equality

Question 1

• In a political economy with formal equal opportunity, each person’s prospects as producer depend on which 3 things

Answer 1

• In a political economy with equal opportunity, each person’s prospects as producer depend only on (1) their initial stock of resources, (2) their ability and willingness to provide goods and services that others value, and (3) how lucky they are in the face of economic shocks.

Question 2

the state’s role in ensuring formal equality of opportunity in economy

Answer 2

• For example, the state would have a duty to abolish market-distorting monopsonies because it would prevent someone willing to sell goods from being able to do so (the monopsony may declare they would only buy from one producer).

Question 3

role of state under formal equality of opportunity

Answer 3

• For example, the state would have a duty to abolish market-distorting monopsonies because it would prevent someone willing to sell goods from being able to do so (the monopsony may declare they would only buy from one producer).

Question 4

formal equality of opportunity

Answer 4

Equality of opportunity among all citizens

equal access to opportunities, rights, and resources regardless of their background,

Question 5

formal equality of opportunity needs more than just law

Answer 5

• Needs more than just equality of opportunity by law; the behaviour of citizens also need to align with such principles for it to work; this is in contrast to Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity which only requires the basic structure to be faireg need fair treatment and non discrimintation like

Question 6

formal equality of opportunity - allows for inequalityof opportunity

Answer 6

• People’s birth circumstances can have profound effects on their life chances (e.g. if people are born rich, they tend to be “luckier” and can withstand more economic shocks because they have deeper pockets) but Formal Equality of Opportunity does not provide a framework in correcting these looming problems

This basic idea is compatible with children benefitting from the inheritance they receive from parents (they are designated to have higher initial stock of resources). So, many theorists who subscribe to this idea would view such a requirement insufficient.

pe: Formal equality of opportunity focuses primarily on ensuring that individuals have equal access to opportunities such as education, employment, and political participation, regardless of their background or characteristics. However, it does not address the broader socioeconomic inequalities that result from disparities in wealth, income, and social status

While formal equality of opportunity may prohibit explicit discrimination based on factors such as race, gender, or ethnicity, it may not address more subtle forms of privilege and disadvantage that result from socioeconomic disparities

Question 7

fair equality of opportunity

Answer 7

• Talent and effort are appropriate criteria for success in the competition for socially advantageous positions and roles, but differences in social class background should neither directly influence the competition, nor indirectly influence how far persons can develop talent or make an effort.

Fair Equality of Opportunity, an idea proposed by Rawls, amends the socialisation process to make people who are naturally endowed with talent in something and those who have the willingness to do the same thing have the same chances at succeeding.
- Those who are willing to be good at maths will have the means of schooling offered to them so that they can become as good as maths as those who have a natural talent for mathematics and do not try. Of course, if one is both naturally talented and is willing to put in the effort one gets better at it than someone without the talent and just puts in effort.
- Hence, Rawlsians would advocate for a public school system and universal basic income to guarantee a similar level of educational and economic opportunity for everyone. Affirmative action, for example, can be interpreted as a strategy to support fair equality of opportunity.

Question 8

Fair equality of opportunity needs familial regulation too

Answer 8

• Rawls applies the requirement of fair equality of opportunity to the basic structure in his principles of justice but it seems that society cannot achieve fair equality of opportunity until the familial level is regulated too.
• Parents have different endowments so children will benefit differently from interacting with their parents. E.g. if a child has a French father and a British mother who each speak their native languages to their children, the child has greater opportunities in life because of their bilingual upbringing compared to a child who only exclusively knows French. Yet, the allocation of parents to children is morally arbitrary

Question 9

luck egalitarian equally of opportunity

Answer 9

• The only inequalities that are acceptable are such that those who are unlucky in brute luck terms could have become as well off as anyone else by pursuing a course of action it would have been reasonable and not impossible for them to take we can be reasonable in holding them responsible for not pursuing it. Hence, luck egalitarianism has been described by Cohen (2009) as advocating “socialist equality of opportunity.”
• Put another way, “the playing field is levelled when unchosen circumstances of individuals are equalised, so that individuals can reasonably be held responsible for their choices that determine their eventual places in the social hierarchy.”

Question 10

education in luck egalitarian equality of opportunity

Answer 10

• The purpose of educational policy, then, is to ensure support for those who have lower natural ability such that they exit school with as much perseverance and ambition as those born well-endowed with natural talents.

Question 11

luck equality response to egalitarianism- luck egalitarian equality of opportunity

Answer 11

• the critics protest that egalitarianism undermines personal responsibility by guaranteeing outcomes independent of people’s personal choices. In response, luck egalitarians have moved from an equality of outcome to an equality of opportunity conception of justice: they ask only that people start off with equal opportunities to achieve welfare or access to advantage, or that they start off with an equal share of resources. But they accept the justice of whatever inequalities result from adults’ voluntary choices. All place great stress on the distinction between the outcomes for which an individual is responsible (option luck) and the outcomes forwhich she is not responsible (brute luck)

Question 12

choice luck and luck egalitarians - redistribution

Answer 12

• Luck egalitarians say that, assuming everyone had equal opportunity to run a particular risk, any outcomes due to voluntary choices whose consequences could reasonably be foreseen by the agent should be born or enjoyed by the agent. The inequalities they generate neither give rise to redistributive claims on others if the outcome is bad, nor are subject to redistributive taxation if the outcome is good

Question 13

distributive justice, choice luck and redistribution

Answer 13

• Distributive justice stipulates that the lucky should transfer some or all of their gains due to luck to the unlucky

Question 14

luck egalitarians and economic mix

Answer 14

• equality of fortune thus share a common core: a hybrid of capitalism and the welfare state. For the outcomes for which individuals are held responsible, luck egalitarians prescribe rugged individualism: let the distribution of goods be governed by capitalist markets and other voluntary agreements.

Question 15

luck egalitarians and wealth redistribution

Answer 15

• For the outcomes determined by brute luck, equality of fortune prescribes that all good fortune be equally shared and that all risks be pooled. ‘‘Good fortune’’ means, primarily, unproduced assets such as unimproved land, natural resources, and the income attributable to native endowments of talent

Taxes for redistributive purposes are the moral equivalent of insurance premiums against bad luck.

Question 16

luck egalitarians and birth lottery

Answer 16

• Most luck egalitarians would consider the time at which a person enters society as irrelevant to their claim to their fair share of the bounties of nature. Children are not responsible either for their parents’ lack of wealth or for their parents’ decision to reproduce. Thus it is a matter of bad brute luck, requiring compensation, if their parents lack the means to give them their fair share

Question 17

hardline equality of fortune and economic inequalities of outcome from option luck

Answer 17

• On Rakowski’s hard-line version of equality of fortune, once people risk and lose their fair share of natural wealth, they have no claims against others to stop their free fall into misery and destitution. Equality of fortune imposes no constraints on the structure of opportunities generated by free markets. Nothing would prevent people, even those whose gambles were prudent but who suffered from bad option luck, from subjection to debt peonage, sweatshops, or other forms of exploitation.

Question 18

hardline equality of fortune and caring inequalities of outcome from option luck

Answer 18

• Arneson would not require accommodation of people who are disabled by their own fault. Dependent caretakers also would not get much help from Arneson…. Roemer explains Arneson’s theory: “Society should not compensate people on their choice of [a more altruistic, self-sacrificing] path because it owes people no compensation on account of their moral views.’’ People who want to avoid the vulnerabilities that attend dependent caretaking must there- fore decide to care only for themselves. This is egalitarianism for egoists alone.

