Non-Fatal Offences against the Person - Cases

Question 1

Assault - Logdon

Answer 1

> Logdon v DPP [1976] Crim LR 121:
D threatened V with a fake gun and once D saw V was frightened he told her gun was fake.
D was convicted of assault but appealed on the basis that he didn’t intend to physically harm V.
Appeal dismissed because MR of assault doesn’t require there to be intent to actually carry out threat of unlawful force.

Question 2

Assault - Venna

Answer 2

> R v Venna [1976] QB 421, [1975] Crim. L.R. 701:
D was convicted with assault occasioning actual bodily harm after fracturing a police officer’s hand whilst resisting arrest.
Appealed on grounds that judge erred in directing that recklessness in applying physical force was sufficient.
Appeal dismissed.
Jones LJ:
-“We see no reason in logic or in law why a person who recklessly applies physical force to the person should be outside the criminal law of assault. In many cases the dividing line between intention and recklessness is barely distinguishable. This is such a case.”

Question 3

Assault Occasioning ABH - Ireland

Answer 3

> R v Ireland [1998] AC 147 (House of Lords):
Ireland = made silent telephone calls to women and they each suffered psychological damage.
Burstow = harassed a woman, including making silent calls, sending threatening notes and appearing at her home. She too suffered psychological harm.
Appeals dismissed.
Under ss 20 and 47 OAPA, recognisable psychiatric illness falls within the definition of ‘bodily harm’ and harm can be ‘inflicted’ without direct application to the victim.
Assault can be committed by words and gestures alone.
Here the silent phone calls causing fear of immediate and unlawful violence were a form of assault.
Lord Steyn:
-“What, if not the possibility of imminent personal violence, was the victim terrified about?”
-“In the context of a criminal case therefore the words ‘cause’ and ‘inflict’ may be taken to be interchangeable.”

Question 4

Battery - Martin

Answer 4

> R v Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54.
This case shows that there doesn’t need to be a direct application of force to constitute battery.
D place iron bar in front of escape route and put out the lights in crowded theatre causing panic.
The audience charged out and some were injured in the stampede.
D convicted of GBH, but appealed on grounds that ‘inflict’ required direct application of force.
Held that indirect application of force was sufficient for conviction under s.20.
He inflicted (indirectly) GBH (the AR) and he foresaw V would incur some harm (MR),

Question 5

Battery - Collins v Wilcox

Answer 5

> Actus reus of battery: the touching of another person without consent, such consent may be implied where necessitated by daily life.
2 police officers suspected D was soliciting for prostitution. D walked away and the officer grabbed her arm. D swore and scratched the officer’s arm. D was convicted of assault on the officer.
Appeal: issue arose as to whether the officer had acted committed battery and thus acted in excess of her powers.
CA allowed appeal – D’s conviction was overturned. The officer had committed battery and thus unlawfully detained D.
Robert Goff LJ:
-Any touching of another person, however slight, may amount to a battery.
-However, given the broad principle, there must be exceptions, a broader exception is where there is implied consent for touching that is necessitated by the ‘exigencies of everyday life’.
-An example is touching someone to gain their attention, but only when ‘using no greater degree of physical contact than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances for that purpose’.
-In this case, because the officer’s action of restraining D ‘went beyond the generally acceptable conduct of touching a person to engage her or her attention’ and thus constituted a battery.
-“Implied consent existed where there was jostling in crowded places, handshakes, back slapping, tapping to gain attention, provided no more force was used than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances. There was no consent given for the grabbing of the arm.”
As to why mere touching can constitute battery, Robert Goff LJ cited Blackstone’s Commentaries: “the law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it; every man’s person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it, in any the slightest manner.”

Question 6

Battery - Santana-Burmudez

Answer 6

> DPP v Santana-Burmudez [2003]:

• D denied that he had no sharp objects on him when V (police officer) asked; she stabbed herself on a needle in his pocket.
• AR for assault can include omission where D exposed V to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury through his acts/speech, and that force doesn’t have to be applied by D directly.
• High Court: where someone by act or word or combination of the two created a danger and thereby exposed another to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury which materialised the AR for assault is satisified.

