International Cooperation

Question 1

What are the three types of relationships among states?

Answer 1

• States have no common interests or policy preferences, so their behavior is always conflictual
  – Cooperation is not possible
• States have identical interests and policy preferences, so they pursue common aims without adjusting their behaviors
  – Cooperation is not necessary
• States have overlapping interests and policy preferences, so they can only achieve common aims by mutually adjusting their behaviors
  – Cooperation is possible, but not guaranteed

Question 2

Definition of international cooperation (Keohane)

Answer 2

The mutual adjustment of behavior by states to achieve common aims (Robert O. Keohane)

Question 3

Three forms of international cooperation

Answer 3

Minimal cooperation:
- States implicitly coordinate policies to achieve mutual benefits
– via mutual observation and policy adjustment over time
– eg. US and USSR on non-deployment of anti-satellite weapons
Thin cooperation:
- States explicitly coordinate policies to achieve mutual benefits
– via negotiation and agreement on policy adjustments
– eg. US and USSR on anti-ballistic missile treaty
Thick cooperation
- States engage in join pursuit of a shared goal
– via shared commitment to join activity and mutual support
– eg. UK, US, and USSR to defeat Nazi Germany

Question 4

What motivates states to cooperate?

Answer 4

Several possible motives, alone or in combination:
- Shared threats
- Shared material interests
- Shared identities

Question 5

Shared sense of threat (what motivates states to cooperate)

Answer 5

Anarchy and interdependence make states vulnerable to threats that can be reduced through cooperation
- External military threat
– eg. Vietnam and US
- Internal political threat
– eg. Belarus and Russia
- Global threat
– eg. cooperation on climate change

Question 6

Shared material interests (what motivates states to cooperate)

Answer 6

World economy creates opportunities for material gain through cooperation
- Gains from trade
– Cooperation improves economic efficiency, so it benefits both state A and state B overall
- Interdependence
– Policies adopted in state A affect conditions in state B, and vice-verse, so cooperation benefits both by reducing their vulnerability to external shocks
- Class interests
– Certain types of cooperation reinforce capitalism and thus benefit the transnational capitalist class

Question 7

Shared identities (what motivates states to cooperate)

Answer 7

Common history, culture, or values makes cooperation natural
- Political values, form of government
– eg. Community of Democracies
- Moral values, religion
– eg. Organization of Islamic Cooperation
- History
– eg. British Commonwealth of Nations
- Culture, language
– eg. “Five Eyes”

Question 8

What makes cooperation difficult?

Answer 8

• Cooperation is costly
• Security dilemma
• Credible commitment problem
• Relative gains problem
• Free-rider problem
• Pressures of two-level games

Question 9

Security dilemma (what makes cooperation difficult)

Answer 9

Robert Jervis (1978)
- Anarchy -> fear and insecurity -> defensive actions -> more fear and insecurity -> difficulty of cooperation

Question 9

Cooperation is costly (what makes cooperation difficult)

Answer 9

Oliver E. Williamson (1990)
* Information costs
– Identify opportunities for mutual gain
* Decision-making costs
– Negotiating the terms of cooperation
* Sovereignty costs
– Compromises on autonomy to achieve cooperation
* Enforcement costs
– Monitoring behavior, punishing violators

Question 9

Credible commitment problem (what makes cooperation difficult)

Answer 9

Cooperation often requires that all focus on long-term interests (rather than maximizing short-term gains), but states may not believe others’ promises to cooperate (mis-fit between short-term and long-term incentives)
Why?
- States lack good information on others’ intentions and future actions
– Others may be lying, trying to cheat or exploit me
– Other may change its mind
– Other may change its government
- Today’s gains are more certain than future gains
Result:
- Mistrust -> cooperation is rare and fragile

Question 10

Relative gains problem (what makes cooperation difficult)

Answer 10

When facing possible cooperation, states may focus on:
- Absolute gains: how much do I gain?
- Relative gains: how does my gain compare to others’ gain?
Under anarchy “relative gain is more important than absolute gain”
- Anarchy -> focus on relative gains -> cooperation is unlikely