One wonders how children and the infirm are to be cared for, with a system that offers so little protection to their caretakers against poverty and domination.” (Anderson)

Question 19

disagreement among luck egalitarians

Answer 19

• luck egalitarians disagree on which space equality should be granted, - Should egalitarians seek equality of re- sources or assets (Dworkin, Rakowski, Roemer), real freedom—that is, legal rights plus the means to achieve one’s ends (Van Parijs), equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson)

Question 20

Anderson’s main critique against luck egalitarians

Answer 20

equality of fortune fails the most fundamental test any egalitarian theory must meet: that its principles express equal respect and concern for all citizens.

Question 21

in what 3 ways does equality of fortune fail the test of an egalitarian theory

Answer 21

Anderson

1. it excludes some citizens from enjoying the social conditions of freedom on the spurious ground that it’s their fault for losing them. It escapes this problem only at the cost of paternalism
2. equality of fortune makes the basis for citizens’ claims on one another the fact that some are inferior to others in the worth of their lives, talents, and personal qualities. - envy as a basis for distributing goods from the lucky to the unfortunate. Such principles stigmatize the unfortunate and disrespect the fortunate by failing to show how envy can obligate them
3. equality of fortune, in attempting to ensure that people take responsibility for their choices, makes demeaning and intrusive judgments of people’s capacities to exercise responsibility and effectively dictates to them the appropriate uses of their freedom.

Question 22

issue of caretakers and children under equality of fortune

Answer 22

Anderson

Dependent caretakers and their children face special problems under equality of fortune. Many people who care for dependents— children, the ill and infirm—command no market wage for discharging their obligations to those who cannot take care of themselves and lack the time and flexibility to earn a decent wage. For this reason, dependent caretakers, who are almost all women, tend to be either financially dependent on a wage earner, dependent on welfare payments, or extremely poor. Women’s financial dependence on a male wage earner results in their systematic vulnerability to exploitation, violence, and domination. But Rakowski’s doctrine implies that this poverty and resulting subordination is by choice and therefore generates no claims of justice on others

the sexist implications of assimilating the performance of moral obligations to care for dependents to the class of voluntarily ex- pensive tastes.

Question 23

Parijs suggestion for overcoming issue of luck egalitarians not compensating for dependents/ caretakers

Answer 23

Parijs suggests a basic income

The chief difficulty with his proposal is that his basic income would be awarded to all unconditionally, regardless of whether they were able or performing socially useful work. Lazy, able-bodied sur- fers would be just as entitled to that income as dependent caretakers or the disabled.

In order to offer an incentive for people to work and thereby provide the tax revenue to fund a basic income, there would have to be a substantial gap between the basic income and the wage provided by the lowest paid unskilled job.

Question 24

Hayek on issue with luck egalitarians

Answer 24

• Hayek says luck egalitarianism requires the state to make grossly intrusive, moralizing judgments of individual’s choices. Equality of fortune thus interferes with citizens’ privacy and liberty

Question 25

issue with luck egalitarians and deciding citizen’s responsibility

Answer 25

Furthermore, as Arneson and Roemer make clear, such judgments require the state to determine how much responsibility each citizen was capable of exercising in each case. But it is disrespectful for the state to pass judgment on how much people are responsible for their expensive tastes or their imprudent choices….. and this gives individuals an incentive to deny personal responsibility for their prob- lems,

Question 26

problematic medical application of luck egalitarianism

Answer 26

• Difficult reading - we should save one person whos life threatening state is due to a genetic condition, not for someone for whom it is due to recklessness. Even if condition isnt related/state isn’t life threatening.

Question 27

problematic criminal application of luck egalitarianism version 2

Answer 27

Stemplowska
luck egalitarianism welcomes, for example, setting up the (criminal) justice system so as to prioritize the claims of those who made no choices increasing the chance that they be victims of crime. Those who opened doors to strangers who turn out to be robbers, or who dressed “provocatively” when going out late at night and were sexually assaulted, would have to wait in line until the claims of the more prudent citizens facing similar problems were met.

Question 28

Stemplowska - second reading of luck egalitarianism

Answer 28

hard baseline

The second reading of luck egalitarianism sees it as offering directions regarding the nature of the baseline. According to this reading, not only must departures from the baseline that are due to luck be neutralized while those that are due to choice do not count, but also the baseline itself should be constructed in such a way as to allow maximum room for the luck/choice filter to differentiate between people. In effect, the opportunities we offer people must be such that people who make different choices end up with different outcomes: the hardworking and the prudent can maximize their advantage vis-à-vis the imprudent and the lazy

For the most part luck egalitarianism has been interpreted in this second way.

Question 29

Stemplowska - first reading of luck egalitarianism

Answer 29

cushioning baseline

On the first reading, luck egalitarianism requires that departures from the egalitarian baseline due to luck be neutralized while departures due to choice be accepted. But this tells us nothing about how we ought to specify what counts as the egalitarian baseline

many ways of structuring the initial baseline of equal opportu- nities—one way of doing it is to set up generous guarantees of assistance, for everyone, in case they end up badly off for whatever reason.

Question 30

Stemplowska - first reading of luck egalitarianism- as egalitarian

Answer 30

cushioning baseline - Some might object that the prudent and the hard working would be forced to subsidize the reckless and the lazy so that the cushioning baseline cannot count as egalitarian. But the baseline makes the prudent and the hardworking no worse off than the lazy and the imprudent are: they all equally enjoy the same opportunities to be imprudent and lazy and yet end up as well off as everyone else.

Question 31

Stemplowska- what baseline should we accept

Answer 31

Even if the second reading is rejected, luck egalitarianism need not opt for the maximally cushioning baseline.

the cushion of the baseline does not stretch to cover cases where reckless and wasteful decisions of some would eat too much, if compensated for, into the resources of others.

Due to scarcity of resources, the choices one person makes can affect the amount of resources available for others. And because we are beings with separate lives in circumstances of scarcity, we must respect each other as holders of entitlements that offer us some protection against the potentially expensive choices of others.

Question 32

Stemplowska- how to decide what choices should not lead to disadvantage

Answer 32

• What any egalitarian view needs, then, is a systematic way of designing the baseline, deciding which choices should not lead to disadvantage

we must ask whether acting to avoid a disadvantage requires greater sacrifice than offering compensation should it arise

Question 33

democratic equality

Answer 33

• Construction of a community of equals – called ‘democratic equality’ (the theory Anderson defends). Democratic equality guarantees all law-abiding citizens effective access to the social conditions of their freedom at all times.

. It justifies the distributions required to secure this guarantee by appealing to the obligations of citizens in a democratic state. In such a state, citizens make claims on one another in virtue of their equality, not their inferiority, to others.

Question 34

democratic equality and responsibility of citizens

Answer 34

, democratic equality’s principles of distribution neither presume to tell people how to use their opportunities nor attempt to judge how responsible people are for choices that lead to unfortunate outcomes. Instead, it avoids bankruptcy at the hands of the imprudent by limiting the range of goods provided collectively and expecting individuals to take personal responsibility for the other goods in their possession.

Question 35

democratic equality and equal moral worth

Answer 35

This assertion does not mean that all have equal virtue or talent.

Negatively, the claim repudiates distinctions of moral worth based on birth or social identity—on family membership, inherited social status, race, ethnicity, gender, or genes.
There are no natural slaves, plebeians, or aristocrats.

Positively, the claim asserts that all competent adults are equally moral agents: everyone equally has the power to develop and exercise moral responsibility, to cooperate with others according to principles of justice, to shape and fulfill a conception of their good

Question 36

democratic equality as relational

Answer 36

Anderson

: it views equality as a social relationship. Equality of fortune is a distributive theory of equality: it conceives of equality as a pattern of distribution. Thus, equality of fortune regards two people as equal so long as they enjoy equal amounts of some distributable good

democratic equality regards two people as equal when each accepts the obligation to justify their actions by principles acceptable to the other, and in which they take mutual consultation, reciprocation, and recognition for granted….. democratic egalitarians are fundamentally concerned with the relationships within which goods are distributed, not only with the distribution of goods themselves.