Question 7

Assault Occasioning ABH - Savage, Parmenter

Answer 7

> R v Savage, Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699:
-Conjoined appeal.
-Savage intentionally threw beer on V, lost grip of glass which cut V.
-Parmenter roughly handled baby whilst playing which injured it, but he didn’t realise his actions would.
Appeal:
1. Whether under S.20, D must have subjectively intended or foreseen harm?
2. Whether the harm intended or foreseen must be the harm that was in fact caused or just some harm?
HoL: Savage’s appeal dismissed, Parmenter’s appeal allowed and convicted under 47 instead.
Lord Ackner:
-Mens rea under s47 OAPA:
-The only mens rea required is the mens rea for assault.
-There need not be any intention or foresight of physical harm.
-Mens rea under s20 OAPA:
-The meaning of ‘maliciously’ is that the defendant intended or foresaw some physical harm.
-The defendant must have actually/subjectively foreseen the harm, i.e., Cunningham recklessness.
-The harm that is intended or foreseen can be of a ‘minor character’ and need not be wounding or grievous bodily harm.

Question 8

Assault Occasioning ABH - T v DPP

Answer 8

> T v DPP [2003] EWHC 266 (Admin):

• V kicked by D whilst lying down, resulting in V becoming unconscious but no external harm was sustained.
• Appeal dismissed.
• Causing V to lose consciousness constitutes ABH within the terms of S.47 OAPA as it’s an injurious impairment of sensory functions.

Question 9

Assault Occasioning ABH - DPP v Smith

Answer 9

> DPP v Smith [2006] EWHC 94 (Admin):

• Cutting hair amounts to ABH under S.47 OAPA.
• D awoken by GF when asleep so D climbed over her and forcefully cut off her hair (ponytail).
• D convicted under s.47 for assault occasioning ABH.
• ABH; ‘harm’ includes any damage, and hair is part of the body.
• Judge considered that amount of hair to be “intrinsic to the identity of the individual.” (Unlikely that a conviction would have been made if only a small amount had been cut off.)

Question 10

Wounding and GBH - Ss. 18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861

Answer 10

> S.18 - Shooting or attempting to shout, or wounding with intent to do GBH:
-“Whosoever shall unlawfully & maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause any GBH to any person with intent, to do some GBH to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life.”

Question 11

Wounding and GBH - Ss. 20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861

Answer 11

> S.20 - Inflicting bodily injury, with or without weapon:
-“Whosoever shall unlawfully & maliciously wound or inflict GBH upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude.”

Question 12

Wounding & GBH - Bollom

Answer 12

> R v Bollom [2003] EWCA Crim 2846:
-V’s characteristics, including his age, must be considered in deciding whether the harm caused constitutes actual bodily harm.
-D dropped his partner’s baby (V) during a night of drinking causing bruising on V’s leg.
-V had sustained other injuries but evidence was unclear how.
-D was convicted of s18 for intentionally causing grievous bodily harm (GBH).
-D appealed on the basis that V’s injuries did not amount to GBH as they had to be assessed without reference to V’s age and health.
Fulford J:
-Assessment of the harm had to be made on the basis of effect on the particular individual.
-The injuries need not be life-threatening, dangerous or permanent to constitute GBH.
-Injuries had to be viewed collectively to assess whether they were serious.
-Injuries had to be caused by one continuous course of conduct constituting a continuous assault.
-Although V’s age had to be taken into account when assessing his injuries, the judge failed to direct the jury to determine D’s responsibility in inflicting the injuries was uncertain, as such the conviction was unsafe.

• Appealed that the injuries did not amount to GBH and that the judge had misdirected the jury by allowing them to use subjective evidence such as the victim’s age in making their decision.
• Appeal allowed.
• Held that the jury are entitled to take into account the particular characteristics of the victim when considering if injuries amount to GBH.
• Fulford J = “In deciding whether injuries are grievous, an assessment has to be made of, amongst other things, the effect of the harm on the particular individual.”
• However, the judge failed to direct the jury that they must be sure that the injuries came from the one assault.
• Changed conviction to assault occasioning ABH (s.47).

