MIND: Arguments for property Dualism Flashcards
What is the gist for property dualism?
Mental states don’t exist, but mental properties do.
What are the main claims for property dualism?
Claims that mental substances don’t exist.
Claims that mental (non-physical) properties exist.
Consciousness and it’s properties of ‘qualia’ and ‘intentionality’ , prove that non-physical properties exist.
Mental states are non-physical properties of the physical body.
What is the aim of the Jackson’s ‘knowledge’ (Mary) argument?
To establish that conscious experience involves non-physical phenomenal properties (qualia), this follows property dualism.
What type of argument is the Jackson’s ‘knowledge’ (Mary) argument?
This argument comes under the metaphysics of the mind and contradicts physicalism, ( the belief that the mind is purely physical.
A deductive argument - the validity of the conclusion is dependent on the truth of the premises.
A posteriori as Mary learns phenomenal properties through experience.
What is the Jackson’s ‘knowledge’ (Mary) argument? (In standard form)
P1: Mary has propositional knowledge of all physical facts.
She has knowledge of the truths of all physical facts.
P2: After seeing red for the first time Mary gains propositional knowledge of a new phenomenal fact.
She knows that redness is ‘like this’ because she has experienced red. She has gained the propositional knowledge that it produces certain qualia, (introspectively accessible subjective features of mental states).
C1: Therefore, there are some facts that are not physical facts.
P3: Non-physical facts must be about non-physical properties.
C2: Therefore, there are some non-physical properties (like the phenomenal properties or the qualia).
What is further detail for the Jackson’s ‘knowledge’ (Mary) argument?
The existence of non-physical properties is the main assertion of property dualism.
The ‘knowledge’ argument rests on the claim that someone with complete physical knowledge about a conscious being could still lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experience of that being (‘the qualia’ meaning what it ‘feels like’).
What are examples for Jackson’s ‘knowledge’ (Mary) argument?
Being deaf and hearing something for the first time (ear qualia).
Acquaintance knowledge isn’t enough to know of the ‘qualia’ of something e.g. the taste of an orange.
A person never feeling an emotion but after feeling anger gaining the phenomenal property of anger.
What is Qualia?
Introspectively accessible subjective/phenomenal features of mental states (properties of ‘what it’s like’ to undergo the mental state in question).
What is the gist for The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument?
We can imagine a world without qualia, so qualia must be non-physical. Therefore, mental properties must exist.
What does Chalmers mean by a ‘philosophical zombie’?
A system that is physically identical to a conscious being but that lacks consciousness entirely.
Someone physically identical to a person but has no qualia.
What is the standard form for The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument?
P1 - A zombie world is a world that is physically identical to the actual world but in which there are no phenomenal properties (no consciousness / qualia).
P2 - A zombie world is conceivable (or imaginable).
P3 - If a zombie world is conceivable then it is metaphysically possible.
Similar to Descartes’ conceivability argument, we can conceive of it as it’s coherent.
C1 - Therefore, a zombie world is metaphysically possible.
P4 - If a zombie world is metaphysically possible then phenomenal properties can’t be the same as physical properties.
Like Descartes’ , if they can exist independently of one another then they can’t be the same. If they can exist independently they can’t be the same/must be separate.
C2 - Therefore, phenomenal properties (the qualia) cannot be (and could not be) the same as physical properties.
This means that phenomenal properties are necessarily not the same as physical properties, property dualism is true.
P5 - Physicalists / materialists claim that all properties are physical.
Both property dualists and substance dualists refute this claim.
C3 - Therefore, physicalism / materialism is false.
What is the example for for The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument?
Ted = Human
Zed = Zombie
They both drink juice.
Ted can experience the juice and says ‘It tastes good’
Zed says the same but has no qualia or way to experience this so only says this, it doesn’t feel the same contentment.
What type of argument is The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument?
A priori - the experience of metaphysical zombies are not necessary.
