Papers

Question 2

results of field experiment on savings and commitments*

Answer 2

Ashraf et al 2005, out of 710 treated people, 202 take up SEED (28%), average saving balances increased 81% for clients assigned to treatment, more ‘hyperbolic’ individuals seem more willing to take up SEED, marketing treatment had no effect

Question 3

explain setting of experiment on exercise and health*

Answer 3

Royer et al 2013, 1000 employees at Fortune 500 company, 2 years, treatments: one month financial incentive to attend company onsite exercise facility (10USD per visit up to 3 each week), half of the incentive group randomly selected and offered to put money at stake for pledge they would continue to use over next 2 months

Question 4

results of experiment on exercise and health*

Answer 4

Royer et al 2013, pure incentive only worked temporarily and went back to normal levels of attendance, 12% take up of commitment contract people who took up commitment increased gym attendance permanently compared to pretreatment levels, hyperbolic and sophisticated (if put money have extra incentive to go)

Question 5

explain setting of field experiment on work effort *

Answer 5

Kaur et al 2010, Indian IT firm small city 124 workers, work was digitalising questionnaires the more you do the more money you get, since effort at work is immediate and benefits delayed, effort at work is an investment good, workers offered contract that penalises them for not achieving a (self-chosen) threshold over the same contract, with no advantages

Question 6

what is the main hypothesis of the field experiment on work effort *

Answer 6

Kaur et al 2010, worker’s effort increases as the payday gets closer (test of hyperbolic, if hyperbolic future person bears little weight) workers choose a contract which penalises them for not achieving a (self-chosen) threshold over the same contract without a penalty (are people sophisticated?, do they accept crazy contract?)

Question 7

how does hyperbolic deal with getting work done before a deadline

Answer 7

would leave until quite last minute as the future bears little weight so would put off until deadline

Question 8

explain setting of field experiment on addiction *

Answer 8

Gine et al 2010, 2000 smokers Philippines, offer urine test for smoking in 6 months, offered some opportunity to voluntarily sign commitment contract to stop smoking, smoker signing contract pledged own money that they would pass urine test in 6 months

Question 9

results of field experiment on addiction *

Answer 9

gine et al 2010, 11% take up of 781 offered, average deposit 57 pesos, at 6 months, increase of 4-5% in chance of making urine test, at 12 months, similar increase at surprise test

Question 10

what are visceral influences

Answer 10

incorporate “visceral” influences such as hunger, sexual desire, physical pain, cravings

Question 11

what was the extension of Saunders (1993)*

Answer 11

Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) extend to 26 countries, use weather of city where stock market located, negative relationship between cloud cover (de-trended from seasonal averages) days with completely covered skies have daily stock returns .11% lower than days with sunny skies

Question 12

what is the experiment for time varying risk aversion

Answer 12

Guiso et al 2013, want to see if investors were emotionally affected by a stock market crash leading to increase in risk aversion, sample of students with a five minute clip of horror film Hostel, subjects who watched horror movie shows higher level of risk aversion (certainty equivalent 27% lower than those who didn’t watch movie)

Question 13

what is the discount rate and what is the discount factor

Answer 13

factor (1/1+ρ) rate ρ

Question 14

what is the field experiment of effect of mood (weather)*

Answer 14

Saunders (1993), days with higher cloud cover in New York are associated with lower aggregate US stock returns

Question 15

explain methodology of paper looking at trading differences between men and women

Answer 15

Barber and Odean (2001), investment accounts of 78,000 hh 1991-96, net worth, investment experience, demographics, difference tests, cross sectional regressions

Question 16

what were results from trading differences between men and women

Answer 16

Barber and Odean (2001), men trade 45% more than women, trading always hurts performance but men losses 54% higher, effects more pronounced when comparing single men and women, men chose riskier decisions

Question 17

what were robustness and limitations of the differences between men and women

Answer 17

Barber and Odean (2001), Robustness: no diff in picking high-performance assets (no ability diff), control for demographics in regression, men only risk averse? (as opposed to overconfident), Limitations: correlation (not necessarily causal), is it really over-confidence or something else about gender, Problem: gender cannot be randomly assigned

Question 18

what is the setting of experiment on betting behaviour in lotteries

Answer 18

Clotfelter and Cook (1993), look at betting behaviour in lotteries, “Maryland daily numbers lottery” -> P(Win)=0.001, P(Win|RecentWin) is still 0.001, look at 52 winning numbers in 1988, in 52/52 cases betting volume for previous winner decreases 3 days after win, relative to before

