liberalism/ neutrality Flashcards
1
Q
Perfectionist liberalism
A
also liberal perfectionism) has been defined by Charles Larmore (1987) as the “family of views that base political principles on ‘ideals claiming to shape our overall conception of the good life, and not just our role as citizens”.
2
Q
perfectionism and pluralism
A
perfectionism that can coexist with pluralism, recognizing that there might be multiple goods or values that are worth pursuing and that can contribute to human flourishing. These forms of perfectionism might prioritize certain values or virtues (such as autonomy, rationality, or self-realization) but still allow for diversity and variation in how individuals understand and pursue these values.
3
Q
role of state in liberal perfectionism
A
posits that the state should promote and facilitate not just the basic liberties and opportunities for its citizens but also certain substantive values or goods that contribute to a good or flourishing life. the state can and should go beyond merely protecting these rights. Eg promote autonomy / self-realisation etc
4
Q
liberal neutralists
A
the state should focus on securing and protecting the basic rights and liberties of its citizens without favoring or promoting any particular comprehensive doctrine or way of life.
Neutrality: between conceptions of the good- not privileging one conception of the good
5
Q
Raz overview
A
perfectionist liberal + - autonomy is necessary but not sufficient – simply having the freedom to choose does not automatically lead to morally desirable outcomes.you need enough good choices but you don’t need any bad choices – have to be autonomous and have to choose wisely to live a good life – nothing valuable in having a wrong conception of the good
6
Q
public reason
A
the set of principles and norms guiding political discourse and decision-making that aims to ensure laws and policies are justifiable to all citizens based on rational and universally accessible arguments
7
Q
monism
A
the belief or doctrine that there is only one ultimate source or principle of value or reality.
8
Q
pluralism
A
pluralism refers to the recognition and acceptance of diverse beliefs, values, lifestyles, and viewpoints within a society. Liberal pluralism emphasizes the importance of individual freedom, autonomy, and tolerance as core principle
9
Q
Political liberalism - modelling the citizen not the individual what does it mean
A
in the context of “modelling the citizen not the individual” emphasizes the importance of viewing individuals as active, engaged citizens within a democratic society rather than as isolated entities. It underscores the interconnectedness of individuals within a political community and highlights the shared rights, responsibilities, and values that unite citizens in their collective pursuit of a just and equitable society
iews citizens not just as isolated individuals but as members of a political community with shared values, interests, and obligations.
10
Q
Political liberalism - modelling the citizen not the individual- rights
A
focuses on the rights and responsibilities of citizens within a democratic society rather than merely individual rights.
- It emphasizes the importance of active citizenship, civic engagement, and participation in democratic processes.
11
Q
Political liberalism and social contract
A
- Political liberalism is often grounded in social contract theory, which posits that individuals voluntarily come together to form a society and establish a government to protect their rights and promote the common good.- citizens collectively determine the rules, laws, and institutions that govern them, rather than each individual acting solely in their own self-interest
12
Q
politcal liberalism - democracy and debate
A
- Political liberalism emphasizes the importance of public reason, rational discourse, and deliberative democracy. It encourages citizens to engage in reasoned debate, dialogue, and decision-making processes to address societal issues and make collective choices.
o This approach values inclusivity, diversity of perspectives, and mutual respect among citizens, aiming to reach consensus or compromise through democratic deliberation.
13
Q
Political liberalism and constitution
A
- Political liberalism emphasizes the rule of law, constitutionalism, and the protection of individual rights and liberties against potential abuses of state power.
- It recognizes the importance of a robust legal framework, independent judiciary, and checks and balances to safeguard citizens’ freedoms, ensure government accountability, and uphold the principles of justice and fairness.
14
Q
Rawls on justice
A
- Rawls argues that the principles of justice are concerned with the fair distribution of rights, opportunities, and resources within society.
- Justice as fairness focuses on establishing fair terms of social cooperation and determining the fundamental institutions, laws, and policies that govern the basic structure of society.
- The principles of justice aim to create a shared framework of rules and norms that ensure equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunities, and the protection of the least advantaged members of society.
15
Q
Rawls on the good
A
- Rawls acknowledges that people have different and often conflicting views about the good life, and these beliefs are deeply personal and may vary across cultures, religions, and individuals.
- Rawls contends that the principles of justice should not favour or promote any particular comprehensive conception of the good life. Instead, justice should be impartial and neutral with respect to individuals’ diverse beliefs and values.
16
Q
Rawls on neutrality
A
- emphasizes the importance of the state being neutral and impartial regarding individuals’ diverse comprehensive conceptions of the good life. This neutrality aims to respect and accommodate the pluralism and diversity of modern democratic societies.
17
Q
Rawls- overlapping consensus
A
- Rawls’ concept of an overlapping consensus seeks to find common ground and shared principles of justice among citizens with diverse moral, religious, and philosophical beliefs. It focuses on what citizens can agree upon despite their differences in comprehensive doctrines.
18
Q
Rawls- political conception of justice - what is it
A
o a moral framework designed to guide the basic institutions, laws, and policies that constitute the basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime
aims to establish a framework of justice that ensures equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunities, and the protection of the least advantaged members of society within the context of democratic governance.
o Political liberalism acknowledges and affirms certain fundamental rights and liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the right to fair trial.
It presents itself as a reasonable and impartial framework that can be endorsed by citizens with diverse moral, religious, and philosophical beliefs about the good life.
19
Q
Rawls- political conception of justice - how is it formulated
A
o it is not formulated in terms of any comprehensive doctrine but in terms of certain fundamental ideas viewed as latent in the public political culture of a democratic society.
These ideas are viewed as latent values and principles that citizens can recognize, understand, and endorse as essential elements of fair and just social cooperation.
