Design of IOs

Question 1

What are Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

Answer 1

Organizations with member states that govern a particular space (regional, global) and/or issue-area (trade, environment, etc.)
- The conventional building blocks of regional or global governance and problem-solving

Question 2

3 faces of IGOs

Answer 2

IGOs as forums
- Places where states meet and negotiate
IGOs as instruments
- Tools that states use to achieve their interests
IGOs as actors
- Independent bodies with their own interests, policy preferences, and ability to act

Question 3

What are international regimes?

Answer 3

Rules, decision-making procedures, and organizations that govern behavior within a region or issue-area
- Often involve a formal treaty and/or a formal IGO, but not necessarily

Question 4

2 examples of international regimes

Answer 4

Antarctica regime (to govern activities in Antarctica)
- Antarctica Treaty + 200 other agreements
- Since 2014: Secretariat in Buenos Aires
Ozone regime (to protect the atmospheric ozone layer)
- Montreal Protocol and Vienna Convention
- Multilateral Fund

Question 5

IGOs relationship to international regimes

Answer 5

• A single IGO may be active in multiple regimes
  – eg. UN active in:
  —> International human rights regime
  —> Nuclear non-proliferation regime
  —> International refugee regime
• A single regime may include multiple IGOs
  – eg. Nuclear non-proliferation regime includes:
  —> International Atomic Energy Agency (monitoring)
  —> London Suppliers Group (export controls)
  —> UN Security Council (sanctions)

Question 6

In what ways do IOs differ?

Answer 6

• Membership
• Function
• Formality
• Decisions-making

Question 6

Membership (how IOs differ)

Answer 6

• Limited
  – Open to states with a given character (regional, cultural, etc.)
  —> European Union - limited by geographical, political, economic, administrative criteria
  —> OPEC - limited to petroleum-exporting countries
• Universal
  – Open to all states
  —> United nations - open to all states (at least in principle)

Question 6

Function (how IOs differ)

Answer 6

• To govern an issue-area
  – WTO for trade, WHO for health
• To govern a geographic space
  – African Union, European Union
• To promote a particular culture or set of values
  – Organization International de la Francophonie, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Community of Democracies…
• Mixed - to govern an issue-area within a geographic space
  – Asian Development Bank, Council of Europe

Question 7

Characteristics of a formal IGO

Answer 7

Organizing principle
- Written and formally adopted
Membership
- Defined by legal agreement
Structure
- Regular meetings
- Formal budget
- Secretariat
Delegation of authority to IGO
- Yes
Example
- UN
- EU

Question 7

Characteristics of an informal IGO

Answer 7

Organizing principle
- Explicitly shared expectations
Membership
- Explicit but non-legal
Structure
- Regular meetings
- Rotating chair
- No secretariat
Delegation of authority to IGO
- No
Examples
- G7
- G20
- G77
- BRICS

Question 8

Decision making (how IOs differ)

Answer 8

Inter-governmental: IO policies are made collectively by member states
- Consensus
– Unanimity (every member has a veto but can abstain)
– Consensus-minus-one (to prevent veto by a single state)
- Majority
– 50%-plus-one
– Super majority (more than 50%-plus-one)
– Weighted majority (based on size, contribution, etc.)
- Mixed
– Some have veto, others don’t
– No veto plus majority
Supranational: IO policies are made by an executive, legislative, or judicial body that operates without (direct) control by member-states

Question 9

What factors shape the creation, design, and reform of intergovernmental organizations?

Answer 9

• Shared interests
• Power
• Shared normative aims
• Past choices

Question 10

Shared interests and IO design: the basic logic

Answer 10

Robert O. Keohane
- Interdependence exposes states to external risks (economic, environmental, etc.) and creates opportunities to achieve joint gains
- International institutions help states to manage interdependence through mutually-beneficial agreements
Which IO design will states “demand”?
- Demand for various IO design “will vary directly with the desirability of agreements to states and with the ability of each design actually to facilitate the making of such agreement”

Question 10

Shared interests and IO design: hypotheses

Answer 10

Barbara Koremenos et al. (2001)
- States design international institutions in order to overcome cooperation problems and achieve joint gains
- Assumptions:
– States’ shared interests shape the design of instituions
– States behave rationally - they compare the costs and benefits of alternative IO designs
- Argument
– Nature of cooperation problem -> Choices on institutional design