Question 13

Wounding & GBH - Dica

Answer 13

> R v Dica [2004] QB 1257:

• GBH is inflicted when HIV or other sexual disease is transmitted.
• Consent by the victim to the risk of sexually transmitted diseases is a defence to s20 OAPA, but not to s18 OAPA.
• D knew he was HIV positive, but still had unprotected sex with 2 women who then got HIV.
• Charged with inflicting GBH contrary to S.20 on basis he had recklessly transmitted the disease to the women when they didn’t know/consent to risk of infection.
• The judge had directed the jury to convict even if women were aware of his condition.
• D appealed, arguing that the women knew of his condition.
• Held that that the V’s consent to sexual intercourse was not regarded as consent to the risk of disease; but if V did consent to such a risk that would provide the defendant with a defence.
• If D had deliberately intended to transmit disease/cause gbh, consent would not be a defence
• Nature of sex is risky and is treated as a private act between 2 people so should not be interfered with without specific legislation from Parliament.
• Judge LJ:
• Consent to sexual intercourse meant that D was not guilty of rape, but it does not entail consent to the risk of sexual diseases if it was concealed: [39].
• Consent is no defence to a charge of deliberate or intentional infection of HIV under s18 OAPA based on the principle from R v Brown, but this was not alleged here: [58].
• Consent is a valid defence to an offence under s20 OAPA for recklessly transmitting HIV through sexual intercourse: [59].
• The defence of consent to the risk of infection was justified by Judge LJ on the grounds of personal autonomy and respect for private life, as well as the impracticality of enforcement.

Question 14

Poisoning - S. 23 Offences Against the Person Act 1861

Answer 14

> S. 23 - Maliciously administering poison, so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm:
-“Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously administer to or cause to be administered to or taken by any other person any poison or other destructive or noxious thing, so as thereby to endanger the life of such person, or so as thereby to inflict upon such person any grievous bodily harm, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding ten years.”

Question 15

Poisoning - S. 23 Offences Against the Person Act 1861

Answer 15

> S. 24 - Maliciously administering poison, with intent to injure, aggrieve, or annoy any other person:
-“Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously administer to or cause to be administered to or taken by any other person any poison or other destructive or noxious thing, with intent to injure, aggrieve, or annoy such person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude.”

Question 16

Threats to Kill - S.16 Offences Against the Person Act 1861

Answer 16

> S. 16 - Threats to kill:
-“A person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending that that other would fear it would be carried out, to kill that other or a third person shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.”

Question 17

Strangulation - S.75A Serious Crime Act 2015.

Answer 17

> The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 amends the Serious Crime Act 2015, introducing two new sections — section 75A and 75B— which will create a new and specific criminal offence of non-fatal strangulation and suffocation.
Section 70 of the act, amends the Serious Crime Act 2015, (the 2015 Act) by adding 2 new sections—sections 75A and 75B.
The new offence has been included in the 2015 Act as the offence of strangulation and suffocation is closely linked with controlling or coercive behaviour which is also contained in the 2015 Act.
Section 75A makes provision for the new criminal offence of non-fatal strangulation and suffocation. This offence will have general application and will apply to all cases where a person (D) intentionally strangles or suffocates another person (V), including cases where this offence occurs in a domestic abuse context. The new offence, which will cover a range of behaviours, includes strangulation but will also cover suffocation and other methods used by a person that affect a victim’s ability to breathe (such as constriction).
As is currently the case under the law for other assault offences, the new offence will also include a defence.
This is set out in section 75A(2), providing a defence for a person accused of strangulation or suffocation to show that the other person (the victim) consented to being strangled or to any other act that affected their ability to breathe. It will be for the defendant to provide sufficient evidence to raise the consent defence and the prosecution will then have to prove that to the contrary beyond reasonable doubt.
However, that defence will not apply where the victim suffers serious harm, and where the perpetrator intended to cause that harm or was reckless as to causing harm, no matter whether the victim consented to the acts that caused the serious harm or not.
This reflects the current law as set out in the case of R v Brown [1993] 2 W.L.R. 556 and subsequent cases, that where a person consents to an act that amounts to no more than a battery, consent of the victim is a valid defence for the person who committed the act of battery.
This provision aims to strike a balance between respect for an individual’s private life and acts that may have been consensual between partners but where no, or limited injury occurs, and those where more serious harm results.
It also remains open to the prosecution to charge a ABH, grievous bodily harm (GBH) or another more serious offence where the evidence exists to sustain such a charge.