Question 19

what is the setting of paper on pension contributions

Answer 19

Benartzi (2001), many companies offer employees to invest parts of pension contributions in company stock, question: does stock price depend on past stock performance, potential case of over-inference

Question 20

what is the method and results of paper on pension contributions

Answer 20

Benartzi (2001), S&P 500 companies with retirement program, yearly data on own-company investments for 2/3 of companies, 2.5 mn participants, $102bn assets, company that performed badly (well) over last 5 yr are far less (more) likely to invest pension (statistically significant), large effect of past returns, effect depends on long-term performance

Question 21

what are the challenges to paper on pension contributions

Answer 21

Benartzi (2001), objection: is it insider information?, Unlikely: high-allocation companies perform worse than low-allocation ones in the following years

Question 22

what is the projection bias example with snacks

Answer 22

Read and Van Leeuwen (1998), office workers choose healthy snack or unhealthy, snack delivered a week later (in late afternoon), Group 1 asked when plausibly hungry (late afternoon) -> 78% choose unhealthy snack, Group 2 asked when plausibly satiated (after lunch) -> 42% choose unhealthy snack, projection bias, think current state of world will continue

Question 23

setting and motivation behind experiment on clothes ordering

Answer 23

Conlin et al. (2007), look at catalogue orders of cold weather items on cold days, Obviously: high utility of cold-weather clothes for today, Projection bias: forecast high utility into future, order ‘too much’ if agents were rational, there shouldn’t be any correlation b/w temperature fluctuations and orders/returns

Question 24

how is there projection bias in the clothes ordering experiment

Answer 24

Conlin et al. 2007, high utility of cold weather clothes for today, projection bias: forecast high utility into future

Question 25

what is the data from the experiment on clothes ordering (projection bias)

Answer 25

Conlin et al. 2007, data from US company selling outdoor apparel and gear, 12m items 1995-1999, date of order and shipping, address & returned yes/no, weather data matched to shipping address

Question 26

what are some further results / limitations of the experiment on clothes ordering (projection bias)

Answer 26

Conlin et al. 2007, similar estimates with HH fixed effects (->selection bias, don’t get this 40/41), no effect on items unrelated to weather, no such effect for snowfall and rainfall, structural model: estimates of projection bias α≈0.3-0.4 people factor in utility of item today by degree of 30-40% (not necessarily take model as true)

Question 27

what are limitations of experiment on clothes ordering (projection bias)

Answer 27

cannot distinguish between mispredicting utility or weather, weak support for role of γR, structural estimates suggest different α for each single ite, alpha should be the same for every item

Question 28

what is the motivation behind the experiment replicating Samuelson’s observations from coin flip and what paper

Answer 28

Benartzi and Thaler (1999) vary presentation format: words vs possible outcomes, problem with MLA (myopic loss aversion): people don’t integrate problems, do people make better decisions if integration done for them?

Question 29

what is the setting of the replication of Samuelson’s coin flip

Answer 29

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), subjects asked if they would accept: Samuelson’s bet, Samuelson’s bet 100 times, Samuelson’s bet 100 times (outcome distribution), 3 subject groups: UGs, random people, MBAs

Question 30

what were results of replication of coin flip

Answer 30

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), people prefer 1 over 2… apart from MBAs, all groups prefer 3 over 2, 1) samuelson’s bet, 2) samuelson’s bet 100 times, 3) samuelson’s bet 100 times (outcome distribution)

Question 31

what is the repeated gambles experiment

Answer 31

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), three equal gambles with equal exp. value (=6) and distribution: 1)90% +0.10$; 10% -0.50$; played 150 times 2)50% +0.25$; 50% -0.15$; played 120 times 3) 10% +0.75$; 90% -0.01$; played 90 times

Question 32

what is the results of the repeated gambles experiment

Answer 32

as the possible amount to lose decreases –> % subjects accepting gamble increases, BUT: far more subjects choose gamble 1) if only shown distribution, Prospect theory ->subjects systematically overestimate the prob. of losing money in positive expected value gambles, seeing distribution can make gamble more attractive. 1)90% +0.10$; 10% -0.50$; played 150 times 2)50% +0.25$; 50% -0.15$; played 120 times 3) 10% +0.75$; 90% -0.01$; played 90 times

Question 33

background of pension plan experiment (repeated investments)

Answer 33

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), pension plans: workers contribute % of monthly income to retirement account, investment choice by worker, mots popular choices: low risk assets small returns