Question 37

Sen’s capabilities approach

Answer 37

• The capability approach focusses on what people are able to do and be, as opposed to what they have, or how they feel- Sen argues that, in analysing well-being, we should shift our focus from ‘the means of living’, such as income, to the ‘actual opportunities a person has’, namely their functionings and capabilities.
• Functionings’ refer to the various things a person succeeds in ‘doing or being’, such as participating in the life of society, being healthy and so forth, while ‘capabilities’ refer to a person’s real or substantive freedom to achieve such functionings; for example, the ability to take part in the life of society.
• Sen’s argument is that inequalities of income and outcome are less important than equality of fundamental freedoms. He has redefined poverty as an objective curtailment of a person’s ‘capabilities’

Question 38

Sen’s capabilities approach and equality

Answer 38

• Does not demand equality of everything - Democratic equality thus aims for equality across a wide range of capabilities. But it does not support comprehensive equality in the space of capabilities. Being a poor card player does not make one oppressed. More precisely, the social order can and should be arranged so that one’s skill at cards does not determine one’s status in civil society. Nor is being a good card player necessary for functioning as a citizen.

Question 39

democratic equality and economic redistribution

Answer 39

, democratic equality is also concerned with the distribution of divisible resources. It requires that everyone have effective access to enough resources to avoid being oppressed by others and to function as an equal in civil society. What counts as ‘‘enough’’ varies with cultural norms, the natural environment, and individual circumstance. For ex- ample, cultural norms and climate influence what kind of clothing one needs Individual circumstances, such as disabilities, influence how much resources one needs to function as an equal

• Once all citizens enjoy a decent set of freedoms, sufficient for functioning as an equal in society, income inequalities beyond that point do not seem so troubling in themselves. The degree of acceptable income inequality would depend in part on how easy it was to convert income into status inequality

Question 40

democratic equality and compensating for choice luck

Answer 40

• Democratic equality does not indemnify individuals against all losses due to their imprudent conduct. It only guarantees a set of capabilities necessary to functioning as a free and equal citizen and avoiding oppression. Individuals must bear many other losses on their own. For example, a person who smokes would be entitled to treatment for resulting lung cancer, regardless of their degree of responsibility for smoking. But she would not be entitled to compensation for the loss of enjoyment of life brought about by her confinement in the hospital and reduced lung capacity

Question 41

democratic equality and employment

Answer 41

The conception of society as a system of cooperation provides a safety net through which even the imprudent are never forced to fall. It provides that no role in the productive system shall be assigned such inadequate benefits that, given the risks and requirements of the job, people could be deprived of the social conditions of their freedom because they have fulfilled its requirements. Society may not define work roles that amount to peonage or servitude, nor, if it can avoid it, pay them so little that an able-bodied person working full time would still lack basic capabilities

o A minimum wage need not raise un- employment if low-wage workers are given sufficient training to make them more productive or if the higher wage induces employers to supply their workers with productivity-enhancing tools

Question 42

superiority of democratic equality over luck egalitarians

Answer 42

…. in regarding society as a system of cooperation, democratic equality has a less demeaning rationale than equality of fortune for state interventions designed to raise the wages of low-wage workers. Society need not try to make the impossible and insulting judgment of whether low-wage workers are there by choice or by the fact that their meagre native endowments prevent them from getting better work. In- stead, it focuses on appreciation for the roles that low-wage workers fill.

Question 43

Equality of democratic citizenship and civil liberties

Answer 43

• Equality of ability to vote and run for office among mentally competent adult citizens
• Top public officials and law makers (positions that matter in a democracy) should be selected democratically by majority vote in elections where all mentally competent adults each have the same number of votes and all are eligible to run for office. The democracy operates against a background of freedom of speech, assembly, association, and citizens are guaranteed a wide right to religious practice.

Question 44

Equality of democratic citizenship and civil liberties - what category does it fit into

Answer 44

fits into the wider category of relational equality

Question 45

relational equality

Answer 45

• Relational egalitarians hold that distributive egalitarian principles are mistaken in their focus, thereby fetishising what does not matter. Ultimately, what they aim at are social and distributive arrangements that can sustain a society of free, equal people, a society in which individuals all relate as equals – the relational egalitarian aim. Relational inequality arises when the state fails to treat interests of each citizen as equal (deontic view).

Question 46

relational equality nad economic redistribution

Answer 46

if someone is so poor they are marginalised and not viewed as social equals, we have a violation of relational equality so relational egalitarians will work to correct it, for example by ensuring some equal distribution of money. In comparison to other theories, we see that the emphasis is placed on equalising the relations between individuals in society, not on the distribution of money per se.

Question 47

scheffler and relational equality

Answer 47

relational egalitarianism to ensure the equality of rank, power, and status, which are instrumentally and intrinsically valuable. The distribution of goods, on the other hand, is merely instrumental to achieving relational equality.

Question 48

relational equality and inequality

Answer 48

• Relational egalitarianism is compatible with radical inequalities
  Imagine a society which is justly equal in terms of distribution and relations. Then an earthquake happens suddenly and unexpectedly, making a small portion of the population lose their homes.
• Distributive equality says that this inequality is unfair/unjust – those affected by the earthquake are worse-off just due to brute luck (and thus we should try to correct it). However, relational equality says that this inequality is acceptable so long as the relations between people haven’t been affected.

Question 49

critique of relational equality and responsibility of people

Answer 49

Suppose a gambler has calculated his propensity to win and decides to enter the gamble. Unfortunately, he loses out and become significantly poorer than the average person. Luck egalitarians would permit the gambler to be poor since his position is a result of his option luck, but relational egalitarians would disallow this self-inflicted poverty because it would reduce the political influence the gambler has as a poor person (e.g. there are opportunity costs associated with going to vote that a poor person struggles to shoulder), compared to others.
- By making citizens inconsistently responsible for their acts, relational egalitarians face the problem of moral hazard where the imprudent force the prudent to pay for their bad choices.

Question 50

overemphasis of relational equality on social relations

Answer 50

Relational egalitarians would justify the guarantee of some level of nutrition to the population on the grounds that it allows for people to have equal relations, which seems to entirely miss the fact that nutrition is essential to one being alive or having a wide range of other capacities.

Question 51

Equality of democratic citizenship and civil liberties and inequality

Answer 51

• Allows for too much inequality

People differ on their ability to influence democratic outcome based on their race or wealth. For example, racism alters perceptions of Black candidates such that their achievements are trivialised. Alternatively, if one is rich, one can secure more media platforms; their views can therefore be overrepresented in a way that crowds out other people’s messages

Question 52

wealth and income equality

Answer 52

Equality of wealth and income among citizens
- Wealth is a stock while income is a flow. Usually, it will be insufficient just to call for income equality because most rich people make money out of their wealth, not their income.

Question 53

critique of wealth and income equality

Answer 53

• attempts to reduce inequality may also reduce the total quantity of goods availiable, by affecting incentives to work and invest.
  Beyond a certain point, the pursuit of equality may sacrifice overall utility, or even the welfare of everyone in the society

the promotion of equality may require objectionable means. To achieve even moderate equality it is necessary to restrict economic liberty, including the freedom to make bequests. Greater equality may be attainable only by more general coercive techniques

Question 54

equality of resources

Answer 54

equality of resources) holds that it treats them as equals when it distributes or transfers so that no further transfer would leave their shares of the total resources more equal

Question 55

Rawls and equality of resources

Answer 55

• Rawls (1971) argues in favour of equality of primary goods (external goods). Primary goods are goods that agents that a reasonable person would want more of. The priorities within the set of primary social goods are to be determined by considering what people, as free and equal citizens, need most. Rawls deals with differences in natural endowments of talents in his second principle of justice, which does not channel an egalitarian spirit.