Question 18

Consent - AG’s ref (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715

Answer 18

> AG’s ref (No. 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715:

• Consent is not a defence to fighting or whenever ABH is intended or caused.
• D and V agreed to fight each other.
• The judge directed the jury not to find guilt if V consented and D used only reasonable force, D was consequently acquitted.
• A certified question was made to the CA as to whether consent is a valid defence to assault arising out of fighting.
• CA held consent not a valid defence.
• Lord Lane CJ:
• ‘…it is not in the public interest that people should try to cause, or should cause, each other actual bodily harm for no good reason. Minor struggles are another matter…it is immaterial whether the act occurs in private or in public’
• However, exceptions apply to ‘properly conducted games and sports, lawful chastisement or correction, reasonable surgical interference, dangerous exhibitions, etc. These apparent exceptions can be justified as involving the exercise of a legal right, in the case of chastisement or correction, or as needed in the public interest, in the other cases.’

Question 19

Consent - Brown - case & majority

Answer 19

> R v Brown (Anthony) [1994] 1 AC 212:
-Consent is no defence to inflicting actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm or wounding i.e., ss 20 and 47 OAPA.
-However, an exception applies to sports, surgery, taking risk of infection in sexual acts.
-A group of gay men were engaged in sado-masochistic sexual activities.
-They were convicted under s20 and s47.
-The judge directed the jury that the prosecution was not required to prove that ‘victims’ did not consent.
-Should the defence of consent be extended to infliction of bodily harm in the course of sado-masochistic encounters?
-HoL: Appeal dismissed, rightly convicted.
Lord Templeman:
-Scope of consent defence:
-Consent is a defence to assault or battery but is no defence where ABH, wounding or GBH is inflicted.
-An exception applies to cases where ABH, wounding or GBH is inflicted as a result of lawful activity such as surgery, boxing, tattooing, ear-piercing, and circumcision.
-Current case - The list of exceptions should not be extended to sado-masochistic activities, due to the cruelty of the violence involved and health risks:
-‘In principle there is a difference between violence which is incidental and violence which is inflicted for the indulgence of cruelty.’
-The acts posed dangers of serious personal injury and blood infection.
-‘Society is entitled and bound to protect itself against a cult of violence. Pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is an evil thing. Cruelty is uncivilised’.

Question 20

Consent - Brown - dissent

Answer 20

> Lord Mustill:
-‘these are questions of private morality; that the standards by which they fall to be judged are not those of the criminal law’.
-‘The only question is whether these consensual private acts are offences against the existing law of violence. To this question I return a negative response.’.
Lord Slynn of Hadley:
-‘I agree that in the end it is a matter of policy. It is a matter of policy in an area where social and moral factors are extremely important and where attitudes can change. In my opinion it is a matter of policy for the legislature to decide.’

Question 21

Consent - Wilson

Answer 21

> R v Wilson (Alan) [1997] QB 47:
-Suggests that sado-masochistic acts in a marriage is susceptible to the defence of consent.
-Wilson (D) branded his initials on wife’s buttocks with a hot knife at her request.
-D was convicted of s47 OAPA.
-D appealed on the basis of consent as a defence.
-CA allowed appeal, consent was a valid defence.
Russell LJ:
-The R v Brown judgment is limited to a ‘sado-masochistic’ encounter, it ‘is not authority for the proposition that consent is no defence to a charge under section 47 of the Act of 1861, in all circumstances where actual bodily harm is deliberately affected’.
-R v Brown itself recognised exceptions such as tattooing, there is no logical difference between what D did and tattooing.
-‘It is not in public interest that activities such as the appellant’s in this appeal should amount to criminal behaviour’.
-Consensual activity in the privacy between married couple and in the home not a matter of criminal investigation.
There are two main lines of reasoning:
1. The activity fell into the exception of tattooing, while the activity in Brown did not fall into any of the categories.
2. Wilson and his wife were a married couple hence conduct was more morally acceptable.

