Lecture 8b: Takeovers 2 Flashcards

1.) Economic Rationale for Takeovers 2.) Empirical Evidences of Takeovers

1
Q

What are the 9 Economical Reasons for Takeovers (ACRONYM(

A

MU UCPD FT. EPS

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

TAKEOVER REASON 1: M

A

Management of Target Company is inefficient

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

What is the evidence to support the inefficient management of the target company? Breakdown the Trend

A

On average, target companies underperform months before the announcement (underperform with a negative cumulative abnormal return)

Few days before announcement, cumulative abnormal return goes up to 12%, because of disclosure and insider trading

On announcement date, share price goes up by about 10% to 24% and STAYS CONSTANT.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

TAKEOVER REASON 2 : C

A

Complementary Assets

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Elaborate on TAKEOVER REASON 1 (M)

A

MANAGEMENT

Takeover replaces managers who are inefficient and too self-interested

Having a more efficient management can increase the value of the firm

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Elaborate on TAKEOVER REASON 2 (C)

A

COMPLEMENTARY ASSETS

Horizontal/Vertical - Takeovers attractive if companies can provide others with needed assets at relatively low costs (Economies of Scale)

Conglomerate - Taking over small companies who cannot realize their full potential because their managers do not have skills across all areas of management (asset + management)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Is the argument “complementary assets’ applicable to human resources

A

Yes. For examples, if T has engineers, B (bigger firm) might want to takeover to use them

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

TAKEOVER REASON 3: U

A

Target Company is Undervalued

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Elaborate on TAKEOVER REASON 3 (U)

A

UNDERVALUATION

Not NECESSARILY in the sense that target company is undervalued in the stock market. Undervalued to the BIDDER.

Investors/Managers identify better value from using company’s assets ALTERNATIVELY (!)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

TAKEOVER REASON 4: C

A

Cost Reductions

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Elaborate on TAKEOVER REASON 4 (C)

A

COST REDUCTIONS

  • Total operating cost of BT < Operating cost B + Operating Cost T

Horizontal: Economies of Scale
Vertical: Cost savings from coordinating activities, improved communications, reduced bargaining cost,
etc

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

TAKEOVER REASON 5: P

A

Increase market power

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Elaborate on TAKEOVER REASON 5 (P) - Controversial

A

INCREASE MARKET POWER (i.e. monopolize)

  • Potential for increase dependent on whether there are significant barriers to entry

E.g. ACCC/other jurisdictions prohibits mergers likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

TAKEOVER REASON 6: D

A

Diversification

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Elaborate on TAKEOVER REASON 6 (D).

Perspective of SH, DH

A

DIVERSIFICATION

  • SH: No difference. They can diversify themselves (with a. own risk preference, and b. control premium)
  • DH: Co-insurance effect. 2 companies whose earning streams less than perfectly correlated reduces default risk. If no economic benefit DH + SH - .

Main point: Equity holders do not gain/worse off by diversification

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

TAKEOVER REASON 7: F

A

Excess Free Cash Flow

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

Elaborate on TAKEOVER REASON 7 (F)

A

EXCESS FREE CASH FLOW

  • Managers might prioritize acquisition over returning excess cash to shareholders (buyback/dividend)
  • Conflict of interest between shareholders and managers may lead to little value/negative NPV takeovers
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

TAKEOVER REASON 8: T

A

Tax Benefits

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

Elaborate on TAKEOVER REASON 8 (T).

Tests to satisfy

A

TAX BENEFITS

If target company has accumulated tax losses, reduces total tax payable by combined company

Continuity-of-Ownership-And-Control = Owners >50% of shares in target company when it incurred losses remains as owners (Hard to pass)
Same-Business Test = Same line of business

Takeover of foreign company can shift company from high to low tax environment

20
Q

Which taxation systems does taxes favor in takeover reason 8 (T)

A

Classical: Tc + Tp. Lowering Tc is good
Imputation: Tp. No benefits (assuming fully franked)

21
Q

TAKEOVER REASON 9: EPS (Controversial)

A

Increase EPS and P/E Ratio Effects

22
Q

Elaborate on TAKEOVER REASON 9 (EPS).

A

IINCREASE EPS AND P/E EFFECT

-By itself, an invalid argument: Can increase EPS without creating value

Bootstrapping: Whenever P/E of Bidding is higher than P/E of Target, EPS Increases and P/E Decreases if value remains constant.

23
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 1: Do takeover comes in waves

A

Yes. Takeovers are positively correlated with behavior of share prices.

24
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers Wave: Why are there waves

A

Increase real demand = Increase Equity Returns = Increase productive capacity

As business and consumer confidence increases, takeover increases

25
Q

What is productive capacity in takeovers

A

Productive efficiency of a firm - Internally (Debt/Equity) or External (TAKEOVERS).

Takeovers are quick way to expand.