Question 56

Dworkin on how far do we need resource distribution

Answer 56

why should the state fund expensive tastes? We cultivate our expensive tastes so we shouldn’t need to compensate people for them. We shouldn’t give welfare to everyone the same because giving lazy people/ expensive taste same welfare and that isn’t fair

Question 57

critique of Dworkin - chances effect choices

Answer 57

• Dworkin argues that the people who should be compensated for defects in internal assets are those who would have purchased insurance against their having the defect if they were behind a veil of ignorance and did not know whether they would have that defect. It follows, uncharitably, that people who have an extremely rare but severe disability could be ineligible for special aid just because the chances of anyone suffering from it were so minute that it was ex ante rational for people not to purchase insurance against it.

Question 58

resource equality focuses too much on material goods

Answer 58

• Environment as well effects welfare function – don’t need to give people in wheelchairs a person to get around and carry them upstairs. More valuable to have a society where ramps are everywhere and these people can be independent – distributive equality focuses too much on material goods

Question 59

equality of welfare

Answer 59

• a distributional scheme treats people as equals when it distributes or transfers resources among them until no further transfer would leave them more equal in welfare.
• People should have equal amounts of human good gained over the course of their lifetime, whether it be gained by themselves or given to them by others. Human good, as Parfit (1984) puts, is what an individual gets insofar as her life goes well for herself

Question 60

the good in equality of welfare

Answer 60

• What counts as good differs across different welfare egalitarian accounts. Hedonists, for example, take pleasure and the absence of pain to be the good;

Some theorists argue that what matters for welfare is desire satisfaction, or life aim fulfilment (if one were worried about running into problems of cognitive errors in estimating the effects of an act on one’s life).

Question 61

issue with equality of welfare- measuring

Answer 61

• Measuring equality in welfare over one’s life-course is problematic
  A sickly baby who only lives for a month would have to be showered with intense welfare before they die, but it is practically impossible to do so. A healthy baby would gain more welfare even if they were to die at the same age.

Question 62

issue with equality of welfare- no room for individual responsibility

Answer 62

The welfare egalitarian would find themselves pouring social resources into people who use them wastefully. This is less of a problem intuitively if it is because someone is ill or handicapped (e.g. if someone with Parkinson’s disease spill half of their food all the time because their hand are shaking) but it is wasteful if the people who waste food are just negligent people (e.g. someone who left some vegetables in the fridge for too long it goes bad so they could not extract welfare from consuming it). To fix this issue, some scholars such as Cohen (1989) modify equality of welfare to equal opportunity to welfare.

Question 63

issue with equality of welfare- expensive tastes

Answer 63

• Expensive tastes criticism: ‘Imagine two persons, one satisfied with a diet of milk, bread, and beans, while the other is distraught without expensive wines and exotic dishes. In short one has expensive tastes, the other does not.’ A welfare egalitarian must, ceteris paribus, provide the epicure with a higher income than the person of modest taste, since otherwise the latter might be satisfied whilst the former is distraught.

Question 64

issue with all resource theories of equality - the notion that they aren’t proponents of equality

Answer 64

• If we want to genuinely to treat people as equals (or so it may seem), then we must contrive to make their lives equally desirable to them or give them the means to do so, not simply to make the figures in their bank accounts the same…

Question 65

Cohen’s view of equality

Answer 65

• Cohen claims that what makes a socialist system desirable is, in part, that it uniquely allows people to be in community with one another. But, inequalities that are too large will impede or destroy such community. It is unclear just how egalitarian the principle is supposed to be, though it is clear the principle is supposed to forbid many of the inequalities that the socialist principle of opportunity would allow

Question 66

how Cohen differs from socialists

Answer 66

• Socialist equality of opportunity requires a kind of equality in starting points, but no equality in results. For Cohen, then, the community principle is supposed to take care of the inequalities that socialist equality of opportunity would omit; it is supposed to help generate equal results.

Question 67

egalitarian response to disability against equality of welfare and equality of opportunity for welfare

Answer 67

Cohen

The egalitarian response to disability seems to defeat not only equality of welfare but also equality of opportunity for welfare. Tiny Tim is not only actually happy, by any standard. He is also, because of his fortunate disposition, blessed with abundant opportunity for happiness: he need not do much to get a lot of it. But egalitarians would not on that account strike him off the list of free wheelchair receivers. They do not think that wheelchair distribution should be controlled exclusively by the welfare opportunity requirements of those who need them. Lame people need them to be adequately resourced, whether or not they also need them to be, or to be capable of being, happy.

Question 68

egalitarians compensating where resource equality theorists don’t

Answer 68

Cohen

There is also something wrong with his arms. He is not less able to move them than most people are: he is especially good at moving them… but after he moves them, he suffers severe pain in his arm muscles… it is not difficult for the man to move his arms, but it is very costly for him to do so. What I call ‘difficulty’ and ‘cost’ are two widely conflated but importantly distinct ways in which it can be hard for a person to do something. (It is costly, but not difficult, for me to supply you with a check for £500). Now there is an expensive medicine which, taken regularly, suppresses the pain that otherwise follows the man’s arm movement. Egalitarians would, favour supplying our man with the medicine. But providing the medicine cannot be represented as compensating for a resource incapacity. The man’s capacity to move his arms is, in the relevant sense, better (so I stipulated) than that of most people.

• The man’s straightforward inability to move his legs and his liability to pain when moving his arms are both disadvantages for which (I tacitly assumed) he cannot be held responsible, and, I suggest, that is why an egalitarian would compensate him for them.

Question 69

Cohen’s equality of access to advantage- against Dworkin

Answer 69

• “There is no place in [Dworkin’s] theory . . . for comparisons of the welfare levels of different people,” nor, I infer, for catering to people whose pains do not diminish their capacity, since that service reflects a judgment about how their welfare, in one relevant sense, compares with that of others. My cut awards redress for both resource and welfare disadvantages

Question 70

Cohen’s equality of access to advantage - difference in taste

Answer 70

• I believe that we should compensate for disadvantage beyond a person’s control, as such, and that we should not, accordingly, draw a line between unfortunate resource endowment and unfortunate utility function… Paul loves photography, while Fred loves fishing. Prices are such that Fred pursues his pastime with ease while Paul cannot afford to…. Paul can afford to go fishing as readily as Fred can. Paul’s problem is that he hates fishing and, so I am permissibly assuming, could not have helped hating it—it does not suit his natural inclinations. He has a genuinely involuntary expensive taste, and I think that a commitment to equality implies that he should be helped in the way that people like Paul are indeed helped by subsidized community leisure facilities

Question 71

Cohen on compensating for expensive tastes

Answer 71

• I distinguish among expensive tastes according to whether or not their bearer can reasonably be held responsible for them. There are those which he could not have helped forming and/or could not now unform, and then there are those for which, by contrast, he can be held responsible, because he could have forestalled them and/or because he could now unlearn them. I do not say that a person who deliberately develops an expensive taste deserves criticism. But it is also nobody else’s business to pick up the tab for him if he does

Question 72

Cohen - relative economic redistribution

Answer 72

• Jude has cheap expensive tastes. They are cheap in that he needs fewer resources to attain the same welfare level as others. But they are expensive in that he could have achieved that welfare level with fewer resources still, had he not cultivated tastes more expensive than those with which he began. Jude began with very modest desires, but then he read Hemingway and cultivated a desire to watch bullfights, and, once he had it, he needed more money than before to achieve an average level of welfare, though still less than what others needed.
• I see no manifest injustice in Jude’s getting the funds he needs to travel to Spain. He then still has fewer re- sources than others, and only the same welfare, so equality of access to advantage cannot say, on that basis, that he is overpaid. But, pace equality of resources, it seems not unreasonable to expect Jude to accept some deduction from the normal resource stipend because of his fortunate high ability to get welfare out of resources

Question 73

Cohen’s concept of “equal opportunity to welfare

Answer 73

Cohen argues that genuine equality requires not just equal access to opportunities, but also equal outcomes in terms of welfare or well-being

Cohen’s theory is grounded in a principle of redistributive justice, which holds that inequalities in welfare should be actively corrected through redistributive measures. He believes that individuals should not be held responsible for factors beyond their control, such as natural talent or family background, and that society has a moral obligation to ensure that everyone has access to a basic level of welfare.

the state has a responsibility to intervene in the market to correct for inequalities and ensure that everyone has access to basic necessities such as healthcare, education, and housing.