Question 34

setting of pension plan experiment (repeated investments)

Answer 34

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), survey recent employees at US university and ask whether they prefer Fund A (high risk/return) or B (low risk/return), ReturnA-ReturnB set to historic equity premium, show distribution of 1) 1-year returns, 2) 30-year returns, 3) retirement income after 30-yr of paying in

Question 35

results of pension plan experiment (repeated investments)

Answer 35

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), large difference in preference for A if shown 1) or 2), no difference if shown 2) or 3). Fund A (high risk/return) or B (low risk/return), ReturnA-ReturnB set to historic equity premium, show distribution of 1) 1-year returns, 2) 30-year returns, 3) retirement income after 30-yr of paying in

Question 36

what is the equity premium puzzle

Answer 36

Mehra and Prescott, (1985) big issue in macro-economics, avg. return on equity (stocks) > avg. return on short-term debt (bonds), 7% vs <1%, at odds with predictions of std. (rational) general eqm. models: only compatible if risk aversion assumed to be excessively high, under normal levels, agents should buy more stocks and thus reduce the premium

Question 37

what paper looked at experimenting on the equity premium puzzle and setting

Answer 37

Benartzi and Thaler (1995), take updated and extended data from Mehra and Prescott (1985), combine with calibrated prospect theory model, for which evaluation

Question 38

results of paper looking at equity premium puzzle

Answer 38

Benartzi and Thaler (1995), bonds/stocks yield equal prospect utility for an evaluation horizon of ≈ 12 months, utility maximised for 30-55% in stocks, E-P falls from 6.5% (1 year) to 4.65% (2 years) to 1.4% (20 years) (don’t really get this paper)

Question 39

what is the idea behind Field (2009)

Answer 39

problem 1: educational debt student loans -> facilitate entering higher education to the poor, BUT: psychological burden of being in debt at graduation, in line with Prelec and Loewenstein 1998, problem 2: many gifted people not choosing the “right” career, best grads go private rather than public sector, suboptimal from social point of view, Reaction: debt relief if student goes into public sector, what if we re-frame “debt relief” for public sector as “penalty fee” for private sector

Question 40

setting of experiment on reframing school fees

Answer 40

Field (2009), NYU law school, tuition fees ≈$45,000 in total (0-interest loan from NYU), funding at NYU law school pre-1998: LRAP scheme -> loan forgiven if… grad chooses public interest law job, stays in low-paying sector for at least 10yr and earns below pre-defined income. New option at NYU law school 1998-: LRAP + Innovative Financial Aid Study (IFAS) -> lottery-based scholarship covering $30k tuition fees, has to be repaid if not working for at least 10 years in public interest job after graduation, for public interest jobs, remaining $15k at graduation covered by LRAP

Question 41

what is the hypothesis of experiment on reframing school fees

Answer 41

Field (2009), LRAP and IFAS de facto identical in terms of post-graduation debt -> expect similar behaviour, Main diff: framing -> IFAS students officially in lower debt while studying than other law students, hypothesis: IFAS recipients more likely to take public-interest jobs

Question 42

what is the data for experiment on reframing school fees

Answer 42

Field (2009), Data: university and financial aid applications, entry/exit surveys, work experience surveys, four student cohorts 1998-2001, Method: mean-comparison tests since treatment randomised, Students could reapply (non-random sample) -> use only first lottery, lottery winners announced before enrolment deadline -> shown to affect enrolment -

Question 43

results of experiment on reframing school fees

Answer 43

Field (2009), students with lower de-facto debt more likely to go into public-interest law. In line with crucial role of framing, especially debt, on high-stakes decisions, selection doesn’t seem to drive results, effect comes from early applicants with longest exposure to differential debt levels

Question 44

results Field (2009)

Answer 44

coefficient of interest is dummy variable whether in public interest job, control about 50% chance, treatment about 70% chance (significant), subsample with selection (look up) still see about 20% increase, late study enlisters (get on programme late) almost no effect, effect strongest basically when in debt for longest

Question 45

results explained from Field (2009)

Answer 45

students with lower de-facto debt more likely to go into public-interest law, in line with crucial role of framing, especially debt on high-stakes decisions, effect comes from early applicants with longest exposure to differential debt levels, alternative stories: better chances of higher salary in public-interest jobs for winners? -> results suggest not, maybe IFAS made public-interest jobs somehow more attractive -> also no evidence

Question 46

results explained from Field (2009)