By focusing on shared political values and principles, a political conception of justice aims to establish common ground and foster mutual respect and understanding among citizens with different comprehensive doctrines.
20
Q
Rawls- political liberalism - why establish a framework of justice
A
o These basic rights and liberties are assigned a certain priority and are considered essential for safeguarding individual freedoms, promoting democratic participation, and protecting citizens from arbitrary power and unjust treatment by the state.
21
Q
Rawls- Political liberalism - justice and good as complementary
A
o While a political conception of justice is neutral with respect to citizens’ comprehensive doctrines about the good life, it does not operate in isolation from ideas of the good- The right and the good are seen as complementary aspects of a well-ordered society, where principles of justice are informed by and draw upon various reasonable conceptions of the good that citizens can endorse and uphold within the framework of democratic institutions
22
Q
Rawls- Political conceptions of justice - inclusion of the good in a limited sense
A
The ideas of the good included in a political conception of justice must be political ideas that focus on the public sphere and are relevant to the basic structure of society.
The ideas of the good must be capable of being shared by citizens who are regarded as free and equal within a democratic society.
o This requires that the ideas of the good do not favor or privilege any particular group or individual based on their comprehensive beliefs, but rather aim to accommodate and respect the diversity of citizens
23
Q
Rawls- Political conceptions of justice - what goods it must impose
A
o A workable political conception of justice should recognize and prioritize human life and the fulfillment of basic human needs and purposes as a general good. This involves acknowledging the inherent dignity, worth, and equality of all individuals, and recognizing the importance of promoting social, economic, and political conditions that enable individuals to lead fulfilling and meaningful lives.
o Must also endorse rationality as a basic principle of political and social organization.
This involves recognizing the importance of reasoned deliberation, mutual respect, and cooperation among citizens in addressing collective issues, resolving conflicts, and making decisions that affect the well-being and interests of individuals and communities.
- political conception of citizens as free and equal who possess moral powers and higher-order interests.
24
Q
Rawls - well ordered political society
A
- A basic feature of a well-ordered political society is the existence of a public understanding about the kinds of claims that are appropriate for citizens to make when questions of political justice arise and how such claims are to be supported.
- A political conception of justice provides the basis for this understanding and enables citizens to reach agreement in assessing their various claims and determining their relative weight within the framework of democratic institutions.- * it is a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts and publicly endorses, the very same principles of justice
25
Rawls - two things suffice for a shared idea of rational advantage
o First, citizens affirm the same political conception of themselves as free and equal persons.
o Second, their conceptions of the good, while distinct in content and related religious and philosophical doctrines, require roughly the same primary goods, including basic rights, liberties, opportunities, the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, and the same all-purpose means such as income and wealth, with all of these supported by the same social bases of self-respect.
26
Rawls - basic list of primary goods
can add to them
o basic rights and liberties, also given by a list;
o freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities;
o powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in the political and economic institutions of the basic structure;
o income and wealth; and finally,
o the social bases of self-respect.
27
Rawls - 4 main kinds of variation between citizens
o a) variations in moral and intellectual capacities and skills;
o b) variations in physical capacities and skills, including the effects of illness and accident on natural abilities.
o c) variations in citizens' conceptions of the good (the fact of reasonable pluralism); as well as
o d) variations in tastes and preferences
28
Rawls - acceptability of variation between citizens
* when the principles of justice (with their index of primary goods) are satisfied, none of these variations among citizens are unfair and give rise to injustice.
29
Rawls - how far can we determine the good
* it is neither possible nor just to allow all conceptions of the good to be pursued (some involve the violation of basic rights and liberties). Yet we can say that when basic institutions satisfy a political conception of justice mutually acknowledged by citizens affirming comprehensive doctrines in a reasonable overlapping consensus, this fact confirms that those institutions allow sufficient space for ways of life worthy of citizens' devoted support.
30
Rawls - responsibility of citizens
* citizens have distinct responsibilities in maintaining equal basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and ensuring a fair share of primary goods for all.
* Citizens are expected to adapt their conceptions of the good to their expected fair share of primary goods.
31
Rawls - restrictions on plans of life
* The only restriction on plans of life is their being compatible with the public principles of justice, and claims may be advanced only for certain kinds of things (primary goods) and in ways specified by those principles
o Claims may be advanced only for certain kinds of things, referred to as "primary goods," which include basic rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, and social bases of self-respect- Citizens are entitled to make claims for these primary goods and seek fair and equal access to them within the framework of public principles of justice that ensure the protection and promotion of these fundamental goods for all members of society.
o but these claims must be advanced in ways specified by the principles of justice that ensure the protection and promotion of these fundamental goods for all members of society.
32
Rawls - the two forms of neutrality of poltical liberalism
* Political liberalism aims to be neutral in terms of procedure and aim, respecting citizens' diverse comprehensive doctrines.
33
Rawls - neutrality in terms of procedure
Neutrality of procedure focuses on the legitimacy, justification, and fairness of the procedures used by basic institutions and public policy. Emphasizes the importance of public reason as the basis for political decision-making and policy formulation within a democratic society. by reference to a procedure that can be legitimated, or justified, without appealing to any moral values at all. Or a neutral procedure may be said to be one justified by an appeal to neutral values, that is, to values such as impartiality, consistency in application of general principles to all reasonably related cases and equal opportunity for the contending parties to present their claims.