26
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 2: Motivation of Takeovers

A
  1. ) Synergy (37.3%)
  2. ) Diversification (29.3%)

Minor points (<10%): Achieve a specific organisational form (10.7%); Acquire target company below replacement cost; Free cash flow; Taxes; Others

27
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 3: Sources of Synergy

A
  1. ) Operating Economies/Economies of Scale (89.9%)
  2. ) Transaction Cost (5.8%)
  3. ) Market Power (4.3%)
28
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 4: Diversification

Perspective of people who agree

A
  1. ) Less devastation in economic downturn (50%)
  2. ) Take advantage of seasonality in production cycle (13.9%)
  3. ).) Internal capital allocation (12.5%)

Others

29
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 5a: Target Company Performance Takeover. Before, Around, After

A

BEFORE announcement = Under performance

AROUND announcement (even in unsuccessful takeovers) = Significant abnormal positive return

AFTER takeover = significant abnormal positive return stays constant

30
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 5b: Bidding Company Performance Takeover. Before, Around, After

A

YEARS BEFORE announcement = Significant abnormal positive returns (i.e. companies doing well)

AROUND announcement = average abnormal return is 0 or negative

POST-MERGER (3 years) = returns are on average negative

31
Q

Who often wins from a takeover

A

Target company

32
Q

Which method of payment is better (cash/stock) for target and bidding companies

A

Cash > Stock for both.

Stock can signal overvaluation.

33
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 5b: Bidding Company poor performance reason 1 (W)

A

Wealth effects are disguised

Usually, value of bidding&raquo_space;> value of target (gain is small relative to combined company)

Main Point: Bidding company known for acquisition. Announcement does not signal new info.

Announcement may be negative signal (esp in share exchange signals shares are overvalued)

34
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 5b: Bidding Company poor performance reason 2 (C) and 2 sub reasons

A

Competition depresses returns

1.) Many bidders to 1 target = Target SH returns increases; Bidding SH returns decreases
1 Bidder to 1 Target/ No Competition = Bidding SH Returns increases

2.) Competition may be influenced by regulations (biased to targets)

35
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 5b: Bidding Company poor performance reason 3 (P)

A

Takeovers are simply neutral/poor arguments and managements do it for ego.

36
Q

What kind of takeover is reason 1 most applicable to, and why?

A

Horizontal takeovers - because bidding company managers have the expertise to manage target company operations more efficiently

37
Q

Does inefficient management mean that management is inefficient?

A

Not necessarily, could be that management are acting in own interest rather than their ability.

38
Q

What is Economies of Scale

A

Splitting of cost over wider base

39
Q

Empirical Evidence of Takeovers 4: Diversification

Perspective of people who disagree

A
  1. ) Shareholders can diversify themselves (35.7%)
  2. ) Parents lose focus of company (31%)
  3. ) Firm should stay in business he knows (26.2%)

Linked with Diversification Discount

40
Q

Why is cash better than stock as a method of payment

A

The market responds negatively to stock.

41
Q

Takeover activity tends to vary significantly over time.

Outline the factors that may explain this variation.

A
  1. ) Share price levels (Share prices reflect an optimistic outlook for investments, some of which will be external)
  2. ) Economic shocks that affect particular industries, and are often followed by industry re-structuring
  3. ) Legislation (changes in legislative controls and foreign investment regulations)
42
Q

Company can reduce risk by taking over

Do you agree with this statement? Is it a justifiable reason for a takeover

A
  • Yes, but systematic risk of the combined company = average of the systematic risks of the two individual companies.

Investors can diversity themselves - takeover does not offer risk-reduction benefits that were not previously available to investors.

However, may be of value if there are barriers that prevent shareholders from directly diversifying.

43
Q

A company with accumulated tax losses is necessarily a valuable takeover proposition. Discuss this
statement and give a caveat.

A

Only if provided that the acquiring company can use the tax losses (Same line of business/ continuity of ownership)

However, benefits associated with reducing company tax by using accumulated tax losses are likely to be small under the imputation tax system.

44
Q

First, it provides diversification. Takeover statement tutorial question

A
  • Diversification = Not sound reason for takeover (Can diversity in own portfolio)
  • Nothing wrong with diversification provided that the investment is profitable in its own right. In this case, there is no evidence that Budget is at all attractive as an investment.
45
Q

Second, he argues that by injecting fresh capital, Budget can be ‘rescued’ and should appreciate markedly in value. Budget works old computers.

A
  • Takeover of Budget might be profitable if its problems were due to, say, inefficient management that could be replaced.
  • However in the qs, its problems flow from fundamental characteristics of the computer industry. Injecting more funds may not be beneficial.
46
Q

There is no reason for on acquiring company to prefer a cash bid to a stock exchange or vice versa.

Discuss this statement.

A

Cash bid = Fixed net cost is fixed

Share swap = Net cost depends on the gain associated with the takeover and on the distribution of the gain between the two companies’ shareholders (depends on bidding company’s shares after it has been announced)

Other factors include:

(a) Availability of Cash
(b) Dilution of ownership and control for existing SHs
(c) Effect on the company’s capital structure. For example, loan covenants or trust deed provisions may restrict the raising of cash by borrowing.

47
Q

What are the benefits and costs associated with having the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) involved with the market for corporate control?

A

Pros:

  • Substantial lessening in competition > bidder has more incentive to operate efficiently given threat of competition.

Cons:

  • Hinder the efficient allocation of resources by allowing firms that are wasting resources to continue to operate, rather than be acquired by firms that are better able to utilize them