Question 74

2 types of arguments for intrinsic value of equality

Answer 74

communitarian and individualistic.

Question 75

communitarian argument for intrinsic value of equality

Answer 75

equality is good for a society taken as a whole. It is a condition of the right kind of relations among its members, and of the formation in them of healthy fraternal attitudes, desires, and sympathies. This view analyzes the value of equality in terms of a social and individual ideal.

Question 76

individualistic argument for intrinsic value of equality

Answer 76

defends equality as a correct distributive principle - the correct way to meet the conflicting needs and interests of distinct people, whatever those interests may be, more or less.

Question 77

2 main ways we believe in equality

Answer 77

We may believe that inequality is bad. On such a view, when we should aim for equality, that is because we shall thereby make the outcome better. We can then be called Teleological - or, for short Telic - Egalitarians.

Our view may instead be Deontological or, for short, Deontic. We may believe we should aim for equality, not to make the outcome better, but for some other moral reason…. We can now redescribe my two kinds of Egalitarian. On the Telic View, inequality is bad; on the Deontic View, it is unjust.

Question 78

telic egalitarianism

Answer 78

inequality is bad

• The Telic View is likely to have wider scope. As I have said, if we think it in itself bad if some people are worse off than others, we may think this bad whoever these people are. It may seem to make no difference where these people live: whether they are in the same or different communities. We may also think it irrelevant what the respects are in which some people are worse off than others: whether they have less income, or worse health, or are less fortunate in other ways. Any inequality, if undeserved and unchosen, we may think bad. Nor, third, will it seem to make a difference how such inequality arose. That is implied by the very notion of intrinsic badness. If some state is in itself bad, it is irrelevant how it came about

Question 79

issue with telic egalitarianism- eyesight

Answer 79

• On the widest version of this view, any inequality is bad. It is bad, for example, that some people are sighted and others are blind. We would therefore have a reason, if we could, to take single eyes from some of the sighted and give them to the blind. That may seem a horrific conclusion.

Question 80

issue with telic egalitarianism- disappearance of inequality must then be good

Answer 80

Suppose that those who are better off suffer some misfortune, so that they become as badly off as everyone else. Since these events would remove the inequality, they must be in one way welcome, on the Telic View, even though they would be worse for some people, and better for no one. This implication seems to many to be quite absurd. I call this the Levelling Down Objection.

Question 81

deontic view of equality

Answer 81

inequality is unjust

Parfit - we do not believe that inequality is bad, so we are not forced to admit that, on our view, it would be in one way better if inequality were removed by level-ling down. We can believe that we have a reason to remove inequality only when, and only because, our way of doing so benefits the people who are worse off. Or we might believe that, when some people are worse off than others, through no fault or choice of theirs, they have a special claim to be raised up to the level of the others, but they have no claim that others be brought down to their level

Question 82

contractarians as part of the deontic view

Answer 82

one large group are broadly contractarian. Such views often appeal to the ideas of reciprocity, or mutual benefit. On some views of this kind, when goods are cooperatively produced, and no one has special claims, all the contributors should get equal shares. There are here two restrictions. First, what is shared are only the fruits of coop-eration. Nothing is said about other goods, such as those that come from nature. Second, the distribution covers only those who produce these goods. Those who cannot contribute, such as the handicapped, or children, or future generations, have no claims.

Question 83

priority view as deontic

Answer 83

Parfit - The Priority View: Benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are. For Utilitarians, the moral importance of each benefit depends only on how great this benefit would be. For Prioritarians, it also depends on how well off the person is to whom this benefit comes. We should not give equal weight to equal benefits, whoever receives them.
- On this view, as I define it here, we do not believe in equality. We give priority to the worse off, not because this will reduce inequality, but for other reasons. That is what makes this a distinctive view.

Question 84

Parfit- deontic view and different communities

Answer 84

• If it is more important to benefit one of two people, because this person is worse off, it is irrelevant whether these people are in the same community or are aware of each other’s existence. The greater urgency of benefiting this person does not depend on her relation to the other person. It depends only on her lower absolute level.

Question 85

main distinction between priority view and relic egalitarians

Answer 85

Parfit: On the Priority View, we do not object to inequality except when it is bad for people. We shall see nothing good in the removal of inequality, when this would benefit no one. Telic Egalitarians dis-agree. On their view, inequality is in itself bad. This implies that inequality is bad whether or not it is bad for people.Parfit:

Question 86

equality has no inherent value

Answer 86

Frankfurt

• The value of equality depends upon its effects. It is only desirable morally to reduce inequality because that will facilitate the attainment of some other goal that is worth pursuing for its own sake because it truly does possess inherent moral value
• Equality is not a freestanding or self sustaining moral ideal. Can be desirable to promote for the sake of other morally worthy goals only.

Question 87

frankfurt’s 2 Arguments against inherent value of equality

Answer 87

o Pursuit and promotion of egalitarianism is in a certain respect significantly pernicious. Has a natural tendency to mislead people into adopting perspectives and ways of thinking that make it difficult for them to understand themselves and conduct their lives sensibly. Could lead to envy and resentment but he does not argue this

distracts people from their real interests - he cannot make a satisfying and successful life by comparing his available resources to those of others

Question 88

should money be the egalitarian currency - issue is economy isn’t everything

Answer 88

• Response 1: the range of things the individual can purchase is still constrained by laws
  and cultural norms
• If something is not up for sale then one cannot purchase it
• If something is illegal, then as a citizen under the social contract, one cannot purchase it

Question 89

Money should be the egalitarian currency

Answer 89

Money gives one effective freedom to engage in a wider variety of activities and experiences compared to a world without it (exchange economy)

Having equal rights to money, then, would imply (to some extent) equal freedom for citizens to make their life choices

Question 90

Money shouldn’t be the egalitarian currency- money does not = freedom

Answer 90

The added freedom to purchase some things are just trivial (e.g. my life is not made significantly better if I had the option to buy an additional sticker set on a messaging app than I have been previously)

Question 91

Libertarianism equality

Answer 91

• Libertarians, most notable John Locke, hold that every person has equal basic or natural rights that apply independently of institutional arrangements.
• Locke (1960): Each person has the right to do whatever they choose with whatever they legitimately owns insofar as they do not violate other people’s rights to be free from harm, be by force, fraud, damage, coercion, whether it be to themselves or their property. On this view, each adult has full-ownership of themselves; meanwhile, children have the right to be cared for.
• If an agent owns something. they have the right to exclude others from the use of the thing and to control its use oneself

Question 92

libertarians - who owns unowned property

Answer 92

• There are two key interpretations of Locke’s account which differ on their approach to intergenerational ownership rights. If, for example, the person who has discovered this unused land and then comes to own it is dead, right-libertarians would hold that whoever finds that plot of land first can come to own it, even if they were just lucky. Left-libertarians, in contrast, hold that each new generation should have a right to an equal share of land.

Question 93

critique of right libertarians

Answer 93

• Right-libertarianism allows for too much inequality
  If someone was born in the densely populated slums, they have a much thinner chance of finding previously inappropriate land. Under right-libertarianism, then, the poor – who tend to live in densely populated conditions – are disproportionately disadvantaged in gaining property ownership, though this is not a problem fro the left-libertarians.
• A libertarian reply could be that any value equality has is trumped by the value of self-ownership.