34
Rawls- neutrality in terms of aims
focuses on the objectives and goals of basic institutions and public policy, ensuring that they are compatible with a shared public political conception that can be endorsed by citizens generally establish principles of justice that are acceptable to all citizens within a democratic society. focuses on ensuring that public institutions and policies are designed and implemented in a way that can be endorsed by citizens generally as part of a shared public political conception that respects and accommodates the diversity of citizens' beliefs, values, and aspirations.
o Eg the state is to ensure for all citizens equal opportunity to advance any conception of the good they freely affirm
35
Political liberalism - conception of superiority
* political liberalism seeks common ground and is neutral in aim but it may still affirm the superiority of certain forms of moral character and encourage certain moral virtues
o if a constitutional regime takes certain steps to strengthen the virtues of toleration and mutual trust, say by discouraging various kinds of religious and racial discrimination (in ways consistent with liberty of conscience and freedom of speech), it does not thereby become a perfectionist state. Rather, it is taking reasonable measures to strengthen the forms of thought and feeling that sustain fair social cooperation between its citizens regarded as free and equal
36
Rawls - restricting versions of the good
* The principles of any reasonable political conception must impose restrictions on permissible comprehensive views
their associated ways of life may be in direct conflict with the principles of justice eg a conception of the good requiring the repression or degradation of certain persons on, say, racial, or ethnic, or perfectionist grounds, for example, slavery in ancient Athens
they may be admissible but fail to gain adherents under the political and social conditions of a just constitutional regime eg a particular religion, and the conception of the good belonging to it, can survive only if it controls the machinery of state and is able to practice effective intolerance
37
Rawls - education
* children's education include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to insure that their continued membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist.
* their education should also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honour the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society.
38
Rawls- political society as good for citizens
* political society is a good for citizens as it secures for them the good of justice and the social bases of their mutual self-respect. Thus, in securing the equal basic rights and liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the like, political society guarantees the essentials of persons' public recognition as free and equal citizens. In securing these things political society secures their fundamental needs
39
Rawls - conception of the good - well ordered society
* a further idea of the good: namely, that of a well-ordered society as a social union of social unions- A well-ordered society facilitates and supports the harmonious coexistence, cooperation, and collaboration among these diverse social unions, fostering mutual respect, understanding, and solidarity.
40
Sandel - need for conception of good If majority agree
* Sandel argues that if a society has a shared conception of the good, such as being overwhelmingly Christian, then its politics should reflect and incorporate these values.
* state actively promotes and embodies certain moral and religious values that are widely shared by its citizens.
41
Sandel's - critique of Rawls
* Rawls' political liberalism is too neutral and detached from substantive moral and religious beliefs, and it fails to address or accommodate the shared values and beliefs that are integral to a society's identity and cohesion.
42
Rawls - modelling individuals versus modelling citizens (response to Sandel)
* He argues that the original position, where individuals come together to establish principles of justice, is not about individuals leaving behind their comprehensive conceptions of the good. Instead, it's about citizens deliberating behind a "veil of ignorance" regarding their particular circumstances.
* He introduces the idea of an "overlapping consensus," where citizens can agree on a common framework of justice and principles of political cooperation, even if they hold different comprehensive doctrines or conceptions of the good.
* even if citizens have different reasons or motivations for supporting a particular political conception or policy, what matters is that they can converge on a shared understanding and agreement about fundamental principles of justice and fairness.
43
critique of Rawls - right v good
Rawls' distinction between the right (justice) and the good (comprehensive conceptions of the good life) is problematic and artificial. They contend that it's challenging to separate the two entirely and that they inevitably influence and shape each other.
o principles of justice are not as neutral and impartial as he claims them to be. They argue that these principles are influenced and shaped by underlying comprehensive moral and philosophical doctrines, even if they are not explicitly stated.
o it's impossible to develop or apply principles of justice without some reference to or consideration of individuals' broader beliefs and values about the good life.
44
Critique of Rawls - practicality
* Critics also question the feasibility and desirability of citizens leaving behind their deeply held religious or moral beliefs when engaging in political deliberation and decision-making
o public reason, as envisioned by Rawls, may exclude or marginalize citizens who cannot or choose not to separate their comprehensive views from their political reasoning and participation
o achieving genuine consensus on fundamental principles of justice may be difficult or impossible in societies characterized by deep-seated moral, religious, and philosophical disagreements.
45
Raz - how far does his notion of the good life extend
* Raz believes that there are objective values or principles that are important for human flourishing. These values serve as a guide for individuals in their pursuit of the good life. In promoting autonomy, Raz seeks to create conditions where individuals can engage with and pursue these objective values.
46
Raz on what the state's role in perfectionism should be
* In Raz's perfectionist view, the state should actively promote autonomy by creating a legal and social environment that supports individual decision-making and self-governance. This involves not just protecting individuals from external interference but also providing opportunities and resources that enable individuals to act autonomously.
there is zero value in autonomy unless you make correct decisions
47
Raz - what personal autonomy is
* personal autonomy holds the free choice of goals and relations as an essential ingredient of individual well‐being. The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.
* Autonomy is opposed to a life of coerced choices. It contrasts with a life of no choices, or of drifting through life without ever exercising one's capacity to choose.
48
Raz- self awareness and the good life
* Evidently the autonomous life calls for a certain degree of self‐awareness. To choose one must be aware of one's options- then the autonomous person must be aware of his life as stretching over time. He must be capable of understanding how various choices will have considerable and lasting impact on his life. He may always prefer to avoid long‐term commitments. But he must be aware of their availability
49
Raz - the good life and basic human capabilities
* If a person is to be maker or author of his own life then he must have the mental abilities to form intentions of a sufficiently complex kind and plan their execution. These include minimum rationality, the ability to comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the mental faculties necessary to plan actions, etc.
50
Raz- the good life and freedom
* Finally, his choice must be free from coercion and manipulation by others, he must be independent.
51
Raz- the good life and use of capabilities
* For a person to enjoy an autonomous life he must actually use these faculties to choose what life to have. There must in other words be adequate options available for him to choose from.
