory doesn’t create new justification

Question 42

Kitchers argument that scientific knowledge isn’t deductive

Answer 42

-deductive= arguments with valid premises that logically entail the conclusion- if premises are true, then the conclusion must be true

-science is not a body of demonstrated truths. virtually all of science is an exercise in believing what we cannot prove
-makes scientific knowledge seem less secure than we take it to be
-so even if we beleive the premises, the conclusion may not be true, making it not deductive

Question 43

theoretical virtues of scientific knowledge

Answer 43

-testability
-fruitfulness
-scope
-simplicity
-conservatism

Question 44

testability

Answer 44

• requires hypothesis to be testable
  -without testing hypothesis it is hard to see how we could come to know
  -testing requires the existence of confirming evidence and the non-existence of disconfirming evidence
  -ex. after observing that a number of carrot eaters live for a long time, I form the hypothesis that carrots elongate life
  -I can test this by observing the facts about the life span of carrot eaters

Question 45

fruitfulness

Answer 45

-fruitful to the extent that they successfully predict new phenomena
-scientific phenomena aren’t isolated from each other
-ex. imagine we observe people who eat carrots and live in apartments are long lived
-we can then form 2 hypothesis- that carrot eating elongates life and that apartment dwelling elongates life
-the former hypothesis will be more fruitful and more superior

Question 46

scope

Answer 46

• scope of a hypothesis is determined by the amount of diverse phenomena that it explains and predicts
  -greater scope allows us to explain more
  -limited scope ex. carrot eating by those who live on the east coast in the 21st century elongates life
  -greater scope ex. carrot eating elongates life

Question 47

simplicity

Answer 47

-thought is that a simpler hypothesis will better allow us to systematize our knowledge
-when we are evaluating for simplicity we must take everything into consideration (simplicity of objects, relations, explanations)

Question 48

conservatism

Answer 48

-a hypothesis is conservative to the extent that it is consistent with our previous beliefs
-hard to accept a hypothesis if it conflicts with our beliefs

Question 49

a priori

Answer 49

-provides direct, immediate knowledge into necessary truth
-can be justified independently of experience
-beliefs are justified just in case they are good reasons for thinking it is true
-cogency does not come from experience
-does not mean experience is not required to possess the reason
-directness guarantees no other mechanisms are needed
-ex. 1+1=2. blue is a colour

Question 50

a posteriori

Answer 50

• knowledge is dependent upon experience
  -ex. the sun is shining- you would have to experience the sun shining based on sight touch etc… therefor it is a posteriori

Question 51

bonjours argument in favour of a priori knowledge

Answer 51

• bonjour is in favour of a priori knowledge as it provides necessary truths that are unarguable
  -ex. mathematical truths, logical truths,

Question 52

Self knowledge

Answer 52

-In general it is natural to think I have some insight into facts about my own mind and/or experience
-Knowledge of our own minds
-Tend to trust my beliefs about my own mental state more than my beliefs about yours

Question 53

(Non)infallibility of self knowledge

Answer 53

-First view of self knowledge as secure
-We can’t be wrong
-One is infallible about one’s own mental state iff one cannot have a false belief to the effect that one is in a certain mental state

Question 54

(Non)omniscience of self knowledge

Answer 54

-Second view of self knowledge as secure
-We are omniscient about our own mental states
-We have complete knowledge of them
-On is omniscient about one’s mental state iff being in a mental state suffices for knowing one is in that state

Question 55

Gertler’s Kate example

Answer 55

-He thinks it is easy to show we are neither omniscient nor infallible about our own mental states
-Consider Kate, she trusts her therapist when they tell her that she distrusts her mother
-Kate then comes to believe this, however her therapist is wrong
-This shows that she is neither infallible (she wrongly believes that she distrusts her mother) nor omniscient ( she fails to believe that she trusts her mother)

Question 56

Descartes cogito

Answer 56

-Claim that he thinks
-I think therefore I am”
-1) I think 2) I am 3) I think therefor I am
-Claims 2 and 3 don’t fit our definition of self knowledge because they aren’t knowledge of our own
-Claim 1) seem as if one is infallible, ie. there is no way to believe 1) falsely

