International Rules

Question 1

International institution definition

Answer 1

Rules and organizations that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations in world politics

Question 2

Categories of international institutions

Answer 2

• International norms
• International law
• Inter-governmental organizations (formal or informal)
• International regimes (usually a mix of rules and organizations)

Question 3

How can intergovernmental institutions differ

Answer 3

• May be effective or ineffective
• May be fair or unfair, morally good or bad
• May involve only states or also non-state actors

Question 4

Functions of international institutions

Answer 4

Prescribe roles:
- Define the characteristics, rights and responsibilities of actors with certain identities (state, member state, NGO, ambassador, prisoner of war, refugee, etc.)
Constrain activity:
- Establish positive and negative incentives for acting in certain ways
Shape expectations:
- Provide ideas and information that helps actors know how others are likely to act in various situations

Question 5

Types of international institutions (with formality factored in)

Answer 5

International law:
- Formal + International rules
Formal Intergovernmental Organizations (FIGOs)
- Formal + International organizations
International norm:
- Informal + International rules
Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs)
- Informal + International organizations
International regimes take pieces from all four sectors

Question 6

What is international Law?

Answer 6

Rules and principles that are generally recognized as binding on states and other international actors

Question 7

What does International Law do?

Answer 7

• Public IL defines rights and responsibilities in relations between states and between states and individuals and other private bodies
• Private IL defines rights and responsibilities in relations between private bodies (individuals, companies, etc.) in different countries

Question 8

Caveat of International Law

Answer 8

The international legal system is decentralized (no world government) so it depends heavily on voluntary commitment and compliance by states and other actors

Question 9

Sources of international law

Answer 9

Treaties
- Rules that states have agreed to follow by signing and ratifying written treaties/conventions
Customs
- Rules that most states follow most of the time based on a sense of legal obligation
– Sometimes unwritten; sometimes later formalized in treaties
– Sub category: jus cogens
—> Rules that are binding on all actors, whether they have agree to be bound (eg. prohibition of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, slavery, piracy)
—> May be reinforced by treaties but this is not required

Question 10

What are international norms?

Answer 10

Informal but widely accepted standards of appropriate behavior for international actors of a particular type
- Are intersubjective “social facts”, they exist in actors’ shared expectations and behavior
- May be formalized in international law but not necessarily
- May be complied with, but not necessarily or not always
- Are often contested

Question 11

What are procedural norms?

Answer 11

Define how actors should interact, how decisions should be made
- Reciprocity
- Consultation

Question 12

What are substantive norms?

Answer 12

Define the outcomes that should be achieved
- Territorial integrity
- National self-determination
- Respect for human rights

Question 13

What are international rules

Answer 13

International rules = international norms + international law

Question 14

Sources of international rules

Answer 14

How are they created, how do they spread, how do they evolve?
- Rational pursuit of joint gains
- Imposition
- Persuasion
- Norm life cycle
- Localization
- Contestation

Question 15

Rational pursuit of joint gains (sources of international rules)

Answer 15

Robert O. Keohane (1982)
- States accept rules that enable them to cooperate under anarchy ad this to achieve joint gains, eg
– Rules that reduce fears of non-compliance (eg. reciprocity and consultation norms)
– Rules that promote transparency (eg. rules that require information-sharing and monitoring)
– Rules that facilitate the negotiation of agreements (eg. diplomatic immunity)
- States will continue to support these rules as long as they enable cooperation and the achievement of joint gains even if the distribution of power among states changes

Question 16

Imposition, unrestrained power (sources of international rules)

Answer 16

Lloyd Gruber (2000)
- Strong states impose rules on the international system that maximize their self-interests
- Weak states accept these rules when rejecting them would be more costly
- When new great powers emerge, they create and impose new rules

Question 17

Imposition, restrained power (sources of international rules)

Answer 17

John Ikenberry (2001)
- After major wars, victorious powers seek to re-establish international order by imposing formal and informal rules on the international system
- These rules will be more acceptable to other states, and thus more likely to endure, when the dominant state(s) accept limits on their own power and avoid maximizing their self-interest

Question 18

Persuasion (sources of international rules)

Answer 18

“Policy entrepreneurs” (diplomats, NGOs, activists, scientists, etc.) persuade state officials or mass publics that certain rules are right and desirable
- Persuasion may be based on:
– Moral arguments (eg prohibition of slavery)
—> Ethan A. Nadelmaan (1990)
– Causal arguments (eg. environmental treaties_
—> Peter M. Haas (1992)

Question 19

Norm life cycle (sources of international rules)

