Lecture 2 Flashcards

1
Q

Puzzle of trade policy

A

Almost all economists agree that Free Trade is welfare
enhancing.
* We can make ourselves richer (on whole).
* All we have to do is eliminate barriers to trade.
* Then why does trade protection persist?

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Types of trade protection tarrifs

A

Tariffs
 A tax on imported goods
* Quotas
 A limit on the amount of goods that can be imported by a
nation or globally (rare today because WTO doesn’t allow
quotas)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Why so many barriers to trade?

A
  1. Economically, free trade is a public good, and countries have economic
    incentives to free-ride
    All countries could be better off from coordinated liberalization
  2. Other, non-economic concerns, especially for non-tariff barriers:
     Consumer safety
     Environmental protection
     National Security Concerns
    Not clear that liberalizing these would enhance welfare
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Economic prisoners’ dilemma

A
  • Gains from trade are only guaranteed if other states also
    liberalize:
  • ‘If you liberalize and another state doesn’t, comparative
    advantage might not be realized and one state may be worse off
     Some states may be better off imposing a tariff if liberalization is not
    reciprocated.
     (Or at least politicians can be better off by catering to domestic interests.)
  • While trade is jointly beneficial, sometimes it is more
    beneficial to exploit others’ open markets while you keep your
    market closed.
     Governments often want to protect important (non-competitive) industries
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Where does an agreement fall?

A

An agreement will fall somewhere along the “contract
curve”, i.e. the set of “efficient” agreements acceptable to
all parties.
* A state’s bargaining power plays a role in where along the
curve it lands
* Not all about providing a public good
* States still want to maximize benefits (either economic or
political)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

What is a determinant of bargaining power?

A

Determinants of bargaining power:
* Market size/trade volume:
* Patience:
* Attractiveness of Outside Options:

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Bargaining can break down

A

What prevents successful bargaining?
* No mutually beneficial gains to be made:
 status quo is already at one country’s policy ideal point
 Preferences incompatible (can be the case for non-tariff barriers, think of
airbags and seatbelts!)
* Information problems:
 Countries don’t know others’ ideal points, level of resolve or patience
 Incentive to misrepresent
* Inability to credibly commit to the agreement
* Outside options

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Facilitating cooperation

A

Several Factors make cooperation and bargaining easier:
* Small # of states, or one hegemon to back the system (more on that later)
* Information to monitor compliance
* Repeated interaction (tit for tat)
 Ability to punish defectors
 Reciprocity
 Incorporate long-term gains into decision making
* Linkage of policies
 Tie compliance to other issues like security
International institutions (WTO or RTAs) can help

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

International institutions in relation to trade

A

Provide mechanisms to aid trade cooperation
 Set standards of behavior
 Monitor and enforce compliance
 Reduce transaction costs
* Often based upon the principle of reciprocity (iteration and tit for tat)
 Concessions granted by one state are matched by others
* Can take many forms
 Global Organisations (WTO)
 Regional Organisations (NAFTA, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, EU CU)
 Bilateral

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

GATT 1948-1994

A

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1948-1994
 23 members by 1948
 Created with other Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, World Bank)
 Lasts until 1994, replaced by the WTO

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

WTO 1994-today

A

World Trade Organization (WTO), 1994 - today
 Includes Updated General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
 Uruguay Round Added Agreements on New Areas (Services, Non-Tariff
Barriers, Intellectual Property Rights…)
 Both successful in reducing barriers to trade
 Still, can’t agree on trade on agricultural and other goods protected by strong
interest groups in Western world.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

3 important WTO elements

A

Established common principles and rules
2. Repeated intergovernmental bargaining process
3. Dispute settlement mechanism

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Most favoured nation (MFN)

A

: All countries are treated as the closest
trading partner
 Article 1: If you liberalize trade for one country, you have to
liberalize it for all WTO members (exceptions: RTAs and GSP…)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

National treatment

A

Behind the border, foreign goods have to be
treated the same as domestic goods
 Article 3: Prohibits regulations and other policies that give domestic
firms an unfair advantage

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Exceptions to MFN

A
  • Regional trade arrangements
     Free-Trade Area (e.g., NAFTA)
     or Customs Union (e.g., EU)
     Condition: can’t raise trade barriers on others above prior
    barriers
  • Generalized System of Preferences (from 1960s):
     Developed countries can apply lower tariffs for developing
    countries than for their peers
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Intergovernmental bargaining process

A
  • Changes require unanimity
     All members have to agree (although in practice the
    biggest countries often heavily influence the smaller
    ones)
  • Often a “single undertaking”: Nothing is agreed
    until everything is agreed
     Facilitates issue-linkage and trading off concessions
     Can lead to stalemates
17
Q

WTO Agreements

A

Not just tariffs, but a lot of trade-related issues, e.g. Uruguay
Round gave us:
 GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services
 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights
 TBT: Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
 SPS: Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures
 Agriculture Agreement
 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

18
Q

Why did Doha fail?