Question 94

money should not be the egalitarian currency- libertarian view

Answer 94

• The redistributive process by which wealth and income equality can be arrived and sustained
  is a serious violation of Lockean rights
• People have a right to self-ownership, so people have a right to the products of their
  labour or talents
• • To tax, then, is to disrespect this fundamental right to self-ownership people possess

The pursuit of monetary equality will remove citizens’ incentive to make money, which would reduce the amount of money people make in the long run, but the effective freedom we have also depends on the amount of money we have; thus, making citizens equal on monetary terms reduces the effective freedom they have in the long run

Question 95

money should not be the egalitarian currency- libertarian view- Having equal wealth and income is not sufficient for making people equal

Answer 95

People with Type I diabetes would have to spend money on insulin shots

Having the same level of purchasing power to others does not make them as well off as others since a portion of their income will have to be spent on medication, so there is less disposable income they can freely consume

o - Aiming for wealth or income equality fetishises money. In practice, we do not care about money apart from what it enables us to do, for example to afford necessary medical treatment; surely egalitarians should care about equality in the space of what ultimately matters to people rather than the means to that.

Question 96

a basic capability

Answer 96

A “basic capability” is one of the capabilities needed for a minimally decent life, but exactly what this is differs across the various theories. One view is to link basic capability to what one needs to enjoy a flourishing life (Nussbaum 1992). Another view is to tie basic capability to what is needed to participate in a democracy (Anderson 1999).

Question 97

socially v naturally caused capabilities

Answer 97

Capabilities may be the product of nature or society. Naturally caused capabilities are such as the capability to find a romantic partner, which may depend on one’s physical features (e.g. how attractive one looks). Socially caused capabilities can be identified by analysing two alternative policies; if one policy brings about an inequality in capabilities but another does not, then that capability is socially caused.
Elizabeth Anderson (1999) claims that the relevant capabilities to equalise are those that are socially caused: “The proper negative aim of egalitarian justice is not to eliminate the impact of brute luck from human affairs, but to end oppression, which by definition is socially imposed.”

Question 98

capability should not be the egalitarian currency- outcomes are more important to equalise than freedoms

Answer 98

We cannot justify why freedom is more important than resultant distributions
The idea of basic capability equality is an attempt to ensure equal effective freedom, but further justification is needed as to why we should equalise freedom and not the outcomes. For example, if we both give A and B freedom to eat a slice of cake and only B eats the cake, since A does not like cake, we have wasted a slice of cake by giving it to A. The fact that A had the freedom to eat cake too did not make her better off either. So it is a misplacement to ground equality on freedom.

Question 99

capability should not be the egalitarian currency- more freedom detracts from welfare

Answer 99

Welfare theorists argue that what one wants is a good life, not more options. Sometimes having too many options detracts one from living a good life. For example, if we equally allowed people of all talent levels to appear in a movie without auditioning them in, those who are passionate in acting but in other circumstances would not make the cut would embarrass themselves to the public such that they may prefer to not have appeared at all.

Question 100

capability should not be the egalitarian currency- capability foes not register the importance of personal responsibility

Answer 100

Roemer-
Suppose we deem having $1000 an amount of money that is required for basic functioning. A gambler can gamble away all that amount in a night and society would have a duty to reimburse him such that he has at least $1000 – the amount required for having a basic capability to live in that society

Question 101

capability should not be the egalitarian currency- involves perfectionism

Answer 101

In determining what the important basic capabilities are, at least in Nussbaum’s sense that they are the conditions for a flourishing life, we must decide on what leads to a flourishing life. If the state decides on one notion of a flourishing life that is controversial then the state is perfectionist. The problem with this is that equality, controversially construed as such, would not be accepted by the citizens.
If the state had instead only required equality in things that matter to flourishing but pertaining to non-controversial elements of flourishing, the equalising policy would be guaranteeing equality in too few dimensions. The role of the state is minimal and not very helpful as a result.

Question 102

issue with resource egalitarianism and inequality

Answer 102

Resource egalitarianism allows for too much inequality
People vary enormously in their personal traits. These traits interact with their circumstances and material resources to determine what they can do with a given resource share.
A Ralwsian reply: Carter’s (2001) response to this criticism is that it is not the government’s business to assess people’s personal traits and judge what they can do with the given resources. The state is merely obliged to guarantee equality in the necessary resources.

Question 103

lissue with luck egalitarianism and privacy

Answer 103

Investigation may be needed to determine which outcomes are the result of brute luck and which outcomes are the result of option luck. Citizens are thus subject to this constant scrutiny by the state; Wolff (1998) calls this disrespectful process a “shameful revelation.”
The luck egalitarian response to this concern is to say that there is nothing shameful in being worse off due to brute luck. Yet, there is shame in being worse off due to option luck and people do experience it as a result of such investigations. A way to reconcile the luck egalitarian case is to realise that there is a plurality of values in society and equality is only one among them. Our values for privacy can justify why such investigations are unduly.

Question 104

hard to distinguish between brute and option luck

Answer 104

It is difficult to determine if something is a product of brute luck or of option luck
While brute luck may assign an individual with a higher chance of contracting lung cancer, their risk of getting it also depends on their life choices, such as whether or not they smoke. The distinction between the two is not as clear as Dworkin envisages it to be.

Also, we are characteristically influenced – even if not fully causally determined – by our wider circumstances such as our dispositions or the society we are part of. These factors often reflect unfair inequalities. Relevantly, people’s decision-making capabilities depend on their level of intelligence which is arbitrarily assigned. Thus, brute luck also impacts the options we choose to take later on, including the our choice of the hypothetical insurance package.

one enjoys the benefits of a good choice even if one is not causally responsible for it. Therefore, by the same logic, one can live the consequences of a bad choice if one is not causally responsible for it too.

Question 105

sickness issue with insurance model of welfare when compensation is set to increase happiness

Answer 105

Roemer (2002): The outcome of the hypothetical insurance market may be counterintuitive Being severely and chronically ill may diminish one’s ability to enjoy the pleasures money may bring (e.g. they find it harder to travel abroad) so one may subscribe to an insurance package which gives the ill person less money than the healthy person. This idea contradicts the intuition that these insurance will compensate the ill for their diseased life.

Question 106

Anderson - response to case of the negligent driver

Answer 106

• Response 1: only denies free medical care; if the negligent driver has purchased insurance or is willing to pay for their medical costs then the luck egalitarian has no issue with them receiving treatment
• Response 2: We live under value pluralism where equality is only one of many values. While equality does not give the reason for why we should give medical care to the driver, we may also have other values (e.g. universal right to healthcare) which means we should give the driver medical assistance
• BUT by giving the negligent driver medical assistance we are using more resources on them than the safe driver; this seems unfair
• Response: in a situation of scarcity, we would want to save the safe driver over the negligent driver, but in a situation without scarcity, our other values may take precedence over the luck egalitarian principles

Question 107

Anderson- case of vulnerable carers

Answer 107

• A single mother denies a job opportunity for the sake of her children
• The luck egalitarian would deny her access to unemployment benefits since her unemployment is due to her own choices
• Response: unemployment may not be a declinable gamble; she could choose to enter employment but it could be a logistically possible for her to do so and to ensure her children are cared for in a way that resource egalitarians would want children to be cared for (e.g. have some level education); if the gamble is not declinable then losing is not her choice

Question 108

issue with welfare egalitarianism - water issue

Answer 108

• Consider a different case: suppose Sarah has a very specific taste for water such that she can only drink mineral water from the Alps and no less; water that is not from the Alps will cause displeasure for her. Suppose water from the Alps is very expensive to secure and Sarah obviously has demands to be hydrated. The welfare egalitarian outcome is one such that society would have to try to secure water from the Alps for her because otherwise she will have very low welfare compared to others.

