MOM- physicalist theories BEHAVIOURISM Flashcards
25 mark plan:
mental states r nothing more than behavioural dispositions
intro: behavioursism is wrong
define: behaviourism + behavioural dispositions
argument against: philosophical zombies
response: ryle cateogory mistake (Oxford uni example + aliens)
response to response: super Spartans
argument against2: asymmetry between self knowledge and others.
response: ryle asymmetry is an illusion
response to response: knowledge argument (quaila)
conclusion: mental states and behavioural dispositions r not the same thing (list all the arguments). so behaviourism is wrong.
behaviorism meaning
mental states: pain, pleasure, sad, happy etc means behaviors and behavioral dispositions.
other words- “pain” is just the outward behavioral manifestations- subject is the inner component (e.g. qualia) is irrelevant to the meaning of the word “pain” is.
For behaviorist to be in pain is to wince, say “ouch!”, try to get away from the source. “pain just means displaying behaviors or having behavioral dispositions.
whats hard behaviorism
All propositions about mental states can be analytically reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about behaviors.
says words used to describe the mind are the same as words used to describe behavior: the mind is nothing more than actual behavior. If you describe all behavior you have described the mind.
(all mental states of behaviour will always happen e.g. u will always display the dispositon)
whats soft behaviorism
propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioral dispositions.
emphasizes the role of behavioral dispositions.
whats Ryles argument called and which side is he arguing for
THE CONCEPT OF MIND
arguing for soft behaviorism
General arguments against dualism: Ryle
starts with critism of dualism: problem of other minds + causational interaction.
Gives new argument: if dualism was true, mental concept would be impossible to use.
Consider: if dualism was true + mental states such as pain referred only to some non-physical + completely private mental state, how could you ever talking to them?
-You cant literally show whats going on in our mind, so how could I know what you mean when u say your in pain?
-If dualism were true, it would be impossible for anyone to know anything about others mental states because there would be no way of seeing or otherwise experiencing their minds and mental states.
whats an objection to behaviorism
mental states but not display behavior
whats the objection can have mental states but not display behavior
- you can have mental state but not display any behavior.
example: can be in pain but hide the behavior- perhaps dont want to look weak. similar, can pretend to be in pain when your not e.g. football player.
whats a disposition
is how something will or likely to behave in certain circumstances.
example: wine glass has disposition to break when dropped on hard surface. Wine glass has this disposition to break even when it hasnt been dropped + is in perfect condition- hypothetically, if you dropped the glass it would break.
Are behavioral dispositions hypothetical?
likewise, someone in the mental state of pain will have a disposition to say “ouch!”- even if they dont actually do so in every instance. Behavioural dispositions are thus hypothetical behaviors as well as actual behaviors. There is an infinite list of hypothtical actions utterance and behaviors that make up being in pain.
example: if you asked someone who stubbed their toe “did that hurt?” they would answer “Yes”. the person has this disposition even if you never actually ask them.
whats ryled argument called
category mistake
whats Ryles category mistake
to think mental states are distinct from their association behaiours is make a category mistake.
whats Ryles example in his category mistake
- someone wants to know what Oxford university is
- So you show them the libary, the lecture theatures, the teachers, the students ect.
-After the tour is over, the person says: “ok, youve shown methe lecture theatures and the teachers and so on, but what is Oxford university?”
To ask such question is to make a category mistake: Oxford university isnt anything over and above the buildings + people ect. that make it up. Theres no one single thing you can point to and go: “that is oxford university”.
Ryles category mistake example linked to daulism
compared with Oxford example
-argue dualists make same sort of category mistake when talking abt mental states. MS are nothing over + above behaviours + behavioural dispositions.
EXAMPLE:
-an alien comes down + wants to know what the mental state of pain is
-So you show the alien people stubbing their toes, being touched, wincing, saying “ouch!” + so on
-after showing the alien these examples of pain, it asks: “ok, you’ve shown me all these people being touched + so on, but hats pain?”
in the same way showing someone all the things of Oxford to show them what Oxford uni is, R argues showing someone various behavioural dispositions associated with pain is to show them what the mental sate of pain is. there is nothing you can show someone over + above these examples of behaviours - no single thing you can point to + say “that is pain”.
It is a category mistake to assume otherwise.
what’s the arguments against behaviourism
-Asymmetry between the self and other knowledge
-super spartans
-zombies
conceivability argument
multiple realisability
what was the issue asymmetry between the self and other knowledge out forward?
-behaviourism analysis of mental states works well for understanding other peoples mental states, but it doesn’t appear to work in the case of self-knowledge.
Asymmetry of the self and other knowledge:
what’s Knowledge of my own mental states is direct?
:when I stub my toe, I have direct access to the feeling of pain It produces. but if I see someone else do the same thing I have to INFER the fact there in pain from their behaviour - so my knowledge of their mental state is indirect.
asymmetry of the self and other knowledge:
I cannot be mistaken about my own mental states:
:when I feel pain theres no way I could be mistaken as to what im feeling - I can’t think im in pain and then realise im not. however, if I see someone else scream “ouch!”, I might mistakenly form the belief that they’re in pain only to find out they were acting and not in pain at all. so, I can be mistaken about other peoples mental states but not my own
what’s the asymmetry between the self and other knowledge in argument form
- behaviourism seems to rule out any asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of other peoples mental states
- but there clearly is an asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of other peoples mental states.
c. so, behaviourism must be false.
who devised the super spartan argument
Hilary Putnam
what’s the super spartans arguments in short
- behaviourism says to be in pain is to have a disposition to behave in certain ways.
- supersparatans can be in pain but do not have a disposition to behave in those ways.
- so, pain is not the same thing as behavioural dispositions
c. so, behaviourism is false
what’s the zombie argument against behaviourism
-opposite of super spartans
-where Spartan has quail but not behaviour zombie other way round.
-if zombies r possible then the behavioural disposition of pain is separate from the mental state of pain. and if the behavioural disposition can be separate from the mental state then behaiourism is false.
what’s the conceivability argument against behaviourism
(argument structure)
- mental states without behavioural dispositions r conceivable (e.g. super sparatans)
- so, mental states without behavioural dispositions r possible.
- so, mental states r not behavioural dispositions
c. so, behaviourism is false.
what problem with behaviourism does the multiple realisability point out
behaviourism identifies mental states with behavioural dispositions. but in the same mental state can be realised thru multiple behaviours depending on other mental states, which also need to be identified with the behavioural dispositions.
This process leads to an endless cycle such that behaviourism can never give a proper account of what mental states are.
multiple realisability in argument structure
- behaviourism says mental states should be understood as behavioural dispositions.
- so, if behaviourism is correct, different mental states r different behavioural dispositions.
- but each mental state can be realised by any behaviour (depending on other mental states)
- and those other mental states can also be realised by any behaviour.
c. this makes it impossible to understand mental states such as behavioural dispositions because any mental state could be realised by any behaviour and vice versa.
multiple realisability example for their argument
mental state: being thirsty
-behaviourism would say this MS is the same as having a behavioural disposition to drink a drink if it was infront of u.
BUT not always the case.
-the person might be thirsty + yet not drink the drink because they have the mental state of believing that drink is poisoned.
what’s the circularity argument against behaviourism
- extension of multiple realisability argument
-process of anaylsing mental states in terms of behaviour becomes circular.
simple example:
- to be in pain is to be disposed to say “ouch!”
-but you won’t say “ouch” if you have a desire to not look like a wimp
-to have a desire to not look like a wimp is to be disposed to hide when you r in pain.