Answer 19

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998)
- Rules spread from new to taken-for-granted through a 3 step process
– Norm emergence
—> Individuals, NGOs, governments seek to persuade others that a certain idea should be an international norm
– Norm cascade
—> More governments accept the norm, after a tipping point is reached it becomes unacceptable to reject the norm, so more accept it
– Norm internalization
—> Governments integrate the norm into their expectations, national legislation, and bureaucratic procedures

Question 20

Localization (sources of international rules)

Answer 20

Armativ Acharya (2004)
- When are international rule is spreading around the world, local actors have several options:
– Rejection: Sustained resistance blocks local adoption of the international rule
– Localization: The international rule is merged with pre-existing ideas and rules producing a new, hybrid rule at local level
– Adoption: The international rule replaces pre-existing local ideas and rules
- Localization:
– The active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices

Question 21

Contestation (sources of international rules)

Answer 21

Antje Weiner (2018)
- Contestation is when actors challenge the meaning, legitimacy, or applicability of a prevailing rule
- This is important because rules depend heavily on actors’ collective agreement on their meaning, legitimacy, and application
- Possible effects of contestation
– Clarify or obscure the rule’s meaning
– Reinforce or undermine the rule’s legitimacy and thus its strength
– Confirm or disconfirm the rule’s applicability in a particular situation

Question 22

Effects of international rules

Answer 22

Why and under what conditions do actors comply with, evade, or violate international rules?
- Managerial approach
- Incentives approach
- Socialization
- Domestic politics
- Evasion

Question 23

The managerial approach (effects of international rules)

Answer 23

Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (1993)
- Assumption: States generally intend to comply with international law for 3 reasons:
– Efficiency - routine compliance avoids costly calculations
– Interests - international law reflects states’ interests
– Norms - states are sensitive to social pressure
- Argument: Non-compliance is generally not intentional, it’s due to:
– Ambiguity - rules aren’t clear
– Incapacity - states lack financial or administrative capacity to comply
- Policy implication: To increase compliance, make rules clearer and improve states’ capacity to comply

Question 24

The incentives approach (effects of international rules)

Answer 24

George W. Downs et al. (1996)
- Assumption: Compliance can be costly, so it depends on states’ deliberate calculation of incentives
– The likelihood that non-compliance will be observed
– The likely costs and benefits (both material and reputational) of compliance vs non-compliance
- Arguments:
– If rules require little departure from states’ preferences, then compliance may be high even if monitoring and punishment of violators are weak
– As rules require greater departure from states’ preferences, compliance becomes more dependent on the monitoring and punishment of violations
- Policy implication:
– To increase compliance, strengthen positive and negative incentives

Question 25

Domestic politics (effects of international rules)

Answer 25

Xinyuan Dai (2005)
- A state’s compliance with international rules is a two-level game:
– International partners prefer the state to comply
– Domestic constituencies have various preferences
- The domestic politics of compliance:
– Governments are accountable to domestic constituencies with difference preferences on compliance and different degrees of influence
– A constituency’s ability to shape government’s choices depends upon two factors
—> Electoral influence: policymakers are more responsive to larger groups
—> Information: it’s more costly to mislead well-informed constituencies
- Larger and better-informed constituencies have more influence on government’s choices regarding rule compliance

Question 26

Socialization (effects of international rules)

Answer 26

Jeffrey T. Checkel (2005)
- Individual states adopt the rules of groups of states (international society) to which they belong or hope to belong
- Types:
– Role playing: States adjust their behavior to fit the rules connected to their role, even if the rules don’t fit their beliefs or preferences
– Persuasion: States’ leaders or masses are persuaded by the moral or causal logic underlying an international rule
– Bureaucratic normalization: A state’s bureaucracy incorporates international rules into its standard routines, over time, these routines become taken-for-granted

Question 27

Evasion (effects of international rules)

Answer 27

Zoltan I. Buzas (2017)
- What is evasion?
– Intentional compliance with the letter of the law but not its purpose in order to minimize inconvenient obligations in an arguable legal fashion
- Why evade?
– It looks like compliance so avoids accountability and punishment, but it defies the purpose of the rule
- When do state evade?
– Evasion is most likely when:
—> Legal obligations are costly
—> There’s a significant gap between the rule’s letter and purpose
- Example:
– France’s use of financial incentives to expel Roma with EU passports

Question 28

Different Types of Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms. (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann)

Answer 28

○ What are the types of norm contestation?
○ What is norm robustness?
○ What is the relationship between norm contestation and norm robustness?
○ How is the relationship between contestation and robustness evident in their 2 case studies – the Responsibility to Protect and commercial whaling?