Question 11

Koremenos et al (2001) - findings (shared interests and IO design: hypotheses)

Answer 11

Research confirmed some hypotheses
- Increasing uncertainty about others’ preferences -> more restrictive membership rule
- More difficult distribution of gains -> broader issue scope
- More actors -> more centralization of tasks
But research did not confirm all the hypotheses

Question 12

Power (design of IGOs)

Answer 12

Lloyed Gruber (2000)
- Strong states promote institutions that maximize their self-interests
- Weak states accept these rules when rejecting them would be more costly
- When new great power emerge, they create and impose new rules

Question 13

Normative aims (design of IGOs)

Answer 13

John Gerard Ruggie (1982)
- The design of international institutions is shaped by the shared normative aims of the states that create them, not just by state power or shared interests
- Post WW2
– Governments wanted an international economic order that would advance social welfare
– Result: International institutions were design to balance growth (via tariff reductions) and welfare (via domestic social protections) = embedded liberalism
- Post-Cold War
– Governments wanted an international economic order that would maximized economic growth
– Results: WTO was design to promote tariff reductions and to limit the ability of governments to adopt social protections = neo-liberalism

Question 14

Past choices ((re-)design of IGOs)

Answer 14

Tina Hanrieder (2014)
- Past decisions on IO design shape current options and decisions
– Existing IO rules may enable (a minority of) member states to resist radical re-design, even when facing strong functional incentives for change
- Result: 2 irrational responses to functional incentives for IO change
– Layering: IO gains new functions despite not fulfilling old functions
—> International Labour Organization adopts new conventions even though many old conventions aren’t ratified or implemented
– Drift: IO isn’t updated so it survives but becomes less effective
—> Office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees loses relevance because governments block redefinition of refugee

Question 15

Example of IIGO

Answer 15

Proliferation Security Initiative
- 107 states
- Shared goal: to prohibit the illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors
- No legal status or permanent staff
- Military and law enforcement personnel from PSI states convene periodically for training exercises

Question 16

Implications of formal IGOs

Answer 16

Flexibility
- Low
Rules and commitments
- Legally binding, hard to change
Policy continuity
- High
Autonomy of states
- Low, centralized oversight
Autonomy of IGO
- Some -> High
Expertise and capacity
- Centralized, available to all
Costs
- Low re-negotiation costs

Question 17

Implications of informal IGOs

Answer 17

Flexibility
- High
Rules and commitments
- Non-binding, easy to change
Policy continuity
- Uncertain
Autonomy of states
- High, decentralized oversight
Autonomy of IGO
- None
Expertise and capacity
- Decentralized, uneven
Costs
- Low set-up costs

Question 18

When do states prefer IIGO vs FIGO? (functional efficiency)

Answer 18

Vabulas and Snidal (2013)
- States opt for IIGOs when the advantages of lower sovereignty and negotiation costs, flexibility, and speed outweigh the need for enforcement, commitment, consensus, and bureaucratic centralization

Question 19

When do states prefer IIGO vs FIGO? (power)

Answer 19

• Status quo states are likely to prefer FIGOs
  – To lock in their power and policy preferences
• Rising states are likely to prefer IIGOs
  – To avoid binding commitments that they may regret later when they’re stronger
• Rising states won’t challenge FIGOs (they’re hard and costly to reform) until the gap between institutionalized power and actual power is large
• As rising states gain power, they are likely to challenge or create new IIGOs, which are easier and cheaper to reform than FIGOs

Question 20

Why did we get rid of the GATT and replace it with the WTO? (de Souza)

Answer 20

• What questions or puzzles motivate this article?
  – Explanation of how we got to the WTO, getting rid of the GATT and replacing it with the WTO
• What is Medina de Souza’s answer or argument?
  — Developing countries accepted the WTO as a “lesser of two evils” because they faced a choice between joining an organization that would lead to absolute losses or you get excluded from global trade altogether
  — Also the concept of institutional power is mentioned which includes “go it alone” power, market power, and forum shifting power