Ch. 14 - Part I - Inchoate Offences

Question 1

Inchoate Offences - definition

Answer 1

> Inchoate offences are ones that seek to deal with defendants who have taken steps towards the commission of an offence but who have not (yet) committed it.
1. Attempts.
2. Offences under the Serious Crime Act 2007.
3. Conspiracies.
SCA abolished incitement.

Question 2

Inchoate Offences - general views

Answer 2

> For:
-Some emphasise practical benefit of such offences as they permit lawful arrest and punishment of those who plan to harm someone else, without having to wait for V to actually be harmed.
-Emphasise moral blameworthiness of such conduct.
-Can be a matter of luck as to whether V is harmed.
Against:
-Higgins: infringes an important principle of criminal law that wicked thoughts alone don’t deserve punishment.
-Zimmerman: not enough to plan harm, must put plans into practice.

Question 3

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - overview

Answer 3

>AR = D has done an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence.
>MR = Normally an intention to commit the full offence. More difficult if AR of full offence requires proof that D did an act in certain circumstances in which case D must intend to do their act but need only be reckless as to circumstances (if MR for full offence requires only recklessness as to the circumstances.

> S. 1(1) of Criminal Attempts Act 1981.
“If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he or she is guilty of attempting to commit the offence.”

Question 4

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea

Answer 4

> Crucial, can distinguish between a harmless act and a criminal offence.
Key MR requirement = intent to produce the AR.
E.g. Whybrow (1951): attempted murder requires intent to kill, intent to cause GBH is insufficient.
E.g. Millard & Vernon [1987]: Attempted criminal damage requires intention to cause criminal damage, even though recklessness is enough for the full offence.
However, there are difficulties with this approach.

Question 5

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea - What does ‘intent’ mean?

Answer 5

> Pearman (1984):

• ‘Intent’ in CAA = same meaning as in comon law.
• Inc. direct intent & sometimes indirect intent.

Question 6

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea - What about the circumstances or consequences of the act?

Answer 6

1. R v Khan [1990] = suggests recklessness as to circumstantial aspects of AR for full offence can sometimes be sufficient for an attempt..
2. This was thrown into doubt in R v Pace & Rogers [2014].

Question 7

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea - What about the circumstances or consequences of the act? Khan

Answer 7

> R v Khan; Dhokia; Banga; Faiz [1990]:
-Ds charged with attempted rape of 16yr-old girl.
-Judge directed jury that if Ds were reckless as to whether or not V would have consented to sexual intercourse they could be convicted of attempted rape.
-Recklessness here included ‘could not care less’ attitude.
-Appealed on basis jury should have been directed that they could be convicted of attempted rape only if they knew or intended that V wasn’t consenting.
Lord Justice Russell:
-“The intent of the defendant is precisely the same in rape and in attempted rape and the MR is identical, namely, an intention to have intercourse plus a knowledge of or recklessness as to the woman’s absence of consent.”
-“A man does not recklessly have sexual intercourse, nor does he recklessly attempt it. Recklessness in rape and attempted rape arises not in relation to the physical act of the accused but only in his state of mind when engaged in the activity of having or attempting to have sexual intercourse.”
-“If this is the true analysis, as we believe it is, the attempt does not require any different intention on the part of the accused from that for the full offence of rape.”
-“We recognise, of course, that our reasoning cannot apply to all offences and all attempts.
-Offences were “no state of mind other than recklessness is involved in the offence, there can be no attempt to commit it.”
-“The only ‘intent’, giving the word its natural and ordinary meaning, of the rapist is to have sexual intercourse. He commits the offence because of the circumstances in which he manifests that intent - i.e. when the woman is not consenting and he either knows it or could not care less about the absence of consent.”

Question 8

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea - What about the circumstances or consequences of the act? R v Pace & Rogers - facts

Answer 8

> R v Pace and Rogers [2014]:

• Ds were scrap metal dealers & charged with attempting to convert criminal property contrary to s. 327(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
• Full offence required that the offender suspected the property to be stolen but the property wasn’t in fact stolen and part of police sting operation.
• CA had to ask what MR was required for attempted offence? Same as full offence (suspicion) or intent?

