MOM- physicalist theories BEHAVIOURISM Flashcards
25 mark plan:
mental states r nothing more than behavioural dispositions
intro: behavioursism is wrong
define: behaviourism + behavioural dispositions
argument against: philosophical zombies
response: ryle cateogory mistake (Oxford uni example + aliens)
response to response: super Spartans
argument against2: asymmetry between self knowledge and others.
response: ryle asymmetry is an illusion
response to response: knowledge argument (quaila)
conclusion: mental states and behavioural dispositions r not the same thing (list all the arguments). so behaviourism is wrong.
behaviorism meaning
mental states: pain, pleasure, sad, happy etc means behaviors and behavioral dispositions.
other words- “pain” is just the outward behavioral manifestations- subject is the inner component (e.g. qualia) is irrelevant to the meaning of the word “pain” is.
For behaviorist to be in pain is to wince, say “ouch!”, try to get away from the source. “pain just means displaying behaviors or having behavioral dispositions.
whats hard behaviorism
All propositions about mental states can be analytically reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about behaviors.
says words used to describe the mind are the same as words used to describe behavior: the mind is nothing more than actual behavior. If you describe all behavior you have described the mind.
(all mental states of behaviour will always happen e.g. u will always display the dispositon)
whats soft behaviorism
propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioral dispositions.
emphasizes the role of behavioral dispositions.
whats Ryles argument called and which side is he arguing for
THE CONCEPT OF MIND
arguing for soft behaviorism
General arguments against dualism: Ryle
starts with critism of dualism: problem of other minds + causational interaction.
Gives new argument: if dualism was true, mental concept would be impossible to use.
Consider: if dualism was true + mental states such as pain referred only to some non-physical + completely private mental state, how could you ever talking to them?
-You cant literally show whats going on in our mind, so how could I know what you mean when u say your in pain?
-If dualism were true, it would be impossible for anyone to know anything about others mental states because there would be no way of seeing or otherwise experiencing their minds and mental states.
whats an objection to behaviorism
mental states but not display behavior
whats the objection can have mental states but not display behavior
- you can have mental state but not display any behavior.
example: can be in pain but hide the behavior- perhaps dont want to look weak. similar, can pretend to be in pain when your not e.g. football player.
whats a disposition
is how something will or likely to behave in certain circumstances.
example: wine glass has disposition to break when dropped on hard surface. Wine glass has this disposition to break even when it hasnt been dropped + is in perfect condition- hypothetically, if you dropped the glass it would break.
Are behavioral dispositions hypothetical?
likewise, someone in the mental state of pain will have a disposition to say “ouch!”- even if they dont actually do so in every instance. Behavioural dispositions are thus hypothetical behaviors as well as actual behaviors. There is an infinite list of hypothtical actions utterance and behaviors that make up being in pain.
example: if you asked someone who stubbed their toe “did that hurt?” they would answer “Yes”. the person has this disposition even if you never actually ask them.
whats ryled argument called
category mistake
whats Ryles category mistake
to think mental states are distinct from their association behaiours is make a category mistake.
whats Ryles example in his category mistake
- someone wants to know what Oxford university is
- So you show them the libary, the lecture theatures, the teachers, the students ect.
-After the tour is over, the person says: “ok, youve shown methe lecture theatures and the teachers and so on, but what is Oxford university?”
To ask such question is to make a category mistake: Oxford university isnt anything over and above the buildings + people ect. that make it up. Theres no one single thing you can point to and go: “that is oxford university”.
Ryles category mistake example linked to daulism
compared with Oxford example
-argue dualists make same sort of category mistake when talking abt mental states. MS are nothing over + above behaviours + behavioural dispositions.
EXAMPLE:
-an alien comes down + wants to know what the mental state of pain is
-So you show the alien people stubbing their toes, being touched, wincing, saying “ouch!” + so on
-after showing the alien these examples of pain, it asks: “ok, you’ve shown me all these people being touched + so on, but hats pain?”
in the same way showing someone all the things of Oxford to show them what Oxford uni is, R argues showing someone various behavioural dispositions associated with pain is to show them what the mental sate of pain is. there is nothing you can show someone over + above these examples of behaviours - no single thing you can point to + say “that is pain”.
It is a category mistake to assume otherwise.
what’s the arguments against behaviourism
-Asymmetry between the self and other knowledge
-super spartans
-zombies
conceivability argument
multiple realisability