52
Raz- conditions needed for the autonomous life
mental abilities, self awareness, independence, adequacy of options
53
Raz - man in the pit
A person falls down a pit and remains there for the rest of his life, unable to climb out or to summon help. There is just enough ready food to keep him alive without (after he gets used to it) any suffering. He can do nothing much, not even move much. His choices are confined to whether to eat now or a little later, whether to sleep now or a little later, whether to scratch his left ear or not
* He does not enjoy an autonomous life- no adequate range of options to choose from. His – options are short term and have negligible significance
54
Raz- adequacy of options
* Adequacy of options requires options with long term pervasive consequences as well as short term options of little consequence, and a fair spread in between- It is intolerable that we should have no influence over the choice of our occupation or of our friends. But it is equally unacceptable that we should not be able to decide on trivia such as when to wash or when to comb our hair
not just number but variety of options - A choice between hundreds of identical and identically situated houses is no choice
also needed is for most of the time choice should not be dominated by the need to protect the life one has.
55
Raz- value of autonomy
* Autonomy requires that many morally acceptable options be available to a person
* only very rarely will the non‐availability of morally repugnant options reduce a person's choice sufficiently to affect his autonomy. Therefore, the availability of such options is not a requirement of respect for autonomy. Autonomy is valuable only if exercised in pursuit of the good. The ideal of autonomy requires only the availability of morally acceptable options.
56
Raz- why coercion and manipulation are bad
* Coercion diminishes a person's options. It is sometimes supposed that that provides a full explanation of why it invades autonomy. It reduces the coerced person's options below adequacy. But it need not. One may be coerced not to pursue one option while being left with plenty of others to choose from.
* Manipulation, unlike coercion, does not interfere with a person's options. Instead it perverts the way that person reaches decisions, forms preferences or adopts goals. It too is an invasion of autonomy whose severity exceeds the importance of the distortion it causes.
* Coercion and manipulation subject the will of one person to that of another. That violates his independence and is inconsistent with his autonomy
* The violation of autonomy caused by coercion and manipulation is not solely due to the outcomes or consequences of these actions. Instead, it is the very nature of these actions—intentionally undermining someone's independence and autonomy—that constitutes the violation
57
Raz- autonomous state= autonomy for people
* For those who live in an autonomy‐supporting environment there is no choice but to be autonomous: there is no other way to prosper in such a society
* The value of personal autonomy is a fact of life - Living in a society that largely values individual choice and where social structures are based on such choices, personal autonomy becomes essential for individual prosperity
58
Raz- compatibility of autonomy with other alternative forms of valuable lives
* Autonomy is, to be sure, inconsistent with various alternative forms of valuable lives. It cannot be obtained within societies which support social forms which do not leave enough room for individual choice. But it is compatible with any valuable set of social forms which conforms with the general conditions specified above. In that lies the distinctiveness of the ideal as a separate ideal, though one which cannot be obtained just in any environment.
59
Raz on pluralism in terms of choice
* Valuing autonomy leads to what is termed as 'weak value-pluralism.' Autonomy is exercised through choice, and for choice to be meaningful and autonomous, the options must include a variety of morally acceptable options. the options available must differ in respects which may rationally affect choice. If all the choices in a life are like the choice between two identical‐looking cherries from a fruit bowl, then that life is not autonomous. options must themselves vary in the reasons which speak in favour of each of them
60
Raz- autonomous life and value pluralism
* autonomy presupposes a variety of conflicting considerations. It presupposes choices involving trade‐offs, which require relinquishing one good for the sake of another.
* Where the goods are varied in character, so that they display varied merits or advantages, their successful pursuit requires different virtues. The existence of more goods than can be chosen by one person, which are of widely differing character, speaks of the existence of more virtues than can be perfected by one person. It tells of the existence of incompatible virtues, that is of value‐pluralism. A person may have an autonomous life without attaining any virtue to any high degree. However, he inhabits a world where the pursuit of many virtues was open to him, but where he would not have been able to achieve them all, at least not to their highest degree
61
Raz autonomous life and moral pluralism
o If autonomy is considered an ideal, it leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism. While an autonomous life doesn't necessarily mean achieving high degrees of any particular virtue, it implies living in a world where the pursuit of many virtues is possible, even if they cannot all be attained to their highest degree.
62
Notion of autonomy not being a conception of good life
* it is sometimes assumed that respect for autonomy requires governments to avoid pursuing any conception of the good life. In other words the ideal of autonomy is used to support a doctrine of political freedom reflecting anti‐perfectionism, the exclusion of ideals from politics. I argued against such views
63
Raz- autonomy and the good life- positively enforcing (citizens)
o I wish to propose a different understanding of it (autonomy as a conception of the good life), according to which it is a principle about the proper way to enforce morality. In other words I would suggest that the principle is derivable from a morality which regards personal autonomy as an essential ingredient of the good life, and regards the principle of autonomy, which imposes duties on people to secure for all the conditions of autonomy, as one of the most important moral principles.
64
Raz- autonomy and the good life- co-opting the harm principle
o Governments are subject to autonomy‐based duties to provide the conditions of autonomy for people who lack them. These extend beyond the duty to prevent loss of autonomy.
o So if the government has a duty to promote the autonomy of people the harm principle allows it to use coercion to stop people from actions which would diminish people's autonomy and then use non-coercive to intervene for your own interests - to improve peoples' options and opportunities.
this is different to Mill as makes it paternalistic
65
Raz on tax
o It is no objection to point out that the funds necessary for all these policies are raised by compulsory taxation. I assume that tax is raised to provide adequate opportunities, and is justified by the principle of autonomy in a way consistent with the harm principle
66
Raz on cultural relativism
o One particular troubling problem concerns the treatment of communities whose culture does not support autonomy. These may be immigrant communities, or indigenous peoples, or they may be religious sects. It is arguable that even the harm principle will not defend them from the ‘cultural imperialism’ of some liberal theories. Since they insist on bringing up their children in their own ways they are, in the eyes of liberals like myself, harming them
67
Raz- mutual support in everyone's autonomy
* Since autonomy is morally valuable there is reason for everyone to make himself and everyone else autonomous.