Question 9

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea - What about the circumstances or consequences of the act? R v Pace & Rogers - judgment

Answer 9

> Lord Justice Davis:
-[52]: “The authority of Khan is not decisive for present purposes… In Khan, the substantive offence admitted of recklessness as the MR: which is not the case here… had they succeeded in the act (penetration), as they had intended, the full offence of rape would have been made out. But that is not so in the present case. The 2 appellants here could never have been guilty of the substantive offence of converting criminal property: just because the property in question did not constitute or represent benefit from criminal conduct.”
-[62]: “Turning, then, to s. 1(1) we consider that, as a matter of ordinary language and in accordance with principle, an “intent to commit an offence” connotes an intent to commit all the elements of the offence. We can see no sufficient basis, whether linguistic or purpose, for construing otherwise.”
-[63]: “A constituent element of the offence of converting criminal property is, as we have said, that the property in question is criminal property. That is an essential part of the offence… But the Crown’s argument glosses over that… It ignores the requirement for the substantive offence that the property concerned must be criminal property. The Crown, in effect, thus seeks to make it a criminal offence to intend to convert property suspecting, if not knowing, that it is stolen. But that is not what s. 327, read with s. 340(3), provide.”
Appeal allowed.

Question 10

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea - What about the circumstances or consequences of the act? R v Pace & Rogers - commentary

Answer 10

> How can Pace & Rogers and Khan be reconciled?

1. Child and Hunt: Khan overruled by Pace and Rogers. D must have intended all elements of AR to be present even recklessness & suspicion where required.
   - However, CA discussed Khan and didn’t expressly overrule it.
2. Khan = law whilst P&R should be dismissed as an error. D intended all AR elements except elements of the circumstances in cases where recklessness or suspicion are sufficient for the full offence.
   - As matter of precedent P&R should have followed Khan.
   - Dyson = suggests in time P&R will be seen as a “flash in the pan.” However, CA were clear suspicion wasn’t enough and will be hard to overrule this.
3. Both correct. Different situations:
   - ‘Impossible attempt’ = D must intend as in P&R.
   - ‘Possible attempt’ = MR for attempt can include recklessness at to circumstances.
   - S. 1(3) states that if D’s intent would amount to an intent to commit an offence if the facts of the case had been as D believed them to be, he should be regarded as having an intent to commit the offence, which is how Virgo explains conclusion in P&R that suspicion not enough for that impossible attempt.
   - Although, statute seems to apply to attempts generally and not just impossible attempts.
4. Both correct; different rules for different crimes.
   - Need to wait for future cases to tell us the MR for other attempted offences & develop a more general rule.
   - Maybe recklessness = Khan and suspicion = P&R.
   - But seems odd that phrase ‘intent to commit the offence’ will have a different meaning depending on which crime is being charged.

> The court also suggested that Khan and P&R could be distinguished on the basis that there couldn’t be an impossible attempt in Khan but there could be in P&R.
-That distinction has been widely rejected by commentators including Simester (2015) and Stark (2014) as hard to justify.

Question 11

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea - What about the circumstances or consequences of the act? Simester

Answer 11

> Andrew Simester supports P&R as fits in with standard meaning of the word ‘attempt’:
-“To ‘attempt’ to do something is to try to do it. If only for the sake of speaking clearly to the citizens it is meant to guide, a law criminalising the ‘attempt’ to do something should mean what it says, i.e. that trying to the thing is a crime.”
Opponents:
-If P&R applied to rape, D must intend V not to consent which means it would be very hard to prove as it means D would regard his plan as having failed if turned out V consented. Only most sadist rapist would have that mindset.
Simester’s counter argument:
-Simester suggests that knowledge or settled belief V wasn’t consenting should be required however, that will be hard to prove.
Khan test seems most workable, but perhaps the hardest to fit into legislation’s wording as Simester argues:
-“A person who advertently runs the risk of harm is not thereby trying to cause that harm. Choosing to risk wrongdoing may be morally problematic, but it is not problematic in the same way: it is not a direct attack on the rights and interests of others but, rather, a form of endangerment.”

Question 12

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea - What about the circumstances or consequences of the act? Should Khan even apply to rape?