Question 57

Introspection as inner sense

Answer 57

-One analogy is that perception and introspection are causal:
-The mental state causes the introspective belief
-Second analogy is that the correlation is contingent:
-I may not have formed beliefs about my own mental state just as I may not have formed beliefs about the external world
-Disanalogies say that inner sense involves no dedicated sense organ, while perception often involves sensory experiences, which is not true of introspection

Question 58

Introspection

Answer 58

-The examination or observation of one’s own mental and emotional processes

Question 59

Shoemakers self blindness argument

Answer 59

-Argued against inner sense accounts of introspection
-His argument was that for any sensory capacity, a rational person could lack that capacity
-However someone who is “selfblind”- (lacks the capacity to reliability form beliefs about their own mental states)- would no longer be rational

Question 60

Introspection as transparency

Answer 60

-Imagine someone asks you if its snowing, you don’t need to introspect, instead it seems natural to just determine if it is snowing
-Idea here is that beliefs about our own mental state are transparent
-In general, to determine whether I believe that P, I look at P itself
-Schema:
-P, therefor I believe that P
-Note that the schema does not yield valid arguments, but conclusion is still true
-If i infer from P that I believe P, then I have to be believing the premise P, so the conclusion will be true
-3 important features
-1. Inferential account: self knowledge comes from via inference not via some direct mechanism
-2. Explains the seemingly infallibility of self knowledge: whenever I use schema it will be successful
-3. Explains the difference between self knowledge and other knowledge: we can’t use the schema on others
-One major worry is that it doesn’t give us insight into our priori beliefs since reasoning may give us new beliefs

Question 61

Security of introspection

Answer 61

-even if I am not perfectly secure about my own emotional states, I may be nonetheless be perfectly secure in my beliefs about some of my mental states
-in particular it seems to many that we can’t be wrong about our current conscious experience
-for example, I believe that Im experiencing pain or seeing red then the thought goes, there’s no room for error and I have knowledge of these states

Question 62

schwitsgebbles argument

Answer 62

-argues against the reliability of introspection about conscious experience
-thinks its highly untrustworthy
-think of a red table, I could be wearing tinted glass that mislead me as to its actual colour, so the belief about the external world that I form on the basis of the experiences may be false
-after all even if I am wrong about the colour of the table, it doesn’t seem I can be wrong about what colour it seems to me
-this is what he denies
-he thinks when it comes to our current conscious experiences we are often ignorant and prone to error

Question 63

Arguments from emotion- schwitzgebble

Answer 63

-argument 1: the general character of emotional presence
- he is arguing that these questions are very difficult to answer
-also thinks that this is incompatible with the claim that introspection is privileged
-argument 2: the very presence of emotion
-we are often mistaken about the very presence of our emotional states ex. pleasure, suffering
-again this would be surprising if introspection was privileged in regard to our emotional states
-argument 3: the character of specific emotional experiences
-previous examples concerned emotional states in very general terms, maybe when we consider very specific emotional experiences introspection is highly effective
-he argues this is not the case

Question 64

belief, knowledge, and action

Answer 64

-imagine I am thirsty and I believe if I drink water I will quench my thirst
-what will I do?
-drink water!
-so we can see why knowing things matter. If I have lots of false beliefs then I will tend to not get what I want

Question 65

cases that motivate Gendler to recognize alief

Answer 65

-case 1: refusing to walk on the glass floor of CN tower
-case 2: refusing to drink from the toilet shaped water fountain
-case 3: shrieking at a horror movie

-dont seem to be cases of deliberate deception
-dont seem to be cases of self deception
-dont seem to be cases of doubt or uncertainty

-according to her, these are all cases in which I have an alief that seems to conflict with my beliefs

Question 66

cn tower example

Answer 66

alief: cliff! danger! stay away!

representational content: cliff

affective content: danger

behavioural content: stay away

Question 67

alief

Answer 67

a mental state associatively linked with content that is representational, affective, and behavioural, and that is activated consciously or non consciously by features of the subjects internal or ambient environment

-think about a case in which you purposely set your watch fast, you know its 5 minutes ahead but looking at it still compels you to act

Question 68

difference between alief, belief and imagination

Answer 68

belief: treating content as true
sensitive to reality
we can only rationally believe something is true when we accept it is true

alief: doesn’t involve regarding something as true
automatic activation of association chains, this can happen regardless of ones beliefs