* There is more one can do to help another person have an autonomous life than stand off and refrain from coercing or manipulating him: One is to help in creating the inner capacities required for the conduct of an autonomous life. Some of these concern cognitive capacities, such as the power to absorb, remember and use information, reasoning abilities, and the like. , there are character traits essential or helpful for a life of autonomy. They include stability, loyalty and the ability to form personal attachments and to maintain intimate relationships.
68
Raz- autonomy and positive freedom
* Positive freedom refers to the capacity to act upon one's free will, desires, and aspirations. It's about having the resources, opportunities, and capabilities to make choices and pursue one's goals. When positive freedom is linked to autonomy, it means that the more capabilities and opportunities one has to make independent choices and lead a self-directed life, the greater one's positive freedom becomes. When there's a disagreement about what enhances positive freedom, the resolution should be based on how the disputed element contributes to or detracts from autonomy. Essentially, if something boosts someone's ability to live an independent and self-directed life, it enhances their positive freedom.
69
Raz- autonomy and negative freedom
* Negative freedom, freedom from coercive interferences, is valuable inasmuch as it serves positive freedom and autonomy. It does so in several ways. Coercing another may express contempt, or at any rate disrespect for his autonomy. Secondly, it reduces his options and therefore may be to his disadvantage. It may, in this way, also interfere with his autonomy. It may but it need not: some options one is better off not having. Others are denied one so that one will improve one's options in the future . In judging the value of negative freedom one should never forget that it derives from its contribution to autonomy.
70
Raz on collectivism
* While Raz values individual autonomy, he also recognizes that there are collective goods and objectives that may require limitations on individual autonomy. His perfectionist approach seeks to strike a balance between individual freedom and the common good, ensuring that autonomy is exercised in ways that contribute to overall human flourishing.
o autonomy is just one component or element that contributes to self-realization. Self-realization involves the full development and actualization of one's potential, which encompasses various aspects of life such as intellectual growth, emotional well-being, and pursuing meaningful goals
.
o While autonomy is valuable, it is not inherently superior or more important than other aspects of human flourishing, such as developing talents, nurturing relationships, or engaging in meaningful activities.
71
Raz- * Three main features characterize the autonomy‐based doctrine of freedom.
First, its primary concern is the promotion and protection of positive freedom which is understood as the capacity for autonomy, consisting of the availability of an adequate range of options, and of the mental abilities necessary for an autonomous life.
Second, the state has the duty not merely to prevent denial of freedom, but also to promote it by creating the conditions of autonomy.
Third, one may not pursue any goal by means which infringe people's autonomy unless such action is justified by the need to protect or promote the autonomy of those people or of others.
72
Chan and Raz on popularity of perfectionism
Chan- If one takes a long view of the development of Western political thought
Raz- perfectionism seems to be the standard view of the state.
73
Chan - perfectionism as a natural view
People care about the quality of their lives and have an interest in leading a good life. seIf the state's existence is to help citizens pursue their interests, it seems natural that the state should assist citizens by promoting valuable conceptions of the good life, just as it should assist the lives of citizens by promoting the economy, offering education and health services, and protecting their rights and justice.
* Put another way since states can have a powerful impact on our lives, would it not be sensible to choose a state that promotes the conditions enabling people to lead a worthwhile life
74
Chan - a good life may include the following
* Agency goods - virtues or dispositions that constitute the good life: e.g. reason, courage, justice….
* Prudential goods - goods or values that contribute to a person's good life: e.g., aesthetic experience, human relationship, amusement and play, knowledge etc.
* A way of life - this is a person's pattern of living, which embodies a particular ranking of agency and prudential goods and a particular way of realizing them
75
Chan - 2 types of coercion in perfectionism
* We may distinguish between coercive and noncoercive perfectionism. For coercive perfectionism, the state may use legal coercion to require people to adopt and lead valuable ways of life or to relinquish worthless ones
* For noncoercive perfectionism, the aim of the state is to create a social environment which is more conducive to the promotion of goods and worthwhile ways of life. The state does this by noncoercive means, such as providing subsidies, tax exemptions, and education.
76
Chan - pure v mixed perfectionism
* Pure perfectionism holds that the good life is the only intrinsic value. All state policies have to be justified in terms of their contribution to that value.
* Mixed perfectionism, however, allows that there are other values that the state needs to care about, such as the peace and harmony of the political community, equality, and distributive justice and efficiency among others
77
chan - different types of perfectionism and the state
* State-centred perfectionism holds that the pursuit of the good life should always start with the state
* Multicentered perfectionism, however, does not hold this principled preference for the state. It may allow voluntary associations to take the primary and active role in promoting valuable goods and ways of life
78
Chan- extreme v local perfectionism
* Extreme perfection is comprehensive in its ranking of goods and ways of life, coercive in its means of pursuit, pure in its (exclusive) concern for the good life, and state-centred in tis principled preference for the state as the direct and primary agent of the promotion of the good life. Moderate perfectionism is local, noncoercive, mixed and multicentered.
79
Chan - typical argument against perfectionist state
i. Conceptions of the good life are objects of reasonable disagreement
ii. We should respect people as ends
iii. Respecting people as ends implies that we should not force people to serve an end with which they may reasonably disagree
iv. Thus the state should not enforce conceptions of the good life.
v. it leads to intolerance and instability.
