MOM- substance dualism Flashcards
25 mark plan:
assess substance dualism
intro: substance dualism false
define: substance dualism
argument 1: descartes conceivability argument
response: masked man fallacy
argument2: descartes divisibility argument
response: mind is divisible (multiple personality disorder)
response2: even if mind is indivisible doesn’t mean its non-physical
argument against: conceptual interaction problem
conclusion: both conceivability + divisibility arguments fail. conceptual interaction problem shows SD is false!
what are the two different kinds of substance in our universe according to substance dualists
Mental substances
physical substances
what are some examples of physical substances
trees, cars, houses, the body, the brain
is the mind considered a psychical substance?
no non-psychical dualist argue the mind is completely different substance to the brain.
what are Descartes two arguments for substance dualism?
conceivability argument
divisibility argument
what is Descartes divisibility argument summarised?
-I have a clear + distinct idea of my mind as a thinking thing that is not extended in space.
-I have a clear + distinct idea of my body as a non-thinking thing that is extended in space.
-anything I can conceive of clearly + distinctly is something that god could create.
-so, God could create my mind as a thinking thing that is not extended in space + my body as a non-thinking thing that is extended in space.
-so, it is possible for my mind + body to exist indecently of each other
-so, mind + body r two separate substances.
what is Descartes overall saying in his conceivability argument?
it is conceivable and therefore possible for mind + body to exist separately.
what are the responses to the conceivability argument (list them)
-mind without body is not concievable
-what is conceivable may not be possible
-what is possible tells us nothing about the actual world.
response: mind without body is not conceivable summarised
-behaviourism says that to have mental states is to have behavioural dispositions
-to have behavioural dispositions is to be disposed to move your body in certain ways
-it is inconceivable to be disposed to move your body in certain ways if you don’t have a body.
-so, it is inconceivable to have mental states if you don’t have a body
-so, mind without body is inconceivable.
what’s a possible response to mind without body is not conceivable
assumes that behaviourism is the correct account of the mind. If behaviourism is wrong then there is no contradiction in the idea of mental states without behavioural dispositions + so we can conceive of disembodied thoughts
what does the what is conceivable may not be possible point out
it attacks Descartes inference from the claim the mind without body is conceivable to the conclusion that mind exists without body.
example to support:
1. I conceive of batman as a caped crusader
2. I conceive of bruce Wayne as a billionaire who is not a caped crusader
3. Therefore, batman is not bruce Wayne
conclusion clearly false: batman IS bruce Wayne
Fall for masked man fallacy
explain why the conceivability argument is fallacious
because it switches from talking about ideas to talking about things themselves. sometimes our ideas are mistaken - what we have an idea of as possible is in fact not possible.
In relation to batman example:
-just because you have an idea of batman + bruce Wayne as separate people.
-similary just because you have an idea that the mind + body r separate, this doesnt mean its possible they r separate things.
what’s a possible response to masked man fallacy (response to conceivability argument)
Descartes would accept you can’t always infer from ideas to reality. But D there’s an important difference between two examples.
-batman example my ideas r not clear + distinct.
D would claim reflecting on the proposition “my mind is a thinking thing that is not extended in space” reveals it is true, whereas this is not the case with the proposition “Bruce Wayne is a billionaire who is not a caped crusader”.
what’s a Clear and distinct idea
from epistemology
Is one that the thinker can see is true through the use of rational intuition- the thinker can see it is true and certain.
response to conceivability: what is possible tells us nothing about the real world.
even if we accept the mind without body is possible, we can still reject D conclusion that substance dualism is true. just because something is possible this doesn’t tell us anything about reality.
example: it is logically possible for me to jump onto moon from earth, this definitely doesn’t tell us anything about the actual world!
similar to D conceivability A: even if its possible that my mind + body are separate substances, this doesn’t show that my mind + body are separate substances in reality. its equally possible that my mind + body are the same substance
what is the divisibility argument summarised:
- my body is a divisible substance
- my mind is an indivisible substance.
- therefore, my mind + body are separate substances
4th implied premise: Lebiniz law of indiscernibility of identicals.
what’s leibiniz law of indiscernibility of identicals
lebinz law says that if 2 things are the same thing then they will have all the same properties. for example, water has the same property of wetness + so does H20, because water + H20 are the same thing.
the converse of lebniz law is also true: is two things have different properties then they can’t be the same thing. For example: “that guy can’t be jones because that guy has black hair + jones is blonde” in this jones has the property of having blond hair but “that guy” has the property of black. so that guy and jones can’t be the same person.
list all the responses to the divisibility argument
- the mind is divisible
- not everything that is psysical is divisible
not everything that is physical is divisible
(divisibility response)
Even if the mind is indivisible doesn’t necessarily prove Descartes conclusion: the mind is a separate kind of substance. instead- its possible the mind is just an indivisible type of physical substance.
obviously can divide the body e.g. cutting leg off. but if you keep dividing it you’ll reach a point where u cannot divide it any further. eventually you’ll be left with just atoms. these could be divided into sub-atomic particles but it’ll eventually be indivisible.
OVERALL POINT: if its possible to reach a point where physical matter becomes Indivisble then not everything that is indivisible is non-physical. so even if Descartes shows that the mind is indivisible, this doesn’t prove that the mind is non-physical. instead possible same substance of the body but just an indivisible form of that same substance.
response to divisibility argument;
The mind is divisible
rejects the 2nd premise
1st example: there r forms of MENTAL ILLNESS where the mind does literally seem divided e.g. multiple personality disorder. In this case one person can have multiple parts of their mind that seem to be completely separate from another. may have completely different memories, beliefs + personality traits. these parts may be completely unaware of the other parts.
2nd example: CORPUS CALLOSOTOMY. potential side effects, mind becomes divided in some way. split-brain patients suggest the left + right hemisphere can have differing personalities, tastes, beliefs.
these examples suggest the mind is divisible in some sense + so the 2nd premise of D argument appear to be false.
what’s a possible response to the claim the mind is divisible
(divisibility response)
dualist can respond that even if the mind is in some sense divisible it is not divisible in the same way as the body. the physical body is spatially divisible e.g. you can cut off a finger + move it to a different spatial location. however the mind is not different locations. instead, you could say that the examples of divided minds above examples of minds being functionally divisible.
list all the responses to substance dualism in general
-the problem of other minds
-causal interaction version 1 + 2
what is the problem of other minds
the problem of how can we know other people have minds - similar to issue of solipsism.
We have experienced our own minds- our own thoughts, sensations + feelings. But other people, we have never experienced their actual minds. we only experience the behaviour of their psychical body. Raises the question of how to know whether there is a mind “attached” to that body at all.
partially difficult for substance dualism to respond to the problem of other minds because substance dualism claims mind + bodies are completely separate substances. Means- its possible on dualist view to have physical behaviour without a physical mind. SO if dualism is true its impossible to know wether other mind exist.
Who gives the 1st response to the problem of other minds?
JOHN STUART MILL