Question 22

Consent - Konzani

Answer 22

> R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706:
-Consent to the risk of HIV infection from sex is no defence to s20 OAPA if it is uninformed due to concealment by the defendant.
-D was aware that he was HIV positive and the risk to his partners.
-D slept with 3 women who were unaware of his status.
-D was convicted under s20 OAPA.
-D appealed on the ground that the women had consented to the risk of HIV by engaging in unprotected sex or alternatively that he had an honest, if unreasonable belief that they were aware of his status.
-CA dismissed appeal.
-Judge LJ:
0It is implicit in the reasoning of Dica that for consent to the risk of infection of HIV to be a defence the consent must be informed.
-Concealment of condition will not allow informed consent.
-In some circumstances, despite recklessness and concealment of condition, there is informed consent where the victim finds out from other sources, such as a friend, or when they started a relationship in a hospital where D was treated for HIV.
-Honest belief by D of consent can be a defence, but there was not the slightest evidence of it.

-“if an individual who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus conceals this stark fact from his sexual partner … the concealment of this fact from her almost inevitably means that she is deceived. Her consent is not properly informed, and she cannot give an informed consent to something of which she is ignorant.”

Question 23

Consent - Barnes

Answer 23

> R v Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246, [2005] Crim LR 381:

• Participants in contact sports are deemed to consent to a reasonable risk of harm.
• D was an amateur footballer who injured an opposing player when he went in for a tackle.
• D was convicted with inflicting grievous bodily harm under s. 20 OAPA.
• Appeal allowed – the judge’s summation to the jury was flawed as it failed to explain how to identify which acts are consented to in a sport.
• Lord Woolf CJ:
• Although consent is generally irrelevant when bodily harm is caused, there are public policy exceptions, which include injury in contact sports.
• If what occurs goes beyond what a player can ‘reasonably be regarded as having accepted’ by taking part in the sport, this indicates that the conduct will not be covered by the defence.
• On what can be reasonably regarded as accepted:
  1. A play that is within the rules is accepted, but in highly competitive sports, conduct outside the rules can be expected to occur in the heat of the moment.
  2. It depends on all the circumstances, including the type of sport, the level at which it was played, the nature of the act, the degree of force used, the extent of the risk of injury and the defendant’s state of mind.
  3. In borderline cases the jury would need to ask themselves, among other questions, whether the contact was so obviously late and/or violent that it could not be regarded as an instinctive reaction, error or misjudgment in the heat of the game.
• Held that criminal proceedings should only be brought if D’s conduct was sufficiently grave.
• Would only be no consent if there was a foul “quite outside what could be expected to occur in the course of a football game.”

Question 24

Consent - Simon Slingsby

Answer 24

> R v Simon Slingsby [1995] Crim LR 570:
-Unforeseen physical injury resulting from consensual sexual activity is not criminal since there is no underlying assault or unlawful act.
-D penetrated V’s vagina & rectum, accidentally cutting her with his ring.
-V developed septicemia and died.
-D convicted under S.20 & 47 of OAPA.
-High Court allowed appeal & conviction quashed.
Judge J:
-Activity of inserting fingers into the vagina & rectum wasn’t an assault & not an unlawful act where consent had been obtained.
-It’s contrary to principle to convict D of manslaughter where an unforeseen & unintended injury had occurred.
In contrast to Brown, the obvious difference is that in Brown the very intention of D’s acts was to inflict degrading violence on the victim.
The sexual activity to which both V and D had agreed did not involve deliberate infliction of injury or harm and, but for the fact that the defendant was wearing a signet ring, no injury at all would have been caused or could have been contemplated… It would be contrary to principle to treat as criminal activity something which would not otherwise amount to assault merely because in the course of the activity an injury occurred.

Question 25

Consent - H v CPS

Answer 25

> H v CPS [2010] EWHC 1374 (Admin), [2012] Q.B. 257:

• The fact that a job may involve the risk of physical harm does not imply consent.
• D, a young student suffering from ADHD, assaulted a teacher at a school for students with special needs.
• D alleged that the assault had been impliedly consented to by the teacher.
• High Court dismissed appeal:
  1. Occupational risk was not the same as implied consent to the use of violence against them by pupils.
  2. An analogy to implied consent in contact sports to the risk of injury was rejected.
• Contrast this case to Barnes which considered the application of implied consent in sport.
• Foresight of some risk isn’t same as consenting to it.

