MOM- property dualism Flashcards
25 mark plan:
assess property dualism
intro: property dualism false
define: qualia, supervient, property dualism
argument1: philosophical zombies
response: zombies not metaphysically possible (H30)
argument2: knowledge argument (Marys room)
response: Marys new knowledge is ability knowledge
response to response: someone could lack these abilities but still know what its like to see colour.
response2: Marys new knowledge is acquantance knowledge
conclusion: both zombie argument + Marys argument fail to prove property dualism is true.
what’s a definition of property dualism
there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.
= even if two things had exactly the same physical properties they wouldn’t necessarily have the same mental properties.
property dualists in relation to qualia explain
property dualists believe that non-physical properties. these physical properties are mental properties known as qualia. so property dualism says that brains can have non-physical properties called qualia.
what is qualia?
are subjective qualities of experience e.g. pain, taste, beauty
qualia is not properties of the objects themselves. they are properties of my experience of those objects of those objects.
knowledge of qualia called phenomenal knowledge.
what is supervenience
is relationship between two kinds of thing. if something supervenes on something else then it is dependent on that thing.
what’s physicalism view on supervenience
says that everything - including the mind + mental states is either physical or supervenes on the physical.
other words- two physically identical things must be the same in every way:its impossible for two physically indentical things to be different.
what’s property dualism view on supervenience
its impossible for two physically indentical things be different in some way. more specifically property dualism says its possible that two physically identical things could have different mental properties different to qualia.
so- qualia are neither physical nor supervenes on the physical.
what is interactionist dualism?
says the mind can interact with the physical world (e.g mental state of hunger causes you to go get food) + the physical world can interact with the mind (e.g. getting hit in the head causes the mental state of pain).
other words- the mental + physical can interact in both directions.
what is epiphenomenalist dualism?
says the physical world can cause mental states (E.G. getting hit in the head causes mental state if pain) but mental states cannot cause changes in the physical world.
other words- physical + mental only interact in one direction: physical to mental.
what is epiphenomenalist a type of?
property dualism
who created the zombie argument for property dualism?
David Chalmers
what is a philosophical zombie?
is a person who is physically, functionally + behaviourally identical to an ordinary human- except they don’t have any qualia.
for example: zombie will say ‘ouch!’ when it gets stabbed + its physical brain will light up + fire the exact same way a normal brain would but their isn’t any pain qualia associated with this.
externally = zombie identical
internally= there is nothing, no qualia
argument for zombies being conceivable for substance dualism
P1. philosophical zombies are conceivable
P2. if philosophical zombies are conceivable then philosophical zombies are possible.
P3. if philosophical zombies are possible then qualia are non-physical (and do not supervene on the physical)
P4. if qualia are non-physical (and don’t supervene on the physical) then property dualism is true.
C. therefore property dualism is true.
just because zombies are possible, why does this automatically mean property dualism is true?
answer to do with supervenience: psychalism claims everything is either physical or superviene on the physical. so, if P is true then its not possible for something to be physically identical but somehow different. However the possibility of a philosophical zombie challenges this claim: implies qualia somehow not supervenient on the physical.
list all the responses to the zombie argument
-zombies are not conceivable
-zombies are metaphysically impossible
-what is possible tells us nothing about the actual world.
what is the response zombies are not conceivable
rejects 1st premise: zombies are concievable.
reason why they seem conceivable: were labouring under false illusion that qualia are non-physical things. but qualia is just physical things.
then it becomes inconceivable to imagine a physically identical being that lacks these physical features.
= identical philosophical zombie is a contradiction + contradictions aren’t conceivable.
TF- once we understand that qualia is just a physical thing, it becomes inconceivable for two physically identical beings not to have identical qualia, and so the zombie argument fails to prove property dualism.
criticism to claim zombies are not concievable
assumes that if we did have all physical facts, we would understand that qualia is in separable from certain physical things + thus that philosophical zombies are inconceivable.
what is the 2nd response: zombies are metaphysically impossible
challenges premise 2: ‘just because something is conceivable or logically possible, this doesn’t mean its metaphysically possible’
EXAMPLE: water is H30 is not contradictory in the same way a triangle has 4 sides is. water is H20 not an analytic truth so we can imagine water without imagining chemical structure H20. but can’t imagine 4 sided triangle because triangle has 3 sides is analytic truth. SO “water is H30” suggests is somehow possible.
BUT we reject water is H30 because H20 is essential property of water. H30 would be something else entirely.
APPLIED: qualia is essential property of physical things, then its not metaphysically possible for the same physical thing to have different qualia. A physical duplicate without qualia (i.e. philosophical zombie) is metaphysically impossible. so philosophical zombies r metaphysically impossible.
criticism to claim that zombies are metaphysically impossible
property dualist rejects analogy between water and qualia.
-the physical structure H20 is essential to what water is + so it is metaphysically impossible to have water without H20.
-but the physical structure is not essential to what qualia is, so it is metaphysically possible to have qualia without the physical structure + the physical structure without the qualia (i.e. philosophical zombie)
response 3: what is possible tells us nothing about the actual world
rejects premise 3: ‘even if we allow that zombies are metaphysically possible, this still doesn’t prove that qualia are actually non-physical in the actual world.’
jumping onto the moon from earth is metaphysically possible, but doesn’t prove people can do this. so likewise even if its possible that qualia are non-physical this doesn’t show that qualia are actually non-physical. so even if zombies are possible this doesn’t necessarily show that property dualism is true- just shows property dualism is possible.
possible response to claim what is possible tells us nothing about the actual world