Answer 12

> At time of Khan, recklessness was required MR for rape but since SOA 2003, MR for rape is more complex as it involves proof that D didn’t reasonably believe V consented.
Findlay Stark believes that the 2003 Act has altered the MR for rape so that:
-“It can be assumes that the MR of attempted rape is, in a case involving non-consent, that the D has (i) an intention to penetrate the complainant’s vagina, anus or mouth with his penis, and (ii) no reasonable belief in consent. In a case where there is consent, the D must have (i) an intention to penetrate the consenting person’s vagina, anus or mouth with his penis, and (ii) the belief that this is not consented to.”
Simester argues that such a claim would depart to much from the wording of the Act.
Whichever test is used, as often in criminal law, much depends on the jury determining what was in the mind of D.

Question 13

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Mens Rea - Conditional Intent

Answer 13

> What if D has an intent to commit a crime only in certain circumstances?
Husseyn (1978): D charged with attempting to steal sub-aqua equipment from van having opened a bah and looking inside to see if there was anything worth taking.
CA held couldn’t be found guilty of attempting to steal it as he hadn’t intended on taking the sub-aqua equipment.
A-G’s Reference (Nos 1 and 2 of 1979): CA explained that conditional intent could form basis of an attempt charge if the indictment was drafted carefully.
E.g. in Husseyn correct charge = attempting to steal “some or all of the contents of the holdall”, whilst Smith & Hogan suggest “attempting to steal from a holdall” would be even better.

Question 14

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Actus Reus - general

Answer 14

> S. 1(1) of CAA 1981, AR = doing an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence.
Jones [1990] = words given normal meaning.
Key word ‘merely’ = not every preparatory act constitutes AR.
1. R v Geddes [1996]

Question 15

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Actus Reus - R v Geddes

Answer 15

> R v Geddes [1996]:
-D was found in a cubicle in a school where he wasn’t meant to be with a cider can, large knife, some rope, toilet paper and masking tape.
-Prosecution alleged he was planning on kidnapping a boy but appealed as he argued that his actions didn’t constitute an offence because they weren’t more than merely preparatory.
-D convicted of attempted false imprisonment.
-Appeal allowed.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ:
-“The cases show that the line of demarcation between acts which are merely preparatory and acts which may amount to an attempt is not always clear or easy to recognise.”
-“There must always be an exercise of judgment based on the particular facts of the case.”
-“could show that a D has done an act which shows that he actually tried to commit the offence in question, or whether he has only got ready or put himself in a position or equipped himself to do so.”
-“Had he moved from the realm of intention, preparation and planning into the area of execution or implementation?”
-“Must the contents of the rucksack, which give a clear indication as to what the appellant may have had in mind, but do not throw light on whether he had begun to carry out the commission of the offence.”
Appeal allowed.

Question 16

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Actus Reus - useful phrases

Answer 16

> CA in Geddes avoided setting down any definite rule for the jury to apply, other than to say that the words ‘more than merely preparatory’ should be given their ‘plain meaning’.
Useful phrases for AR:
1. Osborn (1919) = “on the job”.
2. Gullefer [1990] = “embarks on the crime proper”.
3. In Moore v DPP [2010], Toulson LJ found the following quote from a Law Commission Report helpful:
-“To elaborate further, preparatory conduct by D which is sufficiently close to the final act to be properly regarded as part of the execution of D’s plan can be an attempt… In other words, it covers the steps immediately preceding the final act necessary to effect D’s plan and bring about the commission of the intended offence.”

Question 17

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Actus Reus - summary of facts from cases (not hard-and-fast-rules)

Answer 17

1. Jones [1990]: An attempt is made out if D has done last act before completing offence.
2. Isn’t necessary to show D has done ‘last act’, can be found guilty despite having several actions left to complete. (Gullefer [1990]).
3. Gullefer: just because an act is one of a series of acts which will lead to the offence’s commission, it doesn’t mean that the act is necessarily sufficient to amount to an attempt.
4. In a crime of violence, unless D is face to face with V, it is unlikely the act will be described as more than mere preparation.
   >Must consider AR of full offence carefully.

Question 18

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Actus Reus - attempt by omission.

