Mind: Basics Flashcards
What is Qualia?
- ‘intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible’
-Qualia are the way that a mental state feels. Being angry feels different to being sad, experiencing red feels different to experiencing blue - these are differences in qualia. We know about these differences by ‘looking in’ to our mind.
What is intentionality?
A mental state has intentionality if it is about something. For example my belief that it is raining now is about the current rain. My love of my pet rabbit is about (related to) my pet rabbit.
What is substance dualism?
-Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.
-Minds exist and are not part of the physical world
What is the indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes)?
Minds cannot be divided into parts, but physical things can. Therefore minds are not physical things.
What is the issue of the indivisibility argument that the mental is divisible in some sense?
Minds can be divided up into parts memory perception emotions etc
What is the issue of the indivisibility argument that not everything thought of as physical is divisible?
Not all physical things can be divided into parts
What is the conceivability argument for substance dualism?
I can make sense of my mind existing even if there was nothing physical at all. Therefore, my mind isn’t physical.
What is the issue of the conceivability argument that the mind without body is not conceivable?
No you can’t make sense of your mind existing if there was nothing physical at all
What is the issue of the conceivability argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible?
Just because it makes sense, it doesn’t mean that it’s actually possible
What is the issue of the conceivability argument that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world?
It’s possible but that doesn’t mean it is actually true
What is property dualism?
There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties
There are two kinds of properties - physical properties and mental properties (e.g. qualia)
What is the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism?
Something could be physically the same as me but have no qualia (see above). This means that qualia must be non-physical
What is the issue to the philosophical zombie argument that a ‘philosophical zombie’/a ‘zombie’ world is not conceivable?
I can’t make any sense of something being physically the same as me but not having qualia
What is the issue to the philosophical zombie argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible?
Even if I can make any sense of something being physically the same as me but not having qualia, this doesn’t mean that could actually happen
What is the issue to the philosophical zombie argument that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world?
Even if something could be physically the same as me but not have qualia, that doesn’t mean it can happen here in this reality
What is the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism?
Mary can know all the truths about the physical but not know what it feels like to see red. So what it feels like to see red (the qualia) must be a truth about something non-physical
What is the issue with the Mary argument that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge (the ‘ability knowledge’ response)?
When Mary is let out of the room, all that happens is that she learns how to do things (e.g. how to sort red from blue objects), but she doesn’t learn any new truths. So she doesn’t learn a truth about something non-physical
What is the issue with the Mary argument that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge (the ‘acquaintance knowledge’ response)?
When Mary is let out of the room, all that happens is that she comes into contact with red for the first time (she ‘meets’ red), but she doesn’t learn any new truths. So she doesn’t learn a truth about something non-physical
What is the issue with the Mary argument that Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way (the ‘New Knowledge / Old Fact’ response)?
When Mary is let out of the room, all that happens is that she gains a new way of thinking about her physical brain, but she doesn’t learn any new truths. So she doesn’t learn a truth about something non-physical
What is the argument from analogy response to the problem of minds?
They probably have minds because they behave similarly to me in similar situations and I know that I have a mind
What is the problem of other minds issue facing dualism?
If dualism is true then I can’t verify that other people have minds. So I can’t know that they do
What is the existence of other minds is the best hypothesi response to the problem of minds?
It just makes sense to say they have minds because it is likely that something is causing their behaviour
What is the Dualism makes a “category mistake” issue facing dualism?
Thinking that the mind is a separate ‘thing’ to the body is to think about the mind in the wrong way. Just like it would be wrong to be shown all the lecture halls and classrooms and students at the college etc. and then to think of ‘the college’ as being a separate thing that hadn’t been seen yet and ask ‘but where’s the college?’
What is Interactionist dualism?
The mind and the body can both affect each other
What is the conceptual interaction problem (as articulated by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia) facing interactionist dualism?
It’s inconceivable/impossible for something non-physical (like the mind) to affect something physical (like the body)
What is the empirical interaction problem facing interactionist dualism?
It’s unlikely that something non-physical (like the mind) could affect something physical (like the body). It would break laws of physics
What is Epiphenomenalist dualism?
The body/brain causes the mind, but the mind can’t cause anything to happen
What is the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge facing epiphenomenalist dualism?
