Lecture 5 Flashcards
‘Hatton, (2016)’
Estimates a gravity model for asylum migration for 19 OCED destinations from 48 origin countries from 1997-2012. Accounting for push/pull & stay/stay away factors. Increasing political terror by 1 point increase asylum applications by 20%, and between 2000-12 countries had tightened their policies on asylum seekers so annual application dropped by 21%
‘Bohra-Mishra and Douglas, (2011)’
Maoist Communist Party started an insurgence 1996-2006 in Nepal where natural experiment occurred from varying intensity of violence around the country, and the influence of exposure to violence had an likelihood to move. Found move from none-to-minimal deterred migration wanted to look after assets and only moved when it became more dangerous at which point they moved internationally with higher probability
‘Morrision, (1993)’
Found there was a threshold effect of violent on leaving a nation. Low levels deterred migration but larger levels pushed people away.
‘Moraga and Rapoport, (2015)’
Criticises EU policy of the Dublin Convention and how although slight improvement has been seen regarding direct costs, it is uneven how asylum seekers are spread round Europe placing a added burden on Mediterranean countries. Need a tradable market for asylum seekers to improve the balance. Give each nation an initial allocation and let nations trade until a equilibrium state that I Pareto efficient is found. Use 2 way matching to get the right asylum seekers into each country, embracing migrant heterogeneity.
‘Hatton, (2012)’
There needs to be a joint policy that matches supply and demand and prevents an oversupply of migrants into certain countries
‘Cortes, (2004)’
Looking at immigrants from 1975-1980 in the US economic migrant nations selected immigrants more for labour market success while refugee nations did less. But refugee immigrants gain specific-human capital quicker (at the start refugees earn 17% less but within 10 years disadvantages disappear and out earn economic migrants by 20%.
‘Hansen and Lofstron, (2003)’
Look at the requirements of asylum seekers as for public expenditure compared to natives living in Sweden. Found refugees used the welfare state a lot more than natives (49% compared to 5%) but assimilated out of welfare at a much quicker rate than economic migrants so welfare use was equal to economic migrants after 10 years.
‘Alix-Garcia and Saah, (2010)’
asses the impacts of refugee camps on local markets in Tanzania in 1990’s. Found the price of most agricultural foods increased as you move closer to camps, where sellers of agriculture get richer the closer you are to the camps and consumers are poorer the closer they are to the refugee camps.
‘Balkan and Tumen, (2016)’
Looks at the effects of refugee’s in Turkey on consumer prices. Large influx of Syrian refugees 1.6m in 2012-4 which saw a agricultural demand and decrease in relative prices of 2.6%. But informal goods saw a 4% decrease x10 difference compared to formal goods where decline is primarily coming from labour-cost advantages of informal labour
‘Lach, (2007)’
Found migration from Russia and Israel found a decline in higher price elasticities and a lower search intensity and lower search intensity (because Russians were in higher paying jobs than locals) so saw a increase in prices.