80
Nagel - overcoming disagreement with perfectionism that people may disagree on the ends
o Nagel - P3 must take the following revised form: The principle of higher-order unanimity: in situations where reasonable people have disagreements on how a problem should be resolved but nonetheless agree, or would agree, that the state should adopt a policy, the state may legitimately make policy decisions dealing with the problem
81
Chan - good life is collective
o Civil society and the state are interconnected and interdependent… they both face similar problems and both need each other to help resolve these problems
o Nagel - The pursuit of the good life is not simply an individual endeavor… influence by the social environment
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chan - state can't ignore the good life
o The state cannot simply focus on justice and efficiency and ignore the good life in its justification of the basic structure
o Liberals want to exclude the state from the social pursuit of perfectionist goals. However, their arguments offered thus far would either exclude the state from pursuing social justice and other traditional goals or fail to exclude perfectionist goals at all.
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Nussbaum and monism
* monism as problematic due to its association with tyranny and bigotry
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Berlin's pluralism- perfectionism
* Berlin’s pluralism- ideal is individual freedom: Denies monism about the ultimate sources of value and argues for a plurality of overall accounts of how one should live.
* Berlin's idea of pluralism goes beyond recognizing diversity within cultures. He posits that there are multiple comprehensive views of life that are valid or objectively correct. In other words, there isn't just one correct way to live or one correct set of values to prioritize. Different people or cultures can have vastly different but equally valid ways of understanding and pursuing the good life.
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Berlin and Raz's pluralism- perfectionist
* the pluralism relevant to thinkers like Berlin and Raz is broader. It's about the existence of multiple, overall ways of life that are fundamentally different from each other and might even be incompatible. Berlin and Raz are concerned with the clashes or tensions between different overarching philosophies or ways of life.
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Raz's pluralism- perfectionist
* Raz as a perfectionist- autonomy as the key to what makes lives valuable – should be core value in liberal society and in order to support autonomy must accept a doctrine of pluralism related to Berlin’s pluralism.
* An adequate range of options is required for autonomy, which is why a plural and extensive range is crucial. And because pluralism is true he can conclude that autonomy requires government to create plural options and, indeed, an extensive menu of options
* Raz does not believe all goals are valuable. Thus, the principle of autonomy doesn't necessitate the government to endorse all valuable goals as options
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Larmore's pluralism - political liberalism
* Larmore argues that disagreements about value persist even under conditions of freedom and do not easily resolve themselves, unlike most scientific disagreements. These disagreements arise due to factors such as difficulties in weighting and ordering values, differences in life experiences, etc.
* Larmore suggests that people can accept the reality of "reasonable disagreement" without needing to resolve it.
* He advocates for basing political morality on a core set of principles that reasonable people can accept, despite their differing comprehensive views on the nature of value
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Rawls' pluralism - politcal liberlaism
* Rawls agrees that there are persistent disagreements. we can see that the factors that lead people to differ are complicated, difficult, and deeply rooted in their search for the meaning of life, in such a way that they are unlikely to go away without government coercion. Many different comprehensive doctrines that citizens hold are in that sense reasonable
* He suggests that citizens endorse political liberalism because they respect their fellow citizens as equals. This respect motivates them to give others the space to pursue their own paths, even if they believe those paths to be incorrect.
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Nussbaum - respect
* As I (along with both Rawls and Larmore) use the idea of respect, respect for persons is not a subjective emotional state, such as a feeling of admiration. It is a way of regarding and treating persons, closely related to the Kantian idea of treating humanity as an end and never as a mere means
* the importance of acknowledging and respecting reasonable disagreements about values in a pluralistic society. Unlike raz don’t rely on agreement on comprehensive doctrines about the nature of value
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Rawls and Larmore - morality
* Both Rawls and Larmore argue that political principles aren't neutral or value-free. They inherently possess a moral content, implying that they are grounded in certain ethical or moral beliefs about what is right or just.
overlapping consensus" based on substantive moral notions. it aims for a substantive moral consensus. This means that the consensus isn't just about agreeing on basic rules or procedures; it involves shared foundational values and principles.
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Rawls and Larmore - reasonable
* to address the challenge of determining which doctrines can participate in the overlapping consensus, both Rawls and Larmore introduce the concept of the "reasonable." This serves as a criterion to distinguish between doctrines that align with the society's basic political principles (and are thus deemed reasonable) and those that don't.- disagreements about fundamental values are not mere misunderstandings or irrationalities. Instead, these disagreements arise from deep-seated and complex factors, leading to what they term as "reasonable disagreement."
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Rawls- unreasonable
Unreasonable doctrines, on the other hand, are those that reject central tenets of this consensus, with some being so extreme that Rawls describes them as "mad and aggressive."What Rawls wishes to rule out is that the state would make statements (or incorporate principles) denigrating one religion or doctrine and preferring another, so long as the doctrine in question is "reasonable." Unreasonable" doctrines may be denigrated, and the state is permitted, perhaps required, to incorporate principles that denigrate it
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critique of Rawls' unreasonable criteria
o this demand for a particular sort of grounding for a view is disrespectful to religious citizens who think that faith is a very good basis for their views, in fact the best basis.
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Nussbaum - political liberalism as best - peace
* Recognizing the diversity of values and beliefs in a free society, this liberalism proposes a "thin" view of political principles. This means avoiding contentious debates about metaphysics, epistemology, and comprehensive ethics. The focus is on establishing basic principles that are universally acceptable or at least tolerable to all major comprehensive doctrines.