Question 11

Free-rider problem (what makes cooperation difficult)

Answer 11

Mancur Olson (1965)
- Self-interested actors seek to benefit from public goods and common resources without contributing to their provisions
- Public goods
– Non-excludible (accessible to all)
– Non-rival (use by A doesn’t limit use by B)
– eg. safe transit of ships; elimination of B
– Free-riding -> under-provision of public goods
- Common resources
– Non-excludible (accessible to all)
– Rivalrous (use by A reduces use by B)
– eg. ocean fishers; satellite orbits

Question 12

Pressure of two-level games (what makes cooperation difficult)

Answer 12

Robert D. Putnam
- Preferences of domestic actors and their government may differ
- Governments are caught between domestic and international pressures
- Result:
– To maintain support at home, governments sometimes make unrealistic demands abroad, which makes cooperation difficult

Question 13

Three models of international cooperation

Answer 13

Decentralized cooperation:
- Cooperation without hierarchical authority or centralized enforcement
Institutionalized cooperation:
- Cooperation enabled or promoted by joint institutions
Hegemonic cooperation:
- Cooperation enabled or imposed by powerful states

Question 14

What (sometimes) makes decentralized cooperation possible?

Answer 14

• Weak security dilemma
• Absolute gains
• Reciprocity
• Incentives
• Reassurance
• Shared identities

Question 15

Security dilemma may be weak (may make decentralized cooperation possible)

Answer 15

Robert Jervis (1978)
- The strength of the security dilemma depends on
– Offense-defense balance: does current military technology favor offense or defense?
– Transparency of offensive vs defensive posture: can states observe and distinguish each other’s military posture?
- Strong dilemma: offense dominant, low transparency
- Weak dilemma: defense dominant, high transparency

Question 16

States may focus on absolute gains (may make decentralized cooperation possible)

Answer 16

Duncan Snidal (1991)
- Anarchy does not force states to focus on relative gains when considering cooperation they are more likely to focus on absolute gains when:
- Many states are involved in the cooperation
– If few states, then more incentive to focus on relative gains
– If more states, then more incentive to focus on absolute gains
- The consequences of cheating are not threatening
– If cheating by other is likely to be threatening, then more incentive to focus on relative gains
– If cheating by other isn’t likely to be threatening, then more incentive to focus on absolute gains

Question 17

The power of reciprocity (may make decentralized cooperation possible)

Answer 17

Robert O. Keohane (1986)
- Reciprocity = an international norm that compromises by one state should be balanced by compromises by others
- Specific reciprocity: A and B make simultaneous compromises to enable an agreement
– Not dependent on trust, so there’s no credible commitment problem
- General reciprocity: A makes a compromise to enable an agreement with B on the understanding that B will make an equivalent compromise later
– Heavily dependent on trust, so requires shared identity or expectation of an on-going relationship (distant shadow of the future)
- Significance:
– Reciprocity enables cooperation without hierarchal authority or centralized enforcement

Question 18

Positive incentives (may make decentralized cooperation possible)

Answer 18

Benefits for those who cooperate or support cooperation via:
- Log rolling: a deal with off-setting benefits for all participants
– Part of the deal benefits A, another part benefits B
- Side payments: compensation for any actor (domestic or international) that doesn’t benefit from cooperation and could block it
– Cooperation benefits A and B but C can block it, so A and B offer some other “goodies” to C so that it doesn’t block the cooperation

Question 19

Negative incentives (may make decentralized cooperation possible)

Answer 19

Sanctions against non-cooperators to reduce free riding and credible commitment problems
BUT isn’t easy:
- No states want to be monitored and punished by others
- Non-cooperation can sometimes be hidden
- Few states want to do the punishing (it annoys partners)

Question 20

Reassurance may overcome fear (may make decentralized cooperation possible)

Answer 20

Janice Gross Stein (1991)
- Logic:
– If fear feeds the security dilemma, which makes cooperation difficult then reassuring words and actions can promote positive identification and cooperation
- Strategy:
– Use words and actions (including self-restraint and de-escalation) to make other less fearful and allow focus on shared interests. If reciprocated, it can create a positive spiral