Answer 18

> Omission can’t constitute an attempt.

Question 19

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Actus Reus - is it possible to convict of an attempt if the attempt was successful?

Answer 19

> Not a defence.
D can still be convicted of an attempted offence.
S. 6(4) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 = “where a person is charged on an indictment with attempting to commit an offence of with any assault or other act preliminary to an offence, but not with the completed offence, then (subject to the discretion of the court to discharge the jury with a view to the preferment of an indictment for the completed offence) he may be convicted of the offence charged notwithstanding that he shown to guilty of the completed offence.”
Webley v Buxton [1977] indicated that although s. 6(4) doesn’t apply to summary offences, the common law rule is the same and D can be convicted of an attempt to carry out a summary offence, even if in fact they have committed the full offence.

Question 20

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Impossible Attempts - overview

Answer 20

> Distinguish between a ‘legal impossibility’, ‘impossibility through ineptitude’ and ‘physical impossibility’.

Question 21

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Impossible Attempts - ‘Legal Impossibility’

Answer 21

> D trying to perform act which they believe to be an act but in fact isn’t.
No offence.
E.g. Taaffe [1983] = not illegal to import packages of foreign currency.

Question 22

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Impossible Attempts - ‘Impossibility through ineptitude’

Answer 22

> Where D tries to commit a crime but the means they are using are inadequate to commit the offence.
D is clearly guilty.
More controversial is say sticking pins in a voodoo doll; many view the use of such ‘radically deficient means’ to attempt shouldn’t amount to attempted murder but it is hard to explain how it differs from say D shooting at V from such a long way off that can’t hit V.

Question 23

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Impossible Attempts - ‘Physical impossibility’

Answer 23

> Reason for failure isn’t the ineffective means used, but that the crime simply can’t be committed.
D can still be guilty under s.1(2) and s.1(3) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981:
-S.1(2) = A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence to which this section applies even though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible.
-S.1(3) = In any case where -
a) apart from this subsection a person’s intention would not be regarded as having amounted to an intent to commit an offence; but
b) if the facts of the case had been as he believed them to be, his intention would be so regarded,
then, for the purposes of subsection (1) above, he shall be regarded as having had an intent to commit that offence.
Key is the accused’s intention.
Facts are taken as D believed them to be.
Jury must decide on facts as D believed them to be whether they were doing an act which was more than merely preparatory to the commission of an offence.
Leading case = R v Shivpuri [1987].

Question 24

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Impossible Attempts - ‘Physical impossibility’ - R v Shivpuri

Answer 24

> R v Shivpuri [1987]:
-D confessed he was dealing in illegal drugs, which were actually just snuff and harmless vegetable matter.
Charged with an attempt to commit the offence of being knowingly concerned in dealing with and harbouring prohibited drugs contrary to s. 170(1)(b) of Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.
Appealed that he didn’t possess an illegal drug.
Lord Bridge of Harwich:
-“Did the appellant intend to receive and store (harbour) and in due course pass on to third parties (deal with) packages of heroin or cannabis which he knew had been smuggled into England from India? The answer is plainly Yes, he did.”
-“Next, did he, in relation to each offence, do an act which was more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence?… clearly more than preparatory…”
-“Does the ‘act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence’ in s.2(2) of the 1981 Act (the AR of the statutory offence of attempt) require any more than an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence which the D intended to commit? Section 1(2) must surely indicate a negative answer if it were otherwise, whenever the facts were such that the commission of the actual offence was impossible, it would be impossible to prove an act more than merely preparatory to the commission of that offence and sub-ss (1) and (2) would contradict each other.”
-“But can this conclusion stand with Ryan v Anderton?”
-“Running through Lord Roskill’s speech and my own in Anderton v Ryan is the concept of ‘objectively innocent’ acts which, in my speech certainly, are contrasted with ‘guilty acts’…”
-“The concept of ‘objective innocence’ is incapable of sensible application in relation to the law of criminal attempts… The distinction sought to be drawn in Anderton v Ryan between innocent and guilty acts considered ‘objectively’ and independently of the state of mind of the actor cannot be sensibly maintained.”
If on the facts as D believed them to be, D was doing something that was more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, they can be convicted of an attempt.
Followed in R v S.
Doubt over meaning of ‘believe’: is doubt as to whether V consents to rape enough for ‘belief’ in s. 1(2), are suspected beliefs sufficient?