* aims to be like a "module" that can be attached to various comprehensive doctrines. The idea is to find common ground or shared values that can form an "overlapping consensus" among different belief systems. This consensus would allow for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among diverse groups, despite their disagreements on more comprehensive issues.
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Nussbaum - political autonomy in political liberalism
* Political autonomy is not entirely neutral: it has a definite view about the ingredients of good political life, including a respect for argument and the public exchange of reasons
* The autonomy described here is distinct from the one proposed by Raz, which is more prescriptive and comprehensive in nature. The autonomy discussed in this passage is about creating a framework that accommodates diversity and promotes mutual respect, rather than enforcing a particular set of values or beliefs.
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Quong- role of the liberal state
* The liberal state should not be in the business of deciding what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile life and trying to make sure that citizens live up to this ideal—that job should be left to citizens themselves.
* Instead, the liberal state should restrict itself to the task of providing a fair framework of rules and institutions within which citizens can pursue their own conception of what makes for a valuable life.
the state be concerned only with justice: with the just distribution of freedom, resources, and other advantages between citizens, ensuring that each is given a fair chance to develop and pursue his or her own conception of the good life.
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Quong - why neutrality is best
* Because we disagree about what makes life worth living, it would be wrong for the government to take sides on this question. Instead, the government should remain neutral on the issue of the good life.
* states should not act in ways that they cannot justify to their citizens.
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Quong - why political liberalism is best from liberal viewpoint of freedom and equality
* the liberal view of individuals as free and equal from a moral standpoint. then any form of inequality in moral status or treatment is inherently incompatible with this view.
o the claim of a state to exercise unequal moral status or control over its citizens is incompatible with the liberal principle of freedom and equality.
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Quong's clarification of liberal position
o Liberal philosophy's foundational commitment is to the moral claim that persons (or citizens) are free and equal, and thus the exercise of political power is legitimate only when it can be publicly justified.
o Given the first claim, and given certain further premises about the nature of pluralism, a legitimate liberal state must not act for any reasons grounded in particular judgements about the good life, but should instead restrict itself to the task of establishing just or fair conditions within which citizens can pursue their own conception of the good life.
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Quong- political liberalism's modesty
* the goal of public justification is modest. The aim is rather to understand what kinds of arguments, if any, citizens already committed to certain basic liberal norms can legitimately offer to one another.
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Quong - practicality of political liberalism
* By ‘basic liberal norms’ I mean fairly abstract values such as the idea of persons as free and equal, or a general commitment to fairness in the distribution of goods or advantages amongst citizens. I do not mean more specific liberal principles such as the right to free speech, or some version of the harm principle. Political liberalism, on my account, is thus a theory that explains how the public justification of political power is possible amongst an idealized constituency of persons who are committed to certain fundamental, but fairly abstract, liberal values. This distinction allows for a more inclusive and flexible approach to political liberalism, accommodating a range of viewpoints within a shared liberal framework.
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Quong's overlapping consensus - different from Rawls
argue that there is an important role for the idea of an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable persons within the justificatory structure of political liberalism
o I argue, contra Rawls, that an overlapping consensus between reasonable people ought to mark the first stage, not the last stage, of the justificatory structure of political liberalism. Presenting political liberalism in this way helps avoid objections that political liberalism mistakes agreement for justification
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Quong - why does political liberalism permit the state to enforce controversial conceptions of justice when it would not allow the state to act on the basis of controversial conceptions of the good?
o There are at least two kinds of disagreements that can occur between reasonable people: justificatory and foundational. The former disagreements are framed by common premises or assumptions, whereas the latter disagreements go ‘all the way down’.
o Justificatory disagreements are potentially resolvable through reasoned argumentation and debate.Since these disagreements can be addressed through rational discourse, policies based on justificatory disagreements may be more easily justified to a diverse constituency of citizens.
o Alternatively foundational may be disagreements on world views, values, principles- irreconcilable
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Quong - public justification requires public reason but different from Rawls
all our political decisions and deliberations should be governed by the idea of public reason. We should always want our political principles to be justifiable to others on terms those others can reasonably accept. We should not, as Rawls suggests, only apply this requirement to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.
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limits to Rawls' use of public reason
o In other political domains where public reason might not be explicitly invoked, Rawls would likely focus on principles that promote fairness, equal opportunity, and the well-being of citizens, among other considerations. i.e would likely advocate for fair. Distribution in economic policy and safety nets.- not every economic detail may need full public justification, but the overarching economic policies should not contradict the basic principles of justice and fairness agreed upon in a well-ordered society
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Quong's pluralism
* pluralism not as an external fact to which liberalism must adapt and accommodate to but as a fact inherent to liberalism itself.
* reasonable pluralism recognizes that different individuals will have diverse but reasonable perspectives, and the challenge is to find common ground based on shared liberal values.
* the fact of reasonable pluralism generated by liberal principles and institutions constrains the kinds of political arguments that liberal citizens can coherently offer to one another, and thereby constrains the kind of policies that can be legitimately imposed in liberal democratic societies.
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Quong against Raz's harm principle
o does not offer a consistent or principled commitment to the liberal value of toleration. Raz's argument for toleration appears to be conditional and contingent upon specific empirical conditions, rather than being grounded in the more foundational and universal principles of liberalism.
o it does not provide a clear rationale for why we should treat non-coercive forms of perfectionism differently from coercive forms. If Raz's harm principle is meant to preclude coercion, then logically it should also rule out non-coercive policies advocated by liberal perfectionists. In other words, if the principle aims to protect individual autonomy and freedom from coercive interference, it should apply consistently across both coercive and non-coercive contexts.
