MOM- physicalism type identity theory

Question 1

25 mark plan:
do mental states ontologically reduce to brain states?

Answer 1

intro: type identity theory is wrong
define: type identity theory, ontoligcal reductions, c-fibres

argument for: ockhams razor

response:this argument can support all physicalist definitions of mind not just type identity theory

argument against: descartes divisibility argument

response: mind is divisible (multiple personality disorder or corpus callostomy)

response: location problem = cannot be the same thing

argument against: multiple reliability, octopus, an alien, dog, human all feel pain

conclusion: mental states r not identical to brain states bcos dint share all the same properties r multiply realisable. TF type identity theory is wrong.

Question 2

what does type identity theory say abt brain states

Answer 2

mental states are the same things as brain states.

Question 3

what does it mean when philosophers illustrate brain state is c-fibers?

Answer 3

to say someones c-fibers r firing is just a technical shorthand for the brain state associated with pain. SO, type identity theorists would say pain is the same thing as c-fibers firing.

Question 4

3 things type identity theory would say

Answer 4

-the mind is the Brain
-mental states r Brain states
-pain is c-fibers firing

Question 5

what was JJC smart’s argument

Answer 5

sensations and brain processes
ontological reduction/ contingent identity

Question 6

what does JJC claim

Answer 6

claims that mental states and brain states r contingently identical.
=mental states ontologically reduce to brain states.

examples of ontological reductions/contingently identical things r:
water us H20
lightning is electrical discharge
these relationships r not merely correlations they’re the same thing. according to type identity theory its the same story with pain + c-fibers - they’re the same thing.

Question 7

ockhams razor (against dualism)

Answer 7

-smarts main argument for type identity theory.