Question 109

issue with redistribution egalitarianism as valuing equality above all else

Answer 109

it is difficult to convince ourselves that in extreme cases (e.g. a distribution of 10 utils each compared to 1000 utils to everyone but one person with 10001 utils) that egalitarianism should have so much moral weight attached to it that the 10 each distribution is preferred.

A value pluralist reply could be that in such a case, other values takes precedence over the value for equality.

Question 110

Parfit - nothing inherently bad about equality

Answer 110

o Suppose there were two societies that will never come into contact with one another but it is possible to redistribute resources between them
o Assume in one society each citizen equally have $10 and in the other citizens equally have $100
o Since the individuals in those societies will never come into contact with one another, there is no concern regarding equality

Question 111

Prioritarianism

Answer 111

Prioritarians hold that “the moral value of achieving a benefit for an individual (or avoiding a loss) is greater, the greater the size of the benefit as measured by a well-being scale, and greater, the lower the person’s level of well-being over the course of her life apart from receipt of this benefit.” Arneson (2013)
o - Prioritarianism takes the consequentialist/utilitarian doctrine and adds a layer of moral multiplier such that the worse-off one is (the lower current utility is) the more morally worthy it is to benefit them. In other words, the moral multiplier increases as one’s current level of welfare decreases.

Question 112

how to measure what is better in prioritarianism

Answer 112

• The main point about a measure of urgency is that it is done by pairwise comparison of the situations of individuals. The simplest method would be to count any improvement in the situation of someone worse off as more urgent than any improvement in the situation of someone better off; but this is not especially plausible. It is more reasonable to accord greater urgency to large improvements somewhat higher in the scale than to very small improvements lower down.

Nagel - if the choice is between preventing severe hardship for some who are very poor and deprived, and preventing less severe but still substantial hardship for those who are better off but still struggling for subsistence, then it is very difficult for me to believe that the numbers do not count, and that priority of urgency goes to the worse off however many more there are of the better off.

Question 113

prioritarianism vs egalitarianism

Answer 113

o - Prioritarianism is a competing theory to egalitarianism
* Prioritarians claim that it is the absolute level of welfare/resources/money etc. that matters,

The greater urgency of benefiting this person does not depend on her relation to the other person. It depends only on her lower absolute level

• Prioritarians- do not believe in equality. We give priority to the worse off, not because this will reduce inequality, but for other reasons. That is what makes this a distinctive view. egalitarians posit that there is some value to equality in itself
• Parfit- On the Priority View, we do not object to inequality except when it is bad for people. We shall see nothing good in the removal of inequality, when this would benefit no one
  .- thus avoids the levelling down objection

Question 114

sufficientarianism

Answer 114

o - Sufficientarians hold that it is morally valuable that “as many as possible of all who shall ever live should enjoy conditions of life that place them above the threshold that marks the minimum required for a decent (good enough) quality of life.”

Question 115

sufficientarianism as a positive and negative thesis

Answer 115

• Positive thesis: sufficiency matters as a requirement of justice
• Negative thesis: anything other than sufficiency does not matter as a distributive requirement of justice

Question 116

sufficiantarianism

Answer 116

The egalitarian transfer of resources from the rich can be justified in terms of enabling more people to exceed the threshold and achieve sufficiency
o - Most egalitarians think sufficiency matters but for sufficientarians, only sufficiency alone matters

Question 117

issue with sufficientarianism - prioritises numbers of sufficiency

Answer 117

Suppose the threshold was defined such that numbers individuals live large distances below it and a select few live just below or just above it
* The doctrine of sufficiency would call for the reallocation of the resources from those just above the threshold to those just under so that more people can live above the threshold
* This contradicts with our moral intuitions which suggests that those furthest away from the threshold are those who have the most dire need for those reallocated resources

Question 118

sufficientarianism - where does the priority end

Answer 118

o - It is unclear how much priority people under the threshold get in comparison to those above the threshold
* Suppose there are two women going into labour at the same time; one is rich and lives above the threshold but the other is poor and lives below the threshold
* The rich woman arrives in a taxi to the hospital but the doctor is notified of the poor woman

Question 119

Anderson’s main arguments

Answer 119

Relational Equality: Anderson argues that equality should be understood not only as a matter of distributional fairness but also as a matter of social relations. She emphasizes the importance of relational equality, which involves treating individuals with equal concern and respect, recognizing their inherent dignity and worth as human beings.

Democratic Equality: Anderson contends that equality is essential for the functioning of democratic societies. In a democracy, all citizens should have an equal voice and equal opportunity to participate in political decision-making processes. This requires not only formal legal equality but also substantive equality in terms of access to education, information, and resources necessary for effective participation in democratic governance.

Anderson argues that equality is a fundamental moral ideal that is central to the pursuit of justice and fairness in society.

Anderson acknowledges that equality can also have instrumental value in promoting other social goods, such as economic prosperity, social stability, and individual well-being. She argues that greater equality can lead to better outcomes for society as a whole by reducing social tensions

Question 120

Anderson on libertarianism

Answer 120

Anderson critiques libertarian theories that prioritize individual liberty and property rights over equality. She argues that unfettered market competition and minimal government intervention can lead to entrenched inequalities and undermine the ability of individuals to exercise their freedom and participate fully in society

Question 121

Nagel’s main view of prioritarianism

Answer 121

critique of prioritarianism

seems to me that no plausible theory can avoid the relevance of numbers completely. There may be some disparities of urgency so great that the priorities persist whatever numbers are involved. But if the choice is between preventing severe hardship for some who are very poor and deprived, and preventing less severe but still substantial hardship for those who are better off but still struggling for subsistence, then it is very difficult for me to believe that the numbers do not count, and that priority of urgency goes to the worse off however many more there are of the better off.

Question 122

Nagel’s view of equality

Answer 122

• attempts to reduce inequality may also reduce the total quantity of goods avail-able, by affecting incentives to work and invest. For example, a progressive income tax and diminishing marginal utility make it more expensive to purchase the labor of those whose services are most in demand. Beyond a certain point, the pursuit of equality may sacrifice overall utility, or even the welfare of everyone in the society. Second, the promotion of equality may require objectionable means. To achieve even moderate equality it is necessary to restrict economic liberty, including the freedom to make bequests. Greater equality may be attainable only by more general coercive techniques

Question 123

Parfit main view

Answer 123

priority view and deontic view

compatible - we do not believe in equality. We give priority to the worse off, not because this will reduce inequality, but for other reasons. That is what makes this a distinctive view.

Question 124

Cohen main view

Answer 124

Equal access to advantage encompasses more than just ensuring equal distribution of resources or equal utility. It emphasizes that individuals should have both the opportunity and the capability to obtain goods and resources necessary for their well-being. This concept recognizes that mere equality in resources or outcomes may not suffice if individuals lack the means or ability to effectively utilize those resources.

This includes access to education, healthcare, employment, and other resources that enable individuals to develop their potential and contribute to society. + Equal access to advantage requires addressing systemic inequalities that perpetuate disparities in access to resources and opportunities. This may involve implementing policies and initiatives aimed at dismantling structural barriers based on factors like race, gender, ethnicity, or socio-economic status+

Socialist equality of opportunity requires a kind of equality in starting points, but no equality in results. For Cohen, then, the community principle is supposed to take care of the inequalities that social- ist equality of opportunity would admit; it is supposed to help generate equal results.

Question 125

Zofia Stemplowska’s main arguments

Answer 125

revision of luck egalitarianism

What any egalitarian view needs, then, is a systematic way of designing the baseline, deciding which choices should not lead to disadvantage (Williams 2006b). One possible answer is that we must ask whether acting to avoid a disadvantage requires greater sacrifice than offering compensation should it arise

the cushion of the baseline does not stretch to cover cases where reckless and wasteful decisions of some would eat too much, if compensated for, into the resources of others.