Question 21

Shared identities facilitate cooperation (may make decentralized cooperation possible)

Answer 21

Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995)
- The ease of cooperation depends on the extent of shared values and norms among states
- During the Cold War, cooperation between Canada, Europe, and the US was facilitated by shared values - problem-solving through dialogue and openness to civil society - that outweighed other interests

Question 22

How international institutions promote cooperation

Answer 22

• Reduce transaction costs
• Shape expectations
• Make commitments more credible
• Facilitate reciprocity
• Extend shadow of the future
• Enable interlinkages of issues

Question 23

Reduce transaction costs (international institutions may help cooperation through…)

Answer 23

Information:
- Consolidate expertise, identify opportunities for mutually-beneficial cooperation
Decision-making
- Promote regular contacts, set agendas, establish decision-making procedures, encourage compromise
Sovereignty:
- Ensure input into cooperation
Enforcement:
- Centralize and de-politicize monitoring sanctions

Question 24

Shape expectations (international institutions may help cooperation through…)

Answer 24

International institutions shape actors’ expectation by establishing:
- Rules that define acceptable and unacceptable behavior
- Procedures for sanctioning unacceptable behavior

Question 25

Make commitments more credible (international institutions may help cooperation through…)

Answer 25

International institutions make states’ commitments more credible by:
- Monitoring
– Increasing transparency of (non-)compliance
- Sanctioning:
– Shaming and punishing non-compliance

Question 26

Facilitate reciprocity (international institutions may help cooperation through…)

Answer 26

International institutions promote dynamics of reciprocity by:
- Reminding states of shared identities and shared interests in cooperation
- Arranging complementary compromises (specific reciprocity)
- Promoting on-going relationships (general reciprocity)

Question 27

Extend shadow of the future (international institutions may help cooperation through…)

Answer 27

International institutions promote on-going relationships, which encourages states to prioritize long-term gains from cooperation over short-term gains from non-cooperation

Question 28

Enable inter-linkage of issues (international institutions may help cooperation through…)

Answer 28

international institutions promote cooperation via multi-issue “package deals” in which all actors compromise on some issue(s) to achieve gains on other issue(s)

Question 29

How does hegemonic cooperation work?

Answer 29

• Takes advantage of hierarchy
• Hegemons and great powers have more resources and are expected to lead, so they can promote cooperation
• Requirements for hegemonic leadership, some combination of:
  – Capability: Resources to promote negotiation, monitor compliance, punish violators
  – Willingness: Political interest in promoting cooperation
  – Legitimacy: Acceptance by others of leader’s role and plans

Question 30

Cooperation as a one-level game

Answer 30

• Outcomes between Bmin and Amin are acceptable to both A and B (if they overlap), but each prefers outcomes closer to its maximum point

Question 31

Cooperation as a two-level game

Answer 31

• Normally between government x domestic interests, government x international interests
  Across time
• Imagine:
  – Between time 1 and time 2, societal actors in state A mobilize pressure against their government but there’s no change in state B
  – A’s minimum shifts closer to Amax and further from Bmax, whilst Bmin does not change
• This will reduce the negotiation space
• This will make negotiation agreements less likely
• This will make A’s bargaining power greater? (not sure on this point)

Question 32

What about ‘nonhegemonic cooperation’? (Lee)

Answer 32

• Major trends in East Asian financial cooperation
  – Non-hegemonic cooperation, and new hegemonic cooperation
  – ChiangMai Initiative
  — Works, as there is cooperation without the initiative and resources of a hegemon
  – AIIB
  — Struggle? Tension? Between AIIB and the more decentralised Chiang Mai initiative
• Which model best fits this – decentralized cooperation, institutionalized cooperation, or hegemonic cooperation? Or is nonhegemonic cooperation a distinctive, 4th type?
  – Institutionalized?
  – Is the nonhegemonic simply a way of institutionalized cooperation?