Lecture 5 Flashcards

1
Q

Global supply chain

A

Exporters are
Importers.
Importers are
Exporters.
Many
companies
invest and have
operations
across the
world.

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2
Q

Supply chains and economic interests

A

Not all import-competing sectors benefit from protectionism
* Some firms and workers in import-competing sectors are part of Global
Supply Chains:
 These firms also depend on imports as inputs for production
 May receive foreign direct investment (more on that later) that depends on trade
openness

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3
Q

Trump’s steel tariff

A
  • In February 2018 Trump imposed a 25% Tariff on Steel Imports from EU and elsewhere
  • This should have led to record profits in the US steel industry…
  • They should have performed better than traditional stocks.
    Did they help the industry? They did for a bit.
    However, when Trump imposed tariffs on other
    Chinese inputs, things changed.
  • Chinese imports are key intermediate goods in the
    production of many products that also use steel.
  • This made other parts in goods using steel, but made
    in the US, more expensive to make and thus demand
    fell
  • Less steel was demanded because the products
    making steel (like cars) became too expensive.
  • The lesson:  The modern supply chain is complex. Simple tariffs can
    have complex results.
     Maybe our models are too simple for the complex global
    economy
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4
Q

2 categories of FDI

A

Portfolio investment and direct investment

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5
Q

Portfolio investment

A

 Investors have claim on some income, but do not manage the investment (less than a controlling percentage)
 Investors only interested in the rate of return
 Ex: Stocks, Bonds
 Highly mobile, can be sold instantaneously
 Includes sovereign lending
 Lending directly to a country’s government (We’ll explore this in greater detail in a few weeks)

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6
Q

Direct investment

A

 Investment by a company that owns and controls facilities that are located in another country
 Ex. Shell Oil Refinery in Nigeria
 Ex. BMW factory in US
 Ex. Foxconn factory in Brazil
 Highly immobile, requires a fixed-investment
* When we talk about Multinational Companies, we are typically talking about direct investment

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7
Q

MNC, what are they?

A

Multinational Corporation:
 A single corporate structure that controls & manages production establishments in at least 2 countries
* Emerged during the late 19th century
 Maybe before (Dutch & British East India Companies)
* Initially UK companies dominated
 1
st US MNC in 1867
 US overtook UK in 1920s as largest source of FDI
 Since 1960s US dominance has diminished
 Europe, Japan, and other countries/regions, have gathered steam
* MNCs are not new but the growth of MNCs is.

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8
Q

Why invest abroad?

A
  • Why not just hire a foreign company?
     Like Apple does to build its products (Foxconn)
    1. Locational Advantages
    2. Market Imperfections
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9
Q

Locational advantages

A

Large reserve of natural resources
Acces a large local market
market-oriented investments
 “jump over” trade-barriers!
 E.g. car factories in Brazil
Enhance efficiency
 lower cost of the factors of production
 match the factor intensity of a production stage to the factor abundance of
particular countries:
 Go where you get the most for your money
 Design the Honda Accord in capital-abundant Japan, Assemble the car in laborabundant Mexico

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10
Q

Market imperfections, horizontal integration

A
  • Intangible asset:
     The value is derived from knowledge or from a set of skills/routines possessed by a firm’s
    workforce
     “know-how”
  • It is difficult to sell or license intangible assets
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11
Q

Market imperfections, vertical integration

A
  • Specific assets – dedicated to a particular long-term economic
    relationship
  • Difficult to enforce long-term contracts
  • One party in the long-term relationship can take advantage of the
    specific nature of the asset to extract a larger share of the value
    from the transaction
     One party has leverage to make concessions of the other in the future and
    engage in opportunistic behavior
  • Vertical integration eliminates this problem arising from specific
    assets
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12
Q

Time inconsistency in long-term contracts

A

This is called a time-inconsistent preference problem
* What you want today is not what you’ll want tomorrow (and others know it!)
* You need to find a way to lock in your current preferences to solve the problem.
 Easier said than done.
* Firms face a similar problem of having different preferences across time
 They can eliminate the middle man with vertical integration
* Firms that rely heavily on specific assets are more likely to integrate vertically

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13
Q

MNCs, where and when?

A
  • MNCs are a “predictable” response to the economic environment in which firms
    operate
  • Locational advantages tell us if MNCS are profitable
  • Imperfections tell us whether a firm will internalize the production
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14
Q

FDI potential economic benefits

A
  1. Transfers savings (capital) between states!!!
     Aids economic growth
  2. Technological and managerial experience
     Spillover effects: Advanced technology that can be learned from
  3. Integration into global markets
     Opportunity to show “worth” to other firms
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15
Q

FDI potential economic costs

A
  1. Can potentially reduce domestic capital
     Sometimes they borrow domestic capital and “crowd out” investment to other firms
     (Over)charge affiliates with licensing fees & royalties for technology, “transfer pricing”
    SECOND. Can drive local firms out of business
     More competitive (better tech and management) than local firms.
  2. Technology is often tightly controlled, limiting transfers & integration into global
    markets
  3. MNC objectives might clash with domestic economic objectives
     Can undermine industrial policy or other social policy goals
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16
Q

MNCs in developing world

A

After independence from colonialism, many states wanted to establish political &
economic autonomy from former powers
 Through nationalization or expropriation
* They took control of existing foreign investments and managed the terms of new
investments
* Now, many developing countries are again open to foreign direct investment and
actively try to attract it.
* Why give control back to foreign interests?
* The economic benefits are attractive

17
Q

Where does FDI go?