Question 25

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Impossible Attempts - ‘Physical impossibility’ - R v S

Answer 25

> Followed decision in Shivpuri.
D convicted of attempting to aid and abet a suicide even though V had no intention of committing suicide, if D believed they did.

Question 26

Inchoate Offences - Attempt - Attempts and Abandonment

Answer 26

> Abandonment is not a defence in English law.

>So changing mind after doing a more than merely preparatory act does not remove liability.

Question 27

Serious Crime Act 2007 - statute

Answer 27

> Part 2 of the SCA 2007 creates the following offences:

• 44: Intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence:
  (a) does an act capable of encouraging or assisting…
  (b) he intends to encourage or assist its commission.

-45: Encouraging or assisting an offence believing it will be committed.

• 46: Encouraging or assisting offences believing one or more will be committed:
  (b) he believes -
  (i) that one or more of those offences will be committed (but no belief as to which)…
• 50: Defence of Acting Reasonably:
  (1) A person is not guilty of an offence under this Part if he proves -
  (a) that he knew certain circumstances existed; and
  (b) that it was reasonable for him to act as he did in those circumstances.
  (2) changes ‘knew’ to ‘believes’ in s.50(1) and considers whether reasonable for him to act in circumstances as he believed them to be.
  (3) Factors to be considered in determining whether it was reasonable for a person to acts as he did include-
  (a) seriousness of the anticipated offence/s
  (b) any purpose for which he claims to have been acting;
  (c) any authority by which he claims to have been acting.

Question 28

Serious Crime Act 2007 - overview

Answer 28

> Creates 3 offences which render D liable for offering encouragement or assistance, even where the offence is not committed.
In effect, they provide inchoate liability for accomplices.
Key difference between these offences and law on accomplices is that for the latter the person encouraged or assisted must go on to commit the offence.
AR requirements for s. 44, 45, 46 of the Act is same: ‘an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence.’
They differ in MR requirements.

Question 29

Serious Crime Act 2007 - Doing an act capable of encouraging or assisting an offence

Answer 29

> D must be shown to have done an act or omission (s. 47(8) makes it clear omissions are included) capable of encouraging or assisting an offence.
Careful distinction needs to be made for where D gives an act which is in fact not helpful or encouraging, but if it was capable of being so could be an offence.
Sets bar for these offences very low as only on rare occasion will an act not be capable of assisting an offence at all.
Statute doesn’t even say of substantial assistance.
Omerod & Fortson suggest that “the most marginal of acts might suffice.”
P doesn’t need to know A did act either.
Looks at broad context as in R v James Jones [2010].
Reference to ‘encouragement’ is ambiguous.
S. 65(1) states that threats or pressurizing someone can amount to encouragement.

Question 30

Serious Crime Act 2007 - MR requirements - Section 44

Answer 30

> Must show D intended to encourage or assist in the commission of the offence; foresight is not enough.
S. 45 and s. 46 = D needs simply to believe that offence will be encouraged, doesn’t need to want acts to do so.
Makes s. 44 more serious.
Stark argues that intention for s. 44 must be limited to direct intent and can’t cover indirect intent as if D foreseen the results as virtually certain that will amount to a belief and so fall within s. 45.
Although, if D who foresees the result as virtually certain & is found to have intention under the Woollin direction might be guilty under both ss. 44 & 45. Not unusual for D to be guilty of 2 crimes at same time.
Summary for MR of s. 44:
1. Intent to assist/encourage offence.
2. Foresight or intent that P would have MR for the offence.
3. Foresight or intent that any circumstances which are elements of the AR of the offence that is assisted/encouraged will be present.

Question 31

Serious Crime Act 2007 - MR requirements - Section 45

Answer 31

> D believes the act will be of assistance of encouragement.
No need to show D wanted offence to be committed.
Unclear what degree of foresight would be sufficient.
Statute refers to belief that the offence will be committed which indicates that a suspicion of fear will not be enough.
Andrew Ashworth suggests that “a belief to act without any significant doubt on the matter.”
Not as broad as may first appear.
Schedule 3 to SCA lists offences to which s. 45 can’t be applied, inc. conspiracies, attempts, and some statutory incitement offences.