If the mind could not affect anything, then I couldn’t know anything about my mind as this knowledge would be an effect. But I can know about my mind (e.g. I know I’m in pain), so the mind must be able to affect the body
What is the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life facing epiphenomenalist dualism?
It’s obvious from my experience that the mind can affect the body e.g. the mental state of wanting to go for a walk can cause me to go to for a walk
What is the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution facing epiphenomenalist dualism?
Evolution means we only have qualities that are useful for our survival. If mental states don’t cause anything physical, they would not be useful for our survival and so we would not have them. We have them, so they must be useful, so they must be able to affect our physical bodies
What is Physicalism?
Everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events, objects and any substance(s) that exist)
Everything is physical
What is hard behaviourism?
All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/ movements
When we talk about mental states, what we are talking about is behaviour. For example, saying someone is in pain is the same as saying that they are wincing, crying, calling a doctor etc. etc. These different ways of talking have the same meaning
What is soft behaviourism?
Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language)
When we talk about mental states, what we are talking about is how someone will probably behave. For example, saying that someone understands French is the same as saying that they will respond in French to questions in French, they will be able to understand which platform their train is on in a French train station etc
What is the dualist argument applied to philosophical behaviourism?
If the mind is non-physical (as arguments for dualism prove) then when we talk about someone’s mind, we can’t be talking about their physical behaviour
What is the distinctness of mental states from behaviour facing philosophical behaviourism?
Someone can have a mental state without showing this in their behaviour (e.g. they can feel pain without showing it - spartans) and vice versa (i.e. they can behave as if they feel pain when they don’t - perfect actors). This means that when we talk about someone’s mind, we can’t be talking about their physical behaviour
What is the issue defining mental states satisfactorily due to circularity facing philosophical behaviourism?
When you explain how someone will behave when they have a mental state, you will have to mention their other mental states. For example, someone who is in pain (mental state) will cry but only if they aren’t in shock (mental state)
What is the issue of the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour facing philosophical behaviourism?
People could do almost anything when they are in pain (stay still, cry, run, shout, keel over etc. etc.). Same for all mental states. This means that when we talk about someone’s mental states, we can’t be saying anything specific about their physical behaviour
What is the issue of the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states facing philosophical behaviourism?
If behaviourism was true, I would know other people’s mental states just as well as I know my own mental states. But I know my own mental states better than I know other people’s mental states. So behaviourism can’t be true
What is mind brain type identity theory?
All mental states are identical to brain states (‘ontological’ reduction) although ‘mental state’ and ‘brain state’ are not synonymous (so not an ‘analytic’ reduction)
The mind and the brain are the same thing, but the words ‘mind’ and ‘brain’ don’t mean the same thing
What is the issue of dualist arguments applied to mind-brain type identity theory?
Using indivisibility/conceivability/zombie/mary argument to show that the mind is not the physical brain
What is the issue with providing the type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states) facing mind brain type identity theory?
Different things without human brains can have the same mental state, so mental states can’t be identified with a particular human brain state e.g. parrots and whales can be in pain, so the mental state pain can’t be identical to something in the human brain
What is folk psychology?
‘Folk psychology’ assumes we have mental states like beliefs and feelings, and these explain our actions.
According to eliminative materialists, the idea that we have mental states is wrong - mental states like beliefs and feelings don’t really exist
What is the issue of our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations against eliminative materialism?
We are so certain that we have mental states that any theory which says we don’t must be wrong
What is the issue of folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis) against eliminative materialism?
Folk psychology is good at explaining and predicting how people behave, so it’s likely that it’s true - we really do have mental states
What is the issue of the articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting against eliminative materialism?
Eliminative materialists have the belief that there are no such things as beliefs. This is self-contradictory, so the theory must be wrong
What is functionalism?
All mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised
What makes something a mental state is the role it plays, not what it is made from. For example, anything that is caused by injury and causes you to seek to repair the injury is ‘pain’
What is the issue against functionalism that is the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia)?
What makes something a mental state is not the role it plays, because two mental states can have the same role but still be different because they feel different
What is the issue against functionalism that is the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia?
What makes something a mental state is not the role it plays, because two mental states can have the same role but one feels a certain way and the other doesn’t feel any way at all
What is the issue against functionalism that is the the ‘knowledge’/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts (no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia)?
What makes something a mental state is not the role it plays, because even if Mary knows all about the role a mental state plays she still does not know everything about that mental state (she doesn’t know how it feels)