A
  • Advanced industrial countries!
     Both the largest providers and recipients of
    FDI
  • FDI to developing world is concentrated
     Largely, in most populous and wealthy
    countries (BRICS)
  • FDI has increased to developing world in
    past 30 years.
     Still not as big as theory would predict.
18
Q

Bargaining for FDI

A
  • The state wants the economic benefits
  • The MNC wants a profit maximizing environment and limited risk
  • State fears: Loss of economic policy control, other negative externalities
  • MNCs fear:
     Burdensome regulation
     Expropriation of investments
     Investments are fixed and difficult to remove (i.e. immobile)
     The fixed investment can become a hostage.
19
Q

Democracy and FDI

A

Some states are better at tying their hands
* Generally, democracies attract more FDI because the costs of expropriation are
greater
* Expropriation buys them little in terms of $$ to provide to a larger group of
supporters
 Those $$ buy a lot more support where the individuals needed to remain in power is
smaller

20
Q

Other types of risk

A
  • Beyond expropriation, firms fear that other policies might eat their profits.
  • Policy volatility:
     Regulation changes that make conducting business difficult.
     Environment, labor laws, tax policy
  • Transfer risk
     Restriction on ability to convert currency to move profits out of the country.
  • Exchange rate risk
     Unstable exchange rates (led by monetary policy) can also eat into profits. We’ll look at this in a few lectures.
  • Violence risk
     Civil conflict, terrorism, etc.
     Can make doing business more costly or damage fixed assets.
21
Q

Race to the bottom

A
  • States want to attract FDI and thus offer incentives to firms
  • Firms go wherever taxes are lowest, risk is lowest, and regulation is least
    burdensome.
     Environmental standards, labor practices, kickbacks from governments
  • Developing states are at a disadvantage b/c of their need for FDI and lack of
    economic diversity
  • Countries that want to attract FDI might lower regulation and taxes
22
Q

Climb to the top

A

Firms don’t only want lower taxes and regulation.
* They also want public goods!
 Infrastructure, educated workforce (human capital)
 These are usually paid for with taxes
* Democracy (remember?) and public good investment may attract FDI
* Also, multinational firms can be subject to pressure to improve “Corporate Social Responsibility”
* FDI then (maybe) pressures governments to grow and incentivizes “better” political regimes and
public good investments.

23
Q

International regulation of MNCs

A
  • No Multilateral Rules or Institutions like those that govern trade.
  • Some “legal” norms of behavior but no enforcement mechanism
  • Attempts thus far have been unsuccessful, countries’ interests clash:
     Advanced industrialized countries want protections for investors
     Developing countries want rights for host countries
24
Q

Bilateral investment traties (BITs)

A

In the absence of global rules, states have turned to bilateral treaties to govern int’l
investment
* BITS govern:
 Treatment of foreign investors under the law
 Protection of assets and flow of assets
 Basically, they make sure foreign firms aren’t exploited by host governments
* BITS tend to be highly skewed towards the rights of foreign investors (as opposed to host
countries)

25
Q

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

A
  • Provision included in many trade agreements (such as TPP) and BITS –
    should sound familiar from previous trade lectures
  • Allows investors to sue countries for “expropriation” and rulings may
    take precedence over country’s laws
     Traditionally expropriation meant the literal seizing of assets
     Both now often much broader, e.g. expropriation of expected profits through new
    regulations
26
Q

Example global supply chains

A
  • E.g. Milner and Jamal’s 2019 survey in Tunisia finds that workers in
    import-competing sectors that are embedded in Global Supply Chains
    are more supportive of free trade than those not embedded in Global
    Supply Chains
27
Q

Investor state dispute settlement court stuff

A
  • Suit is heard in private court adjudicated by a panel of arbitrators
  • Cost of lawsuits might be crippling for poor countries.
  • Many suggest the system is being abused and infringes on norms of
    sovereignty, countries have started pulling out/not renewing BITs over it
    (e.g. India, Indonesia, Ecuador, South Africa…)
28
Q

Widespread benefits FDI

A
  • Plus, FDI has widespread benefits
     Leaders will be punished (with poor economic growth) if they deter investment with
    expropriation.
  • Democracies have more “veto players” that can constraint policy choices
29
Q

Obsolescing bargain FDI

A
  • Obsolescing bargain:
     Over time, bargaining power shifts towards the governments (b/c fixed investments grow)
  • These fears (the time inconsistency problem) make attracting FDI difficult for states
  • How can governments tie their hands?
30
Q

States managing FDI and MNC

A
  • States try to manage FDI and MNCs to their advantage
     Prohibited ownership of: utilities, extractive industries and other
    important industries.
     Required some local ownership
     Imposed performance requirements
  • Countries varied in how they regulated FDI
     Thus, competition to attract FDI was born
31
Q

Paradox of info, horizontal integration

A
  • Paradox of information:
     The value of the information for the purchaser is not known until she has the
    information… but then she has acquired it without cost
  • The owner of the information is unwilling to share info, the purchaser unwilling to buy
  • Rather than sell the information, the firm can simply set up shop in a new location