Question 32

Serious Crime Act 2007 - MR requirements - Section 46

Answer 32

> D encourages or assists P in committing a crime, but is unaware which crime P might commit.
MR = D must believe their act will encourage or assist the commission of one of the offences and believe that one of the offences “will be committed” (indicates very strong belief offence will occur).
CA set out MR for s. 46 in their judgment in R v Sadique [2013].

Question 33

Serious Crime Act 2007 - MR requirements - Section 46 - R v Sadique

Answer 33

> R v Sadique [2013]:
-Mens rea of s46 Serious Crime Act 2007: the defendant must believe that his conduct will assist in the commission of one or more offences, but does not have believe that a precise offence will be committed.
-D’s business had supplied drug rings with chemical agents that were used to cut drugs.
-D was convicted of assisting the supply of class A and class B drug offences s46 of Serious Crime Act (SCA) 2007.
-In a prior case Sadique (No 1), the Court of Appeal held that under s46 SCA 2007 D must believe that a specific, identified offence will be committed and that each offence which his act is capable of assisting or encouraging must be charged as a separate count in the indictment.
-D appealed on the basis that he should be charged under s45 instead for separate offences of assisting the supply of class A drugs and assisting the supplying of class B drugs , the indictment under s46 was duplicitous (containing more than one offence) and uncertain.
-CA dismissed appeal; the indictment was not impermissible for duplicity.
Lord Judge CJ:
-“The 2007 Act created three distinct offences. It is not open to the court to set one or other of them aside and the legislation must be interpreted to give effect to the creation by statute of the three offences.” [30].
-S46 is an independent offence that reflects the ‘practical reality’ that a defendant may believe that his conduct will assist the commission of a variety of offences by another without knowing or being able to identify the precise offence which will be committed. [31].
-The ingredients of s46 SCA 2007 underline that an indictment charging s46 SCA 2007 by reference to one or more offences is permissible. [34].
Commentary:
-Sadique (No 1) was roundly criticised by academics for effectively rendering s46 redundant and a duplicate of s45.
-Graham Virgo, commented in “Enough is Enough” Archbold Review, Issue 3, 12 April 2013: “Since each contemplated offence must now be charged as a separate count, the defendant can only be convicted if he or she believed that a specific offence would be committed; that is the same as the conditions for conviction under section 45. It follows that a defendant who contemplates a number of offences being committed but does not believe any specific crime would be committed, cannot be guilty of assisting or encouraging an offence. That is an unfortunate restriction on the ambit of liability and will cause problems in future.”

Question 34

Serious Crime Act 2007 - MR requirements - D. Omerod and R. Forston, ‘Serious Crime Act 2007: The Part 2 Offences’ [2009]

Answer 34

> Intention:
-“There is a further problem with the specific definition in relation so s. 44. Because purposive intent is required here, but not commonly elsewhere in the criminal law (where oblique intent will usually suffice), jurors will be faced with 2 definitions of the same word in many cases to which s. 44 applies, for example at the joint trial of D & P where D assisted by supplying the gun for P to murder V.”
Belief:
-“Belief is an MR concept which has given rise to difficulty in interpretation throughout the criminal law and its boundaries remain ambiguous, lying as it does between the equally vague concepts of suspicion and knowledge. No definition of ‘belief’ is attempted in the Act. It seems safe to assume that ‘belief’ constitutes a state of subjective awareness short of knowledge, but greater than mere suspicion…”
-“Whether the courts will be prepared to dilute the meaning of belief in the context of the present offences is unclear. It is submitted that the offences are already broad enough, and that the principle of construing criminal statutes narrowly ought to apply.”
-“There is a further, crucial limb of the MR of each of the 3 offences under Pt 2 and this, in ordinary language, concerns D’s state of mind in relation to what he anticipates P will do and with what state of mind.”
-“In relation to all 3 offences, the MR is satisfied by D’s belief that P will act in a certain way.