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Quong - perfectionism as paternalistic
* liberal perfectionism, despite claims to the contrary, remains a paternalistic doctrine. Although perfectionist policies can be pursued by non-coercive means—something favoured by most contemporary perfectionists—perfectionist policies cannot avoid being paternalistic since they imply a negative judgement about citizens' capacities to make good decisions and run their own lives. Because it is paternalistic, I argue that liberal perfectionism fails to accord citizens the full moral status of free and equal agents: people who can form, revise, and rationally pursue their own conception of the good life.
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Quong against perfectionism - political legitimacy
* liberal perfectionism lacks a convincing account of political legitimacy, that is, an account of how the liberal state gains the moral right to rule. Perfectionists, have been too quick to assume that if citizens would be justified in following perfectionist directives issued by a state, this is sufficient to show the state has the moral right to rule over those citizens. While the state may have valid reasons (justification) for promoting certain perfectionist ideals, this does not automatically confer moral legitimacy on the state's authority to govern. What justifies an institution, however, is not always what legitimates an institution, and this fact causes serious difficulties for liberal perfectionism.
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Raz - coercive v non coercive
autonomy is only valuable if you make correct decisions so state should help u make correct decisions BUT non-coercively eg taxing bad choices or subsidising good choices
Q- can the state be non-coercive in this
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raz's use of the harm principle to excuse coercion
* the autonomy-based principle of freedom serves as the moral foundation for the harm principle. Autonomy, in this context, refers to the capacity of individuals to make informed and rational choices about their own lives, free from undue external influence or coercion. autonomy principle explains why liberals might be willing to use coercive measures in certain instances – namely, to prevent harm to others. By prioritizing individual autonomy, liberals recognize that certain actions or behaviours can infringe upon the rights and well-being of others, justifying state intervention to prevent such harm.
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autonomy based principle of toleration
Nussbaum
* * The autonomy-based principle of toleration - pluralism about value is true, and that people should believe in the truth of pluralism so that they happily extend autonomy to other, even though they pursue ends that the person themselves does not value.
o Not only permissible but also urgently required for governments to promote toleration by building political principles based on the truth of pluralism.
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belief in truth of pluralism necessary for toleration
* Why is belief in the truth of pluralism necessary for toleration?
o Berlin - so long as people think their neighbours are fundamentally in error, there will be no end to their attempts at repression and coercion.
o Raz - autonomy requires toleration because it requires the state to provide an adequate range of options, and an adequate range is an extensive range (requiring toleration of mutually repugnant lifestyles) only because pluralism is true.
Pluralism about how to motivate people towards toleration: the objective truth of plural options is necessary both to the justification of state policies making an extensive range of options available and to the justification of toleration as an appropriate attitude to foster toward the things we dislike in the lives of our fellows.
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Strength of Raz's pluralism
* How demanding is Raz’s principle of pluralism?
o Very - moral pluralism involves two claims.
“That incompatible forms of life are morally acceptable.”
“That they display distinct virtues, each capable of being pursued for its own sake.”
o Add “one or more” of the following to make this form of pluralism “strong”.
“The incompatible virtues are not completely ranked relative to each individual.”
“The incompatible virtues are not completely ranked by some impersonal criteria of moral worth.”
“The incompatible virtues exemplify diverse fundamental concerns.”
o Raz believes that he has proven that valuing autonomy requires us to endorse the strong form of pluralism but he relies only on the weaker form in his argument.
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religious views and Raz
* Many if not most of secular and religious views of life cannot accept Raz’s idea that autonomy ought to be a moral ideal.
o Most secular views of the good life are not terribly pluralistic.
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Berlin against his own society
* Raz and Berlin was to build liberal society on a set of views that virtually none of its members actually holds.
o Berlin is reacting against the danger to human liberty that comes from excessive dogmatism about one’s own ideal but his own pluralist alternative would have equally dangerous consequences.
o In the service of toleration, he requires of all citinzen something that virtually none of them can believe without abandoning their religion
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scond class citizens and Raz
* Problem of respect - when the institutions that pervasively govern your life are built on a view that you cannot endorse, that means you are in a position of second class citizenship.
o Government will tell you every day that yours is wrong and theirs is right, and will be licenced to try and convert you to the correct view - “expressive subordination”
o “Expressive subordination” is a form of religious establishment even when secular and is wrong for the same reason religious establishment is always wrong i.e., offends against the equality of citizens.
o Raz - if they do not accept the fact of pluralism and the ideal of autonomy it is fine to treat them unequally
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Nussbaum overall argument
* But political liberalism is superior to perfectionist liberalism on ethical grounds, and it does better even on the issue of stability,
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Nussbaum's perfectionist liberalism as good
* An argument for perfectionism- most of the views around in most societies are racist or sexist, or hierarchical in some other way, and only a comprehensive perfectionist view, accepted as the basis of the state, could really get rid of their baneful political influence.
o Okin rejected Rawls’ political reason for such reason - most religions and traditional cultures were sexist to the core, so the only way to make progress was to do away with them by public persuasion i.e., endorsement of a comprehensive perfectionist doctrine including women’s equality in every sphere of life.
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Nussbaum on what definition of reasonable
It is fine to denigrate “unreasonableˮ doctrines so long as the definition of reasonable is an ethical one, thus licensing the state to criticise doctrines that are unethical but problematic to license the state to criticise doctrines that are “unreasonableˮ in the theoretical sense i.e., believing in something silly or subordinating my judgement to some irrational authority.
Should avoid defining “reasonableˮ in a way that denigrates the grounds of some peopleʼs doctrines i.e., “Xʼs doctrine is not as well grounded as Yʼsˮ.
Ethical definition of “reasonableˮ is good i.e., a “reasonableˮ citizen is one who respects other citizens as equals, and a “reasonableˮ comprehensive doctrine is one endorsed by such a reasonable citizen