Question 26

Consent - BM

Answer 26

> R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560:
-The defence of consent does not apply to ABH in the form of body modification.
-D, a tattooist, carried out body modifications including the removal of a customer’s ear, the removal of a customer’s nipple and the division of a customer’s tongue to produce an effect similar to reptilian tongues.
-D was convicted with wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm contrary to s18 OAPA 1861.
-The judge held that consent was no defence, D appealed on the ground that the procedures were consensual.
-CA dismissed appeal as consent offered no defence to s18 OAPA 1861.
Lord Burnett CJ:
1. General rule:
-R v Brown established the general rule that consent provided no defence if violence caused ABH or more serious injury
2. Nature of exceptions:
-Exceptions represent a balance struck by the judges to reflect a series of different interests.
-Whilst the exceptions are incapable of being accommodated within any universally stated test, there are two features which underpin almost all of them:
1. they may produce discernible social benefit and
2. it would be regarded as unreasonable for common law to criminalise i.e., long accepted practices such as tattooing, piercing or religious practices such as circumcision.
-New exceptions should be developed by analogy to existing exceptions, the recognition of an entirely new exception is too policy laden for the criminal trial process.
3. Current case:
-In this case there is no proper analogy between body modification and tattooing, body piercing or other body adornment, they amounted to medical procedures performed for no medical reason by someone not qualified to perform them.
-Policy reasons that were cited:
1. Modifications can lead to profound long-term consequences and many who seek body modification are vulnerable to mental illness.
2. The personal autonomy of one individual does not extend to involving another in what would otherwise be a crime.

Question 27

Consent - Domestic Abuse Act 2021, s. 71

Answer 27

> S. 71 - Consent to serious harm for sexual gratification not a defence:

(2) It is not a defence that V consented to the infliction of the serious harm for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification (but see subsection (4)).
(4) Subsection (2) does not apply in the case of an offence under section 20 or 47 of the 1861 Act where—
(a) the serious harm consists of, or is a result of, the infection of V with a sexually transmitted infection in the course of sexual activity, and
(b) V consented to the sexual activity in the knowledge or belief that D had the sexually transmitted infection.
(5) For the purposes of this section it does not matter whether the harm was inflicted for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification for D, V or some other person.
(6) Nothing in this section affects any enactment or rule of law relating to other circumstances in which a person’s consent to the infliction of serious harm may, or may not, be a defence to a relevant offence.

Question 28

Consent - Tabassum

Answer 28

> R v Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328, [2000] Crim LR 686:
-Consent to assault is vitiated where there is fraud as to the nature or quality of the act.
-Women (Vs) allowed D to examine their breasts on the basis of his false representation that he was medically qualified and conducting a survey into breast cancer.
-D was convicted of assault but appealed on the basis that Vs had consented.
-CA dismissed appeal as defence of consent didn’t apply.
Rose LJ:
1. The women were “consenting to touching for medical purposes, and not to indecent behaviour, that is, there was consent to the nature of the act, but not its quality”: p. 337.

Question 29

Consent - Richardson

Answer 29

> R v Richardson [1999] Q.B. 444, [1999] Crim. L.R. 62:
-Fraud as to matters that are not sufficiently integral to one’s identity, such as one’s qualifications, do not vitiate consent to acts resulting in actual bodily harm.
-D, a dentist, had been disqualified but continued to treat patients without informing them of her suspension.
-D was convicted with assault occasioning ABH although her patients had consented to the treatment.
-CA allowed appeal - conviction quashed.
-Her fraud did not vitiate consent.
Otton LJ:
1. Fraud can only vitiate consent to ABH in circumstances where V was deceived either as to the nature of the act performed or the identity of the performer.
2. The identity of the person did not extend to knowledge of D’s qualifications or attributes.
3. Lesser forms of fraud may suffice for civil claims such, D’s conduct was reprehensible and gives rise to a civil claim.
-Contrast to Tabassum.