Answer 46

students with lower de-facto debt more likely to go into public-interest law, in line with crucial role of framing, especially debt on high-stakes decisions, effect comes from early applicants with longest exposure to differential debt levels, alternative stories: better chances of higher salary in public-interest jobs for winners? -> results suggest not, maybe IFAS made public-interest jobs somehow more attractive -> also no evidence

Question 47

results Field (2009)

Answer 47

coefficient of interest is dummy variable whether in public interest job, control about 50% chance, treatment about 70% chance (significant), subsample with selection (look up) still see about 20% increase, late study enlisters (get on programme late) almost no effect, effect strongest basically when in debt for longest

Question 48

results of experiment on reframing school fees

Answer 48

Field (2009), students with lower de-facto debt more likely to go into public-interest law. In line with crucial role of framing, especially debt, on high-stakes decisions, selection doesn’t seem to drive results, effect comes from early applicants with longest exposure to differential debt levels

Question 49

what is the data for experiment on reframing school fees

Answer 49

Field (2009), Data: university and financial aid applications, entry/exit surveys, work experience surveys, four student cohorts 1998-2001, Method: mean-comparison tests since treatment randomised, Students could reapply (non-random sample) -> use only first lottery, lottery winners announced before enrolment deadline -> shown to affect enrolment -

Question 50

what is the hypothesis of experiment on reframing school fees

Answer 50

Field (2009), LRAP and IFAS de facto identical in terms of post-graduation debt -> expect similar behaviour, Main diff: framing -> IFAS students officially in lower debt while studying than other law students, hypothesis: IFAS recipients more likely to take public-interest jobs

Question 51

setting of experiment on reframing school fees

Answer 51

Field (2009), NYU law school, tuition fees ≈$45,000 in total (0-interest loan from NYU), funding at NYU law school pre-1998: LRAP scheme -> loan forgiven if… grad chooses public interest law job, stays in low-paying sector for at least 10yr and earns below pre-defined income. New option at NYU law school 1998-: LRAP + Innovative Financial Aid Study (IFAS) -> lottery-based scholarship covering $30k tuition fees, has to be repaid if not working for at least 10 years in public interest job after graduation, for public interest jobs, remaining $15k at graduation covered by LRAP

Question 52

what is the idea behind Field (2009)

Answer 52

problem 1: educational debt student loans -> facilitate entering higher education to the poor, BUT: psychological burden of being in debt at graduation, in line with Prelec and Loewenstein 1998, problem 2: many gifted people not choosing the “right” career, best grads go private rather than public sector, suboptimal from social point of view, Reaction: debt relief if student goes into public sector, what if we re-frame “debt relief” for public sector as “penalty fee” for private sector

Question 53

results of paper looking at equity premium puzzle

Answer 53

Benartzi and Thaler (1995), bonds/stocks yield equal prospect utility for an evaluation horizon of ≈ 12 months, utility maximised for 30-55% in stocks, E-P falls from 6.5% (1 year) to 4.65% (2 years) to 1.4% (20 years) (don’t really get this paper)

Question 54

what paper looked at experimenting on the equity premium puzzle and setting

Answer 54

Benartzi and Thaler (1995), take updated and extended data from Mehra and Prescott (1985), combine with calibrated prospect theory model, for which evaluation

Question 55

what is the equity premium puzzle

Answer 55

Mehra and Prescott, (1985) big issue in macro-economics, avg. return on equity (stocks) > avg. return on short-term debt (bonds), 7% vs <1%, at odds with predictions of std. (rational) general eqm. models: only compatible if risk aversion assumed to be excessively high, under normal levels, agents should buy more stocks and thus reduce the premium

Question 56

results of pension plan experiment (repeated investments)

Answer 56

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), large difference in preference for A if shown 1) or 2), no difference if shown 2) or 3). Fund A (high risk/return) or B (low risk/return), ReturnA-ReturnB set to historic equity premium, show distribution of 1) 1-year returns, 2) 30-year returns, 3) retirement income after 30-yr of paying in

Question 57

setting of pension plan experiment (repeated investments)

Answer 57

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), survey recent employees at US university and ask whether they prefer Fund A (high risk/return) or B (low risk/return), ReturnA-ReturnB set to historic equity premium, show distribution of 1) 1-year returns, 2) 30-year returns, 3) retirement income after 30-yr of paying in

Question 58

background of pension plan experiment (repeated investments)

Answer 58

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), pension plans: workers contribute % of monthly income to retirement account, investment choice by worker, mots popular choices: low risk assets small returns

