Epistemology: Basics Flashcards
What is Direct Realism and its simplified definition?
-The immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties
-Objects exist outside the mind and we perceive them directly
What is the argument from illusion (against Direct Realism)?
Issue 1
In an illusion I’m experiencing a property (e.g. bentness) but the external object doesn’t really have that property (e.g. the pencil isn’t really bent). So I’m not directly experiencing the external object
What is the argument from perceptual variation (Russell’s table example) (against Direct Realism)?
Issue 2
The property I experience can change (e.g. the table looks a different shape depending on where I stand), but the external object does not change. So I’m not directly experiencing the external object
What is the argument from hallucination (against Direct Realism)?
Issue 3
In a hallucination I’m experiencing an object (e.g. a pink elephant) but there is no external object there (e.g. there is no pink elephant there). So I’m not directly experiencing the external object
What is the time-lag argument (against Direct Realism)?
Issue 4
Because of how long it takes for an image to reach me, I can experience an object (e.g. a distant star) after the object no longer exists (e.g. after the distant star has exploded). So I’m not directly experiencing the external object
What is Indirect Realism and its simplified definition?
-The immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects
-We never actually experience the external world. Instead we experience things within our mind and they give us information about the external world (a bit like a map of London giving information about London)
What is Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction? (Indirect Realism)
What we experience is similar to the external world in terms of properties like shape, size, speed - these are called primary qualities - e.g. my idea of squareness is caused by (and resembles) the squareness of the external object.
What we experience is different to the external world in terms of properties like colour, taste, smell - these are called secondary qualities - e.g. my idea of redness is not caused by any redness of the external object (because it has no redness)
What is the argument that it leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects (attacking ‘realism’)?
Issue 1
If this view is right and we never actually experience the external world, then we cannot know that it exists
What is Locke’s argument from the involuntary nature of our experience?
Indirect Realist response 1 to Issue 1 of Realism
We can know the external world is causing our experiences rather than them being caused by us. This is because we cannot control our experiences, which we would be able to do if we were the cause
What is the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience, as developed by Locke?
Indirect realist response 2a to Issue 1 of Realism
We can know the external world is causing our experiences. This is because all of our experiences agree with each other. This makes it likely that there is something they agree about - the external world
What is the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience, as developed by Cockburn?
Indirect realist response 2b to Issue 1 of Realism
We can know the external world is causing our experiences. This is because when changes happen with one of our senses, they happen with the others (e.g. something sounding louder and looking bigger as it gets nearer). This makes it likely that there is something ‘out there’ that is changing - something in the external world
What is Russell’s response that the external world is the ‘best hypothesis’?
Indirect realist response 3 to Issue 1 of Realism
It is more likely that there is an external world than that there is not:
(1) It explains why things change when we are not looking (e.g. a cat going from being full to being hungry)
(2) We also naturally believe there is an external world, and we have no reason to think anything else
(3) It is the simplest view
What is the argument from Berkeley, that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent objects?
Issue 2
A map of London can give information about London because they are similar enough (they are both physical things). But experiencing things within our mind cannot give us information about the physical external world because they are not similar enough (the mind is non-physical, the external world is physical). So indirect realism is false
What is Berkeley’s Idealism and its simplified definition?
-The immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind-dependent objects
-There is no external world - only ideas and minds exist
What is Argument 1 for idealism: Berkeley’s attack on the primary/secondary property distinction?
Locke argues that because colour experiences vary in a way that experiences of shape do not, that these are different types of property (colour is a secondary quality and shape is a primary quality)
Berkeley claims that shape experience also varies, and so they are the same kind of property. He thinks that they are both, therefore, in the mind
Locke argues that because you can imagine an object without taste, but not without shape, that these are different types of property (taste is a secondary quality and shape is a primary quality)
Berkeley claims that you actually can’t imagine an object without some secondary quality (e.g. colour), and so they are the same kind of property. He thinks they are both, therefore, in the mind
What is Argument 2 for idealism: Berkeley’s ‘master’ argument?
It’s impossible to think of anything without it being in your mind, so everything must exist in your mind
What are arguments from illusion and hallucination?
Issue 1 to Argument 2 of Berkeley’s Idealism
What makes an illusion or hallucination different from actually experiencing something is whether our experience matches the external world. Idealism thinks there’s no external world, so there seems to be no difference between illusions or hallucinations and actually experiencing something for idealists
What is the theory that idealism leads to solipsism?
Issue 2 to Argument 2 of Berkeley’s Idealism
Berkeley’s idealism leads to the problematic conclusion that no minds other than mine really exist
What are problems with the role played by God in Berkeley’s Idealism (including how can Berkeley claim that our ideas exist within God’s mind given that he believes that God cannot feel pain or have sensations)?
Issue 3 to Argument 2 of Berkeley’s Idealism
For Berkeley, God plays the role of always perceiving all ideas, which explains how things exist even when I am not perceiving them.
One problem with this is that our ideas are often of sense experiences e.g. I feel pain or hear birds, but Berkeley says that God, being completely different to humans, cannot have sense experience (God could not feel pain or hear birds)
What is Innatism?
There are ideas that have always been in our minds
What is the argument for innatism from Plato (ie the ‘slave boy’ argument)?
The slave boy has knowledge of a geometry rule. This can’t have come from experience as he has had no experience of this geometry rule. So this knowledge must be innate