Question 126

2 theories of distributional equality- Dworkin

Answer 126

two general theories of distributional equality: equality of welfare and equality of resources. The former suggests that distribution should aim to make people equal in welfare, while the latter proposes that distribution should aim to make people equal in their shares of resources. Each theory has different interpretations and raises questions about what constitutes welfare or resources.

Question 127

equality of resources v equality of welfare and awareness of others- Dowrkin

Answer 127

In equality of welfare, individuals make decisions about their lives based solely on their personal preferences and goals. They do not consider how their choices might impact others or the overall distribution of resources in society.

in equality of resources individuals consider the broader context of resource distribution when making decisions about their lives. They are aware of the actual cost their choices impose on others and the total pool of resources available in society. This means that individuals take into account the impact of their decisions on the overall distribution of resources and the well-being of others.

Question 128

Dworkin’s auction

Answer 128

The auction is designed as a mechanism to determine the value of resources in a society where equality of resources is the goal. It serves as a tool for allocating resources fairly among individuals.

each person starts with an equal share of resources. These resources include not only material goods but also opportunities, abilities- The auction operates by allowing individuals to bid on the resources they desire, using their initial equal share of resources as currency. This means that individuals must make choices about which resources are most valuable to them

individuals with handicaps may receive additional resources to offset their disadvantages.

Question 129

Williams - main argument

Answer 129

society may strive for equality in the distribution of certain goods and opportunities, such as education or healthcare, there exists another dimension of equality related to respect and dignity. The former focuses on ensuring fair and rational allocation of resources, while the latter emphasizes treating individuals with equal consideration and regard, irrespective of their social status or achievements.

pursuit of equality in the distribution of goods often clashes with the social dynamics of competitiveness and prestige. In societies where certain skills or talents are highly valued, individuals may attain higher status or prestige based on their achievements or socioeconomic background.

importance of fostering genuine equality of respect.

Question 130

sufficientarianism - too much focus on a threshold

Answer 130

• Sufficiency- according to what everyone needs to be sufficient. Firstly, what counts as enough? But then if you introduce a threshold for sufficiency. Let us say a minimum of 1000 creates sufficiency. But then going from 998-999 achieves nothing of value, 999-1000 is valuable but then 1000-1001 is again of no value- discontinuity

Question 131

equality of fortune

Answer 131

equal outcomes of material resources, regardless of talent, effort or merit - eq distribution of wealth, income and opportunities to ensure similar life outcomes

Mixed economy - market forces but redistribution to create equality of outcome

Question 132

Distributive justice

Answer 132

“distributive justice is the
combination of pattern and
currency of allocation of units of
moral concern’

Patterns are egalitarianism,
prioritarianism, sufficientarian- the way goods are distributed

Currency is like welfare or
primary goods or money or
whatever you are trying to
distribute according to ur chosen
pattern- the units of moral concern. what is deserving or valuable of distribution within society

Question 133

Dworkin - eq of welfare and alternative

Answer 133

while equality of welfare has its appeal, it may not be as coherent or attractive as commonly thought. He advocates for careful consideration of alternative ideals, such as equality of resources

eg critiques “expensive tastes.” Dworkin argues that equality of welfare seems to imply that individuals with expensive tastes, who require more resources to achieve the same level of welfare as those with less expensive tastes, should receive more resources.

Dworkin explores how insurance can mitigate inequalities resulting from luck. By providing compensation for losses due to luck, such as through underemployment insurance, societies can help ensure that individuals have a more equal opportunity to achieve their goals and aspirations.

Question 134

Against nagel’s prioritarianism

Answer 134

numbers matter- 10 utils for poor, 100 for rich. let’s say 8x multiplier for giving to poor 80 is still less than 100 so would excuse giving extra resources to the rich and actually argue for giving nothing to the poor

Question 135

Formal v fair eq. of opportunity

Answer 135

 Formal equality of opportunity primarily focuses on eliminating legal and institutional barriers that may prevent individuals from accessing opportunities based on factors like race, gender, or ethnicity. The emphasis is on ensuring that laws and policies do not explicitly discriminate against individuals from certain social classes or backgrounds. This approach typically does not involve addressing broader structural inequalities, such as disparities in access to education, healthcare, or economic resources,
 Fair equality of opportunity acknowledges and seeks to address broader structural inequalities that affect individuals’ opportunities, including disparities in access to education, healthcare, economic resources, and social networks. The emphasis is on creating conditions that enable all individuals to compete on a more equal footing, regardless of their social class background. This approach may involve interventions such as affirmative action programs, educational subsidies, or social welfare policies

Question 136

Rawls difference principle

Answer 136

The difference principle, as articulated by Rawls, states that social and economic inequalities are permissible only if they benefit the least advantaged members of society. According to this principle, inequalities in wealth, income, and opportunities are justifiable if they result in improvements in the well-being and prospects of the most disadvantaged individuals.- improving the position of the least advantaged, rather than maximizing overall welfare or promoting absolute equality.

The difference principle complements fair equality of opportunity by addressing the inequalities that may persist despite the fair distribution of opportunities. It ensures that any disparities in wealth, income, or opportunities serve to the advantage of the least advantaged members of society, thereby upholding the principles of fairness and justice.

Question 137

Dworkin’s welfare state

Answer 137

1. Equality of Resources: Dworkin proposes an egalitarian distribution of resources as the foundation of the welfare state. He argues that individuals should have equal access to resources that enable them to pursue their life plans and aspirations- material resources such as wealth and income + opportunities for education, healthcare, and personal development.

the state has a responsibility to intervene in the market economy to ensure a fair distribution of resources and to provide assistance to those who are less advantaged

Dworkin emphasizes the importance of fair equality of opportunity as a principle of justice within the welfare state.

He argues that individuals have a duty to contribute to society and to make responsible choices that promote their own well-being and the common good.

Question 138

Sen’s capabilities as relational eq.

Answer 138

Sen recognizes the interconnectedness of individuals within society and the importance of social relationships and interactions in shaping individuals’ capabilities and opportunities. He emphasizes that people’s capabilities are not only determined by their personal attributes but also by the social contexts in which they live. This relational aspect highlights the ways in which individuals’ freedoms and opportunities are influenced by their interactions with others and by the social structures and institutions that govern their lives.

different individuals may value different functionings and capabilities, and therefore, policies should aim to promote a broad range of capabilities that reflect individuals’ diverse preferences and circumstances. This recognition of diversity aligns with the relational aspect of equality, which emphasizes the importance of respecting and valuing individuals’ unique identities and aspirations.

Question 139

Dworkin’s equal concern and respect

Answer 139

Dworkin contends that all individuals possess inherent dignity by virtue of their status as human beings. This inherent dignity implies that each person’s interests and rights should be given equal weight and consideration in moral and political decision-making.

equal concern: This means that policymakers and institutions should take into account the needs and interests of all individuals, rather than privileging certain groups or individuals over others

equal respect: based on equal moral worth - This requires treating people with dignity and respect, regardless of their social or economic status, and refraining from discrimination or prejudice based on arbitrary characteristics.

Question 140

Dworkin’s equal concern and respect and justice

Answer 140

He contends that justice requires upholding the principles of equal concern and respect in the design and implementation of laws, policies, and social institutions. This involves ensuring that everyone has equal access to opportunities and resources, and that no one is unfairly disadvantaged or marginalized.

Question 141

Rawls - lottery

Answer 141

social lottery
natural lottery

The social lottery refers to the distribution of social and economic advantages and disadvantages that result from societal institutions and arrangements, such as access to education, employment opportunities, and wealth distribution. In contrast, the natural lottery refers to inequalities that arise from factors beyond individual control, such as genetic endowment, family background, and natural talents or abilities.

compensate for both