Question 59

what is the results of the repeated gambles experiment

Answer 59

as the possible amount to lose decreases –> % subjects accepting gamble increases, BUT: far more subjects choose gamble 1) if only shown distribution, Prospect theory ->subjects systematically overestimate the prob. of losing money in positive expected value gambles, seeing distribution can make gamble more attractive. 1)90% +0.10$; 10% -0.50$; played 150 times 2)50% +0.25$; 50% -0.15$; played 120 times 3) 10% +0.75$; 90% -0.01$; played 90 times

Question 60

what is the repeated gambles experiment

Answer 60

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), three equal gambles with equal exp. value (=6) and distribution: 1)90% +0.10$; 10% -0.50$; played 150 times 2)50% +0.25$; 50% -0.15$; played 120 times 3) 10% +0.75$; 90% -0.01$; played 90 times

Question 61

what were results of replication of coin flip

Answer 61

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), people prefer 1 over 2… apart from MBAs, all groups prefer 3 over 2, 1) samuelson’s bet, 2) samuelson’s bet 100 times, 3) samuelson’s bet 100 times (outcome distribution)

Question 62

what is the setting of the replication of Samuelson’s coin flip

Answer 62

Benartzi and Thaler (1999), subjects asked if they would accept: Samuelson’s bet, Samuelson’s bet 100 times, Samuelson’s bet 100 times (outcome distribution), 3 subject groups: UGs, random people, MBAs

Question 63

what is the motivation behind the experiment replicating Samuelson’s observations from coin flip and what paper

Answer 63

Benartzi and Thaler (1999) vary presentation format: words vs possible outcomes, problem with MLA (myopic loss aversion): people don’t integrate problems, do people make better decisions if integration done for them?

Question 64

paper on inattention to shipping costs

Answer 64

Brown et al. (2010)

Question 65

explain how shipping costs fits in to heuristics model of perceived value (V^ = v + (1-θ)o v: visible component o: opaque component, o can be hidden cost (<0) or hidden feature (>0))

Answer 65

Brown et al. (2010) similarly to taxes shipping costs c often hidden and overlooked, c is a cost so ∂V^/∂c<0

Question 66

explain setting of paper on hidden shipping costs (Heuristics)

Answer 66

Brown et al. (2010) use data from eBay auctions and variation in amount and disclosure of shipping charges, Field experiment: controlled auctioning of iPods on Yahoo Taiwan and eBay Ireland Shipping costs either Disclosed or Shrouded and Low or High (additionally: treatment with lower Reservation price)

Question 67

results of paper on hidden shipping costs (Heuristics)

Answer 67

Brown et al. (2010) DL > SL -> disclosure can increase revenue if shipping costs low, possible explanation: disclosure of low costs may increase valuation as perceived as a feature, above a certain threshold it is, however, optimal for seller not to disclose costs, SL < SH -> if shrouded, raising shipping costs increases revenues

Question 68

what is the paper on inattention to the news

Answer 68

Huberman and Regev (2001) event of high economic importance, the (false) discovery of a cure for cancer, November 97: EntreMed very positive early results on cure for cancer -> Nature prominently feature article, NY Times reports page 28, May 98: NYT feature essentially same article front page Nov 98: Wall Street Journal front page failed replication, in other words, o increased dramatically in Nov 97 and was public knowledge but only became salient later, in May 98

Question 69

what is the experiment about diversification heuristics

Answer 69

Simonson (1990), subjects pick one snack out of six (cannot pick >1) in 3 different weeks, Sequential choice: only 9% picks three different snacks, Simultaneous choice ex ante: 64% chooses three different snacks, explanation: 1/n heuristic diversify evenly across options

Question 70

what is the setting of experiment on choice avoidance (Heuristics)

Answer 70

Iyengar and Lepper (2000), up-scale grocery store in US, randomisation across time of dat, # of jams displayed for taste, small number: 6 jams OR large number: 24 jams

Question 71

what is results of experiment on choice avoidance (Heuristics)

Answer 71

Iyengar and Lepper (2000), more consumers sample with large # of jams (145 vs. 104 customers), Fewer consumers buy with large # of jams (4 vs. 31 customers)

Question 72

results of experiment on preference for salience

Answer 72

Ho and Imai (2008), dummy variable on if they were first on ballot paper (due to increased salience), Major party: effect insignificant or negative on votes, Minor parties: every minor party candidate (bar 1) has positive effect (almost always significant) of being first

