EPISTEMOLOGY: Tripartite definition of knowledge (and objections) Flashcards
What is the aim of the tripartite definition of knowledge?
The tripartite definition of knowledge attempts to provide a real definition of propositional knowledge.
A real definition is based on the objective essence of something.
Propositional knowledge is knowledge of the truth of a proposition
What is the tripartite theory of knowledge? (Key points)
In order for a subject to possess propositional knowledge, they must meet the following individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions.
Necessary means each condition must be met, and sufficient means that no further conditions must be met.
P must be true
This is so the proposition must accurately reflect the actual state of affairs of reality.
S must believe that P
This is so the subject has the correct propositional attitude - that they are prepared to assent to the truth of the proposition.
S’ belief that P must be justified
Their belief in the proposition must have been properly formed - i.e. as a result of the proposition being likely to be true.
What are examples/analogies of the tripartite theory of knowledge?
The earth is a spheroid.
This is true.
It is believed (for the purpose of this example).
Belief in it can be justified.
e.g. by seeing it from space
What is the aim of The Gettier objection?
To present a counter-example, which makes the tripartite definition unsuitable.
It does this by showing an example of a justified true belief which we would not want to call knowledge, therefore showing the three conditions of the tripartite definition to be insufficient.
What is The Gettier objection (in standard form)?
P1: If knowledge is JTB then it is impossible for someone to have a JTB which is not knowledge.
If A is true then B must be true.
P2: It is possible for someone to have a JTB which is not knowledge (as in the Gettier cases).
B is false.
C: Therefore, knowledge is not JTB.
Therefore, A is false
What is the Gettier objection (example/analogy)? Case 1
Smith has strong justification for believing the following propositions:
‘Jones will get the job’
‘Jones has ten coins in his pocket’
This means that he is justified in believing the following conjunctive proposition:
‘Jones will get the job, and has ten coins in his pocket’
This is because if you are justified in believing two propositions, you can infer that the conjunction of those propositions is also true.
This entails the following proposition, and therefore he is justified in believing that:
‘The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job’
Unknown to himself, it is smith that will get the job, and he also has ten coins in his pocket.
Therefore, Smith still has a justified true belief that ‘the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job’
Because this was a justified belief, and coincidentally it has still turned out to be true.
But we would not want to call this knowledge, so JTB must not be jointly sufficient for knowledge.
This is because it is a coincidence that he has formed a justified true belief, as opposed to a justified false belief.
Which would have been the case if he had not had ten coins in his pocket.
What is the Gettier objection (example/analogy)? Case 2
Smith has a strong justification for believing the following proposition:
‘Jones owns a Ford’
Smith has no justification for the following proposition, and does not believe it:
‘Brown is in Barcelona’
Therefore, Smith is justified in believing the following disjunctive proposition:
‘Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona’
This is because the ‘or’ in this proposition is an inclusive or (an and/or), and if you are justified in believing a proposition, you can infer the disjunction of that proposition with any other.
This is because as long as one is true the whole proposition will be true, and you have justification for believing that at least one is true (in this instance, that Jones owns a Ford).
Unknown to himself, it turns out that Jones does not in fact own a Ford, and Brown is in fact in Barcelona.
Therefore Smith still has a justified true belief that ‘Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona’.
But we would not want to call this knowledge, so JTB must not be jointly sufficient for knowledge.
This is because it is a coincidence that he has formed a justified true belief, as opposed to a justified false belief.
Which would have been the case if he had said that Brown was anywhere other than Barcelona.
What type of argument is the Gettier objection?
The example is deductive. It is based on a counter-example.
This is because the relationship between the premises is such that if they are true, the truth of the conclusion is entailed with necessity.
What is the aim of the argument for the criticism that truth/justification/belief is not a necessary criteria for knowledge?
Attempts to criticise the tripartite definition of knowledge (JTB)
The tripartite definition of knowledge claims that in order to possess propositional knowledge, the following individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must be met: S must believe the proposition, S’ belief in the proposition must be justified, the proposition must be true.
This argument claims that truth/justification/belief is not an individually necessary condition for knowledge.
What is the argument (in standard form) of the criticism that truth/justification/belief is not a necessary criteria for knowledge?
P1: If justification, truth, and belief are individually necessary conditions for the possession of propositional knowledge (JTB) then it is impossible to possess knowledge without meeting all three criteria.
P2: It is possible to possess knowledge without meeting all three criteria.
C: Therefore, justification, truth, and belief are not individually necessary condition for possessing knowledge.
What is an example of the criticism that truth is not a necessary criteria for knowledge?
The example is still knowledge despite not meeting the truth condition.
A historical example can work well here: people used to know that stress caused ulcers, though we now understand this to be false.
What is an example of the criticism that Justification is not a necessary criteria for knowledge?
The example is still knowledge despite not meeting the justification condition
Someone being able to give the day of the week any date falls on, despite not being able to give any justification for how this is known.
It’s difficult to claim that someone lacks knowledge when they can state a true fact with complete certainty.
What is an example of the criticism that Belief is not a necessary criteria for knowledge?
Belief - the example is still knowledge despite not meeting the belief condition
Someone who is justified in making a (true) claims as part of a test, but lacks confidence in what they have said.
It may be possible to have propositional knowledge despite not precisely having the confidence that belief seems to imply. i.e. there might be other propositional attitudes we could conceive of (other than belief) which would be appropriate for knowledge.
What is the type of argument of the criticism that truth/justification/belief is not a necessary criteria for knowledge?
This argument is deductive, because the relationship between the premises is such that if they are true, the truth of the conclusion is entailed with necessity.
