Introduction to History of Psychology Flashcards
What are the differences between “old history” and “new history”?
Old history:
Presentist - only the people who did things that led to present day were right and anyone else was wrong, the “right” ones are the centre of focus
Internal - the ones presenting the history are members of the field and are viewing it from the inside (will take some things for granted)
Personalistic - focus on particular people as being responsible for moving the field forward (making progress)
New history:
Historicist - try to take currents (time periods of the field) on their own terms rather than from our own perspective (e.g., sexist thinking)
External - written by professional historians of science
Naturalistic - assume that “great thinkers” were simply products of their context/time
What are some other issues in historiography?
Data sources - secondary (published interpretations)
primary (letters, photos, minutes, journal articles)
- can be a lot of work to find the data in a lot of archives
Writing problems -
data selection - reliability
interpretation
What is the problem of relativism of history?
Is one version of history always as good as another?
How can better histories be distinguished from worse ones?
A Darwinian struggle in the marketplace of historical ideas?
What is a good guideline for formulating hypotheses? What are the two terms used for this idea?
Occam’s razor, also known as the principle of parsimony, is a very important guideline for formulating hypotheses. It states that “entities should not be multiplied without necessity.”
Simple hypotheses are easier to test than complicated ones, hence the principle is good for progress in science even if it does not always single out the correct hypothesis.
What did Karl Popper point out in 1959 about verifying scientific theories?
it is futile to try to verify scientific theories by piling on more evidence.
The problem with trying to verify theories is that, for any given body of evidence, there are always multiple theories that are potentially compatible with it. Adding more evidence does not change this, though it can narrow the range of theories that fit the data.
Because theories are underdetermined by evidence, it is much more epistemically useful to try to falsify theories than to verify them.
What is the falsifiability criterion? Who is this concept associated with?
the process of testing should involve searching for or trying to create situations in the real world where the predictions of the theory break down.
This only works if the theory (a set of linked generalizations about the world) makes sufficiently clear predictions about the world that it can be unambiguously shown to be false (if it is false, of course).
Popper
Popper said that theories that resist repeated attempts at falsification may be accepted as …
provisionally (but only provisionally) true.
According to Popper, a real scientific theory must do what?
must make clear predictions; that is, there must be observations one can imagine, that, if they were actually obtained, would prove the theory false.
If a theory cannot make these sorts of predictions, it is neither true nor false, it is simply a non-theory, empty of empirical content.
According to Popper, both Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis are what? Why?
non-theories
Because they do not make clear predictions that can be falsified
The Oedipus Complex “theory” gives no way to disprove it - therefore, it’s not a theory
E.g., If you ask most men, I predict they will say something along the lines of “Ew, that’s gross!” They might also try to hit you. This would not be considered counterevidence by Freud, because he would see it as a sign of some sort of defense mechanism in action.
The Quine-Duhem thesis states that…
experiments can seldom falsify a theory because there is always a “protective belt” of ancillary hypotheses (for example, about apparatus) surrounding the central theory. These are almost always questioned first.
Often experiments will fail to replicate the conclusions/results according to a theory but this is usually attributed to problems with that particular experiment (which is often true)
What are the three phases Kuhn described for the development of a science?
preparadigmatic
normal science
revolution
Describe Kuhn’s preparadigmatic stage of science.
the first stage
Different workers in the field work on certain problems, but they do not share a core set of beliefs about what the object of study is, what sorts of methods are appropriate for carrying out that study, how questions should be formulated, etc.
Scientists may group together into schools, but the schools often have trouble communicating with each other. Their propositions are said to be incommensurable. Lack of communication may also occur because of a lack of widely read journals and other, similar institutional factors.
What happens in Kuhn’s preparadigmatic stage when some scientist in the field solves a problem spectacularly well, and many others start to follow this individual?
Theories, methodologies, questions, etc. become much more consistent. In Kuhn’s terms the new field now has a paradigm.
Kuhn uses the term “paradigm” in at least two distinct ways.
Paradigms can be these exemplary works of science that give a field structure and direction.
Paradigms can also be that structure and direction; in this case, “paradigm” is a synonym for “disciplinary matrix.”
According to Kuhn, When a scientific field achieves a unified paradigm, it is said to have entered what stage of development? Explain this stage.
the second stage of scientific development, normal science
the terms of scientific debate are settled, though debate can still be vigorous
Kuhn likens this stage to puzzle solving.
A failure to obtain interpretable results is almost never interpreted as a failure of the paradigm, but rather as an error or a problem of instrumentation. Recall Quine-Duhem.
How long can a science be in the normal science phase? What happens with a science over time in this phase?
Normal science can proceed for quite a long time, sometimes centuries.
over time, there are usually either anomalies (consistent failures of observations to accord with theory) or theoretical innovations that can give rise to unease within the field. The first response to such unease is an intensification of puzzle-solving activity.