Question 73

what is paper on confusion (Heuristics)

Answer 73

Shue and Luttmer (2009), choice of political candidate among those in ballot, California voters in 2003 recall elections, looks at effect of being next to major candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger on ballot paper

Question 74

results on paper on confusion (Heuristics)

Answer 74

Shue and Luttmer (2009), percentage vote shares for minor candidate Palmieri never exceeds 0.08% except for when he is adjacent to Schwarzenegger on a ballot. Significantly higher (as much as 1.8%) in county-districts where he is adjacent, suggestng effects of misvoting

Question 75

what paper looked at the relationship between socioeconomic variables and SWB

Answer 75

Blanchflower and Oswald 2005

Question 76

what does loss aversion imply (Weber et al 2006)

Answer 76

loss aversion implies a difference between willingness to accept and willingness to pay for the same good. (as good not part of endowment)

Question 77

what is the motivation of the experiment on neural responses to real-market-transactions (Neuro)

Answer 77

Weber et al (2006), hypothesis: neural activity occurs in brain regions associated with processing of fear when selling an (emotionally charged) product, no such neural activity occurs when buying a product for money in routine transactions

Question 78

what is the setting of of the experiment on neural responses to real-market-transactions (Neuro)

Answer 78

subjects bought and sold total of 64 MP3-songs, in each selling condition subjects stated their willingness to accept (min price) and in each buying condition their wtp, all subjects stated higher prices in the selling than in the buying condition

Question 79

what is McClure et al. (2004) (Neuro)

Answer 79

intertemporal choice with time-dated Amazon gift card, $20 now or $30 in two weeks $20 in two weeks or $30 in four weeks $20 in four weeks or $30 in six weeks, internal part of brain respond “only” to immediate rewards, external part of brain neoclassical and equal response to all rewards

Question 80

what is the paper on stock market returns and football

Answer 80

Edmans et al. (2007), international football matches (39 countries, 1973-2004), lost game -> 0.21% daily stock return, win has essentially no effect, more important matches have larger effects (World cup elimination), effect doesn’t depend on whether loss expected or not

Question 81

what is the paper and setting on university choice

Answer 81

Simonsohn (2010), enrolment at US university “known for academic strengths and recreational weakness”, look at effects of weather on day of students’ campus visit

Question 82

what is results on paper on university choice

Answer 82

Simonsohn (2010), if visiting on days with more cloud cover -> significant positive effect on enrolment, interpretation: higher cloud cover -> mood -> focus more on academic than social attributes

Question 83

what is the motivation behind the paper looking at time preference and mood (emotions)

Answer 83

Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011), survey finds negative correlation between self-reported happiness and time preference, in line with predictions that happiness may increase willpower and reduce competing cognitive demands and happiness may increase affect for future activities. experiment on time-preferences where subjects randomly exposed to a positive or neutral affect mood

Question 84

setting of paper on time preference and mood (emotions)

Answer 84

Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011). mood manipulation randomly shown short film clip of comedy (positive) or wildlife (neutral), questions about mood and emotional effect of film clip, time preference questions: “what amount of money if paid to you today would make you indifferent to $m paid to you in t days?” (ask them for NPV), questions on demographic and psychological characteristics, including happiness and personality traits

Question 85

what is the results of the paper on time preference and mood (emotions)

Answer 85

Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011). positive-affect increases present value of payment by $2 on average (value present more cause having a good time), No ex-post difference in overall happiness across treatment and control, Ifcher and Zarghamee interpret their findings along lines of I-1 (happiness may increase willpower and reduce competing cognitive demands), alternative explanations: Positive affect substitutes for money (not less myopic, they simply care less about money when they’re in good mood (I-2)) Affect influences risk preferences (if positive-affect makes subjects less risk-averse, they may discount less because they are more optimistic about receiving the money

Question 86

what is motivation behind paper on sexual arousal and risky behaviour

Answer 86

Ariely and Loewenstein (2006), sexual arousal -> willpower depletion -> more risky behaviour

Question 87

explain paper on sexual arousal and risky behaviour

Answer 87

Ariely and Loewenstein (2006), Control: male students Treatment: male students that are sexually aroused, Asked about attractiveness of different sexual activities, Treatment -> substantially higher willingness to engage in behaviour that may lead to rape, in line with willpower depletion magnifying insensitivity to probabilities, alternative interpretations: arousal -> beliefs (projection bias) arousal -> present-bias (extreme case of myopia) arousal -> honesty (but same effect for less embarrassing questions)