A

2002 - ?
* Main objective: economic development
* Ambitious agenda:
 All WTO members participated
 Required consensus for completion
 “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”

 Also on the agenda: tightened anti-dumping rules, intellectual property
rights, environmental protections, trade facilitation, “special and
differentiated treatment”…

19
Q

Dispute settlement mechanism

A

A standard upon which to adjudicate and punish violations
of WTO agreements
* Allows for legal reciprocation of victim states
 Other firms or sectors can see new restrictions
 Can be good for violators (a scape goat)

20
Q

Why states like the WTO

A

The WTO lets you lose.
 This is an easy way to shift blame away from politicians onto the WTO
 Lets politicians avoid scorn of special interest lobbies.
* States can get creative with retaliation
 US steel tariffs, EU retaliates with tariffs on Bourbon and HarleyDavidsons
* The WTO makes exceptions. If it requires too much, states
may defect from cooperation

21
Q

Does the WTO work?

A

Did it increase trade?  Maybe, the jury is still out.  WTO members do engage in
more int’l trade
 It is unclear if states that
joined would have liberalized
unilaterally and traded just as
much
* States bring few cases to
the WTO  Still it might act as a deterrent
to imposing trade barriers

22
Q

Will the WTO last

A

Appellate Body necessary to conclude dispute settlement
cases
* Usually has 7 members, appointed by WTO countries, 3 per
appeal
* US has been blocking appointments since 2018, it is now
down to 0 member – essentially defunct
* Long-standing Issues between US and Appellate Body:
 Especially controversial: AB’s interpretation of the
Antidumping/Countervailing Duties Agreement

23
Q

Regional trade agreements

A

Two Types:
 Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA, CPTPP)
 Eliminate tariffs among members
 Separate trade policies with non-members
 Most RTA are Free trade agreements
 Customs Unions (EU)
 Eliminate tariffs among members
 Common trade policy with non-members
* Can be as few as two members (bilateral), but trend towards mega-regional deals
(e.g. TPP, RCEP)

24
Q

Regional trade agreements implementing

A

Easier to implement because they require fewer members
 Remember the more actors, the harder cooperation.
 Powerful states can shop around for the best deal
 Makes it easier to ease into free-trade policy.
 More acceptable than joining the WTO for many domestic interests

25
Q

Are RTA’s a problem for global trade?

A

Problem: Trade Diversion
* Could shift trade away from non-RTA members, e.g. from China-US to
Mexico-US
 Thereby prevent FULL realization of comparative advantage.
* Favors states with a strong bargaining position.
* Biases trade rules in favor of states with large markets (The EU/US!).
 States can exercise “outside options”
Benefit: Trade Creation
* Create new trade that wouldn’t have occurred before
* Might be “stepping stones” to multilateral agreements
Nobody knows which of these effects dominates – very hard to measure

26
Q

TTIP & TPP

A

Oatley mentions two megaregional agreements:
 TTIP = Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (US-EU)
 TPP = Trans-Pacific Partnership (US, Australia, Brunei, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore,
Vietnam)
* Neither went into force, although TPP was eventually
turned into CPTPP without the US, UK recently joined

27
Q

What happened to TTIP & TPP

A

Protests all across the world
* TTIP was already put on ice before
Trump entered office
* Sister Agreement CETA (EUCanada) had to be renegotiated,
because of a referendum in
Wallonia

28
Q

Liberalization beyond tariffs problem

A
  • Tariffs between many of the treaty partners already
    low
  • Instead, agreements now often:
     Try to harmonize standards and regulations
     Introduce controversial rules to further investment (esp.
    Investor-State-Dispute Settlement Mechanisms)
     Introduce stricter intellectual property rights protections (good
    for Pharmaceutical industry, but probably not for consumers)
29
Q

Types of trade protection non tariffs

A
  • Non-Tariff Barriers
     Everything else
     Industry subsidies
     Consumer and environmental safety standards
     Industry insurance programs
     Laws to protect regional products
     Industry lobbies and law makers can get very creative
30
Q

WTO criticisms

A

See Dani Rodrik 2018 – What Do Trade Agreements Really
Do?
* WTO already criticized by environmentalists and
consumer groups for its rules, but RTAs often go much
further
WTO already criticized by environmentalists and
consumer groups for its rules, but RTAs often go much
further

31
Q

Reasons for Doha failure

A
  • Reasons for failure:
     Unwillingness of US, EU and Japan to reduce support for agriculture
     Pits developed vs developing countries for the first time
     Too many cooks spoiling the broth – many countries willing to derail
    negotiations
32
Q

Doha controversial part

A

 Most controversial part: agriculture and removal of developed countries’
subsidies